



UNIVERSITY of
RWANDA

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

**THE ROLE OF NDI UMUNYARWANDA PROGRAM IN COMBATING
THE GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY**

A CASE OF NYARUGENGE DISTRICT/ NYAMIRAMBO SECTOR

**Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Awards of
Master's Degree of Arts in Genocide Studies and Preventions**

Presented By

Mushongayire Alice

Reg N^o: 214003611

Supervisor: Prof. Masabo Francois

MAY, 2019

DECLARATION

I, Mushongayire Alice do declare that this is my original work. To my best knowledge, it has never been submitted anywhere else for any other or similar award at any other higher Institution of learning.

I therefore declare that this work is my own contribution and is based on the research completed as partial fulfillment of the requirement for award of the Degree in of Arts in Genocide Studies and Prevention

Signature

Date:

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the present research project on The Role of Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in Combating Genocide, A Case of Nyarugenge District was done and presented by Mushongayire Alice under my supervision.

Dr. MASABO François

Signature

Date:

DEDICATION

To my beloved Husband

To my children

To my relatives

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Such work would not be possible if done single. I therefore want to extend wholeheartedly my deep appreciation to all who have stood with me in producing this work. The moral and financial support offered.

My most immeasurable thanks go to Almighty God for his love, joy, mercy and grace with all material and immaterial richness entrusted upon me by Him. For He kept me alive along my studies, gave me success throughout and enabled me realize this work.

My special thanks and praise go to my supervise Dr. MASABO François whose advice and critical comments have given me the knowledge that has made this work a success.

Warm thanks to my colleagues, students, and friends who consciously or unconsciously have helped this work to materialize; God bless you all.

Mushongayire Alice

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	i
CERTIFICATION.....	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	x
ABSTRACT.....	xi
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background of the study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the problem.....	4
1.3 Objectives of the study.....	5
1.3.1 General objective.....	5
1.3.2 Specific objectives.....	5
1.4 Research questions.....	5
1.5 Hypothesis of the study.....	5
1.6 Significance of the study.....	6
1.7 Scope of the study.....	6
1.8 Organizations of the study.....	6
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	8
2.0 Introduction.....	8
2.1 Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) Program.....	8
2.2 Genocide ideology and its characteristics in Rwanda.....	10
2.2.1 Characteristics or indicators of Tutsi genocide ideology.....	10

2.2.1.1 The Hutu Power Ideology	10
2.2.1.2 The Akazu.....	12
2.2.1.3 Habyarimanism: between communism and fascism.....	13
2.2.1.4 Scientific racism.....	14
2.2.1.6 The Hamitic myth	23
2.3 Measuring Reconciliation in Rwandan context (Barometers of genocide ideology)	25
2.3.1 Understanding the past, present and envisioning the future	25
2.3.2 Citizenship and Identity	25
2.3.3 Political culture	26
2.3.4 Security and wellbeing.....	26
2.3.5 Justice, fairness and rights.....	27
2.3.5 Social cohesion	29
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	30
3.1 Research design	30
3.2 Sample and target population.....	30
3.3 Sampling procedure	31
3.4 Description of the research instruments	31
3.4.1 Questionnaires	31
3.4.2 Interviews	31
3.5 Validity of research instruments	32
3.6 Reliability of research instruments.....	32
3.7 Data collection procedures	32
3.8 Data analysis techniques	33
3.9 Ethical consideration.....	33

CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION.....	35
4.0 Introduction.....	35
4.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents	35
4.2 Perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program	38
4.3 Indicators genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens	40
4.3 Effects Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combatting genocide ideology.....	42
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	44
5.0 Introduction.....	44
5.1 Conclusion	44
5.2 Recommendations.....	44
REFERENCES	46
APPENDICES	49

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Gender of respondents	35
Table 2: Age of respondents	36
Table 3: Educational level of respondents	36
Table 4: Employment status of respondents	37
Table 5: Religion of respondents	37
Table 6: Marital status of respondents	38
Table 7: Perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program	38
Table 8: Perceptions of respondents on decrease of genocide ideology	40
Table 9: Perceptions of respondents on the Effects Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combatting genocide ideology	42

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

CDR: Coalition pour la défense de la République

FDLR: Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

MDR: Mouvement démocratique républicain

MP: Member of Parliament

MRND: National revolutionary movement for development party

NURC: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

PL: Parti Liberal

PSD: Parti social-démocrate

RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front

RTLTM: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines

SPSS: Statistical Packages of social Sciences

UN: United Nations

ABSTRACT

The general objective of this study is to elucidate the influence of “Ndi Umunyarwanda” Program in reducing genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens while the following were specific objectives: to find out the perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program”, to examine the opinions of respondents on indicators reduction of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens, to find out whether Ndi Umunyarwanda Program accelerated the reduction of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens. Different methods and techniques were used to reach those objectives where the questionnaire and interview were conducted for collecting data. The sample in this study was purposive where 40 people participated in this study from Nyamirambo sector. After data cleaning and analysis with the help of SPSS Version 22, the following were found: First of all the study revealed that the program is well perceived by those who have involved in it regarding different elements that were used for evaluating it. The program was lowly criticized by not being perceived with the majority of Rwandans considering, being taught by professional people who look for the interests of Rwandans. Secondly it was found that the ideology of genocide is gradually decreasing but some problem related to the influence of parents while young people are open to marry and mutually support fellow Rwandans without being influenced by their group identity. Lastly the study revealed that Ndi Umunyaranda Program completed other exiting programs that were initiated to combat genocide ideology and reconciliation in Rwanda. In particular the program helped people who committed genocide and those who feel that they can do something to ask for pardon to do that openly and accelerated the level of forgiveness from genocide survivors.

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter is about background of the study, problem statement, objectives of the study, research questions, scope of the study, hypotheses of the study, significance of the study and organization of the study.

1.1 Background of the study

In the evening of 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda was killed instantly when his plane was hit by a missile and crashed. Radio Mille Collines, the Rwandan state-sponsored radio, immediately blamed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) for the killing and ordered all Tutsis, a minority group within Rwanda, to be killed (Des Forges, 1999:518). Within a few hours, roadblocks were erected all over Kigali by soldiers of the governmental army, the Presidential Guard and the Interahamwe, the fanatical youth group of the MRND, Habyarimana's political party (Prunier, 1997:223). Civilians were told to stay at home. It was that same night that the killings—which were to continue for three months—started, leaving around 75 percent of all Tutsi and large numbers of moderate Hutus murdered (Mann, 2005:430).

Although the Rwandan genocide is certainly not the only genocide in history, it does stand out for the enormous number of people killed in a relatively short period of time, for the mass involvement of the civilian population and for the physical nature and excessive cruelty of the killings. Victims were often not simply killed, but were hunted down, beaten, raped and mutilated before being killed by gunshots or machetes (Prunier 1997: 256). Bellies of pregnant women were slashed open, babies and small children were smashed against walls and relatives were forced to watch how their loved ones were raped, tortured and killed. They were sometimes even forced to join in the attacks (Prunier 1997:256). Research on the Rwandan genocide so far

has shown that the killings were instigated, ordered and organized from above by political authorities and that the genocide was well planned (Prunier 1997:256.). Although several academics have qualified the Rwandan genocide as an ethnic conflict (including Straus (2006:9) and Fujii (2009:183) that the genocide was the result of a politicization of ethnicity rather than pure ethnic hatred. We also found, and this too, corroborates the findings of Straus (2006:116) and Fujii (2009:7), the killings took place almost uniquely in groups.

In a stated attempt to that avoid repeating history, the Rwandan government has tasked the NURC with the implementation of policies and programs designed to educate, sensitize and mobilize citizens to work towards unity and reconciliation in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. All the programs implemented by the commission work towards one broader goal: to foster social cohesion through the removal of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa ethnic labels in favor of identification with a national Rwandan identity. For example, the aims of the Ingando program were to re-educate a diverse range of groups on the role of former colonial powers in creating distinct Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities, and to stress the importance of good governance in moving forward and rebuilding Rwanda (Clark et al, 2009:25).

According to the Rwandan government, Hutu and Tutsi lived together in peace and unity before the genocide, such that external forces, including both the German then Belgian colonial powers and the former leaders of the Hutu genocidal regime are seen as solely responsible for the divisionism that fueled the genocide. However, critics of the government's policy have pointed to the tension between a forward-looking narrative calling for the elimination of ethnicity and a retrospective narrative of the history of the genocide (Lars Waldorf, 2009:25), which runs the risk of associating all Hutu with the perpetration of genocide and all Tutsi with victimhood (Susan, 2011: 110)

Fourteen years after the creation of the NURC, on June 30, 2013, during a Youth Connect conference in the Rwandan capital of Kigali, president invited all Hutu, especially young people, to apologize publicly on behalf of their parents and relatives for crimes committed during the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 (Blackie and Hitchcott, 2017: 24-37). At the end of the conference, well known Hutu poet, actor, filmmaker and now Rwandan MP, Edouard Bamporiki came forward to apologize on behalf of his paternal uncle who had participated in the genocide. Encouraging other young Hutu to follow his example, Bamporiki called for them to “step out of the shadow of what was done by [their] parents.” In his view, “[apology] is an important tool not only for reconciliation, but also for sustained nation building.” His conviction is that “apology redeems people. If we don’t help the young people do away with this kind of shame, whoever is willing to harm government, or Rwandans for that matter, will find it easy to manipulate them (Kimenyi, 2013 , in Newtimes /article/2013-07-22/67715/)”.

