



**COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

**COLLEGE OF ARTS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (CASS)
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (CCM)**

MASTER'S PROGRAM IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

**UNAMIR AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN IN RWANDA IN
1994: SCOPE AND LIMITS**

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Award of Master's Degree of Arts in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation.

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July, 2021

DECLARATION

I, BYABAGABO M. Gady, declare that this thesis is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, no material which, to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UR or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made. Any contribution made to the research by other is explicitly acknowledged in the report.

Signed:.....Date.....

APPROVAL

This dissertation titled “UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in RWANDA in 1994: scope and limits” was prepared and submitted by BYABAGABO M. Gady in partial fulfilment of the requirements for award of Master’s Degree of Arts in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation (PSCT) at the University of Rwanda.

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AUTHORISATION TO SUBMIT THE CORRECTED DISSERTATION

I, undersigned, **Dr Furaha Umutoni Alida**, member of the panel of examiners of the dissertation done by **Byabagabo M. Gady** entitled: *“UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994: Scope and limits”*

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Done at Kigali

Date: 13/07/2021

Signature of the examiner:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Furaha Umutoni Alida', with a horizontal line underneath.

For Administration of the CCM MA Program: Name, Signature

DEDICATION

To Almighty God;

To my beloved wife;

To my beloved children;

To my beloved parents;

To my colleagues and classmates.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research would not have been a success without the support and guidance of various people. In the whole process of this research, I give special thanks to God for his mercy rendered to me.

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BYABAGABO M. Gady

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	: Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
BBTG	: Broad-Based Transitional Government
CDR	: Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
CND	: Conseil National pour le Développement
DFS	: Department of Field Support
DFS	: Department of Field Support
DPA	: Department of Political Affairs
DPI	: Department of Public Information
DPKO	: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DUF	: Directive on the Use of Force
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
ETO	: Ecole Technique Officielle
FAR	: Forces Armées Rwandaise
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GOMN	: Groupe D’Observateur Militaire Neutre
HIV	: Humanimmunodeficiency virus
MINUAR	: Mission des Nations Unies pour l’assistance au Rwanda
MRND	: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCHA	: Officers Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONU	: Organisation des Nations Unies
ONUC	: United Nations Operation in the Congo
OUA	: Organisation de l’unité Africaine
PDD-25	: Presidential Decision Directive 25
PKO	: Peacekeeping Operations
POC	: Protection of Civilians
RGF	: Rwandan Government Forces
ROE	: Rules of Engagement
RPF	: Rwandan Patriotic Front
SRSG	: Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC/PCCs	: Police Contributing Countries

UN : United Nations
UNAMIR : United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMUR : United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF : United Nations Children’s Fund
UNPKO : United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC : United Nations Security Council
US : United States
USA : United States of America
WFPHQs : World Food Program Headquarters
WHO : World Health Organization

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ABSTRACT

This research titled “UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994” has the general objective to examine the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994. This objective is supported by specific objectives, namely (1) to Describe and analyse the mandate of UNAMIR in Rwanda, (2) to identify whether UNAMIR has or not achieved its missions to protect civilians and (3) to examine the challenges pertaining to the then context and the way it affected the work of UNAMIR. In order to achieve these objectives, the research methodology was used notably the interview and desk review for data collection. Findings revealed that the UNAMIR mandate was not clear in regard with the protection of the civilians. In addition, it appears that the mandate was not in favour of ordinary people because its troops were not allowed to use their weapons. Furthermore, the mandate given to a peacekeeping operation is usually the result of diplomatic negotiation and compromise, and may not always meet expectations - particularly those of the host country. Concerning the success or failure of UNAMIR in Rwanda, findings show that the UN had totally failed to understand the situation on the ground and had disregarded the reports of many commentators. The reasons of failure mentioned by the study participants were that UNAMIR numbers were small compared to the number of troops they were required to contain. For the existence of UNAMIR achievements or failure in Rwanda, findings reveal that UNAMIR did not achieve its mission. This failure is under different factors. In fact, the scope of the UNAMIR mandate was too broad for the size of force deployed. According to the challenges encountered by UNAMIR, findings revealed that the UNAMIR achievement or failure revealed that it did not fulfill its mandate. Constraints inherent to the UN system were particularly subject to frustrations of UNAMIR commanders and staff members, since they were confronted with them on a daily basis. The main challenges highlighted by findings are UN bureaucracy & hierarchy, UN military structure, Human resource constraints, material resource constraints, lack of strategy to protect civilians and lack of willingness and preparedness to protect. The researcher concluded that UNAMIR mandate was not fulfilled and then it did not achieve any objective related to the civilians’ protection due to enormous challenges encountered. The UN should avoid the bureaucratic system in terms of decision making related to the human rights protection because the bureaucracy can slow the safeguard and protection of civilians because the heavy top-down structure complicates and impede the procedures.

Key words: UNAMIR, Civilians protection

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This part related the background to the study, the statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives and hypotheses, significance and scope of the study as well as structure of the study.

1.1. Background to the study

It is in 1948 that the United Nations Peacekeeping has started. Its first operation as a mission started in the Middle East to watch and keep up the cessation of the hostilities for the period of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. From that point forward, United Nations peacekeepers have participated in a sum of 72 missions in the world, 14 of which proceed with today. The peacekeeping power all in all got the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (UN, 2020).

Despite the fact that the expression "peacekeeping" is not set up in the United Nations Charter, the approval is commonly considered to lie in (or amongst) Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 (UN, 2020). Chapter 6 portrays the Security Council's capacity to examine and intervene debates, while Chapter 7 talks about the ability to approve monetary, political, and military assents, just as the utilization of military power, to determine questions (UN, 2020). The creators of the UN imagined that the association would act to forestall clashes among countries and make future wars unimaginable; nonetheless, the episode of the Cold War settled on peacekeeping understandings very troublesome because of the division of the world into antagonistic camps. Following the finish of the Cold War, there were re-established requires the UN to turn into the office for accomplishing world harmony, and the office's peacekeeping drastically expanded, approving a bigger number of missions somewhere in the range of 1991 and 1994 than in the past 45 years consolidated (UN, 2020).

The UN peacekeeping power was envisioned in the Arusha Accords, which were marked in Arusha on 4 August 1993 after just about three years of civil war between the administration of the Rwandese Republic and the revolutionary powers of the RPF.

The Accords were expected to stop hostility and to prepare for a change to mainstream government, with the UN capacity to accept a critical adjusting job. The Arusha Accords envisioned a movement of impartial changes, including adventures toward an extensive based transitory government (BBTG), open choices, the consolidation of the military of the two

essential fighters, furthermore, the repatriation of pariahs who had fled to neighbouring nations during the customary war (UN, 2020).

In the Arusha Accords the two parties vowed to advance the security of Rwanda. They vowed to maintain the Ceasefire compromise of 16 September 1991, which incorporated the "suspension of provisions of ammo and weaponry to the gatherings in the contention and furthermore penetration of troops on each side (Walter et al., 1999).

The UN power, as indicated by the Accords, was to aid the footstep of arms reserves and balance of equipped posses all through the nation (Walter et al., 1999). Moreover, the mission was to have a considerably bigger order to aid the recuperation of all weapons disseminated to, or illicitly obtained by the regular citizens (Walter *et al.*, 1999).

The request gave by the Security Council to the peacekeeping force was less trying, anyway it in spite of everything presented the UN to diminishing the assailant conditions in Rwanda (Walter *et al.*, 1999).

The 872 resolution of 5 October 1993, which officially settled the peacekeeping power, gave UNAMIR an essential capacity to add to the security of Kigali, including by viewing a "weapons-secure area created by the parties in and around the city. This solicitation induced the security of occupants even (Walter et al., 1999).

The United Nations had in like way wanted to utilize UNAMIR as an improvement to the already existing peacekeeping activity, UNOMUR, which had been mentioned to assemble data about foreseen offenses, the unlawful development of weapons through the edge with Uganda that may upset the arrangement cycle (Walter et al., 1999). This objective shows that in the months going before the slaughter, during which the riddle courses of action were happening, the United Nations had the order to explore obstruction with the Accords and to propel the security of Rwanda (Walter *et al.*, 1999).

Given the above background, limited or no studies at all have been commissioned to ask whether given the mandate given to UNAMIR by security council in 1993 in Rwanda, the mission did succeed or failure because studies which are out they are mainly concerned with failures and success in general.

However this particular research will focus on the views and perceptions of civilians who were supposed to be the ultimate beneficiary by the actions of the United Nation and the

Security Council in general. Genocide survivors and other people who were directly involved in this mission will be the focus of this research.

1.2. Problem statement

In recent years, there has been increasing debate about the efficiency and the relevance of costly and complex peace operations and the “little progress” observed to this effect. The criticism of traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping relates to their capacity to maintain fragile ceasefires, sustain and support the consolidation of peace beyond political transactions and, most of all, protect civilians (Stean, 2010).

United Nations PKO has always been mandated with the protection of civilians from the deadly repercussions of conflict with considerable success and at the same time failures. However, in Rwanda, more than million civilians were killed while there was the UN mission in Rwanda through UNAMIR mandate. Furthermore, how have the UNAMIR’s goals did not protect civilians during its peace missions in Rwanda? This is the problem addressed by this thesis.

However for the case of UNAMIR, a number of researches have been carried out to examine its failures and success in relation to its mandate. Hamilton (2014) revealed that, via his findings, UNAMIR failed to protect civilians because UNAMIR did not embrace any goal in its unique military command and the Security Council would not approve the utilization of power to protect civilians, safe zones or help activities, leaving countless guiltless regular citizens unprotected amidst destruction. The non-achievement of UN mission was as per the hesitance of the universal network to submit itself and assets to UNAMIR; absence of assets and absence of will to take on the responsibility important to forestall the annihilation is another pertinent purpose behind the UN defeat (Chizom, 2017). These researchers and others have not captured the views and perspectives of people in terms of civilians’ protection. This thesis comes to fulfil this gap.

Thus it is imperative to go beyond the narrative often propagated by foreigner researchers and scholars regarding the achievements and shortcomings of this Peacekeeping Operation and analyse the role of UNAMIR from a civilian perspective and lenses with an aim of critically appraising it so that future discussions regarding the above mission can be guided by actual the views and perspectives which were given by the people who lived and survived the conflicts and the subsequent genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

1.3. Research questions

The research questions are also both general and specific

1.3.1. General question

What do the resolutions governing UNAMIR provide for in relation to peace keeping in general and protection of civilians in particular?

1.3.2. Specific research questions

1. What was the mandate of UNAMIR in Rwanda?
2. What achievements can be attributed to UNAMIR in relation to protection of civilians?
3. What are the challenges pertaining to the then context and the way it affected the work of UNAMIR?
4. What lessons can be drawn from the experience of UNAMIR to inform and achieve more effective civilian protection?

1.4. Research objectives

The research objectives are both general and specific as indicated below.

1.4.1. General objective

The general objective of this research is to examine the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994.

1.4.2. Specific objectives

1. To describe and analyse the mandate of UNAMIR in Rwanda;
2. To identify achievements attributed to UNAMIR in relation to protection of civilians;
3. To examine the challenges pertaining to the then context and the way it affected the work of UNAMIR;
4. To highlight lesson that can be drawn from the experience of UNAMIR to inform and achieve more effective civilian protection.

1.5. Importance of the study

This research is important to a number of people, beginning with me as a student in the field of peace studies and conflict transformation, researchers and scholars in the field of peacekeeping operations (PKO) and lastly policymakers as explained below.

The study will equip me to understand the history, mandate and actions of UNAMIR so it is impossible for one to understand the success and failures of an entity without knowing its mission mandate and goals before.

The research will also identify what were the causes of failures and success of UNAMIR as explained by the civilians because previous gaps existed as no known research has attempted to capture the feelings and perspectives of civilians who were the ultimate beneficiaries of this benevolent humanitarian act.

This research will also help me to partially fulfil the requirements leading to the award of Master's Degree in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation at the Center for Conflict Management at the University of Rwanda.

Scholars and researchers will gain new knowledge and insight from this research as I hope to explore new areas hence leading to the production of new knowledge. Furthermore, I strongly feel that this research will help policy makers to make informed decisions formed out of evidence based on research thus helping the future deployment of PKO.

1.6. Scope of the study

This study of the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994 is scoped in terms of space, time and field.

1.6.1. Scope in space

The study intended to discover the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994. And it has been limited to the survey of Rwanda territory.

1.6.2. Scope in time

The study analysed the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1993–1994, the year in which Genocide perpetrated against Tutsi was committed.

1.6.3. Scope in domain/ field

The study has been limited in field of peace studies and conflict transformation.

1.7. Research outline

The general introduction as chapter one of the present research will cover the general introduction, purpose of the study, definition of the problem, research questions, research objectives (general and objectives), significance of the study, scope of the study and research outline.

Chapter two deals with literature review.

Chapter three looks at the theoretical framework.

Chapter four will deal with research methodology.

Chapter five concerns the findings of research while chapter six focuses on the general conclusion and recommendations of the research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, the researcher defines and explains the key and related concepts. He analyses and discusses theories on conflict for better understanding of the research in question.

2.1. Definition of key concept

In these definitions of different key words of the work, the researcher presents an analysis of the words that make up the research. These key words are: UNAMIR, the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994.

2.1.1. United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental affiliation that plans to keep up widespread concordance and security, develop all around arranged relations among nations, achieve worldwide joint effort, and be an inside for mixing the exercises of nations (Charter of UN Chapter I, 2015). The United Nations is a universal association established in 1945. It is as of now comprised of 193 Member countries (Charter of ChapterI, 2015).

The United Nations (U.N.) has a past filled with working as a peacekeeping power the world over during seasons of contention or progress. Regularly, the states that get U.N. help are immature, and their residents become extraordinarily needy upon the grand guarantees of the U.N (Faggart, 2008).

Consequently, when the U.N. cannot maintain these guarantees, or commits critical errors through the course of its endeavors, the outcomes can be annihilating. With a long resume of peacekeeping missions, one would imagine that the U.N. sits in an ideal situation to comprehend the necessities of important gatherings during seasons of contention just as its own capacities in addressing these requirements (Faggart, 2008).

2.1.2. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

The UNAMIR is a mission with United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 on 5 October 1993 (UN Security Council, October 1993). It was proposed to help the execution of the Arusha Accords, set apart on 4 August 1993, which was expected to end the Rwandan Civil War (Department of Public Information (DPI), 1993). The UN crucial from October 1993 to March 1996(DPI, 1993). Its activities were proposed to enable the concordance to

cycle between the Hutu-controlled Rwandese government and the Tutsi-overpowered rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (DPI, 2015). The UNAMIR has gotten a great deal of thought for its activity in failing, on account of the limitations of its rules of responsibility, to hinder the Rwandan destruction and scene of engaging. Its order loosened up past the RPF remove of the organization and into the Great Lakes banish crisis. The pivotal likewise saw as a critical frustration (DPI, 2015).

2.1.3. Protection of civilian

The powerlessness to get a commonplace understanding is a purpose behind step by step contact between presumably the jobs of the UN (Harston, 2016).

The Protection of Civilians (POC) is an obligation which incorporates all pieces of a peacekeeping crucial, military and police capacities. Much of the time, peacekeeping missions are approved to utilize every single vital mean, up to and including the utilization of savage power, to forestall or react to dangers of physical savagery against inhabitant, inside capacities and zones of tasks, and without preference to the obligation of the host government (Walter *et al.*, 1999). Notwithstanding this reality, there is no away from of "regular people" to be ensured, neither in the UNSCR nor individual UNPKO mission commands (Kiwako, 2013).

Numerous peacekeeping missions have a command to ensure regular citizens, specifically those under danger of physical mischief. The Protection of Civilians (POC) is an obligation which incorporates all pieces of a peacekeeping strategic, military and police capacities (Walter *et al.*, 1999).

The special trait of UN peacekeeping tasks is their ability to shield civilians from physical viciousness. Peacekeeping missions receive a comprehensive methodology, and the regular citizen, police and military segments of the crucial connected at the hip to accomplish this target (Kelly, 2009).