In the weeks that followed, Bamporiki’s apology, several government officials, including then serving Prime Minister Pierre-Damien Habumuremyi, also publicly apologized on behalf of Hutu génocidaires (Blackie and Hitchcott, 2017: 8). Four months later, in November 2013, the call for public apologies was formalized with the launch of the program known as Ndi Umunyarwanda (I am Rwandan). This program includes as a resolution the statement that: “the genocide against Tutsis was committed in the name of Hutus, thus for the real healing of Rwandan society it is indispensable that Hutus whose name was used in the genocide crime apologize to Tutsi victims, denounce such acts and distance themselves from perpetrators, and fight clearly against the genocide ideology and ethnical divisionism (Laura and Nicki, 2018:7).” However, government of Rwanda promotes Ndi Umunyarwanda as a program designed to rebuild trust by encouraging individuals to tell the truth about what happened in the genocide. In doing so, it aims to

strengthen unity and reconciliation among the citizens of Rwanda. Against that background, this study aims at examining the influence of Ndi Umunyarwanda program in combating genocide ideology by considering the views of local leaders and citizens by taking Nyarugenge District as reference.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi resulted from an ideology of hatred, whereby Rwandans were posited to be different from one another. Specifically, the Tutsi population was segregated, stigmatized and perceived as enemy of the Rwandan Hutu political regime. This ideology of ethnic hatred was continually reinforced and disseminated to the general public through radio and television broadcasts, print media, and public meetings. Importantly, it was taught to youth in schools. Tutsi were sporadically killed, their houses and properties destroyed without any consequences for perpetrators of such crimes, and they were often expelled from school and public positions. These human rights violations finally led to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against Tutsi in Rwanda, in which more than one million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed in only one hundred days (Mafeza, 2013:1).

After the genocide, the Rwandan government began to strive to reconstruct the nation and craft social cohesion in order to prevent genocide. Specifically, the government now aims to fight against any forms of genocide ideology, or the propagation of divisive beliefs, as it was a root cause of the genocide. Resulting to that different programs aiming at reconciliation and combating genocide ideology were considered and Ndi Umunyarwanda Program was initiated to compliment them. Hence this study aims at examining whether Ndi Umunyarwanda program is helpful in combating genocide ideology by taking the case of Nyarugenge district.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General objective

The general objective of this study is to elucidate the influence of “Ndi Umunyarwanda” Program in reducing genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens

1.3.2 Specific objectives

1. To find out the perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program”
2. To examine the opinions of respondents on indicators reduction of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens
3. To find out whether Ndi Umunyarwanda Program accelerated the reduction of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens

1.4 Research questions

1. How Rwandan citizens perceived Ndi Umunya Umunyarwanda Program?
2. What are the opinions of Rwandan citizens regarding reduction of genocide ideology?
3. Does Ndi Umunyarwanda Program accelerated the reduction of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens

1.5 Hypothesis of the study

1. Ndi Umunyarwanda Program has reduced the genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens
2. Rwandan citizens have the same opinions on reduction of genocide ideology in Rwanda
3. The program of Ndi Umunyawanda is positively perceived by Rwandan citizens

1.6 Significance of the study

This study is significant since it would show the gaps to be completed for effective implementation of Ndi Umunyarwanda Program and the study will help the government of Rwanda to know the extent of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens in Nyarugenge district. The study would be used as a basis for further academic study. In this way this study may contribute to available literature on the same notion and at the same time serve as a point of reference for future studies.

1.7 Scope of the study

The scope of the study refers to the parameters under which the study is operating it encompasses what the study covers in terms of sources and types of information used, field covered such as domain, space and time (Marshall and Rossman, 2006:35). This study was conducted in Rwanda by taking the district of Nyarugenge as the case study while local leaders and citizens were participated. In terms of time this study considered the span period from the date by which Ndi Umunyarwanda program was implemented up to 2017.

1.8 Organizations of the study

The whole study is divided into five chapters; the first is introduction, which is composed by background of the study, problem statement, objectives of the study, research questions, scope of the study, significance of the study, and the organization of the study.

The second chapter, which is the literature review, focuses on what were written by previous authors on different topics related to genocide and its prevention.

The third chapter , which is the methodology, is about all methods that were used to reach the objectives of the study; they include research design, study population, sample size, data collection techniques, and data analysis procedures.

The fourth chapter is about presentation of results, discussion, and interpretation according to the objectives of the study while the fifth chapter is about summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is about the review of the literature review regarding the variables of the study meaning Ndi Umunyanyrwana Program, roots of Tutsi genocide and the characteristics of reconciliation that here are considered as the signs of reduction of genocide ideology.

2.1 Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) Program

During the Senate plenary session of 10 February 2015, the NURC presented its 2013-2014 annual activity report and its 2014 – 2015 action plan. The commission outlined challenges faced by the NURC in carrying out its mission. Chief among these challenges was the continued existence of ethnic ideology. This is evident in different strata of the Rwandan society, in the presence of some media outlets that still spread genocide ideology in churches where members still cling to divisive thoughts, practices and behaviors, and in the neighboring Congo where genocide ideology is still well maintained and nurtured by the Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) terrorist group. In response to these challenges, the NURC offered “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” (I am a Rwandan), which is a common Rwandan identity programme.³¹ A common identity is needed in order to undo the divisions and ethnic ideology of the past. For this reason, the Rwandan government promotes a notion of collective identity, which is no longer based on ethnicity but on the civic identity of all its citizens. The strategy is centered on an interpretation of Rwanda’s history according to which ethnicity did not exist prior to the arrival of the colonialists (Buckley-Zistel, 2009:35).

Ambassador Amandin Rugira (2015:1) argues that “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” is “a tool to make an objective audit of different policies put in place from the pre-independence period up to 1994. That audit in my opinion is like a *cost and benefit* analysis of the ethnic ideology on which the previous regimes were founded”.

Most important is the way in which reconciliation programs pivot on the abolition of tribal identity: “There would be no talk of Tutsi and Hutu... there are no Hutu and Tutsis: “we are all Rwandans,” *one* Rwandan people “Banya-Rwanda” (Andrew, 2014:52). This strategy aims against ethnic and racial prejudice (Andrew, 2014:52). In reference to Jarvis (2000), Andrew argues that the “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” strategy “is aimed at what sociologists would term ‘redrawing group boundaries,’ where individuals in different social groups come to see themselves as members of a single group. This is believed to lead to more positive attitudes towards each other, more positive contacts between groups, and reduces intergroup bias further” (Andrew, 2014:52).

Despite the relevance of this strategy, some scholars disagree with the underlying philosophy of “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” . This is because the desired results have not been achieved in Rwanda, as the identities are firmly entrenched in the society. Consequently, Andrew, (2014,53) states, “For some survivors, this may feel like a form of re-victimization, as their identity as Tutsi was degraded before the genocide and is subsequently stripped away after the genocide”. In addition, even though ethnic groups are not referred to as Hutu and Tutsi, Kubai (2007:54) also maintains that “the post-genocide population was roughly divided into three broad categories: the returnees, that is, a large proportion that returned from exile; those who did not leave the country during the genocide; and the *génocidaires*, who were accused of perpetrating the genocide and are in prison or are yet to be brought to justice”.

However the above categories, as indicated by Kubai, are related to the old ethnic ideological categories of Hutu and Tutsi. As much as “returnees” or “*génocidaires*” are relevant categories in contemporary Rwanda, these categories are not entirely separate in the minds of the people from “Tutsi” and “Hutu.” However, even if Rwandan people see themselves as different categories this is not a reason to preserve ethnic identities, considering that ethnic division between Hutu and Tutsi was artificially constructed by the colonialists and missionaries. Therefore, the “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” program is the right strategy in the reconciliation process because it addresses and deconstructs ethnic ideology, and thus establishes a new national identity based on trust and the unity of one nation as found in the pre-colonial period.

2.2 Genocide ideology and its characteristics in Rwanda

According to Obote in ICTR Newsletter (2007:1), an ideology is an organized collection of ideas. The word ideology was coined by Count Antoine Destutt de Tracy in the late 18th century as science of ideas. The purpose of an ideology is to offer change in society through a normative thought process (ICTR Newsletter 2007:2). However, “genocide ideology” refers to a set of organized thoughts and beliefs centered on ethnic identity that drives competition for power and dignity using hatred, conflict and violence in order to attain its objectives.

2.2.1 Characteristics or indicators of Tutsi genocide ideology

2.2.1.1 The Hutu Power Ideology

It is a common belief that genocide needs to have an established ideology, and, indeed, History has proved that there was one during the Holocaust and another during the Red Khmers’ regime. In the Rwandan case, the situation remains blurry, and so far no scholar has moved beyond the hypothetical stage. At the ICTR, the prosecutor requested and obtained from the court’s Appeals

Chamber to remove the proving of a genocidal ideology from his tasks. According to the prosecutor's office, this ruling has the merit of silencing the rejectionists' camp who has been disputing the occurrence of genocide (Nyirubugara, 2008:5). Thus, the existence of a genocide ideology has become a sort of biblical truth, which no one has to evidence any more. Ungor (2004:342) had anticipated this situation by suggesting that a Hutu Power ideology is to be blamed for the genocide.

According to him, the Hutu Power ideology was developed by the then ruling party –MRND - and its ally, the CDR, all Hutu-dominated, and thought out by Leon Mugesera, Ferdinand Nahimana and Hassan Ngeze (Ungor, 2004:345). He further compares Nahimana to Nazi ideologist Rosenberg and the Hutu Power ideology to its Nazi counterpart. Unfortunately, apart from the 10 commandments published by Ngeze in 1990 in Kangura – for which he does not demonstrate whether it was a joint endeavor or Ngeze's personal effort - Ungor does not evidence the existence of an elaborate plan. Otherwise, he would have rescued the ICTR's office of the prosecutor which jubilated when the difficult evidence-finding task was removed. The point I would like to insist on is the Hutu Power concept, which Ungor misuses and puts out of its context. First of all, connecting the concept to the MRND and CDR, on the one hand and to Leon Mugesera, Ferdinand Nahimana and Hassan Ngeze on the other hand, is like connecting communism to the USA, or the birth of Islam to the Vatican. The concept appeared for the first time, in the Hutu camp at least, on 25 September 1993 (Gasana, 2005: 222).