2.2. Literature review

2.2.1. Literature on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

2.2.1.1. The contribution of the United Nations in conflict resolution

Awareness of the compromise requires a beginning of the fundamental foundations and system conveyed for settling conflicts. The United Nations is one of the comprehensive affiliations that have been attempting to diminish trouble and quest for generally concordance (Gody, 2012). Notwithstanding, an important solicitation can be introduced here: what is the movement of the United Nations in deal? The dedication of the United Nations in peaceful settlements has various assessments relying on the legitimacy laid by the Charter and the methodology that can be utilized in fight. As indicated by article 1 of the Charter, the UN is made sure about for keeping up comprehensive understanding and security (Gody, 2012).

The all inclusive law and the standard of value under the concordance and security umbrella, the United Nations give various ways to deal with oversee settles. For example, Chapter VI of the Charter depends upon the quiet framework for settling talks about. These techniques are to be utilized in questions which, if raise, can imperil overall congruity and security. As indicated by Article 33 of the Charter, get-togethers to a question will settle their varieties by intervention, conciliation, mediation, legitimate settlement, and resort to provincial offices 53 or methodology or other quiet procedures for their own decision (Gody, 2012).

Notwithstanding these serene methods for settling debates, Chapter VII spotlight on taking activities when global harmony is in question, when there is a burst of peace or a demonstration of animosity (Gody, 2012).

The tremendousness of concentrating on Africa is the uniqueness of the debates met there. By a long shot, Africa can be viewed as the most upset landmass resisting various kinds of contentions, loosening up from interstate clashes to fundamental wars and ethnic clashes. Among others zone of contentions are: Algeria, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Achnkeng, 2013).

2.2.1.2. The Role and Purpose of the United Nations

The structure of the United Nations is contained by the Security Council: issues of war and concordance, General Assembly: fundamental parliamentary, budgetary plan, and dynamic

organ, Economic and Social Council: singular satisfaction around the world, International Court of Justice: settling of overall legitimate conversations, Secretariat: essentially the pioneer organ of the UN, driven by one individual doled out the secretary general. (Achnkeng, 2013).

The UN additionally tries to get states a typical stage to manage social issues and battle general issues, for example, neediness, assistance causing nations to accomplish a transcendent educational framework, to decrease hunger, and obliterate ailments what's more fumes major opportunities regard (Achnkeng, 2013).

One of the most known exercises of the UN is congruity keeping whereby blue top powers are sent to deal with understanding. Today the UN has 15 congruity keeping missions⁵⁷operating around the globe and a political basic Afghanistan (UN, 2008).

The target of the peacekeeping is to make quiet condition in some aspect of the world that are torn by clashes. In any case, for the UN to send agreeableness keeping powers, assent of the clashing social affairs is required. The peacekeepers ought to be reasonable and ought not utilize power alongside in a circumstance of confidence (UN, 2008).

The UN is moreover partakes in amicability building, battle neutralization and objective and humanitarian intercession. Additionally, the affiliation goes after other extensive issues that spread open action too. For example, the UN is similarly managing the confirmation of condition, evacuees and defending calamitous occasion losses. Additionally, the affiliation progresses famous government, essential freedoms, sex consistency and social unforeseen development. However, our fundamental worry here is to manage the example of quiet settlement of requests. The UN has in like way been a get-together of conversation of comprehensive and open issues of individuals through the General Assembly. Every so often, the connection capacities as an essential thinking foundation using an untouchable intercession to choose battle (UN, 2008).

There are distinctive tranquil ways that the UN uses to intervene as outsider running from plan to authentic settlement. The worry of the going with some piece of this part is to talk about the specific framework utilized by the UN in deal (Gody, 2012).

2.2.1.3. UN peacekeeping operations

The U.N.'s honesty awards it to organize and work in probably the hardest spots on earth. Also, over and over, looks at have demonstrated that U.N. peacekeeping is undeniably also persuading and completed far less cash than what any association can do segregated (Ban Ki-moon in Beekhuis, 2015). We live in wild occasions. Since September 11, 2001, different mental oppressor affiliations have restricted, the Arab Spring has eliminated a few set up governments in the Middle East and Africa and the Palestinian/Israeli clash keeps smoldering. These occasions design how all things considered intriguing philosophical emotions can cause interstate strains or clashes. Notwithstanding, disrupting impact might be the essential predictable factor inside the primary remaining century. With globalization and the universes proceeded with restoring towards movement, barbarities that used to be a world away are by and by being happened in our parlors. The United Nations (UN) keeps up a commitment to its stand-out solicitation of keeping up concordance all through the world. In this part we will take a gander at the UN structure, its action concerning keeping up the concordance and, using important assessments, some possible blemishes in the UN structure that may debilitate its general adequacy in (Beekhuis, 2015).

The United Nations, a substitution to the League of Nations, was formally settled in 1945 as a pleasing component between 51 States. The UN Charter for this affiliation, pushed by new memories of two widespread wars, revolves predominately around keeping up amicability and security between all nations of the world. Today, the UN has 192 sovereign nation people and its authenticity is unchallenged in (Beekhuis, 2015).

With an essential order to look after harmony, the inquiry remains, are Peace Keeping Operations (PKO's) still a reasonable device and would they say they are compelling in executing this command? (Beekhuis, 2015).

The essential command of UN is universal harmony, this association likewise keeps up boards liable for giving direction, help, guideline or even lawful implementation for themes that run from HIV scourges, environmental change, improvement, basic liberties', worldwide law or even avionics guideline, all intended to guarantee a stable worldwide network (Beekhuis, 2015).

The ace for these activities begins from the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42, which conveys that the Security Council "may make such travel through air, ocean, or land

controls as might be basic to keep up or re-establish general concordance and security (Beekhuis, 2015).

These occasions have likewise caused an adjustment in the worldwide climate. Writing composed since 2010, on the adequacy of peacekeeping activities, nonetheless, is fairly inadequate. The latest investigations go back to 2008. Innovation has likewise expanded the attention on peacekeeping as universal correspondents are frequently on the cutting edges of barbarities of ten causing quick and resonating clamors from society for activity (Beekhuis, 2015).

The UN is seen by numerous individuals as the most genuine global association to complete these activities however is not the main universally perceived body that has participated in this endeavor. NATO and ECOWAS have both assumed indispensable jobs with respect to their own PKO's, anyway their investment would be restricted external their zones of impact on the planet (Beekhuis, 2015).

Like these researchers, I partition the writing into pre-2000 distributions and post-2000 distributions, with the essential spotlight on crafted by post 2000 researchers. A large portion of these creators have directed inside and out exact investigations on the subject of the adequacy of UN peacekeeping tasks (PKO) (Beekhuis, 2015).

I additionally center around a few creators who led explicit contextual analyses and show the immense distinction between the emphasis on the whole assortment of work contrasted with the more explicit contextual analyses. In 2003, Fortna directed an investigation of a few of the researchers from the 1980s and 1990s and discovered them split two to one on in the case of peacekeeping had any impact on the creation or upkeep of harmony. She likewise concentrated a portion of the creators from mid 2000 and again discovered them split on the viability, with a third creator shifting back and forth expressing that in certain conditions it is successful and in others it is not (Beekhuis, 2015).

Onlooker Missions, the reconciliation of unarmed eyewitnesses accused of guaranteeing the upkeep of a built up understanding; Customary Peacekeeping which makes a neutral territory between warring groups; Multidimensional Peacekeeping which essentially joins non-military personnel elements that help with administrative capacities like police work, political decision holiness or monetary guidance; and harmony Enforcement which is the burden of harmony through power when vital Fortna uses similar definitions to characterize peacekeeping in both of her examinations. Be that as it may, Gilligan and Sergenti do not

fuse any separation in regards to the kinds of missions which, as I emphasize later, is a defect inside their work (Beekhuis, 2015).

The merciful measures were a conclusion to brutality and the severe standards was a conclusion to savagery related to some expansion in democratization. The after effects of their investigation indicated a blend of outside impacts from their information directly affecting the opportunities for harmony (Beekhuis, 2015).

The other approach that has been utilized to contemplate the viability of UNPKO's is that of the contextual investigation. While these examinations can't be duplicated and don't really direct correlation with the entire, they do investigate explicit models and consequently can represent intangibles explicit to an occasion that are hard to measure in light of the fact that every strategic unique. Researcher Shashi Tharoor searched explicitly for these intangibles that legitimately influence the result of UN activities. The essential immaterial that was found, identifies with the UN command under which a considerable lot of the PKO's are directed related to the assent of the warring groups. This frequently implies the UN must depend on the warring groups so as to work inside their space, while simultaneously they are endeavoring to consider this gathering responsible (Beekhuis, 2015).

The producer utilized the PKO's of Somalia and Yugoslavia to help this distortion; related to a declaration from past Secretary General Boutros-Ghali If there isn't political will among the holy people to manage the issue the United Nations can't compel congruity. This features an eminent irregularity with peacekeeping in that the parties to concordance must adhere to the sets of the PKO power, while that power, utilizing their arms for basically cautious purposes, reliably doesn't have the alternative to genuinely realize these solicitations (Beekhuis, 2015).

Another issue that was incorporated was the way that the UN does not keep up any foreseen power, consequently when a solicitation is passed down from the Security Council, the DPKO and DFAS should gather officers and gear from nations that have ensured these things yet this doesn't propose that they will genuinely yield their utilization at whatever point the open entryway appears. Reliably it changes into a piecemeal procedure of work force and gear that are not orchestrated together and whose hardware isn't reasonable. This advances to the issue of interoperability. Tharoor utilized the depiction of a close by get-together of fire fighters getting a call to react to a fire and a brief timeframe later attempting to amass the hardware and staff to react (Beekhuis, 2015).

So as to address this need Tharoor presents the alternative for the foundation of a fortification force, given by constituent countries, which answer really to the Security Council. A spoiler to this choice is Ramesh Thakur who driven a pertinent examination of the Somalia activity. His fundamental question is that there should be a detachment among PKO's and military mediation and that the UN should be cautious, as remembered the case for Somalia, not to change into an overall security power. I would contend that the change between the two is somewhat thin and might be crossed without goal and accordingly it would be incredibly hard for the UN to separate between the two. For whatever length of time that they convey weapons for protective purposes there is the chance of commitment, thusly struggle with either gathering of said strife is conceivable, even in a cautious stance (Beekhuis, 2015).

The writing has likewise offered different choices to illuminate some the UN's impediments. Mats Berdal and David Ucko feature two variable imperfections inside the UN structure and offer an answer for conquer these blemishes. The two essential restrictions that they feature are 'asset requirements' and 'lucidity of political and key purposes (Beekhuis, 2015).

Concerning asset requirements the creators refer to the UN's trouble in building up a firm reacting power or, when built up the failure of the UN or the part states to appropriately prepare their powers for the entrusted mission (Beekhuis, 2015).

2.2.1.4. The United Nations and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

The pacific objective of requests is alluded to under section VI of the Charter of the United Nations whereby it is made under article 33 (1) of the Charter that the parties to any conversation, the continuation of which is likely going to endanger the upkeep of generally concordance and security, will, most importantly, look for an answer in terms of professional career, enquiry, intervention, mollification, verification, legal settlement, resort to close by affiliations or plans, or other quiet strategies for their own decision. Generally, the UN goes about as an outsider in a contention and use exchange, enquiries, intervention, appeasement, mediation or legal settlement. Anyway as of now referenced in such cases the assent of the clashing gatherings is given before the UN can connect with as an outsider (UN, 1975).

Likewise, there is no specific necessity upon the UN to intercede as a third to determine any contention. The Role of the Security Council Composed of 5 constant individuals and 10 others turning, the UN Security Council is on paper the most significant organs of the UN

with keeping recommendation and destinations that part states should see as alluded to in article 25 of the Charter (Monusco, 2006).

When in doubt, the Security Council assesses the danger of risk to by and large friendliness and essential opportunities infringement, where a contention happens inside a state before further choice can be taken. A contest can be brought to the idea of the Security Council either by a segment express, the General Assembly or the Secretary General. Essentially, the Security Council makes an accommodating assessment of the realness of the contention concerning its thought (UN, 2011).

By then the Security Council will push for a tranquil instrument to illuminate such clash. Tragically, every so often states won't keep the choice of the UN, considering impact which by and large makes any intervention as impediment to inside undertakings. Zone VII of the Charter cements the movement of the Security Council. Article 39 gives the advantage to Security Council to pick the closeness of any danger to the congruity, break of the concordance, or show of hatred (UN, 2011).

The article comparatively permits the Security Council to take calm choice that joins non-coercive activities, for example, fiscal favors and arm blacklists (article 41). Be that as it may, under article 42, coercive measures can in addition be taken by the Security Council, and applied if there is have to do in light of everything. The authenticity of the intensity of the Security Council is seen under part VII (UN, 2011).

The territory amasses rights upon the Security Council to pick the standard of point of view and portray comprehensive law. Likewise, the part also permits the Security Council to repulse standards and culprits what's more to step in, in the private ward of states. "In such manner, Chapter VII essential is the essential occasion that part states can assume that central UN rules, for example, impact (Article 2.1) and non-mediation (Article 2.7) are not holy (UN, 2011).

2.2.1.5. General Framework of the Role of UN in Africa

The United Nation's quality and exercises in Africa were the results of the finish of expansionism and coordination of the territory with the remainder of the world. The connection has been significant in keeping an eye out for African clashes. Regardless, today it has all the reserves of being more tangled to accomplish certain objectives in the domain because of complex relationship that colonizer and colonized set up in Africa. Today, the UN

is opposed with amazing difficulties in Africa beginning from proceeding with clashes, urgency, weakened prosperity, issues to desertification (UN, 2011).

The exercises of the UN in Africa revolve generally around monetary and social improvement with the ideal goal of killing the nonattendance of fundamental needs, for example, hunger, giving consumable water, training young people, and these exercises are kept up by the workplace of the uncommon guide on Africa since 2003. Made by this office is to improve in general help for African new turn of events and security and to improve coordination of UN system look after (UN, 2011).

It is vital to the utilization system under the Charter in 1945 Chapter VII is the segment of the extraordinary case since it is disdainful contrasting with express standards created by the Charter as the non-utilization of force in relations between states (Article 2 portion 4) and non-block in inside undertakings of a State (Article 2 area 7) (UN, 2005).

In its application, the Security Council may allow the utilization of power and military intervention in a state. Thusly, the start of 90s, the measures of activities of peacekeeping were made by fairness of this section (UN, 2005).

Part VII follows Chapter VI, Section of assent, concentrated on the quiet settlement of requests. This sale mirrors the worries and goals of the drafters: The thought on quiet target and desire for emergencies and clashes. In any case, any authentic avoidance can't administer without a chance of activity, endorsement if pivotal. Unquestionably, any filtered through society requires responsive measures or favours for the infringement of rules is, in overall society depicted by the Charter, the movement of Chapter VII. It will all things considered give the Council forces to police the overall structure (UN, 2005).

The measures embraced are to pressed the defaulter to stop purposefully, altogether under pressure, to a wrecked direct, at the end of the day, a lead that isn't most likely going to subvert or disturb the amicability and security (UN, 2005).

There are not many cut off centers to the forces of the Security Council when it acts under Chapter VII, close to consistence with the soul of the Charter. This comparably deduces on a basic level, the Security Council must disable all different systems for challenge objective before making off to an authentic military move. Appropriately, Chapter VII sets up a game plan of dynamic endorsements, which sorts out the usage of a bar around the assailant country: blacklist discretionary, budgetary and military (UN, 2005).

Meanwhile, the nation is detached and blocked from the overall framework. Definitely, need development is composed as a check, since it is appeared as a measure that will be applied if the assailant isn't poor upon discretionary and money related supports (UN, 2005).

This impediment is strengthened by the way that the Council cannot have any basic bearing these earlier backings and bring a brief military development. Truth be told, the Council is allowed to settle on choices and its assets, it is remarkable, its degree of activity is fluctuated, and this is the detect the development is a tangle. Supplement has been resolved to balance as opposed to teach (UN, 2005).

It is against this capacity - unimaginably reasonable, the Charter doesn't depict the condition - that the Security Council ought to suggest or pick what measures be taken to keep up or re-establish in general arrangement and security. The use of Chapter VII or any of its articles, similar to some other choice of the Security Council other than issues of strategy relies on an anticipated vote of the suffering individuals. As per Article 27, it must be taken by "an agreed vote of nine individuals including the agreeing votes of the suffering individuals." Essentially; the abstention of a consistent part has not frustrated the choice of the Security Council (UN, 2005).