The word 'Pawa' was introduced by Frodouald Karamira during an MDR party meeting in Gitarama on 25 September 1993. Originally, it was used by the RPF fighters. It was a slogan they kept repeating on the front to remind each other the goal of their struggle. In the new context, MDRP was simply a name given to the majority faction of the MDR to distinguish it

from the microscopic one led by Faustin Twagiramungu. On 23 October 1993 [author's note: two days after the murder of Burundi Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi army officers] all the anti-RPF leaders from the MDR, MRND, PL and PSD [parties] organized an imposing march, which culminated in an enormous gathering at the Nyamirambo stadium. The speakers taken from all the present parties condemned the killings of the peaceful peasant masses by the RPF since the beginning of the war against Rwanda. The remarks converged to unity against the RPF in its struggle to conquer power by force. At the end of his speech, F. Karamira, MDR vice president, stressed the thirst for the unity among the Hutu by chanting in front of the excited crowd: "MDR Pawa...MRND Pawa...CDR Pawa...,PL Pawa, united Hutu Pawa!"(Gasana, 2005: 223).

2.2.1.2 The Akazu

Since the 1990s, an era generally called the beginning of multiparty democracy, voices started arising from the unsatisfied elite in Rwanda about the management of public affairs. Christophe Mfizi, a long-time information-man of president Habyarimana, broke away for some reasons and coined the term 'Akazu' which he rendered as Réseau zéro in French. Mfizi, who is Nahimana's predecessor as director of the National Information Office, informs the public for the first time of the existence of the Akazu in a pamphlet written in 1992,. While the Kinyarwanda name refers vaguely to the entourage of the president, the French appellation is more poetic and gives much more information. Mfizi explains that the word 'zéro' refers to no digit but is rather used because of the initial Z which corresponds to another more famous Z, the short for Zigiranyirazo (Mfizi, 2006:6). Protais Zigiranyirazo is Habyarimana's brother in law and is considered by Mfizi as the creator and animator of the president's Akazu.

2.2.1.3 Habyarimanism: between communism and fascism

According to Mann, unlike in Europe, there has been no long term trend toward genocide on the African continent, but the building blocks of African politics are all ethnic. Apart from the fact that the post-colonial state is in itself weak, the major restraining factor has, in fact been the extent of multi-ethnicity, due to which coalitions with others were necessary in order for a political party to become important (Mann, 2004: 235). Before the 1990s African ethnic conflict was less severe than that of other continents. Rwanda however is in many ways unlike other African countries.

Habyarimana's regime was a strict, totalitarian regime, based on a strong personality cult with pictures of Habyarimana on portraits, pins, in houses and places of business, much like in Tito's Yugoslavia; the regionalism favoring people from the president's region being even more dominant than the ethnic quota which discriminated against Tutsi. According to Prunier, his National revolutionary movement for development party (MRND) exhibited the tightest level of control among non-communist countries (Prunier, 1995, :77). Indeed, this, *Entwicklungsdiktatur* (developmental dictatorship) built a closed off, isolated and wary of outside influences regime based on exclusion and paranoia in order to maintain the fragile national identity. Endogenous development was therefore seen as exclusively a matter of own values and own resources, primarily agriculture (Verwimp,2001:8). The political economy was, thus, as in other developmental dictatorships, premised on the belief that political security was a prerequisite for economic growth, which is why it drew sustenance from critical clusters of power, such as the army and the police. In fact, both Habyarimana and his successor Bagosora were top military figures. Indeed, the idea that the entire nation should be mobilized and act as one person explains the high number of ordinary perpetrators in Rwandan genocide and even civilian institutions

such as Umuganda successfully introduced the theme of militant mobilization with a strong nationalist connotation in the population (Verwimp, 2001:10).

2.2.1.4 Scientific racism

The racist theories relevant for the understanding of Rwandan genocide were introduced to the country by the colonialists; becoming acquainted with a thoroughly different kind of civilization led to an almost obsessive preoccupation with race in the late 19th century, which led to much theorizing, romanticizing and even fantasizing (Prunier, 1995:5). Germans introduced scientific methods, such as craniometry and anthropology, which were used to create a scientific justification for the European fascination with Tutsi, who were viewed as tall and polite with a phlegmatic refinement of feelings. In accordance with Speke's 19th century theory of conquest of inferior by superior races, the Europeans theorized that Rwandan monarchic institutions stem from the time of arrival of foreign, racially superior ancestors of Tutsi-Galla from southern Ethiopia. The lighter complexion of some Tutsis was enough to persuade the racial theorists of the European ancestry of Tutsi, who were admired for their Caucasian skulls, beautiful Greek profiles, Semitic or even Jewish features (Prunier, 1995:8, Kiernan, 2007:567). The —Elegant golden red beauties| with long thin noses, wide brow and fine lips, were stereotyped as separate from Bantu agriculturalists, who were deemed inferior and ape-like. The supposed Tutsi love of money also indicated a Semitic origin and an innate proneness to capitalism. As the quest for origins was at the very core of the European racial theories, Tutsi were seen, together with Maasai, as descendants of the primordial red race, and therefore distinct from inferior Negros. Scientists| entertained the ideas that they might have come from India or Garden of Eden, or it was even hypothesized that they could have been survivors of Atlantis (Semi and Parfitt, 2005:14).

These pseudo-scientific theories, however ridiculous they might sound today, became the governing lines for the political decisions made by Rwandan colonizers. Because they had serious implications, the natives took them seriously, so as a consequence the Tutsi cultural ego became inflated, crushing the Hutu sentiments and polarizing the society radically according to the always applicable divide et impera rule (Prunier, 1995:16).

According to Mann, the attempt to racialize classes in Rwanda was common, particularly in the francophone world, where the idea that class differences are natural and racial in essence was common among aristocracy, making race an attempt to biologize and naturalize class difference. French noblemen believed that the difference between them and the bourgeoisie was racial; they saw themselves as the descendants of Germanic Franks and the third estate of the native Gallo-Romans. In Mamdani's words: —To identify the link between biology and culture, between the language of race and that of civilization is to fill in the shaded transition from Republicanism at home to a full bodied imperialism abroad (Mamdani, 2001, 19). Indeed, modern imperialism was the context in which race spread from a marginal to a main stream doctrine, as race moved from being a preoccupation of the rapidly declining aristocracy to being a fascination of an increasingly bourgeois Europe and this is of ultimate importance for all three contexts analysed in this thesis. The bipolar division of humanity into super humans and sub-humans provided the rationale for the elimination of entire peoples (Mamdani, 2001:19).

In the 19th century, as an application of scientific racism, the "Hamitic race" became a sub-group of the Caucasian race, alongside the Semitic race, grouping the non-Semitic populations native to North Africa, the Horn of Africa and South Arabia, including the Ancient Egyptians. The Hamitic theory suggested that this "Hamitic race" was superior to or more advanced than Negroid populations of Sub-Saharan Africa (Sanders, 1969:521).

The Curse of Ham is a biblical story about Ham, Noah's son, and father of Canaan who sees his father naked in a drunken stupor and is therefore punished by being made slave to his relatives. Even though the Bible itself makes no mention of race or dark skin, the narrative was interpreted, because of an etymological misunderstanding, by some Jews, Christians and Muslims to mean that the punishment came in the form of the black skin of Ham's descendants (Goldenberg, 2003:1-14.). The curse of Ham, at first becomes a justification for serfdom in Europe, but later, set in an African context, becomes an assumed biblical justification for imposing eternal slavery upon black people (Whitford, 2009:173).

The theory illustrates again the non-scientific nature of scientific racism, as early anthropological writers linked the stories in the Bible of Ham's sons to actual ancient migrations of a supposed Middle-Eastern sub-group of the Caucasian race (Sanders, 1969, 521). Three authors are key to understanding the Hamitic curse. The theory that this group migrated further south was introduced by British explorer John Hanning Speke, in his publications on his search for the source of the Nile (1863). Speke argued that he had discovered an evolutionary link between "civilized" North Africa and "barbaric" central Africa. According to Speke, the pastoralist Hamitic race (Tutsi) emigrated from the north (Ethiopia), bringing civilization to the inferior Bantu race, with whom they've assimilated, losing their original language (Gourevitch, 1998:368). According to Sergi and his book —The Mediterranean Race (1901, 41) northern Hamites (Berbers, Toubou, Fulani and the Guanches) and Eastern Hamites (Egyptians, Nubians, Ethiopians, Oromo, Somali, and Tutsis) were a part of the Mediterranean race, which was the greatest race in the world and a source of all superior civilizations. The original European peoples were, according to Sergi, "Eurafricans" (Sergi, 1901, 41).

In its most extreme form, in the writings of Seligman (1930:141), it is asserted that all significant achievements in African history were the work of "Hamites", pastoral Europeans who migrated into central Africa bringing technologies and civilizing skills with them. In contrast with the Negro race, which was seen as agricultural and static, the Hamites were quicker witted and better armed and had introduced most of the advanced features found in central African cultures, such as: metal working, irrigation and complex social structures (Seligman, 1922:141). Scientific racism was thus primarily used to justify the European conquest of Africa as something that has happened in waves throughout history, and was therefore not to be seen as problematic, but a part of a natural evolutionary subjugation of inferior civilizations by the superiors.

The quasi scientific Hamitic theory became the cornerstone of policies of European imperial powers in the twentieth century and the reason for Belgian preferential treatment of Tutsis in Rwanda, which polarised the society and created animosities that were unheard of before (Gourevitch, 1998:54).