During the 2000s, the Security Council would all in all suffer in its demonstration of getting objectives under Chapter VII tasks to make congruity in awkward security conditions: Darfur, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Congo (UN, 2020).

The Security Council additionally presented another showing of not placing in that part of the Chapter VII solicitation permitting the utilization of every single essential measure. The Council subsequently obliged with the Chapter VII blueprints regulating the utilization of force (UN, 2020).

2.2.2. The UN assistance mission for Rwanda (1993–1994)

The UN mission after Somalia that had the best effect on the utilization of-power banter was that in Rwanda. Basically, it was a nil return in the record of the utilization of power by UN missions, since it declined to utilize power. In any case the experience of Rwanda was an incredible stabilizer to the post-Somalia and post-Bosnia standard way of thinking that the UN couldn't or ought not to endeavor to utilize power to force harmony or forestall net infringement of basic liberties (Trevor, 2015).

Conceived as a conventional Chapter VI peacekeeping activity, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was conveyed in October 1993 (UNSCR 872). Its order was: to screen recognition of the Arusha Peace Agreement of August 1993, including the cantonment, grounding and joining of the military of the gatherings (Karhilo, 1995), to build up a weapons-secure territory in the capital, Kigali, and screen the security circumstance until decisions could be held; to help in mine freedom, the repatriation of Rwandan exiles and the coordination of compassionate help; and to explore episodes including the gendarmerie and police (Trevor, 2015).

UNAMIR had the setback to be set up in the wake of the Somalia fiasco and during the proceeding with injuries of Bosnia. The US organization, driven by worry that the US open and Congress were experiencing 'peacekeeping weariness', was hesitant to include the UN and the USA in one more untidy intra-state struggle in Africa inspired by a paranoid fear of excruciating political and military snares and generally feared of all their military faculty returning home in body packs (UN, 1999).

As of late, there has been expanding banter about the effectiveness and the pertinence of exorbitant and complex harmony tasks and the "little advancement" saw with this impact. The analysis of conventional and multidimensional peacekeeping identifies with their ability to keep up delicate truces, continue and backing the combination of harmony past political exchanges and, the vast majority of all, ensure regular citizens (Stean, 2010).

Joined Nations peacekeeping tasks have confronted numerous difficulties since their beginning, running from scrutinizes of the very pith of peacekeeping to optional or tertiary viewpoints not straightforwardly identified with activities. Correspondingly, the idea of "regular citizen peacekeeping" is progressively being evoked as an option in contrast to the current harmony uphold activities (Stean, 2010).

2.2.2.1. UNAMIR mandate in Rwanda

UNAMIR command was:

- (a) To add to the security of the city of Kigali cover alia with in a weapons-secure area created by the get-togethers in and around the city;
- (b) To screen affirmation of the détente understanding, which requires the foundation of cantonment and get-together zones and the constraint of the new fair-minded ground and other deactivation structures?

- (c) To screen the security condition during the last period of the glimmering government's association, planning to the decisions;
- (d) To help with mine breathing space, mainly through preparing ventures;
- (e) To explore as per the get-togethers or on its own drive cases of affirmed rebellion with the strategies of the Arusha Peace Agreement identifying with the mix of the military, and search for after any such cases with the parties cautious and report accordingly as fitting to the Secretary-General;
- (f) To screen the example of repatriation of Rwandese untouchables and resettlement of cleared people to insist that it is done in a made sure about and methodical way;
- (g) To help the coordination of liberal help rehearses related to helping works out;
- (h) To research and report on events as for the activities of the gendarmerie and police (UN Security Council, fifth October 1993).

On 5 April 1994, the UN projected a voting form to loosen up the order of UNAMIR to 29 July 1994, in the wake of imparting significant concern at the deferment in the establishment of the broad based transient Government and the Transitional National Assembly and "stress at the crumbling in security in the country, particularly in Kigali (Department of Public Information (DPI), 2015).

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council projected a voting form to diminish the number of troops from 2,500 to 270 work power in Resolution 912 (UN Security Council, 1994).

On 17 May 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 918, which loosened up UNAMIR's structure to get the going together with extra commitments: (a) To add to the security and attestation of eliminated people, evacuees and typical individuals in hazard in Rwanda, including through the foundation and upkeep, where sensible, of secure strong areas; (b) To give security and sponsorship to the course of facilitating supplies and charitable help exercises (UN Security Council, 1994).

2.2.2.2. UNAMIR and peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is commonly portrayed as an UN development and, is routinely connected with two names: Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson. These two well-known figures set forward standards that portrayed what is suggested as peacekeeping (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000).

The United Nations Organization was made so as to "spare the succeeding ages from another scourge of war" (UN, 2008), however its sanction doesn't explicitly specify or contain arrangements for peacekeeping tasks (Carrière, 2010, Liu, 1999, Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000).

Peacekeeping has additionally been characterized as the avoidance, control, balance and end of threats, through tranquil outsider intercession, sorted out and coordinated universally, utilizing global powers of officers, police, and regular people to re-establish and look after harmony (Diehl, 1993). It very well may be perceived as a system utilized in peace promotion, instead of compromise. It intends to keep up the solidness got through harmony making and forestall the acceleration or new episodes of savagery, subsequently making a domain helpful for peacebuilding (UN, 2018).

Peacekeeping has advanced from a symbolic nearness of spectators to a scope of exceptionally complex exercises and capacities that help harmony in struggle torn nations and help keep up global harmony and steadiness. Peacekeeping has in this way developed from exercises that essentially checked the execution of delicate harmony bargains in the expectation of making conditions helpful for tending to the foundations of a contention, to incorporate exercises, for example, the insurance of regular citizens, organization of philanthropic help and the re-foundation of the standard of law (UN, 2018)..

Peacebuilding intends to change a contention by tending to its underlying drivers (Carrière, 2010), and to conquer the inconsistencies which lie at the base of a contention (Galtung, 1996). It supports crafted by harmony making and peacekeeping (UN, 2018).

While harmony making is a political cycle including conciliatory exchanges and intervention prompting nonaggression treaties (Carrière, 2010), peacebuilding addresses auxiliary issues and the drawn out relations between clashing gatherings (Ramsbotham et al., 2005).

2.2.3. Literature on the protection of civilian

The whole thought of security of customary individuals by UN peacekeeping requires careful planning, coordination, and bargain of attempts with different players to abandon covering, and to let everybody do what they do the best.

2.2.3.1. Background and History of POC in Peacekeeping

All through the previous 20 years, the United Nations has been moved closer over and over to obstruct or end rising tide of successful furiousness and utter detestations against normal individuals the world over. These showings have been a drive for the Security Council to endeavor to finish ruthlessness in various clash zones. The frailty to obstruct butchers in Rwanda, Somalia, and Srebrenica during the 1990s incited calls for development in the sensibility of the UN reaction. Fundamental change was required (Harston, 2016).

The Security Council as of late saw the insurance of customary individuals as a responsibility in its own advantage in 1998 of every two reports from the Secretary-General: on concordance and difficulty in Africa (S/1998/318) and on the confirmation of accommodating help to evacuees (S/1998/883). In 1999, the primary Security Council topical goal on the insurance of regular folks in furnished clash focused on the need to address the main drivers of outfitted clash including sexual orientation disparity to improve the assurance of regular people on a drawn out premise. From that point forward, Security Council goals have additionally characterized the job of peacekeeping in ensuring regular folks and the different commanded assignments that add to it (Harston, 2016).

On 12 February 1999, the Security Council watched out for insurance of typical individuals with expanded reality, saying it would react to conditions in which normal individuals were intentionally based on (S/PrST/1999/6), and referenced further proposals from the Secretary-General. Consolidating those recommendations, the Council passed its first goal on the security of ordinary occupants on 17 September 1999 with objective 1265. This target focused on the need to stick to overall kind law and secure benevolent staff (Harston, 2016).

Since 1999, the Secretary-General has given 11 reports on the protection of customary individuals in prepared conflict (UN, 2015). The 2009 report distinguished the accompanying five center difficulties: guaranteeing consistence with their commitments under universal law, specifically the direct of threats, upgrading consistence by non State equipped gatherings, improving the job of peacekeeping and different missions, upgrading compassionate access, and upgrading responsibility for infringement (UN, 2015).

The new sort of multidimensional strategic generally supplanted good old between positional peacekeeping. Present day missions spread for all intents and purposes all parts of the obligations and exercises of the cutting edge State, and the insurance of regular people

progressively includes high on the rundown of needs in practically all the shifted exercises of the mission (Harston, 2016).

2.2.3.2. Who Provides Protection to Civilians

The security of regular people is a perplexing undertaking including numerous entertainers: the host government; neighbourhood networks; gatherings to the contention; compassionate, common liberties, improvement, and different accomplices. Every peacekeeping crucial conveyed in a particular political and operational condition, with numerous entertainers to give security. Along these lines, it is fundamental in every circumstance to decide the most ideal way the mission could help out all the assurance entertainers (Harston, 2016).

For the principle assurance entertainers, the host State government consistently has the essential obligation regarding ensuring the non-military personnel populace inside its fringes. This affirmation should start from State security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and legitimate structures (Harston, 2016).

In states of arranged clash, all social gatherings to the debate, including non-State entertainers, are fit under overall strong law to regard and assurance the non-military work power individuals (Harston, 2016).

At the point when open authorities and get-togethers to the dispute, including non-State performers, can't or hesitant to meet these responsibilities, UN peacekeeping errands, empathetic affiliations, and other confirmation performers are needed to give protection and shield the benefits of the affected non-military faculty people (Harston, 2016).

UN peacekeeping tasks with POC orders are certified by the Security Council to help or supplement the affirmation attempts of host State foundations. Unmistakable key territory the attestation of standard people. The military and police parts, alongside regular citizen segments, for example, common issues, basic freedoms, political issues, and others, have explicit commands with respect to POC (Harston, 2016).

2.2.3.3. The POC Mandate and the Authorization to Use Force

The UN Security Council is the rule body at risk for the upkeep of in general congruity and security. It sets up UN peacekeeping endeavors and depicts their enlargement and solicitation. Most errands consolidate military and police works out, for example, truce

observing and the watching of cradle zones, just as joint undertakings with local associations in the checking of more extensive nonaggression treaties. Missions may likewise incorporate police movement and regular citizen action in the administration of races and the checking of basic freedoms (Harston, 2016).

The Security Council gives the legitimate power, vital bearing, and political direction for all UN peacekeeping activities (DPKO/DFS, 2008). It is the key degree of power, order, and control. Right when the Council gets a handle on a target declaring the solicitation for an UN peacekeeping development, it vests the operational ace for arranging the activity in the UN Secretary-General (Harston, 2016). The standard wording for a POC demand reliably takes after the going with. The Security Council Concludes that the solicitation for name of PKO will be... to ensure, without tendency to the commitment of the host Government, standard people under unavoidable hazard of physical savagery, inside its abilities and spaces of sending (Harston, 2016).

2.2.3.4. Protection of civilians Policy, Basic Guidelines, and Principles

All UN peacekeepers common inhabitant, military, and police ought to acquaint themselves with the going with key UN plans and rules concerning the usage of the insurance of standard individuals demand in the field (Harston, 2016).

The DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, which went into power on 1 April 2015, is the key system report for all UN peacekeepers. It is intended to build up an unmistakable and reliable comprehension of the order and its execution over all missions and segments, and to give benchmark direction to missions on center parts of command usage. This approach consolidates the operational idea on the security of regular people in peacekeeping (DPKO/DFS, 2008).

In angle on some distance attaining law": Missions are given P.C solicitations to baffle horrible encroachment of fundamental open entryways law, eliminated law, and the standards appropriate to those laws. Commensurate laws and normally speaking preferred law should manage the usage of electricity by using the UN. Navy and police staffs in missions are in like course expected to post to the guidelines of Engagement (ROE) and Directive on using force (DUF) of the project. Tremendous pieces of those standards merge proportionality and the evading of coincidental inevitable end result (Harston, 2016).

A need calls for: where the assignment request unequivocally units percent, by way of then protection of civilians have to be made in all selections about using the venture's dispositions. The host government reliably has the top responsibility with respect to protection of civilians, while the assignment helps (Harston, 2016).

A Peacekeeper duty: at the day's cease, while the law-making frame is missing the mark in its P.C duty, peacekeepers expect on that danger and authority inside their capacity and regions of connection (Harston, 2016).

A all-round set up to guarantee: The protection of standard human beings isn't always responsive. Percent ought to be ideal for dynamic. The undertaking should be running constantly to pre-empt and deter mercilessness towards not unusual citizens (Harston, 2016). under profitable income and manipulate: despite the fact that the unique representative of the Secretary general (SRSG), the pressure Commander, and the Police Commissioner have an all-out obligation concerning the physical activities of people from the project, they equivalently have a promise to ensure that the human beings beneath their sales recognize and maintain brief to the tips (Harston, 2016)..

Consonant with the standards of peacekeeping: Peacekeeping mission despite such endeavor to submit to their exceptional rules. Assent of the host government, fairness, utilization of power in self-insurance and as in any case embraced by the Security Council, including for the certification of ordinary individuals (Harston, 2016).

An entire Mission movement: POC is the duty of both the non-military personnel and formally dressed pieces of the mission. Their joint action must be organized and composed (Harston, 2016).

An exhaustive methodology: All the entertainers (neighbourhood, public, provincial, and worldwide) engaged with insurance in the crucial must cooperate in an organized and complete manner (Harston, 2016).

A social order based strategy: It is fundamental that the local system isn't simply included, yet also takes a lead in exercises to guarantee customary people. Regardless, there is a peril of haggling the security of close by people in contact with the general system both military and standard resident (Harston, 2016).

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is based on the theorization related to the key variables of the study such as normative theory and constructivist theory.

3.1. Normative theory

Frost (1996), Smith (1992), Brown (2001) and Hoffman (1994) present in their works a strong defence of normative theory. Showing that norms matter and how understanding where these norms come from is crucial for international law.

Normative theory refers to the moral or ethical dimension of activities in the international sphere and the question is whether macro-theories and scientific practice in the field of politics in general should extend to the point that they not only explain reality, but also evaluate and suggest certain changes. In other words, this notion deals with the question of whether theories should operate within a set of norms (standards of good and bad in a simplistic sense) in terms of which existing reality is evaluated (Neethling, 2004).

By this theory, it is sustained here then, that the response to the question of how we ought to act, as well as the reasoning behind it, varies greatly between communities (Hoffman, 1994). According to Lawson (2003), the question for normative theory applies to issues such as: what kind of ethics is most appropriately applied to issues such as these?

Normative theory relates to norms, rules, values and standards in world politics and as such ranges over all aspects of the subject area including international law, international political economy and diplomacy (Evans & Newnham, 1998).

The nature of normative theory is that it is explicitly built on moral principles and norms and provides the guidelines for promoting ethical leader behavior. Every exponent of normative theory argues that, adopting their perspective will help leaders to function well as both moral persons and moral managers (Ivy, 2007).

The proponents of normative rational choice that just as rational beliefs (theoretical reason) ought to follow the rules of logic and probability in order to be valid, rational actions (practical reason) must follow from the rules of utility maximization, which incorporate but go beyond logic and probability, in order to be optimal (Cherniak, 1995). The source of

normative theory in politics is the need to know not simply what is done, but what ought to be done (Dyer, 1989).

For normative theorists, the challenge is to explain reality in order to evaluate and even change it (Nel, 1999). Normative theory addresses questions relating to standards of behaviour, obligations, responsibilities, rights and duties as they pertain to individuals, states and the international state system. More particularly, studies with a normative orientation focus on contentious issues such as the moral significance of states and borders, the ethics of war and peace, the nature of human rights, the case for (political and military) intervention, and the requirements of international distributive justice. (Evans & Newnham, 1998).

Based on the above indicates, normative is considered to be what usual or correct way of doing things is. Normative can also be defined as what is considered to be correct, usual, normal and standard based on norms. Principle that tells leaders how they ought to act. Not one leadership can be described as being normative.

In this research, the normative theory is important to examine where there was respect of norms and rules by UNAMIR in case of its assistance mission in Rwanda while the genocide perpetrated against Tutsi was executed in 1994.

3.2. Constructivism theory

Wendt (1992) argues that states acquire identities through interaction with other states. These identities create a basis for the creation of interests and they are dependent on the social context they are acting within (Wendt, 1992). An institution like the UN represents a structure of identities and interest and is pretty stable as it is often reflected in formal rules and norms of the actors involved, and therefore an institution does not exist apart from the actor's ideas about the world (Wendt, 1992). Constructivism believes that state's interest, identity, and norms are created in the interaction between each other and because of that interaction, institutions emerge.

3.2.1. Constructivist perspective on UNAMIR

Looking at the functionality of the behaviour of institutions, Constructivists explains it as dependent upon the cultural norms of an international organization that is given both endogenous and exogenous (Finnemore & Barnett, 1999). On one hand, the rules, rituals, and

beliefs that shape the way the people working within the organization interpret and respond to the outside world are characterized as the cultural norms within the international organization. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the rules of peacekeeping that developed within the UN shaped the way they categorized the conflict in Rwanda, as a civil war rather than a genocide (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This is an example of internal cultural norms leading to dysfunctional behaviour and provides a perspective as to the lack of international response (Finnemore & Barnett, 1999). Cultural norms and the global culture that surrounds and international organization can also influence the dysfunctional behaviour of international organizations (Finnemore & Barnett, 1999). With Neoliberalism the focus was on how design factors within the international institutions affect the lack of success in implementing it (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). In contrast, Constructivism looks at how the global culture of peacekeeping in general influences the choice of a peacekeeping strategy, hence looking at how the international community and other states affects the choice of strategy which may leave the UN to ignore alternative strategies that might be more suitable (Finnemore & Barnett, 1999).

As a result of the UN expanding the number of peacekeeping operations in a short amount of time and around the same time as the Rwandan genocide, there was a change in the nature of peacekeeping challenging the original rules of consent (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Croft et al., 1996). This is relevant because in order to understand the culture of peacekeeping it is important to consider the evolution and practices of it (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). As the complexity and the demand for peacekeeping missions increased, the original rules in greater degree got ignored with more enforcement based strategies, which goes back to the culture dominating a certain peacekeeping strategy over another (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

After a series of failed peacekeeping missions being blamed on the enforcement based strategies, the Security Council implemented more restrictive criteria for authorizing a peacekeeping operation (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This rule changes and the tensions of defining the nature of the peacekeeping culture of the UN, influenced by the global culture and relevant conflicts going on at the same times, led to barriers for the international response of the genocide and the appropriate deployment of UNAMIR (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000). A practical example is the lack of clarity in the communications between UNAMIR and the Headquarters regarding which rules of engagement that was in force during the Rwandan genocide (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000). The new restrictive criterias for authorizing a

peacekeeping operation would explain why there was a lack of acknowledgment from the international community of the crisis being genocide, hence the little response to it (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

3.2.2. Constructivism's limitations in explaining the case

Constructivism is argued to need to pay more attention to agency and research design in order to explain where their social structures (norms) comes from as well as why and how they change over time (Checkel, 1998). Because Constructivism focuses on intersubjective understandings like norms, they are less interested in questioning individual and domestic agency and how that affects the creation of identity, norms, and rules (Checkel, 1998). The lack of interest in domestic agency relates to Constructivism limitations in explaining the lack of international response in the Rwandan genocide. This because of the big role ethnic tensions and domestic politics played in the unravelling of the conflict itself, and the theory's lack of focus on it can be argued to limit the understanding of the conflict and the UN's role in the peacekeeping of it.

Despite the limitations of the two theories in explaining the lack of international response in the Rwandan genocide, they both have their strength and complementary factors in the perspectives they present. Even though it gives less clarity on how it connects to the broader, institutional and social context, the agent-centered approach of Neoliberalism provides a clear perspective on micro level factors of human behaviour (Checkel, 1998). Constructivism is, on the other hand, good at explaining macro foundations of behaviour and identity, but weak on the micro level of explanation.

These dimensions of micro versus the macro level of explanation for the case of the Rwandan genocide is also seen in the different perspectives of explanation provided by the two theories. By taking the domestic agency into account and designing a peacekeeping strategy accordingly, Neoliberalism addresses the limitations of Constructivism have to paying attention to the agency (Checkel, 1998). Constructivism on the other hand, in many ways supplements the Neoliberal explanation in giving a macro perspective by looking at how global and internal culture affected UNAMIR (Finnemore & Barnett, 1999).

The combination of the two theories as an explanation for the failure of UNAMIR can, therefore, be a valuable addition to the analysis (Checkel, 1998). By looking at how UNAMIR was designed particularly to the situation of Rwanda, what internal norms that

affected the culture of the UN and therefore the deployment of UNAMIR as well as how the global environment in terms of other relevant and current issues affecting the culture of peacekeeping in general affected the mission is highly relevant.

Based on the earlier argument of Neoliberalism and Constructivism being complimentary, and how Constructivism as a response to Neoliberalism tries to expand the analysis to a normative one but still has its limitations - it would be relevant to look at a Post structural form of peacekeeping. This is because Post structuralism once again tries to broaden the analysis of the state's role in anarchy to how they control anarchy, and peace, in regards to their own values and interests can be a problem when trying to emancipate from state level and with little engagement of the ones being emancipated (Richmond, 2008) They argue that a universal, single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive (Richmond, 2008). Therefore they suggest a perspective on peace that accepts differences, rejects sovereignty, and make space for hybridity of rationalism and critical thinking while avoiding exercising oppression and power (Richmond, 2008).

Further perspectives to be researched in regards to the deployment of UNAMIR are in what degree the level of consideration of the emancipation of the people might have affected its outcome.

Conclusion

Protection of civilians is a relatively new objective in military operations, but the tactics and concepts of its implementation requires are not. Current efforts to address the gap in doctrines, directives and practices are beginning to meet the need for guidance on how to protect at the tactical level. At the same time, this report has shown that a prerequisite for successful strategies of protection is to select the right approach in which to utilise these measures. When these measures are applied according to principles of other types of operations, the use of military force risks being misapplied or that the full utility of force to protect may not be found. This report has proposed a separate theoretical framework for the use of military force in strategies of protection of civilians that takes as its starting point the perpetrator's own utility of force to attack. It holds that the first two principles in finding utility of force to protect –how to balance military versus other levers of power first, and then how to define the content of this military power must actually come last. Only by mirroring the potential utility of force envisioned in the perpetrator's strategy and matching the

functions of force through which they use violence against civilians, can we successfully balance our own military means and ways in strategies of protection. Two paradoxes have been presented as examples of the different mind-set required. The first is that sometimes, the best protection is a good offence. This paradox holds that protection can at times only be achieved by using force in ways that will involve costs of human life. Such an approach is required when not doing so against perpetrators, for whom large-scale violence is an intrinsic part of their desired ends, will inevitably come at an even higher price. This requires using the full utility force to protect civilians by dealing a decisive blow to the perpetrators, whilst other levers of power cannot. The second paradox is that sometimes, the only protection is a good defence. It holds that the only way force can protect is by addressing the symptoms through amelioration and containment of the conflict, whilst other means must be employed to reduce the threat to civilians permanently. Faced with a perpetrator that targets civilians merely as a method, forcing the end of conflict by disarming him is not necessarily the best approach –and could lead to a failure to protect. It follows that the idea of peace-enforcement in and of itself is not necessarily compatible with protection of civilians in the second scenario. In half of all conflicts, combatants tend to fragment or evolve with time, which may increase the potential utility of force at a later stage.

Ultimately, the applicability of either paradox depends on the particular perpetrator. In reality, both are likely to come into play with multiple perpetrators within the same theatre of operation that must be dealt with by a single unified protection force. Actual and full utility of force to protect will only be found within a proper strategy of protection, which balances military means and other levers of power and employs the right functions of force. This report proposes that insight into why and how perpetrators attack civilians is a prerequisite for doing this successfully in each case, and outlines a theoretical framework accordingly.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A researcher cannot do an examination without a legitimate methodological methodology which can guarantee the validity and the authenticity results. In this chapter, the researcher disclosed the methodology to examine the UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994: scope and limits. It is included research design, methodological approach, study population, sample size, instruments of data collection,, data collection technique, data collection procedure, data management and analysis, ethical consideration, limitations and mitigation strategies.

4.1. Research design

This study is based on the research design which is characterized as a layout, an arrangement or a system indicating the methodology to be used in exploring the examination issue (Ary, 2002). This study is qualified qualitative in nature with individual interview. The qualitative research design is worried about building up answers to the why and how of the marvel being referred to. Because of this, subjective exploration is regularly characterized as being abstract (Rubin, 2005), and discoveries are accumulated in a composed organization instead of mathematical. The reception of qualitative research depends on the way that it generally manages the human experience and looks to investigate rich data typically gathered from genuinely little examples. What is more, the aim of qualitative research was to depict shadow s of significance all through the expressions of respondents. The choice of this research design was based on the fact that qualitative research focuses on words rather than numbers, depth rather than breadth. Its methods are exploratory; they seek to unearth the opinions, thoughts and feelings of respondents. It is most commonly used to help inform new concepts, theories and products. And the researcher needed to collect the views and perceptions of civilians who were supposed to be the ultimate beneficiary by the actions of the United Nation and the Security Council in general.

4.2. Methodological approach

Qualitative research was used in this research. The motivation of choosing qualitative method was that, through it, the respondents provide enough and necessary information that the researcher needs about the subject of the research. The qualitative approach is the methodology conventionally connected with the social constructivist point of view which underlines the socially made nature of this current reality. It is associated with recording,

dissecting and attempting to reveal the more noteworthy noteworthiness and centrality of human direct and experience about the subject, including clashing feelings, practices and sentiments (King and Verba, 1994). The personal interview was composed for each research objective and theme. Besides, members deliberately acknowledged to participate in the interviews.

The researcher supported and guaranteed the participants to communicate openly their position. To make the field works simple, the researcher prepared the interview guide basing on the research objectives. Members agreed and the researcher promised them the classification during the entire procedure of the research. With a regard of moral thought, members accepted to discuss little by little so that the researcher could take notes.

4.3. Population and sampling

4.3.1. Population

Population is defined as the total sum of individual cases of interest for the intended research topic (Abdalla, 2001).. In this research the population size cannot be précised because it is not known the number of population domiciled in Rwanda at that time.

4.3.2. Sample size

Based on the supposed respondents of this research, and the research design, based on the theory of Bertaux (1981) who said that the littlest adequate sample size in qualitative research can be in the range of six and fifteen members, the interview was conducted to 14 participants located in Kigali and elsewhere such as Belgium. In this regard, 9 were in Kicukiro District, 2 in Gasabo, 1 in Nyarugenge and 2 in Belgium. The reason of selecting these 14 individuals is that they were in Kigali in 1994 while the perpetrators started killing civilians.

4.3.3. Sampling

The sampling technique is tied in with choosing a littler gathering that speaks to the qualities of the bigger gathering normally named as the population with the end goal of summing up the outcomes to the whole population (Gay, 2003). During this exploration, the analyst decided to utilize purposive examining which depends on a judgment inspecting type in which the specialist purposively chooses certain gatherings or people for their importance to

the issue being considered (Gay, 2003). With purposive sampling, the researcher selected people who well know the UNAMIR because they have information about what happens during 1994 and the mission of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

4.4. Instruments of data collection

In this study, various instruments were utilized to gather information. As expressed by Silverman (1997), data grouping is a critical development in the assessment cycle. The instrument you choose to assemble the data will depend upon such a data you plan on get-together (abstract or quantitative) and how you mean to accumulate it. In such manner, before beginning the whole action, the scientist expounded an individual meeting for examining with member in this examination, profiting prime materials, for example, journals, and pens for researcher. Subsequent to organizing all necessities for information assortment, singular meetings were directed (Silverman, 1997). During gathering information, the language utilized is Kinyarwanda but all narratives were translated in English for thesis reporting.

4.5. Data collection technique

Data collection refers to all process of compiling the information by researcher for the study (Reisman, 2006). The field information assortment instruments utilized for this research are two main sources.

4.5.1. Individual Interview

This implies like information arrangement approach when the key informant immediately corresponds with the members in research as per the organized questions (Mathers, 2007). Interview is a particular sort of discussion between at least two individuals where one poses inquiries and the different reacts Ross (2010). In this examination, the procedure to talk with them was to meet them at work place. The meeting was valuable since it helped in addressing the examination questions and it has been valuable since it helped in responding to the exploration question identified with the target Ross (2010).

The interview was conducted face to face for respondents living in Kigali. However, some of them respondents responded face to face and other through e-mail. 2 respondents living in Belgium have been sent email containing interview guide and responded it. Other 12 respondents living in Kigali responded face to face through interview. For these, the researcher agreed the time with the participants to meet them at their respective location so

that they do not lose anything. After finding the safe place for guiding interview, the researcher started the interviewed the participant.

The meeting with respondents face to face was adopted in order to take enough time for getting information and care the attention of the key informants in responding. For the emails, there was not any other way for reaching the key informants living in Belgium while they had to provide information; the email was only perfect technique to collect information from them.

Hence, during each session of interviews, the researcher took noted of every interviewee. For the period of interviews, the researcher spent adequate time (one month for interview) to allow normal communications with participants (personal interview). However, the main data collection method was qualitative where the interview was conducted in Kinyarwanda and French languages, although field notes also proved to be relevant information.

4.5.2. Desk review

Desk review exercises incorporate filtering the writing, dissecting auxiliary information, and making a reference list with the goal that all records are sorted out and effectively available to all colleagues. It is the exploration procedure which is predominantly gotten by sitting at a work zone. Work region research is generally drawn in with social affair data from existing resources consequently it is routinely seen as an insignificant exertion strategy when appeared differently in relation to handle research, as the essential cost is locked in with pioneer's time, telephone charges and libraries (Novak, 1996). By this strategy, various course books giving a few related writing, different reports, theories and diaries have been perused and utilized.

4.6. Data collection procedure

The researcher started to contact face to face after submission of recommendation letter from the University of Rwanda. The data collection was done by face to face interview for the respondents living in Kigali and e-mails for respondents living in Belgium. For the face to face interview, the researcher requested them, by phone, the appointment for meeting. Some of them, especially those who live in Kigali in Gasabo, Nyarugenge and Kicukiro Districts agreed to deliver information by individual interview. Other participants (living in Belgium) preferred to fulfil the interview questions and sent them by e-mails.

Regarding the personal interview, the researcher agreed with the participants to meet in the morning. Moreover, the researcher conducted the personal interview (face to face) with 12 respondents. By approaching them, the researcher introduced herself in front of the interview participants; they have been communicated about the explanation and goal of the examination, and it was ensured that the respondents privately ought to be kept up and there ought to be no mischief to the respondents regardless. From that point forward, the scientist with the notes taker began gathering information from the members. The collection of data was done on the personal consent.

4.7. Data management and analysis

The information from interview were deciphered and made translation from French into English as depicted by Bailey (1994). The collected data was kept in Computer basing on the research objectives. During the procedure, the researcher used the systematic examination of data to categorize themes. In direction of Beazley thoughts, utilizing codes, comparable data was converged to figure the significant subjects to address the exploration questions (Beazley, 2007). The analyst dissected the substance of the field noted of meetings and substance of meeting through email so as to pull out sound and predictable portrayals and topics, which ought to in the end realize ends that addressed the investigation's examination questions. In such manner, the specialist's own remarks were separated into information units; squares of data that was analysed together and respondents' reactions to the inquiries questions have been gathered by watchwords and subjects that was obvious in their answers.

4.8. Ethical consideration

Assessment ethics are acceptable guidelines that oversee pros to lead and report research without misleading or expect to hurt the individuals from the examination or people from the overall population all things considered, whether or not deliberately or inadvertently (Churchill, 1992). In this examination, the exploration was directed by the moral qualities and rules driving the lead of an examination, particularly in zones of respondents' mystery, privacy, and confiding in different specialists when and where necessary.