Belgian officials introduced scientific methods of measuring Rwandans to define traits among the various ethnic groups and created policies according to their findings (African Rights, 1995: 8). The idea that the Tutsis were colonizers who came from outside, while the Hutu were indigenous agricultural population became so engrained into the very fabric of the Rwandan society that, with the advent of the post-colonial state Tutsis who fled were denied citizenship, while the Hutu became the democratic majority, demonstrating Mann's idea of majoritarian democracy presenting a precondition for genocide, much like with the fall of Yugoslavia. The idea of Tutsi as foreign invaders was later used as a justification for the 1994 genocide (Mamdani, 2002:34). Additionally, the state structure left by the Belgian colonizers was created in such a way as to enable the domination of one ethnic group over the other. In the post-colonial

state the oppressor and the oppressed merely became reversed. A future completely outside of the colonial norms became impossible (African Rights, 1995: 8).

The language of scientific racism was highly represented in the Hutu power publications before and during the genocide. In the main Hutu power publication —Kangura of March 1993 the reason for cleansing the races is explained through a metaphor: A Cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly, a cockroach can only give birth to another cockroach, thereby fixing the difference between the groups as the difference between species, a language that strongly resembles European scientific racism of 19th and 20th century (Steuter and Wills, 2009:55, Kiernan, 2007:558). In this article, genetic science is used to show how supposedly Tutsi mental traits, such as immorality, treachery and wickedness have been passed on from old generations to new (Kangura, 1993, nr.40). Additionally, in most Kangura publications, Tutsis are referred to as Hamites or —Nilotic minority—, which is characterized by —contingent barbarism, clearly reflecting the combination of colonial terminology with modern scientific vocabulary (Kangura, May 1992:4). In a November 1992 radio broadcast Leon Mugesera, Hutu ideologist proposed sending Tutsi back to Ethiopia by killing them and casting their bodies into Rwanda's north flowing Nile tributary, the Nyabarongo River (Kiernan, 2007: 555).

Another example of how the language of Belgian scientific racism is expressed in the language of indigenous populations, used in the genocide, can be found in a speech written by a leading perpetrator of the genocide, General Theoneste Bagosora: —Before the arrival of Tutsis, Rwanda had been a peaceful Hutu realm. In ancient times, the Hutus of the great Bantu family and the Twa or pygmies of the smaller ethnic group were living harmoniously since as early as 9th century.¶ Then, in the 16th century, intruding on this arcadia, came a race of northern interlopers, whom Bagosora called —these Nilotic Hamitic Tutsis from Abyssinia. Other examples of how

colonial racism was used in the genocide can also be found in a number of publications and particularly in the broadcastings of Hutu power radio RTLM. In a Kangura article from 1992, the Tutsi were accused of intentionally trying to breed out the Hutu: —You belongs to an important ethnicity of Bantu group. Know that a proud and bloodthirsty minority mixed with you in order to dilute you, divide you, dominate you an massacre you (Chretien, 1995:110)

2.2.1.5 Building a racial utopia

The Hutu racial utopia, as is often the case with genocides is mainly traditionalist, with elements of nostalgia and imperial revisionism, which constitute an important part of the Hutu power ideology. The key Hutu ideologist Ferdinand Nahimana, an influential historian and a founder of the radical RTLM propaganda radio station, which was used to entice the genocide, argued that before the arrival and expansion of Tutsi power in the region, the Hutu population had organized itself into important family groups which evolved into states. His research was based on 19 interviews with —direct descendants of the last Hutu princes who reigned over these independent territories (Kiernan, 2007:560). A total of 9 early Hutu monarchies were allegedly proven to have existed, some of which have survived well into the 20th century and resisted the occupation of the Tutsi monarchy, making this one of the most astonishing pieces of scientific racism in our time. These northwest principalities were used as a model for Hutu antiquity and a golden age, while the Hutu were seen through the lens of Abashiru warriors, brave and strong heroes, who resisted both the Tutsi and the white man (Kiernan, 2007:561).

Indeed, Nahimana's influence in Habyarimana's Rwanda cannot be overestimated. In 1990, he was made director of the national Office of information and was even commissioned to prepare lessons on civic and psychological preparation for soldiers in Rwandan military forces including a syllabus for each army battalion outlining history classes, critical of the Tutsi monarchy.

However, his most influential role was as a founding director of RTLM radio, owned by Akazu leaders, where he insisted that the rebel Inyenzi and other Tutsi in Rwanda, were one and the same thing (Kiernan, 2007: 562).

Nahimana, like Habyarimana, also emphasized the agricultural aspect of Hutu power ideology, based primarily on the soil. The term Umuhinza, which Nahimana explained as the title of Prince of autonomous Hutu provinces, was to be translated as —farmer per excellence governing the people of cultivators or —president of crops, whereas Tutsis were mostly seen as city dwellers and cattle herders. According to Phillip Verwimp the romanticization of agriculture was a stepping-stone on a more general idealist pathway. Indeed, in the predominant Rwandan ideology, man was seen as a product of the soil, while cities were seen as places of immorality, theft and prostitution. The urban corruption and cosmopolitanism (modernity in general) were seen as the greatest threats to the strictly moral and disciplined Rwandan peasant society (Kiernan, 2007:565). Resembling the Nazi ideal of warrior peasants, the Rwandan cultivators were also encouraged to do their work while carrying a gun. After killing the enemy, one could resume the all-important work of cultivation, it was suggested (Kiernan, 2007,:566). The nostalgia for the lost agrarian ur-state can be seen in statements such as those by the prefect of Kigali, Tharcisse Renzaho talking about past Tutsi attacks on agrarian Hutu paradise (Kiernan, 2007:567).

According to Kiernan, the obsession with soil should, indeed, be seen as a preoccupation with territory, but in Rwandan case he emphasizes that this is reflected in both internal and external expansionism. In relation to internal expansionism Prunier illustrates how the small extremist clique of Northern Hutu in Habyarimana's Rwanda, gathered around the supposed Bushiru

princess Agathe Habyarimana and her Akazu confidants to conquer the rest of the country, in particular areas dominated by moderate Hutus from the south, who were, during the genocide killed along with the Tutsi (Prunier, 1986:187). The external Hutu power ambitions are best presented in Nahimana's academic publication from 1979, in which he explains how, in spite of the fact that Hutu regions in surrounding states, like eastern Congo and Southern Uganda are under Tutsi influence, they still have legitimate Hutu rulers and local royal courts. With support, he believed, these regions would be able to resist Tutsi hegemony as the regions had a history of anti-Tutsi resistance in common and a potential for anti-Tutsi alliance transcending Rwanda's frontiers existed (Nahimana in Kiernan, 2007:568). Additionally, in 1987, Nahimana claimed that Rwanda, in fact, had historical rights to these regions, by blaming the British and the Belgian colonialists for —amputating‡ parts of Rwanda in order to enlarge their colonies. In accordance with these writings, and by the time of the fall of Hutu power in July 1994, traditional Hutu claims to the northwest extended beyond the rest of Rwanda and spread outside its borders, as Interhamwe took its genocidal violence into neighbouring countries, attacking Tutsi populations there, particularly in eastern Congo, attempting to gain support among Banyamasisi Hutu to eliminate Banyamasisi Tutsi as a part of what Wood calls a Rwandan Lebensraum plan (Kiernan, 2007:568).

The Rwandan racial utopia of pure and uncontaminated Hutu living space was going to be achieved with the use of several strategies, all rational and meticulously planned. Purifying the race from undesirable traits was achieved by eliminating mixed Hutu-Tutsi population and killing those who were married to a person from the enemy group. Purifying the race from any contamination from outside was begun already in 1990, when Hutu ten commandments were published, echoing the Nuremberg laws and preventing marriage, friendship and business

partnerships with Tutsi (Berry and Berry, 1999 :113). In the genocide, itself, apart from the killings, racial purity was accomplished through genocidal rapes. Rapes as a strategy of warfare, committed with the intent of spreading AIDS were common in Rwanda, as between 200000 and 500000 women are estimated raped during the genocide. The infection of Tutsi women with AIDS was expected to further spread the disease to any future partners the woman might have, ensuring that genocide would go on even after the outright killing stops. Additionally, if the rape resulted in pregnancy, the child was considered Hutu, according to the identity of the father, which would contribute further to the genocidal aim. It is important to emphasize that these rapes were an instrument of war and therefore ordered, organized and controlled, rather than passionate or spontaneous (Ka Hon Chu and De Brower, 2009: 16). Tutsi women were also targeted with the intent of destroying their reproductive capabilities by sexual mutilation with the aim of annihilating the entire Tutsi population (Human Rights Watch, 1995: 40,). Lastly, the strategy for race strengthening, which was used the longest and throughout Habyarimana's reign was uncontrolled breeding, as power was usually identified with the numbers, which was believed would ultimately secure the victory against the Tutsi imposters (Verwimp, 2001:24).

Finally, the Hutu racial utopia was attempted with help of religion. No occult or satanic influences can be found here, as Rwanda was strictly Catholic, although religion in Rwanda can be seen as a fusion of the pre-colonial monotheism and Catholicism, as God in the radical Kangura is often called Imana (traditional Rwandan deity). Christianity was widely used to promote the genocidal propaganda. In fact, it was, allegedly, a Marian apparition- Virgin Mary who materialized in front of three college students, showing them that the future holds a blood bath and calling for prayer and repentance. Furthermore, religion was used as propaganda even

before the genocide, and Habyarimana, himself was advertised as a child of God (Cook, 2006: 24). The most detailed discussion of the role of religion in the Rwandan genocide is Timothy Longman's *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, which shows that both Catholic and Protestant churches helped make the genocide possible by giving moral sanction to the killing (Longman, 2010:28). In spite of the fact that religion was used in order to entice genocide, most leaders were pragmatic and used it as a tool, rather than something they actually believed in. Numerous examples in Kangura illustrate this (Gourevitch, 1998: 23).