In this research, there was as a respect and confidentiality (secrecy) of the informants about the questions during the research interview. The proper realization of the information needed, good cooperation, and trust worthy between the researcher and respondents. Throughout this

study, confidentiality was considered, and this helped to prevent any possibility of harm or upset for respondents.

The researcher also didn't force the respondents to respond the interview guide. There was no mistreatment done to any person in the process of conducting this research because name or any other addresses of respondents were required for responding. In addition, the researcher promised to keep confidential the collected data. The researcher also referenced and acknowledged when use information from other researchers.

4.9. Limitation and mitigation strategies

Limitations in research are impacts that the researcher can't control. They are the insufficiencies, conditions or effects that can't be compelled by the expert that place constraints on your system and closures. Any limitations that may affect the results should be referred to (Simon, 2011). In this research, a few issues had the potential to limit the effectiveness of the study. First, the study was principally a desk review and as such highly relied upon secondary sources of data. Consequently, the effectiveness of the study could have been constrained by the theoretical and ideological biases of researchers in the consulted research. To counter this limitation, the researcher read widely and consulted several sources and scholars in order to have a broader perspective of the issues pertaining to Rwandan conflict, the role and effectiveness of UNAMIR in peacebuilding in the country as well as the role of the regional bodies or government and the international community on Rwanda's peace process.

In addition, the researcher met some limitations such as unavailability of respondents, lack of some respondents on time set and some mistakes in filling the interview questions. In order to solve these problems, the researcher tried to convince them to provide all necessary information needed at time and the researcher corrected the mistakes during the editing process, and granted surely them that the data must be used for the only academic purpose and therefore not affect the institution. I also tried to wait for the respondents until their availability.

CHAPTER FIVE: UNAMIR AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN IN RWANDA IN 1994: STUDY FINDINGS

This chapter presents the results and findings on the “UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994: Scope and Limits”. Of course, the results are outlined according to the specific objectives of the study such as description and analysis of the UNAMIR mandate in Rwanda, identification of UNAMIR achievements in Rwanda, examination of challenges encountered by UNAMIR and the way they affected the work of UNAMIR in Rwanda, formulation of recommendations for future peacekeeping interventions in light of the findings. The findings were based on the answers from the interview followed by the information from the documents consulted. The method of analysis is qualitative.

5.1. Presentation of the socio-demographic characteristic of the participants

Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristic of participants in interview

No	Participant code	Location	Age	Gender	Level of education
1	M.N	Kicukiro	57	F	University
2	M.C	Gasabo	58	F	University
3	N.D	Kicukiro	51	M	University
4	M.T	Kicukiro	48	M	University
5	K.T	Kicukiro	53	M	University
6	B.A	Kicukiro	51	M	University
7	R.C	Kicukiro	57	M	A2
8	N.A	Belgique	60	F	University
9	P.J	Belgique	66	M	University
10	T.E	Nyarugenge	61	M	University
11	B.D	Kicukiro	56	M	Doctor
12	M.R	Gasabo	50	M	University
13	H.D	Kicukiro	44	M	University
14	M.L	Kicukiro	53	F	University
Total of Participants: 14					

Source: Field data, 2020

5.2. Description of UNAMIR mandate in Rwanda

As indicated by its balanced mandate, UNAMIR would go about as a mediator between the gatherings trying to tie down their consent to a truce; aid the resumption of helpful alleviation activities to the degree plausible; and screen improvements in Rwanda, with the wellbeing and security of regular folks who looked for asylum with UNAMIR.

5.2.1. The mandate of a peacekeeping operation

The case of Rwanda has proven that peace-keeping mission does not have to take into account the only expectations of warring parties, but also those of the general public. The research participants have even stated that this mandate was not clear in regard with the protection of the civilians.

An interviewee woman who is a genocide survivor and a former journalist testified the following:

“We know that at the beginning of 1994, in January and February, tensions were at the highest level when the infamous BUCYANA, a virulent member and President of the CDR party who proclaimed aloud hatred against the Tutsi under the blessing of the State had just died. Tutsis were killed in the city of Kigali, others fled their homes for fear of reprisals. UNAMIR never intervened” (M.N, 15th May 2020).

From the key informant, UNAMIR was not interested of people protection, if it was a priority for them, the killings in the Kigali City would not happen.

Her fellow, who is a widow of the genocide, categorically thinks the UNAMIR mandate was not in favor of ordinary people because its troops were not allowed to use their weapons, her related statements held:

“In my opinion, UNAMIR was paralyzed in its mission because it did not have the right to intervene with weapons except in self-defense.” (M.L., 15th May 2020). This may be go with the argument of Clausewitz (1997) when stating the function through which military force can serve the end that one seeks, he said that the amelioration function does not involve the use of military force, except in self-defence. Instead, the military deliver aid, put up camps, provide communications, build bridges and all other such constructive activities in aid of civilian life (Clausewitz, 1997). But, amongst the above, they did not do anything.

“The UNAMIR mission was to supervise the cease fire between Government troops and Rwandese Patriotic Army while Peace talks were on-going on in Arusha” (M.R, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

Another respondent remembers that UNAMIR was in Rwanda when he was in secondary school in senior six. What he had of this mission was to observe the implementation of peace agreement, he declared:

“Actually UNAMIR come in replacement of GOMN which was observing the cease fire between the two antagonists (RPF and FAR) and facilitating in implementation of the ARUSHA peace agreements. The UNAMIR was therefore planned in ARUSHA peace agreement signed in August 1993” (M.T, 20th June 2020).

The information from the informants revealed that UNAMIR had not permit to use force for civilian protection and UNAMIR only watched over the execution of the ARUSHA agreements. In this regard, a respondent said *“I noticed that, UNAMIR did not protect civilians due to the Mandate and there was no resolution of Chapter VII of the UN Charter”* (Interview, 23rd June 2020). This shows that the UNAMIR had not thee willingness to protect civilians while they had means to use. This corroborate with the statement of Clausewitz (1997) that the capacity of a force to determine the outcome in conflict must be defined as the sum of available means and the strength of the will (Clausewitz, 1997). In addition, Clausewitz evoked the containment involves a certain use of military force to prevent something from spreading or passing through a barrier (Clausewitz, 1997). In this regard, the UNMAIR did not use its fore to prevent the genocide.

The UNAMIR’s mission was first to observe peace and security in Rwanda and facilitate in implementation of ARUSHA Peace agreements signed between RPF INKOTANYI and Rwandan government led by HABYARIMANA Juvenal.

According to an interviewee, *“this group of military from different countries sent by UN in Rwanda, was supposed to protect RPF authorities, civilians and to facilitate Arusha peace agreement establishment between RPF and Rwandan Government”* (M.T, 20th June 2020).

After the Arusha Peace Agreement and related ceasefire agreements and Protocols were signed on 4th August 1993, the UNAMIR was established to assist in its implementation.

The mandate given to a peacekeeping operation is usually the result of diplomatic negotiation and compromise, and may not always meet expectations particularly those of the host country. And yet, the cooperation of that country, or of its warring factions, is absolutely necessary for the effective implementation of the mandate.

Some literature said that in some instances, the mandate may become overtaken by events such as the defiance of one faction or another and may not be adjusted quickly enough to respond more directly to the new situation. In addition, there may be a fragmentation of mandates amongst different United Nations operations, with attendant problems of coordination and effectiveness (Abdulqawi, 2019).

Each of these problems arose in the case of Rwanda. In mid-1993, in the early stages of the Rwanda conflict, the Security Council built up the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), to screen that fringe all together *"to check that no military help arrives at Rwanda, center being put essentially in such manner on travel and transport, by streets or tracks which could oblige vehicles, of deadly weapons and ammo over the outskirts, too as could some other material which be of military use"* (Security Council resolution 846, 1993-Rwanda).

However, UNOMUR was not a peacekeeping operation in the ordinary sense: it did not have armed troops to monitor a peace agreement, nor it was a force charged with the policing of a buffer zone between opposing forces.

Instead, UNOMUR was a small contingent of unarmed military observers which was probably not adequate by hindsight, certainly not adequate for the task of monitoring movements of troops and arms across the Rwanda-Uganda border. Nor did UNOMUR have the mandate, or the capacity, to interdict and confiscate such arms.

It should be noted, however, that UNOMUR was within the early stages of a United Nations response to crises, during which the main emphasis is on preventive diplomacy and the encouragement of negotiations. Such negotiations were actually under way at that time among the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity.

Thus, the same resolution that established UNOMUR also provided UN support for that peace effort, and urged the parties to conclude quickly a comprehensive peace agreement.

And indeed, such an agreement did emerge from that effort: The Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993, and related ceasefire agreements and Protocols (Security Council, 1993).

It was upon the signing of that agreement that the Security Council proceeded to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), for a period of six months, to assist in its implementation.

According to the resolution 872 (5th October, 1993), there were eight main tasks in this initial mandate, which need to be quoted in full (UN Security Council, 5th October 1993).

The extension of this mandate beyond the initial six months was conditioned on a report from the Secretary-General with regards to whether considerable advancement has been made towards the execution of the Arusha Peace Agreement (Bartrop, 2019). And, if extended, the mandate was expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government, as envisaged in the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Nevertheless, as things turned out, there were elements in Rwanda that had other plans. The plotting remains a deep mystery. But it is clear that prime responsibility for the genocide lies with Hutu extremists within the late President Habyarimana's own party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) (Abdulqawi, 2019).

These elements were evidently unhappy with concessions made to the RPF in the Arusha accords, including participation in a "Broad-based Transitional Government", RPF military presence in Kigali, and eventual integration of the armed forces. But those arrangements were to culminate in the holding of national elections, which must have been an assurance against fears of Tutsi dominance.

As events of the very next day were to illustrate, there was a stark contrast between the hopes expressed by the Security Council, and the realities on the ground. The Arusha Peace Agreement literally collapsed with the mysterious plane crash on 6 April 1994, at Kigali airport, in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed (Abdulqawi, 1996).

The massacres began in earnest that same night. It is significant to note that among the casualties of that night's atrocities were ten UNAMIR soldiers from Belgium, who were on guard duty along with five soldiers from Ghana, at the residence of the Rwandese Prime Minister, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana.

These UNAMIR troops were made to lay down their arms by elements of the Rwandese army, whose intentions, it may have appeared, were to take over the protection of their Prime Minister's residence. The ten Belgians were then murdered. By a stroke of providence, the five Ghanaians were spared gunshots and bayonets, but received severe beatings with gun-butts, clubs and what-nots.

According to one of the respondents, *“the assassination of the Prime Minister gave a sign that killings were allowed, in Kigali and the countryside in the ensuing days, there was obviously no peace to be kept. UNAMIR did not have the mandate or the capacity to disarm the forces of the host government that were engaged in the massacres, along with militia groups; or to intervene in the full scale civil war that had broken out between the government and the RPF”* (RC, interview, 25th May 2020).

For him, such intervention would probably have entailed having to fight both sides, or having to support one side or the other in the civil war. But there was no mandate to support either side, or to fight a war in Rwanda.

At that time, the Council apparently did not have enough evidence to use the word genocide. There were to be no reinforcements. Instead, a reduction of the troop strength was ordered (ultimately, to a force of barely 500), and the mandate of UNAMIR was adjusted as follows:

- (a) to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire, and
- (b) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible (UN, resolution 912, 1994).

But very little was feasible with the very limited number of troops and resources, and UNAMIR was permanently tagged with a monumental failure to stop the genocide of 1994. With the whole country now engulfed in the spreading massacres, and the RPF pursuing the retreating Government forces and militias, the only saving grace for the United Nations was its authorization of a rescue operation by French forces - Operation Turquoise - under Chapter VII of the Charter, on 17 May 1994 which is also criticized for siding with the recently disposed genocidal government.

The supporters of the neoliberalism theory argued that, because of the inadequacy of UNAMIR's mandate and its scope, as well as not managing to adjust the mandate to the reality of the needs of Rwanda, UNAMIR peacekeeping mission was not planned,

dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way that dealt with the peacekeeping sufficiently (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000). These critiques of UNAMIR's mandate and ability to plan and custom the peacekeeping reflects in the design features Doyle & Sambanis (2000) argue to be addressed when creating a peacebuilding strategy. The peacekeeping mission in Rwanda did not manage to create a mandate and strategy that reflected with the country's local sources of hostility, capacities, and degree of international commitment. In terms of not addressing the local source of hostility, the planning failed to take the serious ethnic tensions within the country into account when planning the mandate (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis 2000). In addition, the failure to acknowledge the crisis as genocide as well as a reluctance by key members of the international community to do so, goes back to the design dimension of international commitment available to assist change (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis 2000).

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argued that the lack of acknowledgment and addressing the ethnic tensions hindered UNAMIR in implementing the right strategy for the conflict. For Macqueen (2014), with the UNAMIR not being able to address the dimensions of the design features properly, it also led to the choice peacekeeping strategy and the mandate it covers not being appropriate for the specific case of Rwanda, and hence failing, from a Neoliberal perspective.

By addressing the hostility dimension, local capabilities and international commitment, and carefully deciding the type of peacekeeping operation that is suitable for the peacekeeping mission, the possibility for a successful peacekeeping mission can increase but in Rwanda, it was not the case.

5.2.2. Success and failure of UNAMIR in Rwanda

As mentioned above, the scope of the UNAMIR mandate was too broad for the size of force deployed. Or put another way, the UN had completely neglected to comprehend the circumstance on the ground and had overlooked the reports of numerous intellectuals, not specifically Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire the Canadian UN Force pioneer in Kigali who had frequently made understood that the condition was a fuel box holding on to explode.

In response to the killing by Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) of the Prime Minister, Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, the situation became critical.

The SG's three alternatives postulated on 20th April 1994 provide the UNSC with the necessary options at an early enough stage to take adequate action.

A good starting point of analysis may be the report to the SG analysing the UN's actions. They say that the worldwide network didn't forestall the slaughter, nor did it stop the executing once the annihilation had started. The report goes on to say that the major problem areas were inadequate mandates, lack of political will, lack of assertive action by UNSC, lack of resources, and not enough troops.

If one pauses there for a moment, the fact that the systematic killings had started shortly after 6 April 1994, shows that the political will was not there to stop the killings at this point. The reason for this is that the wide spread killings were going on from 6 to 20 April 1994. The UNSC, however, decided on the 20 April 1994 to go with the lesser option. The SG's Alternative III, complete withdrawal, was not an option.

Therefore, the political will to deploy few thousand troops as favoured in Alternative I together with chapter VII coercive force, was not present. If one looks at the quote from the French President, one can see the lack of political will, and remember that France is one of the five "world policeman" in the Security Council. "In such countries, genocide is not too important..." Words attributed to French President François Mitterrand, reported by Philip Gourevitch in *Reversing the Reversals of War*, *The New Yorker*, 26 April 1999 (*The New Times*, 2012).

I would argue that the traditional Westphalian doctrine of Sovereign states was probably at play here. Notwithstanding the USA's probable reluctance to deploy American forces in another African civil war, the rest of the UNSC was probably working on the assumption that the role of UNAMIR was to monitor a peace and assist with democratic elections. It was certainly not equipped or mandated to prevent genocide. The Arusha accords allowed for a broad role for the UN to assist with implementation of the accords themselves. At the end of 1993, there was no real reason to think that the Government of Rwanda and the RPF were not planning to observe their ceasefire and set up the new government. The SG had been in telephone contact with both the President of Uganda and the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN and had heard their requests to bolster the UNAMIR force on the ground in Rwanda (UN, 2002). I would argue that the SG's favoured option was a very much more

robust UNAMIR presence in Rwanda to enforce a peace with a chapter VII mandate and provide humanitarian support.

It is arguable that had that force been deployed shortly after 20 April 1994, a significant number of killings could probably have been avoided. The independent report to the SG seems to indicate the mandate of UNAMIR was far too wide. Not only that, on 15 September 1993 the Rwandan Government-RPF delegation met with the SG in New York and requested a UN force of 4,260 personnel to be deployed immediately. The SG informed the delegates that this was not going to happen for two reasons. Firstly, there was no way than an international force could be assembled and deployed that quickly. Secondly, there was no political will at that time to send more troops to Rwanda. With approximately 70,000 peacekeeping troops deployed around the world, the political will simply was not there.