2.2.1.6 The Hamitic myth

The Hamitic myth cannot be said to be as global or as widely used as anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, but it has, nevertheless, had quite a disastrous impact in Africa. According to Zachernuk, in places like Nigeria, much like Rwanda (1962-1994) the nationalist historiography emerged as a reaction to the imperialist Hamitic Hypothesis, as African historiography emerged in a form of an interaction between western educated African scholars and European ideas. In other words, these ideas were reworked into distinctive Hamitic hypotheses suited to each particular African context. West Africans, for example, first identified themselves not as victims of Hamitic invasion but as the degenerate heirs of classical civilisations, to establish their potential to create a modern, Christian society. At the turn of the century various authors argued for past development within West Africa rather than mere degeneration (Zachernuk, 2009, :427). The Hamitic hypothesis was also relevant in East Africa, for example in relation to the origin myth of the Iraqw of Tanzania. According to this version of the myth, the Iraqw population is a race of Hamitic nomads, who came from Iraq (Mesopotamia) in Asia, crossing the sea in canoes (Rekdal, 1998:19). In general, the Hamitic myth has had devastating effects on Africa, as the practice of elevating one group to assist in the governance of the colony was common to all

colonial governments in Africa; for example, in South Africa, the Zulus were elevated to semi-European status; in Nigeria, the Ibos were elevated to quasi-European rank, and in Liberia the resettled American slaves received the status of "African-Aryans".

According to Rana, the Hamitic myth, in spite of the fact that it is in fact a departure from the original biblical scripture and basically a modern phenomenon, can only be seen in the light of the ways in which Christian Europe constructed otherness. In fact, the hostility and the suspicion with which Christian Europe viewed its two significant non-Christian others –the Muslims and the Jews, can be seen as a rehearsal for racial formation. The emergence of modern conceptions of race does not occur until the rise of Europe and the arrivals of Europeans in the Americas, when the indigenous civilizations become viewed through the stereotypes commonly used to stigmatize religious minorities in Europe. It was, in fact, the European understanding of the religious other that became the lens for understanding racial difference in the new world, as the primary relationship between Christianity and indigenous heathenry became biologized into modern racism. Through war and reconquest for consolidation of the Spanish nation state, the dark skin of ethnically cleansed Islamic Moors became merged with their religious otherness; hence indigenous heathens in Americas became identified with dark skinned heathens in Europe. Here, the antecedents of the Semitic-Hamitic hypothesis are evident in defining Muslim groups through racial mixture and notions of Blackness, providing the classifications of Semites, Hamites and Negroids, as all three categories became associated with the notion of Muslim-ness (Rana, 2007: 15).

Biologically, American Indians were described as descended from North African Muslims, as the Indian stereotype became focused on the same alleged traits as the Muslim stereotype: barbarism, depravity, immorality, sexual deviance and uncontrollability, emotional immaturity,

vengefulness, sodomy and religious superstition (Puar and Rai, 2002: 117). Through slavery, the —Negrol then merely took the place originally occupied by Jews, Muslims and Indians, while the Hamitic hypothesis re-emerged in the 19th and 20th century narratives of Black Muslims in the US and, indeed, the forced migration of African Muslims to the Americas.

2.3 Measuring Reconciliation in Rwandan context (Barometers of genocide ideology)

In view of the above perspectives of reconciliation in general, and above all in Rwandan context, in particular, it appears that the aspects related to identity and citizenship, understanding the past, equal rights, trust, truth, security, and justice, healing, respect, reciprocal attitudes and relations, within the overall perspective sustainable development— and with the guarantee that “the divisions and violence of the past will not return”—are key in the current measurement of reconciliation in Rwanda. In so approaching, 6 overlapping and mutually complementary variables that are expected to best assess the current status of reconciliation in Rwanda are: (1) Understanding the past, present, and envisioning the future of Rwanda, (2) Citizenship and identity, (3) Political culture, (4) Security, (5) Justice, and (6) Social cohesion.

2.3.1 Understanding the past, present and envisioning the future

In Rwanda, it is generally argued that one of the significant causes of its historical destructive conflicts, and particularly the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, is the way the past was understood and taught. Therefore, understanding and confronting the sources of social division can help promote reconciliation in Rwanda. A general hypothesis in this regard is that *“the more Rwandans are able to understand and confront the sources of their historical social divisions, the more reconciliation is likely to occur”* (NURC, 2010:17).

2.3.2 Citizenship and Identity

In a simpler and broad sense, citizenship can be defined as a status of equal membership in a self-governing polity, as a bundle of rights and obligations attached to this status, as a shared identity in diverse societies, and as a set of civic virtues and practices that sustain political freedom and self-government (Bauböck, 2007, 2). Identity theory emphasizes *‘doing’*, while social identity theory emphasizes *‘being’*. The conclusion in this regard is that identity theory and social identity theory are special cases of a single unified identity theory (Burke, 1998, 1).

2.3.3 Political culture

The desired political culture for reconciliation to occur was described by the NURC as conditions where public and private institutions are —characterized by a number of critical qualities, including independence, efficiency, incorruptibility, transparency, and fairness. Other qualities that are noted to increase confidence in the political culture is —trust in media trust in leadership to act in the best interests of the public and to treat all Rwandans equally. The contention in this regard is that —in any society, contested views and some degree of conflict are to be expected: it is the role of a legitimate status to ensure that such a conflict is managed and mitigated, and that the rights of citizens are protected...Effective management of conflict by government requires that citizens perceive institutions of the status to be characterized by a number of critical qualities, including independence, efficiency, incorruptibility, transparency, and fairness (NURC, 2010:21).

Ultimately, institutions that demonstrate these characteristics garner the support of citizens and bolster the legitimacy of the status, supporting reconciliatory effort. The hypothesis in this regard is that —if *citizens view political structures, institutions, and leadership as legitimate and effective, national reconciliation is more likely to occur* (NURC, 2010: 21).

2.3.4 Security and wellbeing

One of the primary roles of the status is to provide security for its citizens both within the nation-status and to ensure their protection against threats from outside, which is indeed important for the promotion of reconciliation. A particular focus, in this regard, points generally to economic security, personal security, and political security (Rugumamu, (1993:29). Therefore, if citizens feel secure and protected, they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes.

2.3.5 Justice, fairness and rights

The most discussed area regarding factors affecting reconciliation is that of dealing with the past so that the future is not continually hampered by unresolved past. This particularly tends to refer to how to deal with past gross violations of human rights, as well as how to approach the direct victims and perpetrators of such acts. The creation of sense of justice is thus often presented as essential for reconciliation (Hayner : 2003: 254).

One of the reasons why it is important to create at least a sense of justice is to reduce the desire for vengeance and to prevent private acts of revenge, both of which seriously impede reconciliation. An atmosphere of vengeance, for example, contributes to fear and strengthens hostility and enemy image and can plunge the parties back into violent conflict. However, justice is a complicated issue and can be defined and understood in many ways. As Kriesberg notes, justice varies in several significant ways. It may be understood to mean punishment of those who had previously inflicted injuries. Justice may also mean correcting the prior unjust conditions, which might include ending discriminatory and other oppressive practices.

Justice is most commonly understood in its retributive sense, focusing on punishment. Restorative justice on the other hand aims to repair the injustice, recover the humanity of both perpetrators and victims and restore social connections (Minow, 2003: 43).

In addition, justice can be viewed in a more narrow sense relating to human rights violations, but can also be seen in a broad way referring to the creation of more equitable relationships and structures. This approach to justice goes under several interrelated terms, such as redistributive or distributive justice, social justice, and socio-economic justice. Compensatory justice focuses more narrowly on compensation to the victims of human rights abuses. Procedural justice relates to whether the procedures by which justice is to be attained are seen as fair and legitimate.

Another type of justice is symbolic, including acknowledgment of past abuses. The concept of transitional justice is also discussed while connecting reconciliation to justice. Transitional justice stems from the international human rights movement. Today it covers the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, lustration of status administrations, settlement on reparations, and also political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, reconciliation and cultures of remembrance (Martina, 2011: 407).

Simply put, transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures aimed at redressing the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms. In the aftermath of massive human rights abuses, victims have well-established rights to see the perpetrators punished, to know the truth, and to receive reparations.

The relationship between reconciliation and justice thus depends, to a large extent, on how the two concepts are defined. Reconciliation is at times perceived as ‘_forgive and forget’ (sometimes called ‘_false reconciliation’). Within this viewpoint, reconciliation is seen as a method to cover up the past, preserve the status quo and prevent the attainment of justice (Evaldsson, 2010: 45)

Some researchers argue that even more important than a sense of justice is a mutual commitment to move forward into a shared future. The likelihood of such an attitude increases considerably if

people believe things are moving in the right direction and that the past will not return. _This does not mean forgetting, but learning to live with it in such a manner that it does not determine the future. And the only sound basis for that is the development of a new and resilient culture of respect for human rights and for human difference, a culture that is embodied in the everyday routines of life within the family, the school, the neighborhood, and the wider community (Evaldsson, 2010: 45).

2.3.5 Social cohesion

In the most basic and intuitive sense, social cohesion refers to *something that glues us together or the glue that bonds society together*. Social cohesion is correlated to social capital whereby relationships, norms, behaviors and institutions are strengthened to attract a better societal system that enhances inclusiveness and social interactions. This is so put because social cohesion and unity are critical to societies' socio-economic development and growth in democratic and healthy status institutions (Ho-Won, 2005: 35).

The most generic and recent definition of social cohesion sees it as a status of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations (NURC, 2008:26).

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents details of the research design, target population, sample size and sampling procedures, description of research instruments, validity and reliability of instruments, data collection procedures and data analysis techniques.