Therefore, some seven months before the SG wrote to the UNSC recommending that they deploy a large number of troops together with a coercive mandate to enforce a ceasefire, the parties themselves seemed to be requesting a large force of some 4,260 UN troops. From 1990 to 1993, all the ceasefires had been violated. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the August 1993 one would also probably not be respected.

The mandate was also based on the premise that the UNAMIR force would not need to be large because the RGF and RPF would respect the ceasefire. Once again, this would also prove to be misguided. Resolution 872 (1993) establishing UNAMIR did not approve all of the mandated recommendations from the SG. Instead, it was issued with a more limited mandate.

The mandate also established a weapons-secure area around the capital. With hindsight, this would appear to be an extremely weak requirement, because both sides had never respected a ceasefire and to expect them to respect an area around Kigali seems optimistic at best and down-right stupid at worst. Down-right stupid at worst.

The other supporters of constructivism theory showed that, after a series of failed peacekeeping missions being blamed on the enforcement based strategies, the Security Council implemented more restrictive criteria for authorizing a peacekeeping operation (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This rule changes and the tensions of defining the nature of the peacekeeping culture of the UN, influenced by the global culture and relevant conflicts going on at the same times, led to barriers for the international response of the genocide and the

appropriate deployment of UNAMIR (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000). A practical example is the lack of clarity in the communications between UNAMIR and the Headquarters regarding which rules of engagement that was in force during the Rwandan genocide (Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2000). The new restrictive criterias for authorizing a peacekeeping operation would explain why there was a lack of acknowledgment from the international community of the crisis being a genocide, hence the little response to it (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

Due to the killings of 1994 in front of UNAMIR eyes, the UNAMIR mandate had not been realized in terms of civilians' protection.

5.2.3. Factors of UNAMIR failure in Rwanda

UN peacekeeping powers are created and work under Chapters VI (Pacific settlement of conversations) and VII (Collective essential against dangers to, or breaks of, quietness) of the UN Charter. The Chapter VI demand is commonly the UN standard working method, considering the way that the sending of UNAMIR troops was dependent upon the assent of the warring get-togethers and such assent had been acquired. In any case, under the states of the part the UNAMIR troops, as other UN peacekeeping powers, were 'obliged from utilizing power alongside in confidence' (Kuperman, 1996).

Thusly, the accomplishment of a military activity relies on the generosity of the warring get-togethers to regard the agreeableness terms. A basic snare, as was illustrated, demoralizes and shocks the whole peacekeeping essential. Notwithstanding, the issue looked by UNAMIR was that it was unacceptable (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1996). It was hard for the UNAMIR troops to satisfy their key they were going toward two military with present day weaponry (Kabunduguru, 1999).

Also, UNAMIR numbers were little veered from the measure of troops they were required to contain. The degree of the size of the military in any development picks its thriving or dissatisfaction. The higher the degree, the basically certain the activity is to bite the dust. The UN peacekeeping crucial Bosnia should have filled in as an action to the degree gear and work power. The UN recognized that generosity would win and neglect to maintain a strategic distance from any dangers noteworthy in any military development. Right when magnanimity disconnects, the impact on peacekeepers is obliterating. The butchering by Rwandan troopers, of ten Belgian competitors serving in UNAMIR was accused on the

second size for the UNAMIR unforeseen, and its frail gear (US Committee for Refugees, 1995).

Following this occasion, Belgium pulled back its powers from the development. Such difficulties have been in danger for explicit overseeing bodies' abhorrence for contributing to the UN missions: they would uphold their warriors to face a conflict, as opposed to just participate in self-protection as highlighted by Clausewitz (1997).

Other key bits of a pro military activity solidify solicitation and control. Solicitation and control are both political and military contemplations, and for a military to work splendidly, it should have both political and military solicitation and control exemplified in a unitary structure, something which is evidently feeble in UN peacekeeping. For instance, the vitality of solidarity of solicitation is incorporated by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali (Raevsky, 1995).

'Solidarity of solicitation is a significant condition for the operational common sense, particularly in tricky missions. On the off chance that a development neglects to fill in as a joined entire, both the mission's capacity to appear at its goal and the security of its workforce are bet' (Kabunduguru, 1999).

UNAMIR should be seriously affected by the UN Secretary General as its Commander in Chief (political control) and General Dallaire as its activity authority. Examination of UNAMIR proposes, notwithstanding, that it was not strongly influenced by the UN Secretary General, nor did the field boss have full control of the development.

This was show in the manner Belgium and France pulled again from the vital chatting with, additionally getting the assent of, the UN Secretary General. UNAMIR didn't have a condition of blending of trustworthiness. Such a power with commitment to no political authority was likely going to experience the underhanded effects of a nonappearance of operational commitment.

Furthermore, an activity subject to a 'possibility of section and leave' model made it difficult for the UN to practice gigantic authority over the UNAMIR troops. Specifically, the field supervisor couldn't search for after reasonable operational planning on the grounds that considering the flow situation he was unable to check the measure of staff open to him.

The action of a military information unit is to get data noteworthy for war. With adequate data, development chiefs can grasp their adversaries' attributes and insufficiencies, and pick the noteworthy idea of their own weaponry and workforce. Raevsky (1995) battles that one of the issues looked by UN peacekeeping activities is that they depend after contributing nations for data. He sees that two or three nations are hesitant to movement such data as a result of contention between the UN and these nations' protect or security interests. UNAMIR had this issue in Rwanda (Kabunduguru, 1999).

Kuperman (1996) acknowledges that if the UN had been generally taught with respect to the forces at work in the Rwandan crisis, it could have acted cautiously and hereafter avoided the butchery. His perception proposes that the UN expected that the administration powers and the RPF were the main members in the harmony cycle. On the opposite there were different entertainers, for example, the nearby civilian army.

Kuperman proposes that there was a requirement for the UN to take a more extensive viewpoint, in light of the fact that there were divisions among the administration itself, with a gathering of clergymen hesitant to acknowledge the harmony bargain. These divisions likewise infiltrated the non-military personnel populace. Thus, notwithstanding their little numbers and helpless hardware, UNAMIR was not completely mindful of whom they were going up against. This was a deadly miscount in military terms.

5.2.3.1. Rules of engagement (ROE)

On 23rd November 1993, Dallaire sent a draft set of ROE for approval to Headquarters. This draft was never given a formal response. Dallaire also asked specifically whether force could be used in response to crimes against humanity or other crimes. At that time, UNAMIR's mandate was contained in Resolution 872 (1993) paragraph three. It was quite broad. In particular, UNAMIR could contribute to the security of the city (Un Resolution 872, 1993).

This language seems vague but could give UNAMIR the ROE to use deadly force to ensure the city is secure. As a more general point, the objects and purposes of the United Nations Charter are to save life and promote peace. It is an open question whether UNAMIR soldiers could stand by and watch innocent civilians being slaughtered without the ability to prevent this by using deadly force. I would argue that the mandate would have to dictate this specifically.

5.2.3.2. The 11th January 1994 cable

Dallaire sent a cable asking whether UNAMIR was able to intercept weapons cache based on information provided by an informant. A cable was sent by Kofi Annan, signed by Iqbal Riza, stating that seizing the weapons cache went beyond the mandate in Resolution 872 (1993) and that the information was to be given to the Rwandan President Habyarimana (UN, 1993).

This must be the correct course of action for Headquarters to take because seizing weapons caches did not appear in Resolution 872 (1993) even under a broad reading. In a later report on 23 February 1994, Dallaire again urged, "Time is by all accounts running out for political conversations, as any spark on the security side could have disastrous results" (Grunfeld and Huijboom, 2007). Mr Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, the Special Representative of the SG in Rwanda (SRSG) wrote the following day of his concerns for the potential for a tinder box situation given the country's history and the continued tension, fear and confusion.

These comments now seem particularly apt given the events that were set to unfold after 6 April 1994. It is difficult to see, however, whether there would have been any major change in the political will of the UNSC given the fact that Resolution 912 (1994) limited the mandate on 20 April 1994. If there had been a prevention mind-set in the UNSC, as there was with Congo in 1960, then maybe the genocide could have been avoided with a broader chapter VII mandate from the start. Again on 7 April 1994, Riza confirmed to Dallaire that UNAMIR was not to fire until fired upon.

This again confirms the limited mandate that UNAMIR was under. In essence, UNAMIR was there to broker a ceasefire and that alone. They were not a protection force sent to save the prime minister or anyone else.

Dallaire summed up the shortcomings of UNAMIR to the Belgian Senate commission thus, "*The UNAMIR mission was a peace-keeping operation. It was not equipped, trained nor staffed to conduct intervention operations*" (UN, 1999).

5.2.3.3. Withdrawal of the Belgian contingent

After the SG met the Foreign Minister of Belgium Mr Willy Claes on 12 April 1994, Belgium withdrew its forces. Claes had in fact asked the SG to recommend that UNAMIR be suspended. The reason was that due to the lack of peace, there was no reason for peace

keepers and that not only should UNAMIR be suspended, but that UNAMIR should withdraw when the Belgians departed. Belgium, of course, was the colonial power from 1919 to 1962. Therefore, some would argue that they had a special responsibility to maintain a peace in Rwanda (United Nations, 1999).

The Belgian government did not see it that way and withdrew their troops. It is interesting that the Belgians did not request that UNAMIR's mandate be expanded to chapter VII even though they must or ought to have known of the genocide happening all around them. The subsequent telexes and emails from DPKO, Nigeria and others all effectively said that UNAMIR should be maintained and not withdrawn otherwise there would be terrible consequences. The UNSC seem to be leaning towards the decision to reduce UNAMIR unless there is a ceasefire.

There does not seem to be any detailed mention in these documents of the unfolding genocide. Indeed, DPKO were advocating for a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR as there was no likelihood of a ceasefire.

5.3. Existence of UNAMIR achievements or failure in Rwanda

Throughout this study, the researcher tried to know whether UNAMIR realized its mandate or not in terms of civilians' protection. In this angle, when you ask some Rwandans and other people who were in Rwanda during the period the UNAMIR was in the country, to talk about its achievements, they all get frustrated. Different information provided by research participants revealed the following:

“Supervising the Cease fire as no fighting was recorded until the Genocide followed by war in 1994 and evacuation of International community during the Genocide” (M.R, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

“Frankly, just a small handful of civilians who were able to defeat the vigilance of the killers and reach the UNAMIR encampment” (M.N, Interview, 20th June 2020).

Another respondent declared:

“In my opinion, the only achievement of UNAMIR was to escort the RPF contingent stationed at the CND for their supplies from Mulindi to Kigali” (M.C, Interview, 14th June 2020).

Pierre talked about security guaranteed by UNAMIR by saying that it was like “*Give civilians a pretense of security*” (P.J, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

“*Supervising the Cease fire as no fighting was recorded until the Genocide followed by war in 1994; Evacuation of International community during the Genocide*” (M.R, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

“*For me, I can't say any achievement; it is a major failure instead. It failed to protect civil population in danger, the genocide against the Tutsi has been prepared and executed in their eyes, It didn't stop it. It didn't also achieve their mission of facilitating the implementation of ARUSHA Peace accords*” (M.T, Interview, 20th June 2020).

As mentioned above, the information provided by the research participants revealed that UNAMIR did not achieve its mission. This failure is under different factors. In fact, the scope of the UNAMIR mandate was too broad for the size of force deployed. Also, UN had completely neglected to comprehend the circumstance on the ground and had dismissed the reports of numerous analysts; not in particular Major-General Romeo Dallaire the UN Force leader in Kigali who had oftentimes made realized that the circumstance was compounding (Raevsky, 1995). This ought to have been the job of a military knowledge unit. The one that is accountable for acquiring data fundamental for war. With adequate data, activity commandants can understand their forces' qualities and shortcomings, and decide the important quality of their own weaponry and staff. Raevsky (1995) contends that one of the issues looked by UN peacekeeping tasks is that they depend on contributing nations for data. He sees that a few nations are hesitant to delivery such data in light of contention between the UN and these nations' protection or security interests. UNAMIR had this issue in Rwanda.

In any case, Kuperman (1996) accepts that if the UN had been very much educated regarding the powers at work in the Rwandan emergency, it could have acted mindfully and henceforth dodged the slaughter. His perception proposes that the UN accepted that the administration powers and the RPF were the main members in the harmony cycle. On the opposite there were different entertainers, for example, the nearby civilian army.

Kuperman proposes that there was a requirement for the UN to take a more extensive point of view, in light of the fact that there were divisions among the administration itself, with a gathering of clergymen hesitant to acknowledge the harmony bargain. These divisions likewise infiltrated the non-military personnel populace Thus, notwithstanding their little

numbers and helpless hardware, UNAMIR was not completely mindful of who they were facing. This was a deadly erroneous conclusion in military terms.

The above led the researcher to seek for the challenges encountered by UNAMIR to protect civilians in Rwanda. The following section illustrates more the related information.

5.4. Challenges encountered by UNAMIR and the way they affected the work of UNAMIR to protect civilians in Rwanda

The information related to the UNAMIR achievement or failure revealed that UNAMIR did fulfill its mandate. Requirements inalienable to the UN framework were especially dependent upon dissatisfactions of UNAMIR commandants and staff individuals, since they were defied with them consistently. First scopes of insurance challenges are limitations intrinsic to the UN framework. While average for the Organization, these constraints affect UNAMIR, since the strategic's was more unpredictable than that of some other UN harmony crucial the time. The following are the challenges underlined by the research participants.

5.4.1. UN bureaucracy & hierarchy

This challenge was highlighted by respondents in different views. For the resident who was born in Kicukiro and still lives there, this global organization *“is like a playground on which politicians play their political game, because it doesn't have empathy of people, it doesn't care about people who are dying. Why did they withdraw from Rwanda while Tutsi were killed?”* (K.T, Interview, 28th June 2020).

Other respondents think UNAMIR faced mainly the political challenges and the bureaucracy at the UN headquarters level. For the resident who was born in Kicukiro and still lives there, this global organization *“is like a playground on which politicians play their political game, because it doesn't have empathy of people, it doesn't care about people who are dying. Why did they withdraw from Rwanda while Tutsi were killed?”* (R.C, Interview, 28th July 2020).

This bureaucratic protocol was combined by the lack of a clear mission of the UN troops:

“I think the main challenge was first the definition of its mission and the cumbersome protocols in place within the UN. It was not that UNAMIR troops were in the minority compared to government forces or that they were less armed. One might also think

(my own opinion) that the great powers have used their veto power to delay any decision to stop the genocide” (M.N, Interview, 20thMay 2020).

Another Kigali resident who was a basketball player and a senior six student thinks in the same direction: *“the major challenge of the UNAMIR was to get instructions or feedback from the UN when they were asking to protect civilians”*, he notes (M.N, Interview, 20thMay 2020).

Some respondents disclosed that the absence of ability and readiness on the peacekeepers and feeble correspondence at the time with the populations were the elephant in the room when it came to the failure in regards to civilian protection.

The common views of interviewees converged at the same opinion that UNAMIR did not protect civilians before and during Genocide.

Given these challenges, the information provided by respondents revealed the following:

“When citizens see people in uniform and UN blue helmets, highly armed, they hope they have come to protect them and they don’t flee their country. So, in case the killers manage to massacre people in the presence of these troops, they lose the trust. Therefore, if there were no UN Peace keeping mission, people would find out what to do for themselves like self-protection or seeking asylum” (R.C, Interview, 28thJune 2020).

As accentuated by respondents, they think that UNAMIR faced mainly the political challenges and the bureaucracy at the UN headquarters level.

As emphasized by the interviewee,

“Limitations inborn to the UN framework were especially dependent upon dissatisfactions of UNAMIR leaders and staff individuals, since they were stood up to with them consistently. A first scope of security challenges are requirements intrinsic to the UN framework. While commonplace for the Organization, these constraints affect UNAMIR, since the strategic's was more mind boggling than that of some other UN harmony crucial the time, an authority at the National Commission for the Fight against the massacre clarified”(B.D, Interview, 22nd June, 2020).

In regard with UN bureaucracy, the harmony activity is described by a substantial top-down structure with complex systems. Each activity requires endorsement, which regularly prompts fixed status. Subsequently, prompt responses in the field don't exist and space for suddenness and individual activities is restricted. Accordingly, UNAMIR peacekeepers for the most part didn't act to forestall, however to fix the harm. Nonetheless, it is said that a few contingents

summon the substantial administration and progression as a reason for inaction. In light of the data given by respondents, UN harmony activity is described by a hefty top-down structure with complex methodology. Each activity requires endorsement, which frequently prompts fixed status. In any case, it is said that a few contingents summon the weighty organization and progression as a reason for inaction. Potential cures are the advancement of a quick response component so as to offer direct help to the populace under danger.

Besides these particular challenges the UN mission faced in Rwanda, there are other which are common, and they are linked to the structure of the whole UN system and its mission in general as highlighted by the following paragraph.

5.4.2. UN military structure

The UN military structure was another test. By then and at the present time, there was no planned progressive system of initiative or mixed structure, nor are there ordinary philosophy. Differing open contingents are sent under one Force Commander, who has the request over all the contingents. The difficulty, regardless, is that each unanticipated reports to its surprising official, who is first capable to his own organization, before consenting to the Force Commander (Kofi Nsia-Pepira, 2017).

Troops are sent by nations and are less thought of but rather more a part of the UN structure. Since Member States somewhat consider the contenders they pass on as their own warriors, open interests sway the contingents' presentation during military errands. Security commitments were apparently hampered by the way that Member States don't wish to rise up to general inclination with officials in body packs. Certainly, contingents are constrained by their councils to avoid loss of life (which proposes sidestepping threats) (Kofi Nsia-Pepira, 2017).

According to the observation of the respondents, "During the period when UNAMIR was here, it seemed to me as if everybody was doing his or her own things, the partnership and camaraderie between the Senegalese peacekeepers and the ones from Belgium was not that of partners and friends" (Interview 10th June 2020).

It is obviously clear that UN Member States ought to know about neighbourhood conditions and dangers when they consent to convey their soldiers in the field. While apparently a harmony activity depends somewhat on the desire of troop contributing nations, the

production of a genuine worldwide power with an incorporated level of leadership could take care of this issue. Be that as it may, this ought to be a piece of a worldwide UN change.

A part from the military challenge, respondents revealed that there are other related to the lack of enough human resources and logistics as the following section illustrates.

5.4.3. Human resource constraints

On the challenge of human resources, the UN doesn't have a lasting armed force; it relies upon the altruism of Member States for conveying the vital soldiers (Kofi Nsia-Pepira, 2017). In any case, actually scarcely any nations were eager to convey their warriors to Rwanda.

The majority of the respondents reckoned that the UN should review and establish its own army and equip it fully for a given assignment (Kofi Nsia-Pepira, 2017). So the remaining responsibilities like training, deployment, and redeployment should be an exclusive area/monopoly of the United Nations.

Logistic wise, UNAMIR was extremely constrained, the mission was underfunded, the personnel were insufficient to the task ahead and as such 2500 personnel were very little compared to the challenge. The contingent of UNAMIR could not contain violence in Kigali which was the epi-center and in the countryside where killings were fast taking place, regret the respondents (all). *“I think the challenge is in the rule of engagement which determine if they can use force or not while protecting civilian in danger and the instruction of withdrawal few days after the genocide has started.”*(M.T, Interview, 20th 2020).

Respondents cannot believe how such decision of downsizing the troops in the course of the genocide was taken. The report to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, breaking down the UN's activities, says that the worldwide network didn't forestall the slaughter, nor did it stop the executing once the annihilation had started. The report goes on to say that the major problem areas were inadequate mandates, lack of political will, lack of assertive action by UNSC, lack of resources, and not enough troops(UN report, 1996).

As the UN doesn't have a lasting armed force, it relies upon the generosity of Member States for conveying the fundamental soldiers. In any case, actually scarcely any nations were eager to send their troopers to the Rwanda.

Majority of the respondents reckoned that the UN should review and establish its own army and equip it fully for a given assignment. Training and deployment and redeployment should be an exclusive area/ monopoly of the United Nations.

5.4.4. Material resource constraints

Logistic wise, UNAMIR was extremely constrained, the mission was underfunded, the personnel were insufficient to the task ahead and as such 2500 personnel were very little compared to the challenge. The contingent of UNAMIR could not contain violence in Kigali which was the epicentre and in the countryside where killings were fast taking place.

5.4.5. Lack of strategy to protect civilians

A genocide survivor who was in Kigali at the time of the events, stressed that there was no clear strategy to protect civilians because those who survived tried to reach where the troops were camping:

“To my knowledge, UNAMIR did not have the mandate to protect civilians but to enforce the implementation of the Arusha accords. Before the genocide she did nothing for civilians. During the genocide, she protected those who managed to reach their camp and Amahoro stadium” (M.C, Interview, 14th June 2020).

Another 57 year old man said on the 9th he went to hide in UNAMIR in the back of Bralirwa the brewery of soft drinks:

“When I got there was no soldier of the UNAMIR in that barracks. I was hiding in a church in Gatenga, and it was on the 9th April. So, I decided to climb and get in Bralirwa buildings till 25th April 1994”. Even in ETO Kicukiro the UNAMIR left the Tutsi. Another evidence is that even before the genocide started UNAMIR patrol helicopters were flying over Kigali but Interahamwe continued killing Tutsi, especially during the political parties protests. Between January and April 1994, operations of killing people were carried out. There were planned power cuts in order to kill Tutsi in their own homes. And even those residing near the UNAMIR camp like at WFP HQs in Kicukiro, fled the area to look for other safe areas like Nyamirambo. (Interview with, 28th June 2020).

The same source points that in the presence of UNAMIR, Tutsi and moderate Hutu were kidnapped and killed secretly by Interahamwe militias. The Tutsi tried to solidify their houses because they were killed using grenades and UNAMIR could not intervene or report such selective killings. The fact that UNAMIR did not stop the killing of Tutsi, is clearly an evidence of the failure of the mission:

“UNAMIR did not prevent more than a million Tutsi from being exterminated. I agree that the mission was limited to the city of Kigali at the beginning, but there too people died under their noses. As long as the UN has not reviewed its way of working, streamlining the decision-making procedures and leaving the Head of Mission the latitude to act spontaneously according to the situation of the moment when the lives of civilians are at stake. Danger, peacekeeping missions will always remain an abyss that will swallow up huge funds for so little” (M.N, Interview, 20th 2020).

Consulted literature and respondents interviewed, expressed the issue of a lack of clarity regarding civilian protection. Some who took part in this study argued that Part VII order just permits peacekeepers to utilize power in self-preservation, in the guard of UN staff and UN framework (power insurance) and in the protection of regular people. As indicated by this 'receptive' or 'guarded' translation, peacekeepers would just be permitted to utilize power because of a danger. This implies that killings may as of now have occurred before peacekeepers figure out how to respond.

Other argues that the mandate licenses peacekeepers to embrace a proactive mentality, utilizing power so as to forestall dangers. The absence of lucidity it was argued that it made UNAMIR hesitant to explore the mandate's potential.

5.4.6. Lack of willingness and preparedness to protect

A big number of respondents who were interviewed for this study claimed that at the time, UNAMIR peacekeepers needed eagerness and readiness when it came to ensuring regular folks. UNAMIR peacekeepers were not prepared and arranged to confront that hazard. The Rules of Engagement (RoE) among military power were supposed to be barely deciphered, in this manner barring any brutality, aside from on account of self-preservation or power assurance. A more tolerant understanding is that peacekeepers stay away from inadvertent blow-back.

On this point, one interviewee who was working in European Union in 1994, says the protection of civilians targeted only expatriates and for the Rwandans it was a long process:

“UNAMIR did not protect civilians well both before and during the genocide. I intervened twice to extract families threatened by the Interahamwe in early 1994 in Gikondo. The blue helmets patrol told me that everything was normal in Gikondo but finally after my insistence, we went to extract a family. I concluded that he only intervened at the request of expatriates and the patrol had to lie to his superiors to do so” (P.J, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

The protection of Rwandan civilians was not actually among the main objectives of the mission. This is the general perception of the interviewees who explain that people who managed to get where the UNAMIR troops were camping were also killed during the genocide or right few days before:

“During the genocide, UNAMIR camped on the sites that housed the refugees, for example at the Thousand Hills Hotel, at ETO Kicukiro, but this did not prevent the militias and soldiers from killing those who had taken refuge there” (M.N, Interview, 20th June 2020).

From the above, we can note that a very large number of peacekeepers in the field, it is unquestionable that a few people may need inspiration or get into mischief, yet this ought not be summed up. Most peacekeepers would be willing and arranged to ensure regular people and face hazards. Albeit some of them were not appropriately prepared.

Notwithstanding, we ought to be cautious with speculations and generalizations. An enormous number of peacekeepers in the field, it is certain that a few people may need inspiration or act mischievously, yet this ought not to be summed up.

We can quickly presume that UNAMIR tasks were restricted by inadequacies and requirements intrinsic to the UN framework, an absence of readiness and readiness on the peacekeepers' side, system and, correspondence challenges, assets limitations and absence of methodologies.

By looking at how UNAMIR was designed particularly to the situation of Rwanda, what internal norms that affected the culture of the UN and therefore the deployment of UNAMIR as well as how the global environment in terms of other relevant and current issues affecting the culture of peacekeeping in general affected the mission is highly relevant.

For the utility of force in civilians protection, the security of Civilians is consistently a complementary goal and the need to protect civilians arises only just when a culprit has discovered that utilizing violence against civilians by one way or another serves his own objectives (Clausewitz, 1997). There would be no requirement for mediation if the perpetrator has not effectively directed the law upon his casualties in total terms. Nor can regular citizen lives be recuperated if effectively lost, in contrast to power over a domain or arrangement of government. On the off chance that one chooses to intercede for motivations behind security, we should perceive that we cannot change the standards of this last chance

game, yet should play as indicated by them. Every classification of perpetrators moves toward the utilization of power against regular folks from various beginning stages. Ends-based strategies will follow rationale of boosting viciousness against regular people on the grounds that accomplishing their objectives relies upon it. Their procedures are in this way essentially dependent on an answer through military power, whose specific elements of power start from the most damaging finish of the range (Clausewitz, 1997).

Further points of view to be explored concerning the arrangement of UNAMIR are in what degree the degree of thought of the liberation of individuals may have influenced its result.

5.5. Lessons leant from UNAMIR

It is hard to sort out the positive lessons the world would learn from the UNAMIR, Rwanda. However, through mistakes people learn how to deal with future similar situations. Indeed, the UNAMIR could serve as an example of a failed mission. On one hand, it failed to protect its troops, and on the other, it failed to stop the killings of the innocent civilians in Rwanda. So, for some of the research participants, UNAMIR was affected by the whole UN system:

“The lessons? That the UN is nothing more than a platform for the great powers to control the world. That UNAMIR really had limits or at least could have saved the lives of its members who perished trying to save civilians; the UN should be held responsible” (M.N, Interview, 20th June 2020).

For the other interviewee, *“UN Security Council should be proactive for the decision of use of armed force under the Chapter VII of UN Charter whenever required; UN Missions should have enough troops and well equipped. Not only the presence in conflict areas”*(M.R, Interview, 23rd June 2020).

Another respondent who lost her husband in the genocide only mentioned: *“The UN laughed at the Rwandans”* (M.C, Interview, 14th June 2020).

This respondent does beyond the emotions and frustrations and suggests the following lesson: *“The lesson is that, UN serves the interest of great power nations like USA, French, We should therefore not rely on it in terms of peace and security. If you want peace and security, you have to fight for it yourself”*. (M.T, Interview, 20th June 2020).

This position of the respondent is also confirmed by prior research. The United States' choice to contradict the execution of UNAMIR in the fall of 1993 was a piece of a bigger move in

U.S. international strategy at that point, away from supporting peacekeeping missions because of the political setting at that point, and the emergency in Somalia was the ideal open door that policymakers were searching for to get open help for restricting UNAMIR's order.

Grünfeld and Huijboom compose that "*after Somalia, the Republican Party needed the United States to get less engaged with the peacekeeping missions of the United States, which was appeared in the advancement of PDD-25.*"(Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007).

For other Rwandans the UNAMIR force had no clear mission, and they behaved like tourists, which would probably have impact on the overall mandate: "*The peacekeepers don't have to be deployed like tourists. They have to bear in their mind that they go to protect the civilians and help in restoring peace*" (R.C, Interview, 17th June 2020).

All the respondents are convinced that the UN mission must first protect the civilians because they are vulnerable in armed conflicts. So, it must have sufficient means above those of the warring parties so that this mission is possible: "*We must give ourselves sufficient means to impose peace*" (P.J, Interview, 23rd June, 2020). Imposing peace requires enough information about the conflict, and the assessment of conflict situations in which UN wish to deploy the troops should be done by neutral people who would release accurate information.

We can say that when moving toward clashes with such profound underlying foundations of political and social strain, a lot of reality should be set on the mission. In Rwanda, the U.N. regularly thought little of the reality of the contention and its potential for an unfortunate result. In this manner, the peacekeeping key not proceed with the affectability and quality required for progress.

Second, the U.N. should have found that a key factor in overseeing such delicate conditions is that developed plans ought to be painstakingly clung to in a helpful manner. The social affairs related with these disputes become decidedly dependent upon comparable consistence with the understandings came to between the get-togethers.

Right when cut off times are missed, social occasions can get awkward and the effects of this can be miserable. Further, the U.N. necessities to anticipate disasters in their progression and must have the arrangements and solidarity to rapidly calm deviations that could develop. In Rwanda, the U.N's. order was flawed from its introduction.

Besides, the interior exercises learned cycle has recognized crisis insurance limit as being one of the significant shortcomings in the reaction to the Rwanda crisis.

In fact, the conflicts in Rwanda right from colonialism, through the post-colonial government to the events immediately preceding the genocide offer candid lessons to the broad subject of conflict prevention, management and peace building. Key lessons emanate from the UNAMIR failure of the strategies on preventive Genocide against Tutsi and diplomacy thus leading to one of the biggest mass killings in human history within such a short period.

The above set of facts present several lessons pertaining to conflict prevention and management. The lessons learnt are as follows.

a. Need for conflict mapping

Conflict mapping is a tool used by those involved in conflict resolution to identify the actors, strengths and relationships of the parties to a conflict. Conflict mapping therefore is important in bringing to the negotiating table all the actors in a conflict, their interests whether frivolous or not. When the mapping is properly carried out a clear relationship between the parties can be used by the mediators to align similar interests and also use those in good relations to convince the other out of a conflict. Putting into consideration the interests of the parties brings satisfaction and renders credence to the whole process of conflict resolution. In so doing all the parties will have a source of ownership of the peace agreement and will have no grounds or fears that will lead to its future challenge.

b. Openness by parties to a conflict is one way of confidence building among the members to relieve them of any suspicion of ill motive.

This can be done by fostering openness and truthfulness to each other. They should openly relay their fears so that a lasting solution can be arrived at. Certain issues such as fear of reprisals by the other party may be brought to the negotiating table. The Arusha Accords seem not to have fully addressed the fears that would arise from the power sharing agreement such as fear of reprisals by the Tutsi against the Hutu. The Hutu extremists therefore viewed the accords with a lot of suspicion and therefore could not leave to see its implementation.

c. Paying attention to early warning signs

In conflict prevention, it is important to pay attention to early warning signs. Like was the case in Rwanda, early warning signs were clear but ignored by the mediators, international community and other parties to the conflict who only focused on signing and implementation of the Accords. Some early warning signs may seem so ambiguous and seemingly impossible to execute. This may lead to certain parties holding such threats lightly just like the messages through the radio stations to wipe out and clean the country of any Tutsi seemed ambiguous. It is important to note that early warning signs are signs of dissatisfaction and only need an immediate fault for conflict to erupt. From this, clearly, the problem was not early warning. It was early action.

5.6. Findings and the theory

Throughout the majority of UNAMIR, normative evolution was stalled because the UN refused to authorize the use of force for anything beyond self-defence, including the protection of civilians in safe areas and the protection of humanitarian supplies or personnel. The UN Secretariat, specifically the Secretary-General and the DPKO (with the exception of Dallaire), downplayed the need for militarized POC measures in Rwanda. The P-5, most specifically the US, vetoed any suggestion that UNAMIR be authorized to use force to protect civilians, even after the genocide began and the accounts of Dallaire, the RPF and NGOs were confirmed. The only actor willing to use force to demonstrate POC objectives was France.