3.1 Research design

The research design refers to the overall strategy that one may choose to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical manner. This is done in order to ensure that one effectively addresses the research problem. Research design constitutes the blueprint or the roadmap for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. According to Kothari (2004, 14), research design is a plan, a roadmap and blueprint strategy of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions; it is the heart of any study. This study employed a survey research design owing to its usefulness in describing the characteristics of a large population, use of large samples and thus making the results statistically significant even when analyzing multiple variables. Many questions can be asked about a given topic giving considerable flexibility to the analysis. The design allows use of various methods of data collection like questionnaires and interviews. It also makes use of standardized questions where reliability of the items is determined.

3.2 Sample and target population

The target population for this study consisted of local authorities and citizens Nyarugenge district in Nyamirambo sector. The sample size in this study was purposive where 40 people participated in this study including local authorities from Nyamirambo sector, opinion leaders in the sector, and member of sector counsel.

3.3 Sampling procedure

Sampling is a procedure, process or technique of choosing a sub-group from a population to participate in the study. It is the process of selecting a number of individuals for a study in such a way that the individuals selected represent the large group from which they were selected. Non-probability sampling procedures were used to arrive at the sample of selected respondents.

3.4 Description of the research instruments

3.4.1 Questionnaires

Questionnaires were used as the key data collection instrument. Questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data from local citizens and local leaders. This instrument used simply because it can be used to reach a large number of respondents within a short time, it gives the respondents adequate time to respond to the items, offers a sense of security (confidentiality) to the respondents and lastly it tends to be objective since there is no bias resulting from the personal characteristics (Ogula, 1998:37). The questionnaire consisted of a number of questions printed or typed in a definite order on a form or set of forms. The questionnaire was subdivided into various sections: demographic information of the respondents, and questions responding the objectives of the study.

3.4.2 Interviews

Interviews were used to collect qualitative data from high ranked people in each category of respondents, especially top level administrators of the sector of Nyamirambo. This instrument was be used since it generally yields highest cooperation and lowest refusal rates, offers high response quality and takes advantage of interviewer presence and its multi-method data

collection, which combines questioning, cross-examination and probing approaches (Owens, 2002:24).

3.5 Validity of research instruments

The researcher validated the research instruments in terms of content and face validity. The content related technique measured the degree to which the question items reflect the specific areas covered. The validation of the questionnaires and interviews was done through the following ways: the researcher requested researcher experts, professionals of education and administration to review the items on the instrument to determine whether the set of items accurately represent the variables under study. They were asked to read, judge, make recommendations and give feed back to the researcher.

3.6 Reliability of research instruments

Reliability of the instruments will be determined in terms of consistency. To establish the reliability of the research instruments, the researcher carried out a pilot test of the instruments using another similar group with the same characteristics as the one targeted in the study. The reliability of the questionnaires was computed using split half method with the help of SPSS. George and Mallery (2003: 24) observed that if the value found falls within the accepted levels (0.6-0.9), the questionnaires was held reliable.

3.7 Data collection procedures

Prior to the commencement of data collection, the researcher obtained all the necessary documents, including an introduction letter from the University. Upon getting an appointment, the researcher in person administrated the questionnaires to the respondents. The researcher considered assistance from the local authorities. The purpose is enhancing full cooperation and

coordination among the respondents and the researcher. During the distribution of the instruments, the purpose of the research was fully explained. The researcher conducted herself the interview for local authorities.

3.8 Data analysis techniques

Data analysis is a process of summarizing the information gathered so as to give meaning to such data. The collected data will be analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis approaches. The data analysis started with editing of the information obtained from the participants. The responses in the questionnaires will be assigned numerical values.

The data obtained from the questionnaires for quantitative analysis were combined into themes and then summarized into frequency tables and percentages. Data were then put in tabular forms for analysis by using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 20.

The qualitative analysis on the other hand was used in this study to analyze the data obtained from the interview guide. The data were categorized in themes in accordance with research objectives and were reported in narrative form along with quantitative presentation. The qualitative data were used to reinforce the quantitative data.

3.9 Ethical consideration

The ethical rules that are likely to limit the effectiveness of this study were given due consideration. These include: access and acceptance, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality. Respondents were informed about the aim and nature of this research. This helped the researcher to get access and acceptance from the respondents. The informed consent was also sought by explaining to the participants about the nature and the purpose of the research, benefits and participants' rights. Privacy and confidentiality were addressed. Here, the researcher had to protect the identity of individuals by keeping their names and that of their

schools as anonymous as possible using the promise of confidentiality and the information obtained would be used for academic purpose only.

CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter is about presentation, analysis, and interpretation of the data that were collected from the field in order to respond the objectives of the study. The collected data include demographic characteristics of respondents and those responding the objectives of the study.

4.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents

The demographic characteristics of respondents that were collected in this study included those of gender, age, education level, employment status and religion and marital status. There were collected in order to have trusted group of people to participate in the study.

Table 1: Gender of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
Male	21	52.5
Female	19	47.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

The above table shows the distribution of respondents by their gender. Male people participated on the percentage of 52.5% while female were participated on the percentage of 47.5%. this shows that women and men provided mixed information for making the study more coherent. This also helped to know the emotions of both sexes on the subject under study.

Table 2: Age of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
31 to 35 years	3	7.5
36 to 40 years	7	17.5
41 to 45 years	18	45.0
46 to 50 years	9	22.5
51 to 55 years	3	7.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

The above table shows the distribution of respondents by their age. Majority of respondents were found to have the age ranging from 41 to 45 years with the percentage of 45% of the total respondents and respondents with the age ranging from 46 to 50 years were found to be 22.5%. This shows that participants in this study are mature enough to conceive the past of the country and to this the information provided could be trusted at certain level.

Table 3: Educational level of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
No formal education	2	5.0
Primary uncompleted	6	15.0
Primary completed	14	35.0
Secondary uncompleted	2	5.0
Secondary completed	10	25.0
University studies	6	15.0
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

Table 3 shows the distribution of respondents by their education level. Majority of them were found to complete primary education with the percentage of 35% while respondents with secondary education were found to be 25%. Those results show that the selected respondents had the skills that could allow them to provide trustful information regarding the objectives of the study.

Table 4: Employment status of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
No formal job	5	12.5
Private sector	15	37.5
Public servant	20	50.0
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

Table 4 shows the distribution of respondents in this study by their employment status. Majority of respondents who have participated in this study were public servants in various forms with the percentage of 20%. This is an advantage since that category of respondents uses to be with the community and they can perceive what people think about different programs initiated by government stakeholders.

Table 5: Religion of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
Muslim	5	12.5
Protestant	15	37.5
Catholic	12	30.0
Adventist	8	20.0
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

Table 5 shows the distribution of respondents by their religion. Protestants in this study were 37.5% of respondents, Catholic were 30% of the respondents, Adventists were 20% of the total respondents, and Muslims were found to be 12.5% of the total respondents. Having different respondents from different religious sects is an advantage since religions gather large number of people and this may influence the perceptions of respondents especially in topics related to reconciliation in Rwanda.

Table 6: Marital status of respondents

Values	Frequency	Percent
Single	3	7.5
Married	33	82.5
Separated	4	10.0
Total	40	100.0

Source: Primary data, 2018

The above table shows the distribution of respondents by their marital status. Majority of respondents who have participated in this study were married people with the percentage of 82%. This is an advantage since married people are known to be cautious on different subjects regarding the society.

4.2 Perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program

The first specific objective of this study was to assess the perceptions of respondents on the program. The aim of this was to see the extent by which it is perceived in Rwandan community and this was helpful to know if is critical or not.

Table 7: Perceptions of respondents on the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda program

Statements	SD	D	NS	A	SA	Mean
The program was necessary for Rwanda in order to know the truth behind Tutsi genocide	---	---	5 (12.5%)	14 (35.0%)	21 (52.5%)	4.40
The explanations and the goals of the program were comprehensive	---	---	8 (20.0%)	20 (50.0%)	12 (30.0%)	4.10
The program sounded well to all people who were involved in it	---	2 (5.0%)	13 (32.5%)	19 (47.5%)	6 (15.0%)	3.72
The program is not selective since it include all Rwandans	---	---	5 (12.5%)	22 (55.0%)	13 (32.5%)	4.20
The program is well perceived by majority of Rwandan	---	1 (2.5%)	11 (27.5%)	22 (55.0%)	6 (15.0%)	3.32
The program is impartial by its nature and conception	---	---	7 (17.5%)	21 (52.5%)	12 (30.0%)	4.13

The program was taught by professional people who look for the interests of all members of Rwandan community	---	---	8 (20.0%)	22 (55.0%)	10 (25.0%)	3.05
The programs was considered as the best reconciliation tool among others	---	---	8 (20.0%)	23 (57.5%)	9 (22.5%)	3.03

Source: Primary data, 2018

Note: 5. Strongly Agree= [4.21-5.00] =very high, 4. Agree = [3.41-4.20] =high, 3. Not Sure = [2.61-3.40] =Moderate, 2. Disagree= [1.81-2.60] =low 1. Strongly Disagree= [1.00-1.80] = very low

According to the above table, respondents positively perceived many elements of praising the program of Ndi Umunyarwanda. Those included finding that the program was necessary in order to know the truth behind Tutsi genocide with the mean of 4.40 which is interpreted as high mean, comprehensiveness of the program in terms of its explanations and goals with the mean of 4.10 which is interpreted as high mean, the program sounded well to all people who have involved in it considering the mean of 3.72 which is interpreted as high mean, the program is not selective since it include all Rwandans considering the mean of 4.20 interpreted as high mean, and the program was found impartial by its nature and conception considering the mean of 4.13 interpreted as high mean, and the program.

However, the above paragraph focuses on elements of Ndi Umunyarwanda program that are positively perceived by respondents but criticism persist on being perceived with the majority of Rwandans considering the mean of 3.32 which is interpreted as moderate mean, being taught by professional people who look for the interests of Rwandans considering the mean of 3.05 which is interpreted as high mean, and being considered as the best reconciliation program considering the mean of 3.03 which is interpreted as moderate mean.