The UN and its member states were presented with multiple opportunities to act upon its ideational commitments articulated in *An Agenda for Peace* and the Vienna Declaration prior to and throughout UNAMIR I. Even before the creation of UNAMIR I, a UN Special Rapporteur visited Rwanda from 8-17 April 1993 and confirmed that thousands of Rwandan civilians had been the victims of unjust executions and massacres (UN Special Rapporteur, 1993). The Special Rapporteur (1993) reported that the massacres in Rwanda partially fit the description of genocide put forward by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and he recommended that the UN immediately set up a “mechanism for the protection of civilian populations against massacres.” (UN Special Rapporteur, 1993). However, the UN ignored intelligence reports foretelling ethnic violence, and it also disregarded the RPF’s appeals for a Western response after the genocide began.

The Security Council initially authorized UNAMIR because it believed that monitoring the peace agreement in Rwanda would be straightforward. The Security Council, along with the DPKO, felt that Rwanda presented a much-needed opportunity for the UN to bolster its own credibility with a peacekeeping ‘victory.’ (Melvern, 2004). Thus, even after the genocide began, the UN Secretariat refused to support efforts to authorize UNAMIR to protect civilians on the basis that addressing anything in Rwanda beyond a cease-fire would be too difficult, and subsequent failures would occur to the detriment of the organization.

There was no normative evolution during the UNAMIR period for civilians’ protection. The UN gradually introduced POC measures to the mandate of UNAMIR, but each of these POC measures had been institutionalized in the mandate of a previous peace mission. For example, at first, UNAMIR was also authorized to assist with the coordination of humanitarian aid in conjunction with relief operations. In May 1994, Resolution 918 authorized UNAMIR troops to establish and maintain safe areas for the protection of refugees and civilians at risk, as well as to provide security for relief operations.

It was nearly impossible for UNAMIR troops to demonstrate POC because the Security Council consistently refused to authorize UNAMIR troops to use force beyond self-defense. Because the Security Council prioritized UNAMIR’s neutrality over its ability to protect civilians, the UNAMIR troops were also denied more aggressive ROE. The DPKO insisted that “rather than intervene to protect the population, all that the troops could do was to patrol and be visible.” (Alison Des Forges, 1999). In addition, UNAMIR did not have the troop strength to demonstrate POC, rendering mandated POC objectives moot. For example, while Resolution 912 granted UNAMIR authorization to protect civilians in their custody while the genocide was still on-going, it also reduced the size of UNAMIR to 270 troops. Predictably, “as soon as the bulk of the UNAMIR troops left Kigali, many of the civilians protected by them were immediately killed (Wheeler, 2000).

UNAMIR demonstrated POC limitedly during Operation Turquoise and the ICTR, both under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, both creations had flaws that ultimately proved detrimental to POC. By the time Operation Turquoise became operational, the genocide was largely over, though between fifteen and twenty-five thousand Tutsis found sanctuary in the French safe zone.

In summary, the normative theory was not applied because throughout UNAMIR, normative evolution was stalled because the UN refused to authorize the use of force for anything beyond self-defense, including the protection of civilians in safe areas and the protection of humanitarian supplies or personnel. POC objectives were gradually introduced to UNAMIR's mandate, but these objectives had been institutionalized and demonstrated during previous UN peace missions.

The main actors responsible for stalling the evolution of the POC norm were the UN Secretariat, specifically the Secretary-General and the DPKO (with the exception of Dallaire), and the P-5. The UN Secretariat downplayed the humanitarian situation in Rwanda as it was looming. And by denying Dallaire's requests for stronger ROE and refusing to pass on Dallaire's intelligence reports to the Security Council, the Secretariat made sure that UNAMIR did not adopt any objectives beyond its original military mandate. But even after the genocide commenced, the Security Council refused to authorize the use of force to protect civilians, safe areas or relief operations, leaving hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians unprotected in the midst of genocide.

For the UN, fear that another peacekeeping failure would cripple the organization's capacity to tackle issues of peace and security in the future made expanding UNAMIR's mandate beyond monitoring a cease-fire seem unreasonable.

CHAPTER SIX: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the major findings on the “UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994”. The key findings as far as this study is concerned, they are categorized into four sections namely the UNAMIR mandate in Rwanda, existence of UNAMIR achievements or failure, challenges encountered by UNAMIR to protect civilians.

6.1. Summary of key findings

At the end of the present research, the researcher found it very important to remind the main parts of my research entitled “UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994: Scope and Limits”. It has the general objective to examine the contribution of UNAMIR and the protection of civilian in Rwanda in 1994.

The specific objectives were:

1. To Describe and analyse the mandate of UNAMIR in Rwanda;
2. To identify achievements attributed to UNAMIR in relation to protection of civilians;
3. To examine the challenges pertaining to the then context and the way it affected the work of UNAMIR
4. To highlight lesson that can be drawn from the experience of UNAMIR to inform and achieve more effective civilian protection.

For the achievement of the research objectives, the research used qualitative approach and the research design was qualitative. The sample size was 14 respondents. Data was collected using interview. The researcher analyzed the content of the field note and documentation.

Regarding the mandate of UNAMIR, findings revealed that the UNAMIR mandate was not clear in regard with the protection of the civilians. In addition, it was revealed that the mandate was not in favor of ordinary people because its troops were not allowed to use their weapons. Furthermore, the mandate given to a peacekeeping operation is usually the result of diplomatic negotiation and compromise, and may not always meet expectations - particularly those of the host country. Moreover, the analysis of eight main tasks in this initial mandate revealed that the mandate of UNAMIR was related to security issues rather than civilians protection.

What to note is that UNAMIR did not have the mandate or the capacity to disarm the forces of the host government that were engaged in the massacres, along with militia groups or to intervene in the full scale civil war that had broken out between the government and the RPF.

Such intervention would probably have entailed having to fight both sides, or having to support one side or the other in the civil war. But there was no mandate to support either side, or to fight a war in Rwanda.

Concerning achievements attributed to UNAMIR in relation to protection of civilians in Rwanda, findings revealed that the UN had completely failed to recognize the situation on the ground and had disregarded the reports of many commentators. The reasons of failure revealed by findings were that UNAMIR numbers were little contrasted with the quantity of troops they were needed to contain. This is on the grounds that the proportion of the size of the armed forces in any activity decides its prosperity or disappointment. Another reason is the rules of engagement where the internal rules or directives among UNAMIR military were difficult to make decision circumstances, conditions. Another reason was the withdrawal of some contingents especially the Belgians on 12 April 1994. The reason was that due to the lack of peace, there was no reason for peace keepers and that not only should UNAMIR be suspended, but that UNAMIR should withdraw when the Belgian's departed. Belgium, of course, was the colonial power from 1919 to 1962. Therefore, some would argue that they had a special responsibility to maintain a peace in Rwanda.

Findings revealed that UNAMIR did not achieve its mission. This failure is under different factors. In fact, the scope of the UNAMIR mandate was too broad for the size of force deployed. Also, UN had totally failed to understand the situation on the ground.

According to the challenges encountered by UNAMIR, findings revealed that the UNAMIR achievement or failure revealed that it did not fulfill its mandate. The main challenges highlighted by findings are UN bureaucracy & hierarchy, UN military structure, Human resource constraints, material resource constraints, lack of strategy to protect civilians and lack of willingness and preparedness to protect.

For the lesson that can be drawn from the experience of UNAMIR to inform and achieve more effective civilian protection, findings revealed that the UN is nothing more than a platform for the great powers to control the world;

The UNAMIR really had limits or at least could have saved the lives of its members who perished trying to save civilians; the UN should be held responsible, the UN laughed at the Rwandans. Another lesson is that, UN serves the interest of great power nations like USA, France; and then, we should therefore not rely on it in terms of peace and security. Moreover, the peacekeepers don't have to be deployed like tourists. They have to bear in their mind that they go to protect the civilians and help in restoring peace. Another lesson is that we must give ourselves sufficient means to impose peace. The internal lessons learned process has identified emergency protection capacity as being one of the major weaknesses in the response to the Rwanda emergency.

Key lessons emanate from the UNAMIR failure of the strategies on preventive Genocide against Tutsi and diplomacy thus leading to one of the biggest mass killings in human history within such a short period.

6.2. Conclusion

In light of the discoveries, the scientist inferred that the Protection of Civilians (POC) stays a significant test for UN peacekeeping and that worldwide UN change is fundamental as to inner authoritative and operational imperatives. Additionally, the case of UNAMIR consolidates the ability hole present day UN harmony tasks are looking notwithstanding developing worldwide interest and shows the requirement for achievable commands. It likewise shows the significance of exercises realized with regards to non-military personnel insurance and all the more critically in regards to their interpretation into solid activities. To wrap things up, our contextual analysis demonstrates that the global network's purpose to attempt activity can have any kind of effect in the field though the extent is often disputed.

In addition, the case of Rwanda just like any other jurisdiction offers key peculiar lessons in prevention of conflict and wars, and peace building. Much as different lessons may be drawn from other conflict zones it is important to analyze what lesson are learnt to prevent further conflicts in Africa and the world over. The underlying factor is that conflicts must be properly mapped to identify the different actors, their relationships and strengths with an intention of addressing all their concerns. There should also be openness and commitment by the parties to have the conflict resolved before it escalates. Keen attention should also be made on early warning signs and proper strategies of addressing the rising discontent should

be implemented. In so doing, we shall try to abate violent conflicts and therefore preserve human life and development.

In general, the researcher concluded that UNAMIR mandate was not fulfilled and then it did not achieve any objective related to the civilians' protection due to enormous challenges encountered such as bureaucracy, military challenge, resources challenges, strategies of civilian's protection, lack of willingness.

6.3. Recommendations

At the backdrop of the elucidations and the findings of the research, the study makes the following recommendations. As revealed that some challenges jeopardized the fulfilment of UNAMIR mandate and impossibility of civilians' protection, the UN should avoid the bureaucratic system in terms of decision making related to the human rights protection because the bureaucracy can slow the safeguard and protection of civilians because the heavy top-down structure complicates and impede the procedures. The UN could permit the immediate reactions in the field in order to save population in danger and allow the spontaneity and personal initiatives.

Concerning the UN military structure challenge, the UN should oblige the integrated chain of command or mixed structure, and adopt common procedures in decision making concerning the civilians protection.

UN Member States ought to know about neighborhood conditions and dangers when they consent to convey their soldiers in the field. While apparently a harmony activity depends to a limited degree on the desire of troop contributing nations, the formation of a genuine worldwide power with an incorporated hierarchy of leadership could tackle this issue. Notwithstanding, this ought to be a piece of a worldwide UN change.

For the human resource constraints, UN should mobilize all countries members to have goodwill to provide all sufficient resources either human capital, financial or materials which are useful to the field and safeguard the civilians.

Apropos the lack of strategy to protect civilians, UN should entrust the mandate to protect civilians and to enforce its implementation.

UN ought to endow the command which licenses peacekeepers to embrace a proactive mentality, utilizing power so as to forestall dangers particularly against regular folks.

In relating to the lack of willingness and preparedness to protect, most peacekeepers would be willing and prepared to protect civilians and face risks, if not, it could cause the genocide as it was perpetrated against Tutsi in Rwanda.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Interview guide

A. Introduction

Hello,

My name is Byabagabo Gady, I am a student at the Centre for Conflict Management at the University of Rwanda and I am working on a research project for my master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies. I am currently conducting interviews for the completion of my thesis on 'UNAMIR AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVLIAN IN RWANDA IN 1994: SCOPE AND LIMITS'

The objective of this project is to conduct an in-depth study on

- (a) The mandate of UNAMIR and how well did this function,
- (b) The achievements of UNAMIR and the challenges it faced during its mission,
- (c) Challenges pertaining to the then context and the way it affected the work of UNAMIR
- d) Lessons that can be drawn from the experience of UNAMIR to inform and achieve more effective civilian protection.

I thank you in advance, Mr. / Ms. Nshimiyimana Deogratias for taking part of this interview. Your valuable time and inputs towards the success of my research are highly appreciated.

B. Confidentiality and consent:

During the interview, I may ask you some personal questions, feel free to decline where you do not feel comfortable. You can withdraw from this interview of course but I would like to emphasize that your answers are for research purpose only and will help me to better understand the "UNAMIR AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVLIAN IN RWANDA IN 1994: SCOPE AND LIMITS". They will be strictly confidential and your name will not appear in the text or bibliography of this thesis, should you wish to protect your confidentiality.

Furthermore, your comments do not necessarily have to be associated with your workplace or unit. The interview should take 60 minutes or more upon your consent.

.....

Je m'appelle Byabagabo Gady, je suis étudiant au Centre de gestion des conflits de l'Université du Rwanda et je travaille sur un projet de recherche pour ma thèse de maîtrise en études sur la paix et les conflits. Je mène actuellement des entretiens pour la finalisation de

ma thèse sur «LA MINUAR ET LA PROTECTION DES CIVILS AU RWANDA EN 1994: PORTÉE ET LIMITES»

L'objectif de ce projet est de mener une étude approfondie sur (a) le mandat de la *MINUAR* et dans quelle mesure cette fonction a fonctionné, (b) les réalisations de la *MINUAR* et les défis auxquels elle a été confrontée au cours de sa mission, (c) les stratégies / recommandations ou les enseignements de l'expérience de la *MINUAR* afin d'informer et d'assurer une protection civile plus efficace.

Je vous remercie d'avance, M. / Mme _____ d'avoir participé à cet entretien. Votre temps précieux et vos contributions au succès de mes recherches sont très appréciés.

Confidentialité et consentement:

Lors de l'entretien, je pourrai vous poser quelques questions personnelles, n'hésitez pas à décliner là où vous ne vous sentez pas à l'aise. Vous pouvez bien sûr vous retirer de cet entretien, mais je tiens à souligner que vos réponses sont uniquement à des fins de recherche et m'aideront à mieux comprendre la «*MINUAR ET LA PROTECTION DES CIVILS AU RWANDA EN 1994: PORTÉE ET LIMITES*». Ils seront strictement confidentiels et votre nom n'apparaîtra pas dans le texte ou la bibliographie de cette thèse, si vous souhaitez protéger votre confidentialité.

C. Identification

1. Record/notes taker of this interview: Gady Byabagabo Murwanashyaka
2. Interviewee:
3. Age:.....
4. Sex:.....
6. Place of abode in 1994:.....
7. Function:.....
8. Employer/ Work Place:....
9. Full address:.....
10. Email & Tel. number:

D. Interview guide/Guide d'entretien:

a) For ordinary citizens/ Pour les citoyens ordinaires:

- 1) What do you know about UNAMIR and its mission to Rwanda?
Que savez-vous de la *MINUAR* et de sa mission au Rwanda ?

2) How well did UNAMIR protect civilians the before and during the genocide against Tutsis (give example of places or people you know if any)?

Dans quelle mesure la *MINUAR* a-t-elle bien protégé les civils avant et pendant le génocide contre les Tutsis (donnez des exemples des lieux ou personnes s'il y a eu) ?

3) In your opinion, what do you think are the major achievements of UNAMIR?

4) Why it is said that UNAMIR failure or achieve its mandate?

Selon vous, pourquoi est-il dit que la *MINUAR* a échoué ou atteint son mandat ?

5) What do you consider as the major challenges that faced UNAMIR?

Quels sont, selon vous, les principaux défis auxquels la *MINUAR* a été confrontée ?

6) What lessons can one draw from the experience of UNAMIR?

Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de l'expérience de la *MINUAR*?

7) How would rate the mission of UNAMIR (Failed/Succeeded)?

En un mot, comment évalueriez-vous la mission de la *MINUAR* (Échec / Succès)?

8) What recommendations can you formulate for other UN peacekeeping missions based on the experience of UNAMIR?

Quelles recommandations pouvez-vous formuler pour d'autres missions de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies sur la base de l'expérience de la *MINUAR*?

Feel free to share any relevant comment/detail not above covered.

N'hésitez pas à partager tout commentaire / détail pertinent non couvert ci-dessus.