Apart from those results that were collected through a likert questionnaire, the officers from the sector of Nyamirambo in social affairs revealed the following “*Gahunda ya Ndi*

Umunyarwanda ifite umwihariko wo guha umwanya abanyarwanda bakaganira ku mateka nta guca ku ruhande, abumva bafite umutima ubashinja bagasaba imbabazi kandi abarokotse Jenocide babishoboye nabo bagatanga imbabazi. Ndi Umunyarwanda ituma abantu bumva neza ko UBUNYARWANDA aribwo bubahuza kurenza ibyo bashobora kuba batandukaniyeho". This is to say that the Ndi Umunyarwanda Program has the particularity of giving Rwandans the space to talk and discuss their history without leaving behind anything, those who feel that they have to ask to be apologized and genocide victims also provide pardon if they find it necessary. The program also helps Rwandans to put aside their differences.

4.3 Indicators genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens

The second specific objective of this study is to find out the level the decrease of genocide ideology among Rwandan citizens through different indicators. This was achieved by considering the views of respondents who participated in this study. Below table show what were revealed by respondents.

Table 8: Perceptions of respondents on decrease of genocide ideology

Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA	Mean
People who are ethnically oriented in this area are no longer exist	---	---	4 (10.0%)	22 (55.0%)	14 (35.0%)	4.25
People support each other without looking on their history	---	2 (5.0%)	9 (22.5%)	21 (52.5%)	8 (20.0%)	3.37
Hate speech and discussion are no longer exist in this areas	---	---	8 (20.0%)	18 (45.0%)	14 (35.0%)	4.15
Business partnership is done without caring on the origin and the history of partners	---	---	7 (17.5%)	21 (52.5%)	12 (30.0%)	4.13
Jobs are offered to those who can without considering the same history with the job offer	---	---	7 (17.5%)	25 (62.5%)	8 (20.0%)	4.03
Families are not involved while young people pretend to marry	---	4 (10.0%)	9 (22.5%)	17 (42.5%)	10 (25.0%)	3.22
The reconciliation program sound well in the ears of all members of the community	---	---	10 (25.0%)	21 (52.5%)	9 (22.5%)	3.98

Socio-economic development programs are implemented in the way pleasing all members of the community	---	---	12 30.0%	19 (47.5%)	9 (22.5%)	3.93
--	-----	-----	-------------	---------------	--------------	------

Source: Primary data, 2018

Note: 5. Strongly Agree= [4.21-5.00] =very high, 4. Agree = [3.41-4.20] =high, 3. Not Sure = [2.61-3.40] =Moderate, 2. Disagree= [1.81-2.60] =low 1. Strongly Disagree= [1.00-1.80] = very low

Regarding the decrease of genocide ideology, the following were revealed by participants: people who are ethnically oriented are no longer existing in the area considering the mean of 4.25 which is interpreted as very high mean, there are no hate speech and discussions considering the mean of 4.15 which is interpreted as high mean, business partnership without considering the origin and history of partners considering the mean of 4.13 which is interpreted as high mean, offering jobs without considering the quality of applicants considering the mean of 4.03 which is interpreted as high mean, reconciliation programs sound well in the ears of all members of the community considering the mean of 3.98 which is interpreted as high mean, and all socio-economic programs are implemented in the way pleasing all members of the community considering the mean of 3.93 which is interpreted as high mean. However, some low advancement were found in terms of involvement of parents while young people pretend to marry considering the mean of 3.22 which is interpreted as moderate mean, and mutual support considering the mean of 3.37 which is interpreted as moderate mean. Completing that one of the local leader in exclusive interview revealed the following: ***Ingengabitekerezo ya Jenoside irangwa n'ibikorwa bibi bishobora kwibasira abarokotse Jenoside, kubabwira amagambo abakomeretsa, kwangiza imitungo yabo, kwica amatungo yabo n'ibindi.*** The ideology of genocide is characterized by bad actions toward the survivors of genocide, telling them hurting words, to damage the assets of genocide survivors, killing their livestock, and among others.

Concluding to this, it to say that efforts are still needed in order to build the Rwandan society in

sustainable manner in order to avoid anything that can engender genocide again, this the task for government especially stakeholders from central government to local authority.

4.3 Effects Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combatting genocide ideology

The third specific objective of this study was to examine the effects of Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combating genocide ideology. This also was achieved in the same manner for the two above objective where opinions of respondents were considered.

Table 9: Perceptions of respondents on the Effects Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combatting genocide ideology

Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA	Mean
The program has boosted the process of reconciliation among Rwandans	---	---	9 (22.5%)	18 (45.0%)	13 (32.5%)	4.10
The program helped to extend the truth about genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda	---	---	8 (20.0%)	19 (47.5%)	13 (32.5%)	4.13
The programs increased the level of trustiness among all categories of Rwanda	---	---	6 (15.0%)	19 (47.5%)	15 (37.5%)	4.23
The program helps in healing the victims of genocide and those who committed related crimes	---	---	10 (25.0%)	20 (50.0%)	10 (25.0%)	4.00
The programs helped Rwandan to be engaged in mutual programs leading to total reconciliation	---	1 (2.5%)	13 (32.5%)	16 (40.0%)	10 (25.0%)	3.88

Source: Primary data, 2018

Note: 5. Strongly Agree= [4.21-5.00] =very high, 4. Agree = [3.41-4.20] =high, 3. Not Sure = [2.61-3.40] =Moderate, 2. Disagree= [1.81-2.60] =low 1. Strongly Disagree= [1.00-1.80] = very low

According to the above table, it was revealed that Ndi Umunyarwanda program has boosted the process of reconciliation among Rwandans considering the mean of 4.10 interpreted as high mean, the program helped to extend the truth about genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda considering the mean of 4.13 which is interpreted as high mean, the program increased the level of trustiness among all categories of Rwandans considering the mean of 4.23 interpreted as high mean, the program helped in healing the victims of genocide and those who committed related crimes

considering the mean of 4 which is interpreted as high mean, and the program helped Rwandans to be engaged in mutual programs leading to total reconciliation considering the mean of 3.88 which is interpreted as high mean.

In exclusive with one of the local authority ta sector level, she revealed that “*the program helps in healing genocide survivors and letting people who were involved in it to express what happened and asked to be apologized*”. Another interviewee revealed that the decrease of genocide ideology was possible due to other programs and the Ndi Umunyarwanda Program helped to fill the gap.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter is about conclusion and recommendations. The conclusion is drawn based on the main findings of the study per objectives and the recommendations regarding what could be done for strengthening the efforts for combatting genocide ideology in Rwanda.

5.1 Conclusion

This study aimed to examine the role of Ndi Umuntarwanda Program in combating genocide ideology. First of all the study revealed that the program is well perceived by those who have been involved in it regarding different elements that were used for evaluating it. The program was lowly criticized by not being perceived with the majority of Rwandans considering, being taught and promoted by professionals who look for the Country's interests. Secondly it was found that the ideology of genocide is gradually decreasing but some problem related to the influence of parents while young people are open to marry and give mutual support to peers without historical ethnic division. Lastly the study revealed that Ndi Umunyaranda Program complemented and completed other exiting programs that were initiated to combat genocide ideology and promote reconciliation in Rwanda. In particular, the program helped people who committed genocide and those who feel that they can do something to ask for pardon to do that openly. Ndi Umunyarwanda also accelerated the level of forgiveness from genocide survivors.

5.2 Recommendations

To eliminate the genocide ideology and in order to avoid the recurrence of genocide, the following are recommended to government and other stakeholders especially NURC:

- Decentralization of reconciliation programs where local authorities and opinions leaders

may help in boosting reduction of genocide ideology.

- The Ndi Umunyarwanda Program should be written clearly and explained in order to avoid intense criticisms from community where some people say that they don't understand its aims and objectives
- Information sharing on the updates of genocide ideology country wide where this may help to tackle it down early
- Putting more efforts on young people in order to create generations that feel, we are all Rwandans, a healthy inclusive vision of a desired present and future Rwanda.

REFERENCES

- African Rights. (1994). *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. African Rights
- Andrew, R., (2014). 'Hybrid Models of Justice and Rwanda's Post-genocide Response'. A Master's studies in Political Science, University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada.
- Bauböck Rainer (2007). *Theories of Citizenship: Problems of Membership and Political Boundaries*, European University Institute. Available
- Buckley-Zistel, S., (2009). 'Nation, narration, unification? The politics of history teaching after the Rwandan genocide,' *Journal of Genocide Research*, 11(1), 31–53.
- Burke Peter J. & Jan E. Stets (1998). *Identity theory and social identity theory*. Washington Status University (A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association)
- Chretien, J. (1995). *Les medias du genocide*. Karthala edition.
- Eugenia Zorbas, "What Does Reconciliation after Genocide Mean? Public Transcripts and Hidden Transcripts in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, no. 1 (2009), 127–47.
- Felly Kimenyi, "We Need to Step out of Our Parents' Shadows – Poet Bamporiki," *The New Times Rwanda*, July 22, 2013, accessed January 10, 2017, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-07-22/67715/>.
- Gasana, K. James (2002), *RWANDA : du parti-Etat à l'Etat-garnison* (Paris : L'Harmattan, 2002)
- Goldenberg, D. (2003). *Early Jewish and Christian views of Blacks*. Collective Degradation. Slavery and the Construction of Race. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference, University of Yale.
- Gourevitch, P. (1998). *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Kiernan, B. (2007). *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press.
- Kubai, A., (2007). 'Between justice and reconciliation: The survivors of Rwanda.' *African Security Review*, 16(1), 53-66.

- Lars Waldorf, "Revisiting *Hotel Rwanda* : Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers," *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, no. 1 (2009), 101–25. Zorbas, "What Does Reconciliation after Genocide Mean?"
- Mafeza F. (2013), The Role of Education in Combating Genocide Ideology in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Research and Documentation Center on Genocide/ National Commission for the fight against Genocide (CNLG), *International Journal of Education and Research Vol. 1 No. 10 October 2013*
- Mamdani, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press.
- Mann, M. (2005). *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mfizi, Christophe (2006) LE RESEAU ZERO (B):Fossoyeur de la Démocratie et de la République au Rwanda (1975-1994). Rapport de consultation rédigé à la demande du Bureau du Procureur Du Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda (Arusha, March 2006)
- Obote, O. (2007), Understanding and fighting genocide ideology: The 13th Commemoration of Rwanda Genocide at African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa-Ethiopia.
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994, History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Puar, J. K. and Amit S. R., (2002). Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots. *Social Text* 20 (3) pp. 117-148.
- Rana, J. (2007). The Story of Islamophobia', *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society*. 9 (2), pp: 148-162.
- Rekdal, O. B., (1998). When hypothesis becomes myth: The Iraqi origin of the Iraqw. *Ethnology*. 37 (1), 17-38.
- Rugumamu, S. (1993). Post -Cold War Peace and Security: Prospects in Southern Africa. SAPES Occasional Paper Series No.5, Harare.
- Sanders E. (1960). The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origins and Functions, *Journal of African History*. vol. 10, (4).
- Sergi, G. (1901). *The Mediterranean Race*. London

- Stiel, S. (2011). *The Discover Bosnia Program*. Accessible online at <http://thevibe.co.uk/2011/11/17/the-discover-bosnia-program/>
- Susan Thomson, “Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Rwandan Peasants to Post- Genocide Reconciliation,” *African Affairs* 110, no. 440 (2011), Eltringham, *Accounting for Horror*.
- Verwimp, P. (1999). *Development Ideology, the Peasantry and Genocide: Rwanda Represented in Habyarimana’s Speeches*. Yale, Centre for International and Area Studies: Working Paper Series.
- Whitford, D. M., (2009). *The curse of Ham in the early modern era*. Ashgate Publishing.
- Zachernuk, Philip S. (1994). Of Origins and Colonial Order: Southern Nigerian Historians and the Hamitic Hypothesis’ c. 1870–1970. *The Journal of African History*.

APPENDICES

**THE ROLE OF NDI UMUNYARWANDA PROGRAM IN COMBATING
GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY/ AKAMARO KA NDI UMUNYARWANDA
MUKURWANYA INGENGABITEKEREZO YA JENOSIDE**

QUESTIONNAIRE/ IBAZWA

Instructions/ Amabwiriza

1. Tick front of you choice for basic information / Shyira akamenyetso imbere y'igisubizo cyawe
2. For opinions questions cycle the number corresponding to your choice/ Kubiri mumbonerahamwe shyira akazero kumubare ujyanye n'amarangamutima yawe
3. For , write your comments/ Ahari utudomo andika igisubizo cyawe

Part I: Close ended question/ Ibibazo byo guhitamo

Section A: Profile of respondents/ Igice cyambere: Umwirondoro w'usubiza

1. Tick front of your gender / Shyira akamenyetso imbere y'igitsina cyawe

1. Male/ Gabo

2. Female/ Gore

2. What is the category corresponding to your age? / ni ikihe kiciro cy'imyaka yawe

1. Below 25 years/ Minsi ya 25

2. 25 to 30 years / 25 kugeza 30

3. 31 to 35 years/ 31 kugeza 35

4. 36 to 40 years/ 36 kugeza 40

5. 41to 45 years/ 41 kugeza 45

6. 46 to 50 years/ 46 kugeza 50
7. 51 to 55 years/ 551 kugeza 55
8. 56 to 60 years/ 56 kugeza 60
9. Above 60 years / hejuru ya 60

3. What is your educational level? / Ni ayahe mashuri wize

1. No formal education / Ntayo
2. Primary uncompleted/ Yacikije abanza
3. Primary completed/Abanza
4. Secondary uncompleted/ Yacikije ayisumbuye
5. Secondary completed / Ayisumbuye
6. University studies/ Kaminuza

4. State your employment status / Ni akahe kazi ukora

1. No formal job/ Ntakazi kazwi
2. Public sector/ Akora munzego za Leta
3. Private sector/ Kwikorera
4. Other/ Abandi

5. What is your current religion? / ni irihe dini ryawe

1. No religion/ nta dini
2. Muslim/ umusilamu
3. Protestant/ umuporoso
4. Catholic / gatolika
5. Adventist/ umudive
6. Other/ Irindi

6. Tick front of your marital status

1. Married/ Arubatse
2. Separated/divorced/ Baratandukanye
3. Single/ Silibateri
4. Widowed/ Umupfakazi

Section B: Research questions/ Igice cya kabiri: Ibibazo bijyanye

nubushakashatsi

1. Provide how your perceived the “Ndi Umunyarwanda program” through statements in below table where 1= Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree/ Nigute ubona cyangwa wakiriye porogaramu ya ndi umunyarwanda, tanga igisubizo cyawe aho 1= Sibyo cyane, 2= Sibyo, 3= Simbizi, 4= Nibyo, 5= Nibyo cyane

Statements/ Interuro	1	2	3	4	5
The program was necessary for Rwanda in order to know the truth behind Tutsi genocide/ porogaramu ni ngombwa kugirango ukuri kwitsembabwoko ryakorewe abatutsi kumenyekane					
The explanations and the goals of the program were comprehensive/ ibisobanuro ni intego za porogaramu birasobanutse					
The program sounded well to all people who were involved in it/ Poprogaramu yumvikanye neza kubantu bose ireba					
The program is not selective since it include all Rwandans/ Porogaramu nitoranya kubera ko buri munyarwanda ayibonamo					
The program is well perceived by majority of Rwandan/ porogaramuye yakirwe neza numubare munini W’abanyarwanda					
The program is impartial by its nature and conception/ porogaramu ntibogama bitwe nuburyo yateguwe					
The program was taught by professional people who look for the interests of all members of Rwandan community/ porogaramu yigishwa nabanyamwuga bareba inyungu z’ abanyarwanda muri rusange					

The programs was considered as the best reconciliation tool among others/ porogaramu ingenzi cyane mugushaka ubwiyunge bw'abanyarwanda					
--	--	--	--	--	--

2. Provide if there are signs of genocide ideology in your community through the statements in the below table where where 1= Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree/ Vuga niba hari ibimenyetso by'ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide bigaragara aho mutuye wifashishije interuro zikurikira aho 1= Sibyo cyane, 2= Sibyo, 3= Simbizi, 4= Nibyo, 5= Nibyo cyane

Statements	1	2	3	4	5
People who are ethnically oriented in this area are no longer exist/ Ntabantu bakigaragaza ibitekerezo bishingiye kubwoko bagaragara muri aka gace					
People support each other without looking on their history/ Abaturage barafatany batitaye kubwoko					
Hate speech and discussion are no longer exist in this areas/ Imbirwaruhame nibiganura byurwanganano ntibigaragara muri aka gce					
Business partnership is done without caring on the origin and the history of partners/ Ubufatanye mubucuruzi cyangwi imishinga ibyara inyungu birakorwa hatitawe kumutake yabafatany					
Jobs are offered to those who can without considering the same history with the job offer/ akazi gahabwa abashoboye hatitawe kumateka y'uhabwa akazi					
Families are not involved while young people pretend to marry/ Imiryango ntiyivanga iyo urubyiruko rwenda gushinga ingo zarwo					
The reconciliation program sound well in the ears of all members of the community/ ubumwe nubwiyunge buhagaze neza mubanyarwanda					
Socio-economic development programs are implemented in the way pleasing all members of the community/ ibikorwa by'amajyambere bigera kuri bose ntavangura					

3. How do you consider the effects of Ndi Umunyarwanda Program in combatting genocide ideology where 1= Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree/ ni gute ubona umusanzu wa ndi umunyarwanda mukurwanya ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide, ifashije interuro zikurikira aho 1= Sibyo cyane, 2= Sibyo, 3= Simbizi, 4= Nibyo, 5= Nibyo cyane

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
The program have boosted the process of reconciliation among Rwandans/ porogaramu yihutishije urugendo rw'ubumwe n'ubwiyunge mubanyarwanda					
The program helped to extend the truth about genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda/ porogaramu yazamuye imyumvire kubijyanye nukuri kwa jenooside					
The programs increased the level of trustiness among all categories of Rwanda/ porogaramu yongereye urugero rw'ubwizarane munzego zose zabanyarwanda					
The program helps in healing the victims of genocide/ porogaramunyu yagabanyije ibikomere kumutima yabayicitse kwicumu					
The programs helped Rwandan to be engaged in mutual programs leading to total reconciliation / porogaramu yafashije abanyarwanda kwitabira porogaramu zitandukanye zubwiyunge					

Thank you for participation/ Murakoze

Interview guide for exe

1. What are the indicators of genocide ideology? Ni bihe biranga ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide?
2. How genocide ideologies appear in real life of people? Ni gute ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide igaragara mu buzima busazwe?
3. What are reconciliation programs adopted in this sector? Ni izihe pogaramu z'ubwiyunge zikoreshwa muri uyu murenge?
4. Does “ Ndi Umunyarwanda” Program taught in this sector? Ese Ndi Umunyarwanda yigeze yigishwa muri uyu murenge?
5. How do you measure the difference between Ndi Umunyarwanda program and other reconciliation program?/ Ni hehe ndi umunyarwanda itandukaniye nizindi porogaramu zubwiyunge zayibanjirije?
6. How do you perceive the effects of Ndi Umunyarwanda in combating genocide ideology?/ Ni gute ubona Ndi Umunyarwanda mukurwanya ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide?