



**UNIVERSITY of
RWANDA**

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

CENTRE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

**Any contribution of UNAMID in the Protection of Civilians in Darfur
Region, SUDAN? The perspectives of peacekeepers**

**A Dissertation submitted to the University of Rwanda in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of a Master's Degree of Arts in Peace Studies and
Conflict Transformation**

By

Monique Mukaruliza

Reg. No: 221029783

Supervisor: Alice Urusaro Karekezi, PhD

September, 2022

DECLARATION

This project, “*Any contribution of UNAMID in the Protection of Civilians in Darfur Region, SUDAN? The perspectives of peacekeepers*”, is my original work. I ascertain that this work has not been submitted to any tertiary institutions or colleges for whatever purpose, in whole or in part. I further confirm that I have acknowledged using in-text citation and complete reference at the end of the thesis, where I consulted other literature. Finally, apart from the supervisor's guidance, I declare that I own the paper's content.

Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Reg. No. 221029783

DEDICATION

This dissertation work is dedicated to my children and my husband for their encouragement and support.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very thankful to the Almighty God for protecting and strengthening me during the time I carried out this study.

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Alice Urusaro Karekezi, PhD, who tirelessly guided me for this study. Her valuable time, sacrifice, encouragement and support contributed to the success of this study.

I am thankful to the Leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda for its encouragement and support during my studies.

I sincerely thank all the lecturers and the administration of the Center for Conflict Management – University of Rwanda for facilitating and contributing to the success of this master’s program.

I am deeply indebted to the Chief of Defense Staff and the Inspector General of Police for their support and facilitation. To my respondents, men and women in uniform, thank you very much for your valuable contribution to the success of this study.

My sincere gratitude to my family members: my husband, my children, my mother, my sisters and brother, for their support and encouragement.

I am very grateful to the Commandant of the Rwanda Military Academy in Gako for the massive support and facilitation during data collection process.

I am also thankful to my colleagues at University of Rwanda in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation program, who contributed in one way or another, to the success of this study.

LIST OF FIGURES AND APPENDICES

Figure 2.1 Basic Framework for Understanding Protection of Civilians	24
Appendix: Interview guide	83

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
GoS	Government of Sudan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JMST	Joint Mediation Support Team
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NRC/IDMC	Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PoC	Protection of Civilians
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RNP	Rwanda National Police
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement Army
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

UNSG

United Nations Secretary General

USA

United States of America

CONTENT

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
LIST OF FIGURES AND APPENDICES	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	v
ABSTRACT	xi
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Background	2
1.3. Problem Statement.....	3
1.4. Research Purpose	4
1.5. Research Objectives	4
1.5.1. General objective.....	4
1.5.2. Specific Objectives.....	4
1.6. Research Questions	5
1.6.1. General question.....	5
1.6.2. Specific questions.....	5
1.7. Research Approach.....	5
1.8. Significance of the Study.....	7
1.9. Delimitations and Limitations.....	7
1.10. Outline.....	8
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1. Introduction.....	9
2.2. Previous studies	9
2.3. Conceptual framework	14
2.3.1. Peacekeeping	14
2.3.2. A Hybrid Force.....	16
2.3.3. Protection of Civilians.....	16
2.3.4. A Robust mandate	18
2.3.5. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).....	19
2.4. Exploring the effectiveness of Peacekeeping missions in the PoC.....	20
2.4.1 UN policy on the PoC.....	21

2.4.2. Relationship between the level of security and the amount of protection measures for PoC	23
2.4.3. Preconditions for effectiveness in the PoC.....	25
2.4.4. The ‘Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians’	27
2.5. Summary	30
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH.....	31
3.1. Introduction.....	31
3.2. Research design	31
3.3. Participants and setting	31
3.4. Selection of respondents	33
3.5. Instrument and Data Collection process	35
3.5.1. Qualitative Interviews	35
3.5.2 Data Collection.....	36
3.6. Data analysis.....	38
3.7. Reliability and Validity.....	39
3.8. Ethical issues	40
3.9. Summary.....	42
CHAPTER 4: UNAMID PEACEKEEPERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON PoC: FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS.....	43
4.1. Introduction.....	43
4.2. The protection of civilians mandate as understood by peacekeepers	43
4.2.1. The physical protection	44
4.2.2. Provision of Security for Humanitarian Aid and Workers	46
4.2.3. Peacekeepers assess their achievements in PoC.....	47
4.3. Challenges in PoC.....	50
4.3.1. At Strategic level	51
4.3.2. At the operational level.	55
4.4. Enablers.....	63
4.4.1. Strategic proximity of team sites to the IDP camps	64
4.4.2. Well- trained peacekeepers.....	64
4.4.3. Outreach and quick impact projects	65
4.5. Requirements for satisfactory PoC.....	65
4.5.1. Understand the roots cause of the conflict and possible solutions	65
4.5.2. A political will to resolve the conflict	65
4.5.3. Adequate training	66

4.5.4. Rapid deployment of a capacitated peacekeeping force.....	66
4.5.5. Responsibility to protect by the host country	66
4.5.6. Exercise the powers offered by the UNSC.....	66
4.5.7. A flexible UN system	67
4.5.8. A well-defined mandate matching with resources.....	67
4.5.9. An Intelligence gathering capabilities	67
4.5.10. Regular consultations with the mandating authority	67
4.5.11. Holding peacekeepers accountable.....	68
4.8. Summary	68
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	70
5.1 Introduction.....	70
5.2. Conclusion	70
5.3. Recommendations.....	72
5.4. Suggestion for future research	73
MAPS.....	75
Map of Darfur in Sudan.....	75
Map of Darfur IDP camps	76
REFERENCES	77
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE.....	83

ABSTRACT

The central question the present study aims to answer is the extent to which has the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) fulfilled its mandate of civilians’ protection, from the perspectives of the peacekeepers who are among the primary agents in this regard. The study’s main focus is to examine the effectiveness of contemporary United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians and identify gaps and tensions in the protection agenda from the Rwanda’s peacekeepers’ perspectives.

Methodologically, this study used a qualitative approach. The data were collected through individual interviews and group discussions with selected former UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda, military and police components. A purposive sampling was used in the selection of peacekeepers who mainly could provide adequate information and were available. A total number of 30 former peacekeepers participated in the study. In addition, a review of the literature was undertaken, and analysis of selected existing studies made in order to get insights on related subject and facilitate the data analysis.

The narratives of the respondents indicate a general feeling that they fulfilled the protection of civilians’ mandate, based on the reduction in attacks, killings, rapes and other atrocities against civilians since the time of UNAMID deployment in Darfur. However, they also acknowledged that they didn’t provide full and sustainable protection to civilians since some violent incidents continued to occur in their presence in Darfur, due to numerous challenges they faced, including the restrictions imposed by the host country and the absence of an inclusive peace agreement among others, which negatively affected the Protection of Civilians’ (PoC) implementation. The respondents pointed out a number of requirements to achieve a satisfactory PoC, including the adequate training of the peacekeepers and all involved staff in PoC prior to their deployment, set of a clear and achievable mandate with adequate resources to implement it, accountability by peacekeepers, facilitation by the host government and use of all means including force when necessary to protect civilians, etc. Most of these requirements are contained in the Kigali principles on the Protection of civilians and in the UN policy on the PoC.

Key Words: UNAMID – Peacekeeping – Protection of civilians – Hybrid force – Robust mandate

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

I remember when the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5th May 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, after two years of intense negotiations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Rebel Movements of Darfur, facilitated by African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), European Union and other Stakeholders (Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006). Despite that some rebel movements had not signed, it was a relief for the people of Darfur, considered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, who had hope to see the armed conflict and atrocities against civilians stopped. The enduring corrosion of the security situation in Darfur has prompted succeeding reexaminations of the mission's mandate and strategic priorities that eventually centered on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) as a priority issue.

The dreams of those living in Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) camps and those in exile in neighboring countries were to return to their villages and live a new life with their families. Those who stayed in their villages had hoped to move freely and live a better life free of fear and attacks.

One can also well expect that, equally, troops deployed to implement such protection on a daily basis aspired to eventually help the dream of peace triumph, but do we know their perspectives about the promises and perils of implementing the PoC as a core mandate of a peacekeeping mission? Even a rapid review of the published work about the above suggests the contrary.

Hence, the key motivation for this research is to bring the voices of peacekeepers on the heated debate of protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions in order to get their views on what is required to provide a satisfactory protection of civilians in mission areas in Darfur and beyond. A basic argument for this thesis is that the voices of those who are at the front of the protection of civilians is of utmost importance if we are to understand better the challenges and prospect of the protection of the civilians of our times. More on this will be discussed further down, but before, this chapter is organised as follows: It provides a background to the study on the one hand. On the other, it states its problem, objectives and research questions before saying its approach,

significance and scope. In place of conclusion, an outline of the whole study is offered. The section below provides some context to this study.

1.2. Background

After the 2004 Addis Ababa talks in Ethiopia, the AU had deployed peacekeepers in Sudan, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to facilitate negotiations of a peace agreement between the government of Sudan (GoS) and the rebel movements operating in Darfur and protect civilians (Netabay, 2009; Luqman et al., 2012). The AMIS was ill-equipped and found difficulties to protect civilians, including its own personnel (Müller, 2020). Some AMIS personnel, while conducting night patrols around the IDP camps and villages lost their lives in ambushes by armed groups. Cars hijacking was a day-to-day experience for AMIS peacekeepers.

At the same time, debates were going on at the United Nations (UN) on the necessity to deploy a stronger force to oversee the implementation of DPA and protect civilians since the AU seemed to lack the capacity to do so. However, the Government of Sudan (GoS) was strongly opposed to the deployment of a UN Force in Darfur. After lengthy negotiations between AU, UN and pressure exerted by the International Community on the GoS, the later finally agreed to the deployment of a “Hybrid force”. Therefore, in July 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted the resolution 1769 deploying a UN- AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under chapter VII of the UN Charter, with a character of being a largely African force supplied and financed by the United Nations (UNSC resolution 1769, 2007).

According to the UNSC resolution 1769 on Darfur, the initial mandate of UNAMID was the protection of its personnel and properties; the provision of security that will enable the free movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers; the facilitation of effective implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement; the prevention of its implementation’s disruption and armed attacks and the protection of civilians, taking into consideration the primary responsibility of the Government of Sudan to protect its citizens (UNSC Resolution 1769 Darfur, 2007).

In December 2007, the AMIS force in Darfur was transformed into the UN-AU Hybrid force and further troops’ deployment followed. The mandate of UNAMID was later on

reviewed to put more emphasis on the protection of civilians in Darfur and add facilitation of mediation between GoS and non-signatories rebel movements (UNSC Resolution 2148, 2014). The People of Darfur had high expectations and assurance that security in Darfur will improve following the deployment of a robust UNAMID force and that the DPA will be implemented. On the other hand, the rebel groups, non-signatories to the DPA, had expectations that the Hybrid force will facilitate the negotiations of an Agreement, which is inclusive (Luqman et al., 2012). The above developments have triggered much reflection on the issue of the protection of civilians.

There is a number of important studies on the performance of UNAMID mandate to protect civilians population in Darfur. Examples include Tanja R. Müller (2020), Tanja R. Müller & Zuhair Bashar (2017) that write respectively on the security of local staff employed by UNAMID and on how local perceptions of conflict dynamics interact or not with incident reporting in UN peacekeeping missions. Yet, both studies focus on the views of some former UNAMID local staff that were in charge of collecting data on human rights abuses and Darfurian refugees living in camps in Eastern neighboring Chad.

In addition, Punga (2011) assessed peacekeeping success in terms of protection of civilians in the cases of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UNAMID using only the secondary data. All these studies concluded that UNAMID failed to protect civilians. Surprisingly so, none of them did hear the voices of the peacekeepers, primary providers of protection to civilians, making an understanding of what might have been the problems and the possibilities to improve on the issue unlikely.

Hence, this study aims at filling this gap and does so by centering the present study on the perspectives of UNAMID peacekeepers.

1.3. Problem Statement

In spite of the numerous important studies on the topic of civilians' protection in Darfur, which mainly focused on the stories of the IDPs and refugees, targeted beneficiaries of protection, the perspectives of the peacekeepers, providers of protection are still not fully known more than a year after the closing of this mission on December 31, 2020.

This thesis sets out to attending to this gap in knowledge by focusing analysis on the voices of peacekeepers that served under UNAMID and get their feelings on how they contributed to the protection of civilians in Darfur as part of their mandate and the challenges they faced in performing it.

1.4. Research Purpose

The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the centrality of civilians' protection in peacekeeping mission from the peacekeepers' perspective, by bringing to the fore the perspectives of peacekeepers who are the custodians of protection of civilians. Fully understanding how to better contribute to UNAMID mandate of civilians' protection success, which is understood here as a reduction of atrocities against civilians including attacks, killings, injuries, women rape and children abuse as a result of the deployment of UNAMID in that region. To this end, it will examine the implementation of the protection of civilians' mandate in Darfur by those expected to fulfill it, peacekeepers, how they understood their mandate, the challenges they were faced with, and the ways they attended to them. In addition, the extent to which UNAMID contributed (or not) to regional peace with the return of IDPs and refugees and what need to be done to improve future peacekeeping missions with a protection of civilians' mandate in the region.

1.5. Research Objectives

1.5.1. General objective

The general objective of this study is to examine the extent to which UNAMID has fulfilled its mandate of civilians' protection in the Darfur region, and what facilitated or hindered that undertaking, from the peacekeepers' perspective.

1.5.2. Specific Objectives

1. To understand what peacekeepers thought their mandate was and the extent to which they feel they have attended to it
2. To understand what peacekeepers thought were the main challenges for its fulfillment
3. To understand what peacekeepers thought had eased its fulfillment

4. To Understand what peacekeepers thought are the requirements to provide satisfactory protection of civilians of our time.

1.6. Research Questions

1.6.1. General question

To what extent has UNAMID fulfilled its mandate of civilians' protection in Darfur region from the peacekeepers' perspectives?

1.6.2. Specific questions

1. How did you understand your mission and felt you fulfilled it? Please explain.
2. How do you see as the main challenges for the fulfillment of your mission? Please explain.
3. How do you see as the enablers in the fulfillment of your mission? Please explain.
4. What do you see as the requirements to provide satisfactory protection of the civilians of our time? Please explain.

1.7. Research Approach

The approach used to address the above questions is qualitative and exploratory in nature because this study aims at exploring the feelings of the peacekeepers on how they performed their mandate of civilian protection in Darfur.

It follows Creswell & Poth (2016) who argue that a qualitative research is conducted when there is a problem or issue that need to be explored, and that the exploration gives space to the silenced voices by directly interacting with them and getting their opinion about a specific issue (Creswell & Poth, 2016, 39-40). Also, Stebbins Robert (2001) indicates that an exploratory research aims at studying or investigating an under-researched phenomenon (Stebbins, 2001, 2). In the same line, Richard Swedberg argues that the exploratory research involves investigating what is not known or new (Swedberg, 2020). In addition, the exploratory research technique examines or investigates a relatively small number of participants by asking, in most of the cases, open-ended questions and getting timely, accurate and rich data and enabling the researcher to get more insights on a phenomenon under study (Stebbins, 2001). I have

not found a published study with a similar focus. I have therefore conducted a small sample size research, privileging the views of key informants most likely to provide rare insights. Subsequent studies may increase the size and include all the three components from other troop contributing countries.

The study used both primary and secondary sources, drawn from the interviews as well as various UN documents, reports, articles, internet sources and political maps of Darfur in Sudan and Darfur IDP camps. However, the study relies mostly on key informants unstructured interviews of peacekeepers from Rwanda, both military and police components who served under UNAMID during the period from 2013 to 2020.

In the military, the focus was on those who were at command level, from the top force command down to the platoons' heads who were on the field as per their command structure, since they can explain more on the mandate of UNAMID, its achievements and the challenges that they faced in the fulfillment of its mandate. They gave directives and produced reports on the functioning of the Mission. On the side of the police, since their deployment was done on individual basis, the selection considered senior officers and officers. Creswell & Poth (2016) argue that "in a narrative study, one needs to find one or more individuals to study, who are accessible, willing to provide information and who shed light on a specific phenomenon or issue being explored". They further state that "most importantly, they must be individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon being explored and can articulate their lived experiences" (Creswell & Poth, 2016, 119-120).

In this study, the narratives of the respondents, former UNAMID peacekeepers, who all experienced the implementation of the PoC mandate, indicate a general feeling of having fulfilled that mandate, based on the reduction in attacks, killings, rapes and other atrocities against civilians during the time of UNAMID presence in Darfur. However, they also acknowledged that they didn't provide full and sustainable protection to civilians since some violent incidents continued to occur in their presence in Darfur, due to numerous challenges they faced, including the restrictions imposed by the host government and the absence of an inclusive peace agreement among others.

1.8. Significance of the Study

From an academic point of view, this study intends to address a knowledge gap about an important issue of our times, by means of completion of existing studies that focus almost exclusively on the stories of the former UNAMID local staff and refugees from the Darfur region living in camps in neighboring Chad. It is designed to serve as reference material to future research about the protection of civilians in the field of Peace studies and conflicts transformation.

This study might be also beneficial to the stakeholders in the Darfur conflict transformation and decision- makers at AU and UN. Furthermore, the study's findings may be useful to troop contributing countries (TCC), helping to understand what is required for the full protection of civilians in Darfur region and beyond. More generally, the recommendations to be made are meant to contribute to guide the planning of future peacekeeping missions that are designed with an emphasis on the protection of civilians.

1.9. Delimitations and Limitations

This study will focus on the contribution made by UNAMID in the protection of civilians in Darfur from the peacekeepers' perspectives. I would have wished to interview all of the three components: military, police and civilians from different contributing countries, but due to the time constraint, I will only interview the military and police peacekeepers, from Rwanda, because they are easily accessible, using their institutions' channels and can provide required information to understand better the role they played as peacekeepers in the fulfillment of UNAMID mandate of civilian protection.

Furthermore, the focus will be on the peacekeepers' perspectives and no field research will be conducted to talk to the beneficiaries: IDPs and refugees in their camps and civilians at the villages, not because they aren't important, but for the reason that the few studies that exist were focusing on those groups. This study will cover the period from 2013 to 2020 when UNAMID was at the highest capacity in terms of personnel and equipment and the time of its closure. In fact, the period before 2013 was characterized by the progressive troops' deployment while the period from mid-2017

saw the progressive reduction of troops, preparing for the transformation of the peacekeeping into a peacebuilding mission and UNAMID closure in December 2020.

1.10. Outline

This study is structured around five chapters:

Chapter 1 has served to provide a general view of the research, including an introduction to the study, a background, a problem statement, the research objectives and questions, the research approach, its significance and delimitation and limitation;

Chapter 2 will review the existing literature on the topic and the key concepts and theoretical framework;

Chapter 3 will elaborate on the methodological approach used for this research;

Chapter 4 will present the findings and data analysis from the interviews conducted with UNAMID former peacekeepers from Rwanda, military and police components; and

Chapter 5 will provide the general conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The previous chapter provided a panoramic view of the present study. This chapter sets out to attend to the following two tasks. The first one is to evaluate previous studies, to establish the relevance of this particular one. The second is to draw lessons from similar and/or related studies, in terms of their theoretical and methodological orientations and concepts. The aim was to draw conceptual, theoretical and methodological elements that can serve as a point of departure for this particular study.

2.2. Previous studies

The protection of civilians is a new concept introduced in UN Peacekeeping operations as a core mandate after the failure to protect those civilians in need in the 1990s namely Somalis, Rwandan-Tutsis and Serbs (Punga, 2011, 17). Therefore, it is not surprising that not much has been yet written about this concept. Meanwhile, the few existing studies in the field enlighten on the importance of this undertaking and the challenges associated with it, and stimulate for more research.

Below is a selective review of the most important studies in the field.

Nicolas Lamp and Dana Trif, PhD candidates in London school of Economics and Berlin School of Transnational Studies respectively, conducted a research in 2009, on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping forces in African countries, assessing those UN peacekeeping missions assigned the mandate of PoC and deployed under chapter VII of UN Charter, allowing them to use force to fulfill their mandate. Those assessed UN missions include UNAMSIL I and II in Sierra Leone deployed in 1999 and 2000 respectively; MONUC I and II in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), deployed in 2000 and 2004 respectively; Artemis/Ituri Brigade in DRC, deployed in 2003; UNMIL in Liberia, deployed in 2003; UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire, deployed in 2004; and ONUB in Burundi, deployed in 2004 (Lamp & Trif, 2009). Their paper was published in the Hertie School of Governance Working Paper Series as Working Paper No. 47 of November 2009. This was a documentary study which based on the empirical data on PoC from UNSC resolutions, UN Secretary General's reports and reports made by

international organizations like International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Group and Human Rights Watch (HRW) as well as newspapers' articles.

The authors first set standards of effectiveness of a peacekeeping to protect civilians and those are twofold: the ability of the peacekeepers to control the area of deployment so as to enhance the protection of civilians; and the implementation of the protection measures such as patrols, escort, cordon and search operations in order to reduce attacks on civilians (Lamp & Trif, 2009, 8). Those standards were applied to the listed UN Peacekeeping Missions in assessing their effectiveness. Interestingly, the analysis revealed that UN Peacekeeping that were deployed with enough capacity to control their area of deployment effectively protected civilians and achieved their mandate and those are: UNMSIL II, MONUC II and Artemis and Ituri Brigade, UNMIL and ONUB (Lamp & Trif, 2009, 37).

On the contrary, those with low capacity were unable to control their area of deployment and failed to fulfill their PoC mandate and those are: UNAMSIL I, MONUC I and UNOCI (Lamp & Trif, 2009, 37). The second standard that relates to the implementation of the protection measures was closely linked to the first one. At the time of the publication of their study, UNAMID was at its second year of operation with the PoC mandate and deployed under chapter VII but was not listed among the UN Peacekeeping missions to be assessed since the analysis period ended in December 2005 before its deployment. Their study has also identified factors which can explain the capacity of a peacekeeping force to perform PoC mandate namely its size, equipment, commitment of troops, credibility, expert knowledge, homogeneity of troops, salience of task of PoC in mandate and in operations, intensity of the conflict, the legitimacy of the Peacekeeping, cooperation of major stakeholders and enforcement mandate (Lamp & Trif, 2009, 38-41).

There is no theory on the PoC that their study based on, but we can draw from it the developed standards and identified factors for effectiveness to apply them to the current study.

In her Master dissertation entitled "UN Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians in the 21st Century; Case studies of MONUC and UNAMID", Irina Livia Punga (2011) assessed peacekeeping success in terms of protection of civilians in the cases of the

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) which was transformed into the United Mission Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and UNAMID using only the secondary data. The assessment was based on four determinants of success notably the existence of a peace agreement from which the mission was deployed, the clear and effective mandate, the understanding of the situation on the ground by the mandating authority and the capacity that the mission has to effectively protect civilians. The study concluded that both missions have not been able to protect civilians and new atrocities on civilians were occurring in the presence of peacekeepers (Punga, 2011).

This study is a documentary study and many sources have been used including UN reports, resolutions and guidelines. Even if it is an academic research, the methodological approach followed is not explained. However, it elaborates on the key concepts to draw up on for the present research such as peacekeeping, protection of civilians, a robust mandate and it gives a set of factors for success in PoC by UN Peacekeeping, which can serve for theoretical point of departure for this research which will use primary data.

In their article on UNAMID effectiveness and local perception of the conflict in Darfur, published in the *International Peacekeeping* journal on 4th October 2017, Tanja R. Muller & Zuhair Bashar conducted a study on how the local perception of conflict is integrated into UNAMID data set and analysis, and the importance of inclusion of local knowledge into the mission's data set for an effective PoC. They used interviews for data collection, with some Sudanese refugees living in Chad and former UNAMID staff living in UK (via skype) and other staff in Addis Ababa, using a semi-structured questionnaire. 53 in-depth interviews were conducted with 41 men and 12 women.

The narratives of the refugees from Darfur portrayed the difficult moment they lived in Darfur, exposed to violent incidents without any assurance to be protected by UNAMID force. They detailed the reasons of their exile, pointing out the everyday violence they experienced, which forced them to flee to Chad, including regular attacks on their villages by Arabs pastoralists aimed at looting their cars, lorries, animals, shops, crops, money and lack of safety from home to markets, and other places, as well as arbitrary arrest without any clear reason. They expressed general feeling of fear and insecurity

since when they reported those incidents to the security organs, not only they didn't get any feedback, but were also threatened by those that were supposed to protect them (Müller & Bashar, 2017, 763-768). The authors concluded by highlighting the importance of including in UNAMID data collection and reporting, the local people's perception of the conflict dynamics, the way they perceive the treats that they experience, in order to develop proper civilian protection strategies.

This study only focused on the refugees' accounts and the perspectives of the peacekeepers, providers of protection were not known, and yet they could help to understand better the challenges behind PoC and the possible strategies to address them.

In another article on the histories of refugees from Darfur about the protection of civilians mandate and unintended damages to civilians in a peacekeeping mission, published in *International Peacekeeping* on 06th August 2020, Tanja R. Müller conducted a study on the protection of civilians focusing on the security of local staff employed by UNAMID to collect data on human rights abuses and on how local perceptions of conflict dynamics interact or fail to interact with incident reporting in UN peacekeeping missions. The author conducted interviews with 4 former employees of UNAMID (3 men and 1 woman) in United Kingdom, in relation with their previous work of documenting human rights abuse in Darfur. They were selected through snowball sampling and as explained by the author, the number was too small because only few former UNAMID staff were willing to talk about their experience in this peacekeeping mission. The study revealed that UNAMID failed to protect its local staff against government threats when they reported on security incidents in which the government or its allies were involved, making it difficult to get accurate information (Müller, 2020). Consequently, any report or translation made by local staff needed to be contextualized in order to understand the conflict dynamics in Darfur.

These two researches conducted by Tanja R. Müller & Zuhair Bashar and Tanja R. Müller, although focused only on the narratives of refugees from Darfur and former local staff of UNAMID, have enlightened on the Darfur conflict and how these two groups perceived the performance of UNAMID in the protection of civilians. This portrays what is known about UNAMID's civilian protection which this study will draw on to analyze data collected in the interviews with former UNAMID peacekeepers about their feelings on the performance of PoC mandate, which were not yet known.

In a policy research commissioned by the Dutch Development Organization Cordaid, conducted by Jair van der Lijn on the factors of success or failure of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) and UNAMID, published in 2013, the author made a comparative analysis of the two missions basing on nine set factors of success for a mission to contribute to a durable peace, which implies the absence of physical violence and handling of the causes of the conflict. Those factors include the willingness and sincerity of conflicting parties to resolve the conflict; Parties to conflict guaranteed of security; causes of conflict attended to; enough cooperation with stakeholders and parties; timely deployment of the peacekeepers; competent leaders and personnel; long-term approach for the mission; coordination of policy implementation and, ownership of the parties.

The author applied the lessons learnt from South Sudan peace process and UNMIS operations to the Darfur situation to assess the chance of success or failure of UNAMID. He based his study on literature and relevant documents and conducted interviews with key experts and stakeholders including academics, representatives of GoS and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and parties to conflict. The paper concluded that UNAMID was deployed in absence of a peace to keep while the hostilities were raging and since the key factors for the success were not met in the case of Darfur, UNAMID was unlikely to contribute to a durable peace (van der Lijn, 2013).

This paper missed analyzing the performance of UNAMID in relation with the PoC mandate but made a broad analysis on its chances to contribute or not to a durable peace and stop physical violence, based on the lessons learnt from UNMIS, which this study can draw on for data analysis.

In sum, existing published studies focused on assessing the effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping missions assigned the PoC mandate, using secondary data collected mainly through UN reports, UNSC resolutions and other International organizations reports and basing on the authors' understanding of what should be the assessment criteria influencing the mission's effectiveness or success. Most of them included in the criteria, a clear and achievable mandate matching with resources, existence of an inclusive peace agreement and the capacity of the peacekeepers to perform the PoC mandate. Other studies focused on the perception of the refugees of Darfur living in Chad and the former local staff of UNAMID living in different countries, on the Darfur

conflict and the protection they received or not from UNAMID, using mainly primary data, collected through interviews. Both studies concluded that UNAMID failed or may fail to protect civilians and yet the perspectives of the peacekeepers who undertook the PoC mandate were not known. This gives an orientation to the current study of defining its territory by ways of focusing on the perspectives of the peacekeepers and get their feelings on how they performed the PoC mandate and the challenges they faced in the execution of it.

This study will draw from these previous ones the developed standards and factors for effectiveness in PoC, the key concepts used and the narratives of the beneficiaries of protection from Darfur, for data analysis.

2.3. Conceptual framework

This section elaborates on the key concepts that have a relationship with the topic under discussion which is the protection of Civilians in Darfur conflict by the UN – AU hybrid force. Below, the study presents the key concepts and how it has been used in this dissertation.

2.3.1. Peacekeeping

From the literature, Peacekeeping can be defined as a third-party intervention, UN or a regional body, in a conflict area to help parties to the conflict to restore peace through observation of the ceasefire and negotiation of a peace agreement and its implementation. It is defined by Bash L. Brooks as an international technique used to manage conflict, using peacekeepers to create conducive environment for conflict resolution or prevention of further hostilities (Bash, 1994, 6). It follows the principle of consent of conflicting parties, impartiality of peacekeepers and only use of force for self-defense or defense of the mandate (Bash, 1994, 6; Punga, 2013,).

Furthermore, UN defines Peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 2008, 18). Peacekeeping is a tool for maintenance of international peace and security as mandated to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (UN Charter, 1945, art. 24). In his report entitled “Agenda

for Peace” of 1992, the UN secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali defines Peacekeeping as the deployment of a United Nations force in the field, with the consent of all parties to the conflict, for the prevention of the conflict and the making of peace (Schaub, 2014, 11). Ishaque Waseem (2021) argues that “Peacekeeping has proven itself to be a highly effective tool available to the UN to facilitate the host countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace – the transition – and enduring stability” (Ishaque, 2021, 15). He went further to indicate that Peacekeeping involves the intervention of a third party, UN or a Regional Organization, in building positive peace after the warring parties’ consent (Ishaque, 2021, 16). Peacekeeping implies the existence of a signed ceasefire agreement or a peace agreement to be implemented by the parties to conflict and it plays the observation, verification, protection and reporting roles (Ishaque, 2021).

Peacekeeping has evolved over years from a traditional to a robust model. At its first deployment few year after the end of the World War II, it was primarily a military force observing the ceasefire implementation and separating the parties to conflict. Later on, with the changing nature of conflict, from inter – states to intrastate and non-traditional security threats, it became robust and multidimensional, comprising military, police and civilian elements with a complex mandate for sustainable peace, stability and protection of civilians (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 2008, 18; Ishaque, 2021, 14).

The multidimensional peacekeeping has also become too broad to include both United Nations – led peace operations, and those led by other bodies, like regional blocks, subject to the authorization of the Security Council (UN, DPKO, Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008). It is the case of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), deployed in 2004, in which the African Union led the efforts of the international community to secure peace in Darfur. The last and recent evolution of peacekeeping is a multidimensional hybrid force, commanded by UN and a regional block (Luqman et al., 2012, 61). The United Nations – African Union hybrid force (UNAMID) deployed in Darfur, in replacement of AMIS, illustrates this recent peacekeeping evolution, in which the UN had for the first time, since its inception, shared the command of a Peacekeeping mission with another Regional Organization, the African Union (Luqman et al, 2012, 65; Ishaque, 2021, 16).

Thus, no common definition has so far been agreed on internationally. In this study, the UN definition of peacekeeping will prevail.

2.3.2. A Hybrid Force

Traditionally, UN has deployed peacekeeping missions wherever the need arises in order to fulfill its mandate of maintaining international peace and security. The UNSC deploys peacekeeping force under chapter VI or chapter VII of the UN charter, depending on the mandate assigned to the mission which in turn is informed by the nature and content of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict (UN charter, 1945, 8-9). In a likely pacific settlement of disputes, chapter VI will apply while in likely threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and act of aggression, chapter VII will apply for the deployment of UN peacekeepers (UN charter, 1945, 8-9).

Chapter VIII of the UN charter provides for Regional arrangements in dealing with maintenance of peace and security and in consistence with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN charter, art. 52). It is the case of the African Union (AU), a continental body that succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was assigned, at its creation, a security role by its members. According to Arvid Ekengard, the constitutive act of AU has given it the intervention right in its member states when the need arises to restore peace and stability, prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and address situations that constitute a serious threat to legitimate order (Ekengard, 2008,10).

The Hybrid peace operation is a new arrangement involving UN and a Regional organization, sharing the command and responsibility for the fulfillment of the mandate assigned by the Security Council. It is the case of UNAMID, the first ever hybrid force, commanded by both UN and AU. Ishaque Waseem (2021) argues that the cooperation between AU and UN is provided for under chapter VIII of the UN charter and, more importantly, sets a milestone in the peacekeeping evolution into a hybrid form of Peacekeeping operations (Ishaque, 2021, 16).

2.3.3. Protection of Civilians

Debates have arisen in the literature on the meaning of Civilian's Protection with diverging and ambiguous definitions depending on the actors' perspectives. According

to Wels Welmoet (2019), the confusion in the interpretation of the concept of protection of civilian, affects negatively the delivery of effective response and the agencies collaboration since they do not have a same understanding of that concept and cannot plan together (Wels, 2019, 2). The Protection of civilians is mandated to all component of a UN Peacekeeping mission, including military, police and civilians.

UN has defined protection of civilians as “taking all necessary actions, including use of force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the host state to protect its citizens” (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, 2015, 3). In the same line, Paul D. Williams argues that protection is qualified in terms of physical defense of individuals, communities and installations by military institutions while the Humanitarian organizations define protection in terms of fulfillment of human rights and legal norms (Williams, 2010, 15). According to Ferris (2011) cited by Jacob (2019, 119), the protection concept has been extended to include different activities such as providing food, advocacy, monitoring, support in building basic infrastructure, voter registration, etc (Ferris, 2011, xii).

Furthermore, Weir A. Erin (2013) argues that PoC in armed conflict is an obligation for parties to the conflict, emanating from the International Humanitarian Law and refers to "the PoC from widespread threats of violence, coercion, and the deliberate deprivation of aid" (Weir, 2013, 1). Inspired by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s “Egg framework” for protection activities, Paul D. Williams conceptualized the civilian protection in “Onion framework” implying activities of physical protection from imminent violence, provision of basic necessities, enjoyment of human rights and enabling conditions, the physical protection being at the center (Williams, 2010, 15).

The UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approaches to PoC differ in focusing on “how to protect” and “how not to kill” respectively.

UN started deploying force with the primary mandate to protect civilians in 1999 in Sierra Leone while NATO deployed an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2001 specifically with a mission to protect the people in Kabul and on the request of the Afghan Authorities (Beadle, 2010, 7).

A gap has been revealed in both UN and NATO, between assigning the protection mandate and providing guidelines on how to implement that mandate at the operational level. While the UN focuses tactically on how to protect civilians, the NATO's preoccupation is on how not to kill civilians during its interventions involving in some cases evacuation of the people out of the battlefield (Beadle, 2010, 7).

This study will base on the UN definition of Civilian Protection since we are assessing a Peacekeeping mission in which UN is involved in its command and financing.

2.3.4. A Robust mandate

The PoC is an operational mandate assigned by the UN Security Council to a UN peacekeeping mission or by a regional body to a non-UN led peacekeeping mission under the authorization of the Security Council, to protect civilians in the area of deployment. Cecilia Jacob (2019) argues that traditional UN peacekeeping were assigned to monitor the ceasefire and peace agreement implementation. It is following the failure of the UN force to protect civilians in the 1994 genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda and mass killings of civilians in other countries like in Angola, Somalia and Bosnia, in the eyes of UN peacekeepers in the 1990s that the Security Council was pushed to place the protection of civilians (PoC) on its agenda and adopted resolutions that enabled peacekeepers to respond to the civilians' protection mandate (UNSC resolution 1674, 2006; Sebastian, 2015, 7; Jacob, 2019, 204-205; Weir, 2013, 1).

This mandate requires a robust peacekeeping, deployed under chapter VII of the UN charter, which implies the authorization by the Security Council to use force when necessary to protect civilians and the mission's mandate. UN has defined the PoC mandate of a peacekeeping operation as: "without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force" (UN Department of Peace Operations, 2019, 6). Chataing defines in ACLED a robust mandate as "one which permits the use of "all means necessary" to fulfil the mandate or parts thereof" (Chataing, 2015, 2). It is however challenging for UN Force, deployed on the principle of neutrality and impartiality to use force, taking part in the conflict

and becoming also target and exposed to armed attacks. This concern was also raised by Alexander William Beadle, indicating that the use of force can, in some cases endanger the civilians' lives instead of saving them when used disproportionately, causing civilians' casualties and therefore undermining the mission's legitimacy. He further argues that the use of force should save more lives than it can endanger and improve more security than it can provoke conflicts (Beadle, 2010).

The use of force requires to deploy a robust peacekeeping with adequate resources matching with the mandate to ensure that protection of civilian is achieved. Cecilia Jacob refers to some reports of commissioned studies to re-examine the efficiency of UN Peace Operations like the 2000 Lackhdar Brahimi report, the 2015 High Level Independent Panel. Both reports emphasized the need for deployment of robust peacekeeping missions which is the one capable to protect civilians with adequate resources realigned with the strong and clear mandate (Jacob, 2019, 205). The use of force can however endanger the lives of innocent civilians like it was the case in Haiti. The UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) fired from heavy machine guns mounted on armored personnel vehicles and destroyed houses and killed many people (Khalil, 2018, 114).

2.3.5. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The R2P is an international norm adopted by the UN World Summit in 2005 and calling for all countries and the international community to protect the population from mass atrocities (Jacob, 2019, 206). The concept of the R2P was introduced in 2001 as a response to reconcile sovereignty of states and protection of human rights. It implies the primary responsibility of each sovereign state to protect its people from abuse and harm and in case of failure, the R2P is undertaken by the international community.

Therefore, protection is a human right that citizens should enjoy at all times. In this context, Kathryn L. Nash (2010) argues that the first entity responsible of protection of the people is the state within its territory and the international community intervenes when the state fails to do so (Nash, 2010,1).

The R2P has 3 components, namely: (1) the prevention of conflict by addressing the root causes, (2) the reaction to situations of violence including sanctions, prosecution

and military intervention, and (3) the assistance for recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation (Nash, 2010,1).

In his 2009 report on the implementation of the R2P, the UN Secretary General identified 3 pillars of the R2P namely (1) the responsibility of individual state to protect its citizens, (2) the responsibility of the international community to support the efforts of individual states in providing assistance and capacity building and (3) the responsibility of the international community to intervene in timely manner in case of failure of the individual state and occurrence of crimes (UN, 2009).

In the case of Darfur, the government of Sudan took part in the conflict, fighting with rebels and failed to protect its people. Even the intercommunal conflicts were fueled by the government in arming the Arab militia called Janjaweed (Meulen et al., 2009, 9). The AU first intervened in deploying AMIS in 2004, followed by the hybrid mission's deployment UNAMID in 2007 with the protection of civilians at the core of its mandate (UNSC resolution 1769).

Despite its endorsement by over 170 states at the World Summit, some states viewed the R2P as a pretext for powerful countries to pursue their political agenda in the territory of weaker states (Jacob, 2019, 207).

2.4. Exploring the effectiveness of Peacekeeping missions in the PoC

The protection of civilians is a new concept introduced in UN Peacekeeping mandate in late 1990s after the failure of UN to protect civilians against genocide and mass atrocities that occurred in the 1990s. It's not surprising that there is not much written on the topic and no theories yet developed, especially that it is more practical than theoretical.

The following paragraphs elaborate on what has been written by other scholars and policy makers on the factors for effectiveness and standards for success of peacekeeping missions in the performance of the PoC mandate, that this study will draw on to explore the effectiveness of UNAMID in the fulfillment of its PoC mandate from the perspectives of the peacekeepers.

2.4.1 UN policy on the PoC

In order to ensure effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the PoC, promote consistency in UN approach to the protection of civilians and taking into consideration the different contexts in which UN peacekeeping operate and the need for flexibility to adapt to the changing environment and available resources, UN has developed a policy to guide the implementation of the PoC mandate. The 2019 policy, which is an update of the 2015 policy, adopts a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilian that include political, security and economic factors which influence and contribute to addressing the threats to civilians in short and long term. Thus, the need for proper coordination of all capabilities available in the mission to effectively protect civilians. An integrated approach involving the three components, civilians, military and police, and other UN agencies operating in the same area enable the mission to implement the comprehensive approach in the PoC (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019).

The policy shed light on the roles and expectations for each component, and the individuals and institutional accountability needed for effective implementation of the PoC mandate. The policy indicates that for an effective and sustainable PoC, the Peacekeeping mission has to ensure stability, peace and security through an inclusive political peace process, sustainable solutions to address the conflict and support the host government to exercise its R2P. It has also to prevent any harm to civilians in case the political process to resolve conflict is not delivering or not working. It will do so by preventing or responding to acts of violence against civilians, taking into consideration the primacy of political resolutions to conflict and when necessary, use of force according to the mandate, when deployed under chapter VII of the UN charter, and to the rules of engagement.

The policy has set guiding principles for implementing the PoC mandate, including (1) Grounded on international law, implying the prevention of violation of international laws on human rights, humanitarian and refugees; (2) a priority mandate involving the prioritization of PoC in resources and capabilities allocation; (3) primary responsibility of the host state to protect its citizens and be supported by UN peacekeeping except when the host country fails to accomplish that task; (4) In harmony with the principles of peacekeeping, namely consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate; (5) under effective leadership, command and

control, implying accountable leaders at all levels on the PoC implementation; (6) a comprehensive and coordinated efforts for PoC; (7) do no harm, meaning avoid to expose civilians to risk or to cause harm; (8) cooperation with humanitarian and development actors in respect of humanitarian principles and protection of humanitarian workers; (9) a tailored community based approach, integrating women and mainstreaming child protection concerns in implementing the PoC mandate (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019, 7-8).

Furthermore, the policy sets three levels of PoC action, implemented at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and by all the three components of the peacekeeping mission. Those actions include: (1) Protection through dialogue and engagement; (2) Provision of Physical protection and (3) Establishment of a protective environment (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019).

The protection through dialogue implies activities relating to engaging perpetrators or potential perpetrators of violence against civilians; supporting the search for political solutions by the parties to conflict; advocating for protection and human rights for women and children; engaging the communities in policing and in community-based mechanisms for conflict resolutions; engaging the security organs of the host country in the PoC, etc.

The provision of physical protection involves activities relating to protective presence of the peacekeepers and deterrence of threats to civilians, intervening between fighters and civilians and mitigating potential harm to civilians, threat or use of force and facilitating safe passage or refuge by patrolling, transferring, evacuating or relocating civilians to a secure area.

The establishment of a protective environment involves activities meant for peace building including the institutional capacity building, the security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, supporting the political process, the social cohesion and reconciliation, etc. (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019).

Although this policy was adopted in 2019, it is an update of the 2015 policy and bringing in new ideas, based on the experience of the past years, that will, if implemented, strengthen the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in PoC mandate.

In defining roles and responsibilities of each component and senior leaders involved in the PoC at the UN Headquarters and at the field mission, will hold them accountable for the effective implementation of the PoC mandate (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019). This is a harmony with the Kigali Principles on the civilian protection which introduced the accountability element in the performance of the PoC and were taken into consideration in developing this policy (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019). This policy was supplemented by a PoC handbook that provides practical guidance on the PoC implementation taking into consideration various specific contexts.

It is however silent about the responsibility of important actors in the protection of civilians mandate such as the UNSC being the mandating authority that has to set a clear and feasible mandate; the troop and police contributing countries which have to provide well trained personnel capable to fulfill the PoC mandate and committed to face the risks associated with PoC; the funding and logistics suppliers who commit to avail the necessary resources for the execution of the mandate and other actors involved in PoC. Therefore, there is an important part of accountability that is missing to ensure effective implementation of the PoC mandate.

2.4.2. Relationship between the level of security and the amount of protection measures for PoC

Researchers have developed frameworks for understanding Protection of civilians like Alexander William Beadle in his paper on Protection of Civilians in theory – a comparison of UN and NATO approaches published by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in 2010. He emphasized on the relationship between the level of security to be achieved and the required measures needed to sustain it. According to him, theoretically “the greater level of civilian security to be achieved, the more sustainable protection measures will be required, and the greater the role of civilian components should be” (Beadle, 2010,11). He further indicated that this theory also applies in reverse, that “the greater the threat to the physical security of civilians, the more basic protection needed, which is provided for by predominantly military components” (see below).




Fig. 2.1. Framework for Understanding Protection of Civilians

Source: Beadle (2010), Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, FFI-rapport 2010/02453

This figure demonstrates the nexus between the level of insecurity or threats to civilians and the required type or means of protection. Beadle (2010) argues that in the initial phase of protection, there is a need to provide the basic physical security by the military force who can use all means including force to protect the civilians and secure humanitarian relief. He further highlights the need to provide sustainable security to civilians through the Disarmament program, the institutional building and security organs capacity building. This enables an efficient handover of the protection tasks from external forces to the host government leading to a sustainable peace (Beadle, 2010).

As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs on literature review, those UN Missions that were deployed in armed conflict area with low capacity in term of personnel and equipment have struggled to perform the PoC mandate until they were strengthened and given enough capacity to control the whole area of deployment (Lamp & Trif, 2009). In their investigation on how, in civil wars, UN Peacekeeping protect civilians, Hultman et al (2013) as cited by Lawin Kochani (2020), found that UN peacekeeping

force, once deployed in sufficient large number reduce atrocities against civilians including killings.

However, the capacity in terms of number of personnel isn't enough to perform the PoC as argued Lawin Koshani in his thesis, assessing if high quality peacekeepers equals better civilian protection in the cases of Mali and DRC. He cited Novosseloff (2017), who advanced that MONUSCO had a big number of peacekeepers but poor in quality, lacked tools like night vision capabilities and couldn't exercise his PoC mandate during night, giving a room to rebel groups to attack after the sun set (Novosseloff, 2017, as cited by Koshani, 2020, 29).

This conceptual framework advanced by Beadle (2010) also applies in the case of Darfur where the complexity of the Darfur conflict, involving the GoS army and armed movements without political will to reach an inclusive peace agreement (Ishaque, 2021) and the local communities, the high level of atrocities against civilians and the enormous size of that hostile region required the deployment of a robust peacekeeping force from the beginning of the peace intervention. The failure to do so by UN and AU in deploying an African Force (AMIS) with very low capacity in terms of personnel, skills and equipment resulted into the inability to provide protection to civilians. Hence, the need to deploy the UN-AU hybrid force with more capacity.

2.4.3. Preconditions for effectiveness in the PoC

Scholars and consultants have identified some pre-conditions determining the effectiveness of peacekeeping in fulfilling the PoC mandate that this study will use in analyzing the perspectives of the peacekeepers on the performance of the PoC mandate. The most defined conditions for success or failure to effectively protect civilians in armed conflict include a clear and achievable mandate that matches with resources.

In this context, the Brahimi report on the review of the UN peace operations' activities, conducted in 2000 to establish the preconditions to have an effective peace support operation following the failure of UN missions to protect civilians in Rwanda and in Bosnia, made recommendations that were adopted by the Fifth-fifth UN General Assembly. It recommended that peacekeeping has to be the suitable option, there must be a peace to keep, consent of parties to conflict of UN intervention to solve the conflict,

the mandating authority has to consider the political, economic and humanitarian factors on the ground and the mandate has to be clear and have an achievable end state (Tim Murithi, 3, cited by Schaub, 2014, 8-9). However, in the case of Darfur, those recommendations were not applied. Principally, there was no peace to keep since no inclusive peace agreement was signed. Even the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire agreement which was the basis for the deployment of the AU force in Darfur was violated by the signatories. There was no mission end state since all the elements of the mandate were linked to the political will for inclusive peace process and there was no funding accountability (Schaub, 2014, 9).

In a study conducted by the Ford Institute for Human Security of the University of Pittsburgh in 2009, on the Effectiveness of a peacekeeping force in protecting civilians especially in IDPs and refugees' camps, examining eight African countries that were in conflict, four key determinants were identified. Those are: (1) the timing of the deployment of the peacekeeping force; (2) the composition of the peacekeeping force, Africans vis a vis non-Africans; (3) the ability of peacekeepers to effectively patrol the conflict area and (4) their ability to initiate and implement disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) programs (Reich et.al,2009). This study indicates that a peacekeeping can effectively protect civilians against attacks if it is deployed earlier to prevent violence against civilians instead of protecting those already affected, if its size is adequate to patrol the conflict area or IDPs. It also indicates the need for a mandate and capacity of the peacekeepers to implement the DDR program in order to avoid the recurrence of hostilities (Reich et.al,2009).

Alexander William Beadle in his research on Protection of civilian, notes that protection by presence of military personnel on the field deters the potential aggressors and build confidence and trust of the population in the peacekeepers who in turn get familiar with the concerns of the population (Beadle, 2010, 19).

In the same line of ideas, Nicolas Lamp and Dana Trif (2009) in their study assessing the effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping forces in the PoC in armed conflicts identified standards to determine whether the Peacekeeping mission was effective or not. Those standards include the ability of the UN Peacekeepers to control their area of deployment and protect civilians from atrocities; and their capacity to perform activities aimed at

protecting civilians such as patrols, cordon and search, and escorts in order to reduce attacks on civilians.

In a report of the independent Panel, commissioned by the UNSG in 2014, to assess both UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions, and make recommendations on the needed changes for UN peace operations to stay indispensable and effective, the Panel made recommendations that include: “the restoration of the search for peaceful political settlement to the centre of UN efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and protect civilians; stronger partnerships with regional organizations, host governments and local communities to achieve this; full spectrum of peace operations to be used more flexibly; a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions enabled by field – focused administrative framework” (UNSG’s report, 2015). The Panel stresses urgent need for new approaches to preventing conflicts and mediating disputes before violence erupts (UNSG’s report, 2015).

In the case of Darfur, the absence of a peace agreement, lack of GoS’s cooperation with UNAMID made difficult the protection of civilians. However, the strong cooperation between UN and the regional organization, AU, enabled UNAMID to make some achievements in the protection of civilians during the time of its physical presence in Darfur. UNAMID was deployed at a time violence had already escalated and prevention and mediation were only possible if there was a political settlement to address the roots causes of the conflict .

2.4.4. The ‘Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians’

The 'Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians', are a set of 18 non-binding but committing principles endorsed by troop and police contributing countries and other stakeholders in UN peacekeeping at a High Level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Kigali, Rwanda, on 28-29 May 2015.

The Kigali Principles on the PoC were developed based on the past experiences and lessons learnt in the UN peacekeeping missions, with the objective to set forth the responsibility of troop contributing countries for effective implementation of the

protection of civilians' mandate in peacekeeping operations (Keeler & Kanetake, 2017, 3).

They relate to member states' commitment to the training of peacekeepers at all levels on protection of civilians before their deployment to a peacekeeping mission (Principles 1 and 2), Use of force to protect civilians as necessary and consistent with the mandate and rules of engagement (Principles 3, 8, 9, and 10), Avoid undue delays in protecting civilians and make arrangements for rapid deployment (Principles 4, 7, and 11), Identify and communicate to UN any resources and capabilities gaps and contribute to enabling capabilities for the protection of civilians (Principles 5, 6, and 17), Monitor and report any human rights abuse and, hold accountable and take disciplinary action against Missions' own personnel that fail to take action in PoC while circumstances allow or fail to observe the highest standard of discipline (Principles 12, 13, and 15) and, Undertake own review in case own personnel are unable to protect civilians in order to address the causes of failure and urge for regular consultations of UN with troop and police contributing countries, particularly in case of the mandate's review that may involve possible changes, and to ensure that mandate matches with resources (Principles 14, 16, and 18) (Keeler & Kanetake, 2017, 17; The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, 2015).

A lot of attention and debates on these principles have been going on at different occasions including at the High Level Event on the Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations, under the theme: "Endorsing and Implementing the Kigali Principles", which took place in New York on May 11, 2016; at the event on the Kigali Principles as best practice guidelines for the effective implementation of the PoC mandates in UN peacekeeping operations, hosted by the United States Institute of Peace in collaboration with Rwanda, Uruguay, the Netherlands and the United States in 2016; at the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping convened by President Barak Obama of USA and other world leaders on the sidelines of the 70th UN General Assembly and at the Policy Forum held virtually on May 29, 2020 on the occasion of the International Day of Peacekeeping, co-hosted by the International Peace Institute and Rwanda, Ireland and Uruguay Permanent Missions to UN, under the theme: "Pledging to Protect Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons from the Implementation of the Kigali

Principles” ([youtube.com/watch/Implementing the Kigali Principles for Peacekeeping](https://www.youtube.com/watch/Implementing%20the%20Kigali%20Principles%20for%20Peacekeeping)).

Those debates aimed at familiarizing with the Kigali Principles, emphasizing on how they might be used to effectively implement the PoC mandate in UN peacekeeping missions and calling all UN members to adhere to them. By end of 2019, these principles were endorsed by 50 countries including the main troop and police contributing countries and partners funding the peacekeeping missions.

The debates also served to learn from the experience of countries that have implemented the Kigali Principles like Uruguay, Rwanda and Ethiopia among others. Those countries have established Training centers to train peacekeepers prior to deployment in UN Peacekeeping missions and ensure that they contribute skilled and disciplined peacekeepers capable to effectively protect civilians. At the end of the mission, other sessions are organized for debriefing and lessons learnt in order to address identified issues that can be fixed by the sending country and report to UN the remaining unsolved issues ([youtube.com/watch/Implementing the Kigali Principles for Peacekeeping](https://www.youtube.com/watch/Implementing%20the%20Kigali%20Principles%20for%20Peacekeeping)).

The most debated issues in these forums were the provision on the use of force by peacekeepers where necessary to protect civilians, the accountability of peacekeepers, holding them at the highest standard of conduct and take disciplinary measures in case of misconduct. The use of force is seen by many as the last resort solution that comes after the political resolution of the conflict fails and criticized for changing the nature of peacekeeping operations from observing a ceasefire or a peace agreement implementation to peace enforcement or to country insurgency or foreign invasion especially when the force of the host government is involved in the conflict. Others see the use of force as a necessary action to take when there are atrocities against civilians in the face of peacekeepers assigned a mandate to protect civilians using all means and at any cost.

The accountability of peacekeepers should be linked to other factors such as adequate training and holding them at the highest standards by troop and police contributing countries, availability of required resources to perform PoC and a clear and feasible mandate by the mandating authority ([youtube.com/watch/Implementing the Kigali Principles for Peacekeeping](https://www.youtube.com/watch/Implementing%20the%20Kigali%20Principles%20for%20Peacekeeping)).

2.5. Summary

In this chapter, previous studies in the field have been reviewed. Taking a look at the above review, even a rapid evaluation of the existing studies, mostly conducted by the researchers from the Global North, suggests that there is no study with the focus as presented in chapter 1. In addition to the fact that the topic in focus is under-researched, a lot of what existing can be best classified as gray literature (policy papers, reports, working documents, etc.). This is not surprising given that the issue is highly practical, and most current peace operations are new in character especially with the protection of civilians' mandate.

Therefore, bringing at the front the perspectives of the peacekeepers on the issues of debate on PoC, using empirical data, will much contribute to knowledge by completion of existing studies, empirical and documentary, that focused almost exclusively on the stories of refugees from Darfur and former local staff of UNAMID.

Nonetheless, the few existing studies, provide important insights on related subjects, especially so, regarding the concepts and preconditions for PoC effectiveness that can serve as point of departure for the present research.

The following chapter will elaborate on the Methodological approach adopted in conducting this study.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

3.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, previous studies in the field have been reviewed and an absence of research that focuses on the perspectives of the peacekeepers about the protection of civilian in relation to UNAMID was revealed. Nonetheless, the review has inspired this study on the particular methodological approach to adopt and a number of concepts that can serve as point of departure for the present research. The aim of the present chapter is to reveal how I approached the present study through a deeper discussion into the more practical aspects of our methodological choices.

3.2. Research design

Because this study aimed at exploring the perceptions and feelings of the peacekeepers on how they performed their mandate of civilian protection in Darfur, it has adopted a qualitative approach in data collection and data analysis and exploratory in nature. It followed Creswell & Poth (2016, 39-40) who argue that a qualitative research is conducted when there is a problem or issue that need to be explored, and that the exploration gives space to the silenced voices by directly interacting with them and getting their opinion about a specific issue. Also, Stebbins indicates that an exploratory research aims at studying or investigating a phenomenon (Stebbins, 2001, 2). Furthermore, this study has used a purposeful sampling in the selection of respondents, targeting the peacekeepers who are accessible and mainly can provide the information which would enable the researcher to get answers to the research questions. This is in line with what advance Rai and Thapa, that the purposeful sampling implies the selection of respondents based on the interests that the researcher has in them, those who can provide the most useful information enabling to understand the research problem and central phenomenon in the study (Rai and Thapa, 2015, 6).

3.3. Participants and setting

The target respondents for this study are the former peacekeepers from Rwanda, both military and police components, male and female who served under UNAMID during the period from 2013 to 2020.

Initially, I thought I could extend my study to all the three components of UNAMID since it was a multidimensional peacekeeping mission and that also civilians may have played an important role in PoC, but due to time constraint and difficulty to access to the civilians peacekeepers, I focused on the military and police components of UNAMID. The choice was made based on their accessibility through the Ministry of Defense and the Rwanda National Police. In addition, they were part of UNAMID personnel, implementing the protection of civilian mandate, and were able to provide adequate information that would enable the researcher to understand better the research topic and get response to the research questions. Dickinger (2007, 11) argues that one of the advantages of qualitative research method is the richness of the data.

The period chosen corresponds to the time when UNAMID was at its highest capacity in terms of staff and equipment and the time of preparation for its closure in order to have ideas on the real challenges that were not addressed alongside the Mission. In fact, as observed from the UNSC resolutions on Darfur, the first years of UNAMID were characterized by progressive deployment. From 2013 to 2017, it was at its full deployment capacity while from end 2017 to 2020 it saw its staff slowly reduced as a result of the process of change of mandate from peacekeeping to peacebuilding mission and the preparation for its closure in December 2020 (UNSC resolutions 2363, 2017).

Regarding the military respondents, the focus was on those who were at command level, from the top force commander down to the platoons' heads who were on the field as per their command structure, since they can explain more on the mandate of UNAMID, its achievements and the challenges that they faced in the fulfillment of its mandate and have critical analysis of the situation. They gave directives and produced reports on the functioning of the Mission. On the side of the police, since their deployment was done on individual basis, the selection considered both senior officers and officers. They worked hand in hand with the military, especially during patrols around the Internally Displaced Persons' camps (IDPs) and humanitarian assistance and can also provide useful information and important ideas for this study. Creswell & Poth (2016, 119-120) argue that "in a narrative study, one needs to find one or more individuals to study, who are accessible, willing to provide information and who shed light on a specific phenomenon or issue being explored". They further state that "most importantly, they must be individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon being explored and can

articulate their lived experiences”. In this study, both military and police personnel selected have experienced the PoC assigned to UNAMID and were able to elaborate on their experience as peacekeepers in Darfur.

3.4. Selection of respondents

This study has used a small size sample of 30 respondents, 20 from the military and 10 from the police. Such choice is consistent with the whole study, exploratory in nature and chiefly, because to my knowledge there have not been other studies with such focus. The fact that I chose a qualitative approach entails that I had privileged meaning rather than looking for a representative sample. Rai and Thapa (2015, 6) state that in a qualitative research method, the issue of non- representativity of the sample population is not to be considered as a weakness, contrary to the quantitative research method. As Dickinger (2007, 13) argues, in qualitative research, what count is not the big sample size, but rather the quality or richness of the information the researcher gets from the few selected respondents, which enable him/her to get response to the research question.

Qualitative research experts contend that there is no clear-cut answer to the question of ‘how many’ and that sample size is depending on several factors (Baker & Edwards, 2012) . Sandelowski (1995) proposes that qualitative sample sizes are big enough to make possible the developing of a ‘new and richly textured understanding’ of the subject of the study, but sufficiently small so that the ‘deep, case-oriented analysis’ (p. 183) of qualitative data is feasible. Morse (2000) contends that the more concrete data are collected from each respondent, the fewer respondents are necessary. She calls on researchers to consider factors, such as the breadth of study, the quality of topic , the nature of data, and the research design. In fact, the level of structure of questions in qualitative interviewing has proved to impact on the wealth of data generated (Ogden & Cornwell 2010).

In this study, respondents were purposively selected, precisely using homogeneous sampling technique since my population share the same characteristics of being former peacekeepers who served in UNAMID, at different levels of leadership, military or police from Rwanda and have experienced and involved in the PoC implementation in Darfur region. It has followed Rai and Thapa (2015, 7) who argue that a homogenous

sampling is a technique used in purposive sampling when the units under study are similar or have the same traits or characteristics. Their recruitment was made through the institutions they belong to, namely the Ministry of Defense and the Rwanda National Police. These institutions helped to identify the respondents since they are deployed in different locations. A formal request was made with the two institutions, seeking their facilitation to reach out to the respondents, what they promptly responded to, positively.

In order to get relevant information, the respondents from the military were selected from the former leaders of UNAMID force at different levels of command: Force commander, battalion's, company's and platoon's commanders. Both played an important role in planning, execution and reporting on the functioning of UNAMID. Rwanda deployed annually four battalions of 800 soldiers each and led by a battalion commander. Each battalion was composed of 4 companies of 200 each and in turn the company was made of 3 platoons of 50-60 soldiers each. Furthermore, two Rwandan Senior Military Officers occupied the post of UNAMID Force Commander during the period under study.

The Office of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) has assisted to identify and avail the former UNAMID battalions', companies' and platoons' commanders who are deployed in different locations. The same office connected me to the top leadership of the Gako Military Training Academy, who very much facilitated to meet with a good number of former UNAMID peacekeepers at the Academy. Also, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, who is also a former UNAMID peacekeeper facilitated my first contacts with CDS's office.

For the Police component, since they were deployed on individual basis, 2 most senior officers and 8 officers were interviewed. The Rwanda National Police through the Office of the Inspector General of Police facilitated to meet the respondents at the RNP headquarters in Kacyiru and other venues in Kigali for the most senior officers since they are deployed in different sites.

3.5. Instrument and Data Collection process

This study, being explorative in nature rests principally on collected primary data for analysis, using the qualitative interview as the main technique. Since its objective is to hear the voices of the former UNAMID peacekeepers and get their feelings on the extent to which they fulfilled the mandate of the protection of civilians, the one-on-one conversation between the interviewer and the respondents as well as the group discussions have enabled the researcher to achieve this objective.

In addition to the above, a review of the existing studies and literature on the topic were conducted. In other words, though relying principally on primary data, the study has also used secondary data, in the form of institutions' reports, interviews, newspapers, internet, publications, etc. According to Farber (2006, 369) and Watkins (2012, 154), two types of data collection are used in qualitative research, namely the secondary and primary data. On one hand, the researcher gets secondary data from existing sources such as the library. On the other hand, the researcher generates primary data.

In this study, which is an exploratory research and the first of its kind, data were collected from primary source through interviews and secondary source by literature review. In a qualitative research, as argues Watkins (2012, 154), there are various methods of primary data collection, including but not limited to Focus groups, in-deep interviews, uninterrupted observation and ethnographic participation. In the same context, Farber (2006, 369) observes that two processes are involved in primary data collection: interviews and observation.

This research has used interviews and groups' discussions with guiding questions for both the military and police selected respondents. Dickinger (2007,13) argues that the advantage of a guiding questionnaire in a qualitative study is that it eases the comparison of answers from the respondents when analyzed.

3.5.1. Qualitative Interviews

In order to get adequate information that is required to respond to this research questions, unstructured interviews were conducted. This is in line with what Atkinson (2017, 70) and Dickinger (2007, 10) suggest on the forms of interviews: structured and unstructured. They argue that structured one implies a questionnaire with a list of

questions that is strictly followed, one by one during the interview while the un-structured one uses a guide with a list of topics to be covered and has flexibility to ask sub-questions. Atkinson (2017, 70) further argues that even if the structured interview helps to get organized data that will facilitate the analysis, it limits the respondents to the listed questions, while the un-structured interview is more flexible and the researcher can ask sub-questions that can address issues missed in the initial guiding questionnaire.

In addition, Creswell & Poth elaborate on the forms of interviews including un-structured, open-ended, semi-structured, audiotape, focus group and which can be face-to-face, email, online and telephone interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2016,130). This study has used unstructured interviews with guiding questions which facilitated to explore new and relevant issues that emerged during the interview. Furthermore, groups' discussions were conducted with the selected Rwandan former peacekeepers, both Military and Police who served in UNAMID.

3.5.2 Data Collection

There is a number of activities that this study has pursued for data collection. It has followed Creswell & Poth (2016, 118) who define seven data collection activities in a qualitative research, namely: “(1) locating site or individual; (2) gaining access and making rapport; (3) purposeful sampling; (4) collecting data; (5) recording information; (6) resolving field issues, and; (7) storing data”.

For this study's site and respondents' location and access, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Rwanda National Police (RNP) have facilitated to get access to the military and police officers who participated in the civilians' protection in Darfur as former UNAMID peacekeepers. Contrary to what I had initially planned, the interviews with military senior officers took place at different sites and not at the MOD Headquarters. The most used facility was the Gako Military Training Academy premises in Bugesera district, Eastern Province. The interviews with police officers took place at the RNP headquarters in Kigali as planned but the interviews with Senior police officers were conducted in different locations depending on their preferences like it was done with the military most senior officers. One interview was conducted through Webex platform. A written request to facilitate this research interviews was

sent to the CDS's Office as well as to the IGP's Office. I was very much impressed by the prompt feedback received from both CDS's and IGP's Offices pledging to provide the requested facilitation I would need.

Concerning the purposeful sampling, 30 respondents were selected from the military and police former UNAMID peacekeepers based on the expected quality information they were expected to provide, which would be very useful for this research. A pilot interview was conducted to verify if any change may be needed on the sampling and estimate time required for each interview. Initially I has planned to use maximum two hours for each interview but fortunately the respondents pledged for more time in case I have probing questions to ask.

After the first interview, I reassessed the outcome of it to find out if there is any need to review the guide questions or the population or the timing or the delimitation of my study. Since all interviewees talked about how UNAMID ended its mission without any strategy to sustain what was achieved with regard to the PoC, I reviewed the period of time covered by this study and extended it from December 2017 initially planned, to December 2020. I also had to review the selected respondents to include those who served in UNAMID in the last years of its operations, without changing the size of the sample.

Regarding the forms of data collected, this study applied a topic guide. Initially I thought I would use the tape records to facilitate the transcripts of the data collected in addition to the notes taking. However, when I sought consent of my respondents to record the interview, they were rather uncomfortable and preferred that I take notes instead. According to Hove and Anda (2005), the video or audio recording and note taking are two commonly known techniques used to collect data during the interview. Taking notes can be used to back up the tape recording or solely used in case the interviewees feel uncomfortable with using a recorder (Hove & Anda, 2005).

In taking notes, I followed Williams C. Adams who advises to use a block note and use a quotation mark to highlight a particular and memorable comment made by the respondent during the interview (Adams, 2005). To ensure that I have captured all important information provided during the interview, I took some time after each

interview to review the notes taken and complete any missing useful information I remembered.

Regarding the field issues aspects, the most encountered by researchers relate to determining the required time for the interview. Others are relating to the preparation of the respondents in order to get quality information and ethical issues. For this study, I was impressed by the high ranked officers in uniform, whose time is very precious, giving me ample time for the interview and the importance and interests they saw in this study when I explained to them the purpose of it. I found it easy to communicate with them, especially because of my past experience in Sudan as Deputy Head of AMIS and the connection with some of them.

Concerning the data storage, this study has used computer to store data collected as well as keeping in a safe place the physical documents used. As Davidson (1996), cited by Creswell & Poth (2016, 142) argues, some principles of data storage include developing a back up copies of computer files; and drawing a master list of types of information gathered". These principles have guided this study in data storage.

3.6. Data analysis

Data analysis in qualitative research is a process. In this study, the data analysis has consisted of organizing data collected, making interview transcripts, reading and re-reading the transcripts in order to get their meaning and selecting valuable data. Furthermore, data was organized by questions to be answered to, looking across all respondents' answers in order to identify consistencies and differences in relation to the research question, grouping the ideas which were similar and formulating themes which form the sections and sub-sections of chapter 4, relating to findings in this report. This is in line with different scholars' ideas like Ponelis (2015), Mohajan (2018), Faber (2006), Atkinson (2017) and Creswell & Poth (2016), who argue that data analysis is a dynamic process involving organizing data after the interviews, making transcripts, coding and categorizing the important information for the research topic, formulating themes and writing up the findings. The latter are presented either in figures, tables or narratives (Faber, 2006, 372-373; Creswell & Poth, 2016, 148). For this study, which is a qualitative one, has presented the findings in form of narratives.

3.7. Reliability and Validity

In this study, the methods and tools used in the selection of the respondents, the collection of data and their analysis have ensured of quality research and therefore its reliability and validity. Roberts and Priest (2006) define Reliability and Validity as “ways of demonstrating and communicating the rigor of research processes and the trustworthiness of research findings” (Roberts, & Priest, 2006). In the same context, Jacques de Wet and Zimitri Erasmus associate reliability and validity with trustworthiness (de Wet & Erasmus 2005,28).

The purposeful sampling that was used in this study, targeting the military and police former UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda who served at different levels, strategic and operational, have enabled the researcher to get the quality information to respond to the research questions. The pilot interviews with a small number have served as test of the quality information to get from the respondents, the time required for the interview and the assessment of the settings so that necessary adjustments can be made before interview to ensure quality research.

Since this is an exploratory research, the first of its kind, the sample size of 30 respondents is appropriate and doesn't diminish the quality of the research but opens ways for future research on the topic. As Dickinger (2007) argues, what counts in qualitative research is not the big sample size but the quality of information collected. The face-to-face interviews and groups discussions tools for data collection have addressed the research objective of giving voice to the peacekeepers who were silenced in previous researches on the performance of UNAMID mandate of civilians' protection. The guiding questions or topics have enabled the researcher to compare answers when analyzing data.

Taking notes carefully during the interview and allocating sometime after each interview to reflect on how was the interaction, has enabled the researcher to avoid missing any important element said by the respondents and this is assuring of reliability and validity.

3.8. Ethical issues

The issue of confidentiality has been seen by many scholars like Konza, Lipson and Creswell&Poth, as the most critical ethical issue in qualitative research) (Konza, 2005; Lipson,1994, cited by Creswell & Poth, 2016, 141). According to the same authors, some of the ethical issues to be considered in a qualitative research include confidentiality towards participants, their benefits from the research over risks and social norms (Konza, 2005; Lipson,1994, cited by Creswell & Poth, 2016, 141). In this study, as explained to the respondents before interview, consideration has been made to protecting the anonymity of the respondents by avoiding to use individual names in narratives but rather use letters M for the military and P for the police, with identifying numbers. Hence, interviewees are referred to by M1 up to M20 for the military and P1 up to P10 for the police. Furthermore, they were assured that the collected data are only used for the purpose of the academic research and nothing else.

Other ethical issues I was faced with are related to data collection from the field, including how to relate with high ranked officers in uniform, speak to them and gain their confidence to talk and share their experience, some of them having been my peers in different appointments, mainly in Peacekeeping mission in Sudan where I was deputizing the head of AMIS and during the transition to UNAMID and in the government of Rwanda at different senior positions levels.

My positionality, a female and senior government official, knowledgeable in peacekeeping operations, has eased the data collection. I was able to communicate with the top leadership of the Rwanda Defense Force and of the Rwanda National Police. Hence, it has facilitated to meet in one venue some respondents who were deployed in different locations. My experience in peacekeeping mission in Sudan also has played a role during the collection of data. It helped me to ask right questions and converse easily with former peacekeepers, using a language understood by both of us. Building trust and getting enough time for the interview, asking probing questions were done in order to ensure less bias and distortion by positioning myself within the study (Bailey et al., 2000, 12)

Although I was well acquainted with my interviewees, the interviews were conducted in considering ethical issues. I started by welcoming the respondents, thanking them for

their time, for accepting to be interviewed and share their thoughts on the topic under study, explaining to them the purpose and relevance of the research being carried out. I also explained to them how the interview or group discussions were to be conducted before undertaking them. I specified that the information was meant to be used for the purpose of the academic research. The respondents were confident and happy to participate in this research and promised to respond to the questions listed on the guiding questionnaire and other probing questions that the researcher may find useful to address the research question.

Initially I had planned to record the interview but in seeking their consent to do so, respondents were not comfortable and preferred that I take notes instead of recording. This helped them to build confidence and feel free to talk and express their feelings on how they performed the PoC mandate and respond to other questions of the interview.

What I learned from the unstructured interview is that the language the interviewer will use, the technical words understood by the interviewees showing that the interviewer is conversant with the subject under study, have a very positive impact on the interaction and quality of information you get from the participants. The fact that I was familiar with peacekeeping operations and the activities involved, helped me to easily talk to respondents using technical words that both of us understand and get useful information for this study. This is in line with what Chauncey Wilson argues that when you use a language that is understood by your respondents, using the technical terms they are familiar with, “can enhance your credibility and help build rapport” (Wilson, 2013, 32).

During the group discussions, some members were more silent for the first 5 to 10 minutes. In order to build mutual trust and incite them to talk, I started by engaging them in a dialogue on what we remember from Darfur and Sudan in general. The discussions became very interesting and proceeded with asking questions on their experience in UNAMID and how they feel they have performed the PoC mandate.

At the end of the interviews, I expressed my appreciation, thanking the respondents for allocating their time to the interview and the rich information they have shared. Surprisingly one of my respondents whose time is so precious, invited me for a follow up session during the week that followed the interview.

This study was conducted in acknowledging the work done by other researchers and citing them where their words or thoughts were used.

3.9. Summary

This chapter provided a detailed account of the practical aspects of the research process for this study. It began by describing the ways this research was designed, elaborated on the targeted population and sampling process. It described the instruments and process used for data collection and data analysis before discussing issues of reliability, validity and ethics and how they were addressed. The following chapter presents the findings and data analysis of this study that focused on the perspectives of the peacekeepers on how they have performed the PoC mandate under UNAMID.

CHAPTER 4: UNAMID PEACEKEEPERS' PERSPECTIVES ON PoC: FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter presented the methodological approach adopted in this study, giving details on its design, the sample population and the instruments used to collect data and how data was analyzed. This chapter will elaborate on the accounts of UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda on how they performed the mandate related to protection of civilians and what have been the challenges and enablers in undertaking it. Based on the questions asked in chapter 1 and previous related research, the findings from the interviews conducted with 30 former UNAMID peacekeepers, military and police components from Rwanda, made of 8 females and 22 males will be both presented and analyzed. Respondents are referred to by M1 to M20 for the military and P1 to P10 for the police in order to protect their anonymity. The next section put forward the major themes that have emerged from the interviews regarding the protection of civilians.

4.2. The protection of civilians mandate as understood by peacekeepers

Peacekeepers interviewed, both military and police, stated that the mandate assigned to UNAMID was to protect civilians, its own personnel and installations, humanitarian aid and workers; the facilitation of the mediation between the GoS and non-signatories rebel movements in order to achieve an inclusive peace agreement, the restoration of peace in Darfur and support of the return of IDPs and refugees to their villages. They further indicated that this mandate was too broad, involving parties to conflict to negotiate and agree on an inclusive peace agreement and have a political will to restore peace in order to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees into the normal life in their villages. The respondents pointed out that the protection of civilians was the main component of the mandate they performed, and it involved all activities undertaken to prevent or stop violence against civilians. This is in conformity with the mandate assigned to UNAMID by the UNSC through resolution 1769 of July 2007 and subsequent resolutions on that matter.

However, contrary to the definition of PoC by UN, stating that the PoC is fulfilled by a peacekeeping mission “without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state

to protect its citizens, ...” (UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2009), it was not the case for Darfur conflict. The GoS didn’t exercise its R2P since it was hostile to a part of its population of Darfur, providing support to the pro-government militia called Janjaweed which was the main aggressor of civilians in Darfur (Meulen et al., 2009)

The police interviewed added other activities undertaken after the incidents have happened like investigation and reporting for the purpose of law enforcement that would prevent the repeat or re-occurrence of the violence.

The PoC activities, as stated by the respondents are performed in two ways: the physical protection and the provision of security to humanitarian aid and workers. In a group discussion with the respondents on how they understood the PoC at the time of deployment, they indicated that for them, following prior trainings they received and the experience acquired from other similar missions for some of them, they were well aware of the meaning of PoC in violent conflict, the activities it involves and the risks it exposes to the peacekeepers including death. They however indicated that as far as UNAMID is concerned, depending on the experience of the troops or police personnel, some of them were not familiar with PoC, that this concept was new to them and received the induction course on PoC when they reached the mission. The lack of adequate training at home before the deployment of peacekeepers paralyzed the mission’s performance as stipulated most of the respondents.

The PoC mandate has been performed by all the three components of UNAMID: military, police and civilians. However as explained in the previous chapters, two components were considered in this study, namely the military and police components. The two ways of protection are described in the following sections.

4.2.1. The physical protection

In Sudan, like in other African countries facing intra-states conflicts, civilians are the main victims. As stated by Paul. D. Williams (2010) in the State of Peacebuilding in Africa, when the State is part of the conflict and cause harm to its own people, the responsibility to protect is not exercised. Civilians are killed, injured, harassed, women raped, children abused, etc. Respondents explained that with the deployment of UNAMID in Darfur, physical protection of civilians against threats of violence took a

big part in the civilian's protection mandate. Physical protection requires physical presence of peacekeepers. The respondent, M3 indicated the essential activities they undertook in the physical protection in the following term:

“In order to ensure physical protection, we set up team sites near the IDPs camps, and conducted daily patrols around IDP camps, escorted women going outside the IDPs camps for different activities such as cultivate, fetch water, collect fire woods, going to the market, in order to protect them against rape which is common in Darfur. Rape is a day-to-day experience for women in Darfur. Men are killed when they leave their camps and women prefer to do all activities outside the IDP camps with the risk to be raped but protect their husbands” (M3, May 2022).

The above narrative is in line with what UN and scholars like Lamp & Trif define as activities involved in the physical PoC by a peacekeeping mission, including conduct of patrols and escorts (UN, department of peace operation, 2019; Lamp & Trif, 2009; Beadle, 2010).

Other activities relating to physical protection, as stated by the police respondents, include the education of women and men on gender issues in order to know their rights and reduce gender-based violence cases, investigation of incidents and monitoring, verification and reporting on security situation in Darfur.

When asked if there was any demarcation between PoC activities performed by the military and those performed by the police components, respondents explained that in fact, the physical protection activities were carried out in teams made of all components but the military played a critical role since, in addition to IDPs and villagers, they were also assigned to protect non-uniformed police personnel and civilians staff of UNAMID and humanitarian workers. However, respondents pointed out that there are some activities performed inside the IDP camps that were specific to the police officers like the community policing, education, etc.

Initially, I thought that UNAMID had the capacity to cover the whole Darfur area and be able to effectively protect civilians since it was a robust force. In this context, researchers like Reich et. al. (2009) identified the ability of peacekeepers to effectively

patrol the whole area of deployment as one of the determinants of effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission in PoC. Surprisingly when I asked respondents if all IDP camps were allocated team sites to mitigate attacks on IDPs, they responded that the capacity of UNAMID was not enough to deploy at all camps given that Darfur is very large and the IDP camps were naturally set before UNAMID or AMIS were deployed. But importantly, the most critical IDPs camps in hostile area were covered. It is clear that despite recommendations made in various reports of experts hired by UN to assess effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions like the 2000 Brahimi report, matching mandate with adequate resources is still a challenge for UN peace operations.

4.2.2. Provision of Security for Humanitarian Aid and Workers

Another aspect of protection, as indicated by respondents, relates to escorting humanitarian aid workers and supply (food, water, medicines and other items) up to the distribution sites. As explained by the former peacekeepers during the interviews, this activity has been subject to attacks by armed groups on the convoys, targeting to loot the supplies to be used for their own subsistence and car hijacking for use in their movements and needed a robust force, ready to fight once they are ambushed. Even though UNSC assigned to UNAMID the robust mandate, authorizing it to use force when necessary for the PoC (UN, Department of peace operations, 2009; Chataing, 2015), this was not applied by all contingents, some of them becoming subject to regular attacks on their convoys, losing their lives and properties.

Respondents further indicated that because of the bad weather and poor infrastructure especially roads and lack of aerial survey capabilities, UNAMID convoys have been attacked during the raining season as well as the period of dust storm in Darfur.

These attacks on UNAMID have been one of the reasons of lack of trust in the peacekeepers by the people of Darfur who decided to flee to neighboring countries, stating that they did not trust UNAMID in providing protection since it was not able to protect its own personnel (Müller & Bashar, 2017).

Other activities relating to humanitarian protection, as narrated both military and police respondents, are quick impact projects that prevented women from physical attacks and rapes such as construction of modern cook stoves and water drilling by peacekeepers

who have the required expertise. This has reduced women's movements outside the IDP camps to collect firewoods and fetch water, which usually exposed them to rape and harassment.

4.2.3. Peacekeepers assess their achievements in PoC

During interviews, peacekeepers were confident that they performed the protection of civilian mandate within the capacity and means they had. They were always comparing the incidents frequency in the time of AMIS and their time in UNAMID since some of them have served in both AMIS and UNAMID and others have read reports on the AMIS failure to protect civilians and its own personnel. Respondent M5 from the military component narrated:

“The incidents of attacks on civilians were frequent in Darfur during the time of AMIS and things have much changed during the time of UNAMID because it had enough capacity to deploy troops in the hostile areas of Darfur and was well equipped. UNAMID was under control” (M5, May 2022).

Participants stated that despite some violent incidents, UNAMID presence has been a deterrent to attacks on civilians since it was capacitated to cover the most hostile areas of Darfur. This is in line with the statement made by one of the Darfur refugees in UK, interviewed by Tanja R. Müller, who indicated that the presence of UNAMID itself showed that it was ready to help and that even lessening to the community members was something of value (Müller, 2020). When asked to explain more about their achievements, respondent M2 narrated that:

“UNAMID was a robust force with more capacity in terms of resources. Peacekeepers were able to monitor movements around the IDP camps, conduct regular patrols and security of humanitarian supply corridors assured. This has reduced significantly the level of incidents, such as attacks, killings, rapes, children abuse, looting, etc...we don't have figures but this security improvement around the IDP camps was real” (M2, May 2022).

This narrative shows how peacekeepers were confident that their presence was a deterrent to the atrocities against civilians, and that the protection measures undertaken including patrols, escorts of civilians and humanitarian aid, etc. reduced considerably

attacks, killings, injuries, rapes, children abuse, etc. in and around the IDP camps. This also goes in line with what indicated researchers like Beadle (2010), Lamp & Trif (2009) on the protection by presence of the military personnel on the field that deters potential aggressors and build confidence and trust of civilians in peacekeepers.

However, respondents acknowledged that a part of the mandate was not fulfilled since it involved other stakeholders and UNAMID didn't have control over it. They specified that they were unable to restore durable peace and support the return of IDPs and refugees until the mission ended in December 2020. The lack of political will to put an end to the conflict on the side of both the GoS and rebels, the absence of an inclusive peace agreement and the lack of cooperation of the GoS with UNAMID hampered the fulfillment of UNAMID mandate including the PoC, explained the respondents, both military and police, men and women. They added that instead of seeing a reduction of IDPs in the camps returning home, an increase of IDPs in number was observed as people have continued to migrate from their villages to the IDP camps, looking for security and humanitarian aid accessibility in the camps. Some of the IDPs continued to invite their family members to come and settle in the camps since the security was assured there by the presence of UNAMID near the camps. These movements of people from villages to IDP camps illustrate how security was more assured in the camps than at the villages, Respondents added that some humanitarian and human rights agencies were also encouraging people who were staying outside the camps at the villages to join their relatives in the camps for more protection and easier access to humanitarian aid.

Moreover, respondents pondered that they could have achieved more in the protection of civilians if a conducive environment was created. Respondent M4 narrated it as follows:

“We could have achieved more if we had gained trust and collaboration of the host government, the commitment by troop contributing countries to take the risks associated with the protection mandate, existence of an inclusive peace agreement making each party accountable of its acts, etc” (M4, May 2022).

This narrative demonstrates the consequences of the absence of what researchers identified in the literature as pre-conditions for success of a peacekeeping mission in PoC.

Those are notably the cooperation of the host government, the commitment of the parties to find a political solution to the conflict or existence of an inclusive peace agreement to implement and the consent of the parties for the deployment of a UN or regional peacekeeping to contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Those pre-conditions for success are part of the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi report and the 2014 Independent Panel report, both commissioned by UN, and the policy research conducted by Jair van der Lijn (2013), commissioned by the Dutch Development Organization Cordaid on UNAMID possible success or failure, learning from UNMIS. The above pre-conditions were not met when UNAMID force was deployed and during the whole period of its presence in Darfur.

During the interviews, discussions were made around some narratives of the Darfur refugees living in camps in Chad on the reasons of their exile to Chad as seen in the literature review. Refugees had indicated that they fled to Chad because UNAMID was unable to protect them and when informed about an incident in their area in Darfur, UNAMID staff went there to investigate and report, but there was no feedback and the report was an end in itself. Respondent P3 confirmed this in the following words:

“Any movement of UNAMID police officers for patrols or Investigation on incidents were to be first authorized by the Sudanese National Police. The investigation reports were submitted to it for law enforcement but getting feedback was a big challenge. The victims have claimed to get feedback from UNAMID investigators but the later were unable to respond to this claim” (P3, May 2022).

In sum, respondents, military and police peacekeepers, men and women, were assertive of their contribution to the PoC in Darfur, especially when they compared both situations during AMIS and UNAMID presence. In fact, UNAMID was capacitated in human resources and logistics and could develop protection strategies and implement them, particularly patrols and escorts. For the police respondents, majority being women, they were happy of their achievements in community policing which was not known by IDPs before their deployment and of how they handled gender education, child protection, women accompaniment to various activities outside the IDP camps that reduced rape cases and children abuse. This is in line with the multidimensional concept of peacekeeping where the military, police and civilian components play a significant role in combining efforts to

successfully protect civilians (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 2008, 18; Ishaque, 2021, 14)

Nonetheless, peacekeepers also recognized that due to numerous challenges they faced, some shortcomings in the PoC were inevitable.

More on the challenges will be elaborated in the following section.

4.3. Challenges in PoC

Respondents pointed out that UNAMID was the most challenging UN Peacekeeping operation deployed based on a ceasefire and a peace agreement which were not valid. They further explained that this is evidenced by the fact that UNAMID replaced AMIS, deployed based on the Ndjama ceasefire agreement, which was violated by all parties to it. In addition, it was assigned the implementation of the Darfur Peace agreement signed in Abuja in 2006 (UNSC RES 1769, 2007), which was not inclusive, and the only 2 signatories to it, namely the GoS and one faction of Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) of Mini Minawi did not implement its provisions. Therefore, new negotiations were undertaken to tentatively get an inclusive peace agreement.

Even the way UNAMID was conceived was not as a standard UN or AU peacekeeping mission but rather as a compromise between AU, UN and the GoS after the latter's refusal of a pure UN peace operation on its territory. Generally, a peacekeeping mission emanates from a ceasefire, or a peace agreement specifying the consent of the signatories for the deployment of peacekeepers to support and observe their implementation (Punga, 2011, 6). It was the case of AMIS, deployed to observe the implementation of the Ndjama ceasefire agreement and support and facilitate the negotiations of a peace agreement.

By contrast, UNAMID conception followed the inability of AMIS to perform its mandate and the need to replace it with a strong and capacitated UN peace operation. Unfortunately, the later was denied by the GoS to enter its territory until a UN-AU hybrid arrangement was accepted by the GoS, on the condition to have an African character, limiting the choices of UN to get experienced peacekeepers.

Respondents classified the challenges faced by UNAMID during its operations of civilians' protection in two categories: Strategic and operational.

4.3.1. At Strategic level

The following challenges were identified as at strategic level by peacekeepers:

4.3.1.1. Challenges relating to force generation

Respondents explained that setting a peacekeeping mission requires the collaboration and engagement of different stakeholders who play different roles in this exercise. These include mainly the warring parties who give consent for the deployment of a peacekeeping after they have secured a ceasefire or a peace agreement to be implemented; the mandating authority which assign a mandate to the peacekeeping mission; the troop and police contributing countries which avail peacekeepers and equipment; the partners who provide funds and logistics; the Humanitarian & human rights agencies which provide support on the field, etc. They further stipulated that since UN doesn't have a standby force which can intervene in case of hostilities requiring its intervention, it relies on troop contributing countries which sometimes send non-trained personnel or who are not familiar with PoC. In an interview with former peacekeepers, respondent M10, military, male, stated that:

“The forces are sometimes generated from different countries without any connection with the conflicts. They don't understand the dynamics of the conflict nor how to perform the protection mandate. Peacekeepers' understanding and the training they get from their countries before deployment have to fit with the PoC mandate” (M10, June 2022).

This narrative explains why in a peacekeeping mission some contingents are more efficient than others on the field. It also shows the importance of the Kigali Principles on the protection of civilians which put more emphasis on the training of peacekeepers prior to their deployment to ensure efficiency (Kigali Principles on the protection of civilians, 2015). Participants in a group discussion indicated that UNAMID comprised both categories of trained staff to perform the PoC mandate and others who were not trained or didn't understand the PoC mandate or didn't want to take risks associated

with it. This last category hampered the effective implementation of the PoC in their areas of deployment. Respondent M1 pointed out that:

“Efficiency of peacekeepers start at home; inefficient forces at home are also inefficient in the peacekeeping mission” (M1, May 2022).

The respondent added that in many cases, peacekeepers are generated without means and capabilities to perform the PoC mandate.

4.3.1.2. Conflict of interests by the UNSC members

The respondents commented on the various messages that come indirectly from the members of the UNSC. They believe that the UNSC, being the mandating authority of the peacekeeping, is expected to show commitment to finding solutions to the conflict taking place in the country of deployment. However, due to diverging interests of its permanent members into the conflict, their engagements to the conflict resolution will depend on which side to take or party to support which will secure their interests. Like Richard Gowan (2019) contended, the PoC concept has been abused by super power countries in deploying peacekeepers to back their political interest. In the case of Darfur, the respondents recalled the time when the leaders of the rebel groups who refused to sign the peace agreement and continued to cause the killings of the people, were accommodated and hosted by some UNSC permanent members. Even the proposed sanctions against those leaders like denying them visa extension and cutting financial support to them could not work. Respondent M1 narrated:

“UNSC members fuel conflict and ask to stop it knowing that if their interests are not secured, the conflict won't end” (M1, May 2022).

In this context, some members of the UNSC do not facilitate the mission to be accomplished and this sends wrong message to the people suffering from atrocities and undermine the efforts made by the troop contributing countries and other stakeholders to stop that conflict, explained the respondents.

Another respondent, P4 underscored the fact that interests of countries supporting UNAMID were put first instead of the mission's mandate. She said:

“There was a market share between countries providing helicopters, others supplying fuel, others securing contracts for building infrastructure, others providing and installing communication equipment, etc” (P4, May 2022)

The respondents also emphasized the influence that the main funders of UNAMID had on the political leadership of the mission in securing their interests. Respondent M2, stated that:

“UN is careerist, some leaders were appointed not because they were politically qualified to handle the issues faced by the mission but because of influence of some partners in the Darfur conflict resolution” (M2, May 2022).

Another respondent, M5 added that:

“It was critical to have a political leadership capable to negotiate with all the parties to the conflict, especially that the GoS was suspicious to the UN peacekeeping in Darfur, not trusting the motive of its presence” (M5, May 2022).

The above narratives demonstrate how the conflict of interests of the UNSC members in the Darfur conflict jeopardized the effectiveness of UNAMID in the PoC and no solution to end the conflict was agreed on until the closure of the mission in December 2020.

4.3.1.3. Troop contributing countries not ready to take the risks associated with PoC

Respondents indicated that there are risks that are associated with the PoC including loss of lives. Unfortunately, some troop and police contributing countries were not ready to take those risks and the briefing their contingents received prior to their deployment were not favoring to act using all means, precisely force, to perform their PoC mandate.

Respondents indicated that some troop and police contributing countries sent peacekeepers and imposed them caveats which prevented them to quickly act when necessary without consulting their capitals. In those cases, peacekeepers watched attacks or aggression of armed groups on civilians in the vicinity of their team sites and

restrained to take action, seeking first the guidance from their capitals. This paralyzed the PoC implementation and tarnished the image of UN and the peacekeeping mission, loosing trust from the beneficiaries of protection. Respondents added that even the command of various troops without a common understanding and commitment to undertake activities aimed at implementing the assigned mandate made difficult the fulfillment of UNAMID PoC mandate.

It is evident that this challenge relating to the command of forces that receive instructions from their capitals instead of complying with the mission' command line impacted negatively on the performance of UNAMID.

4.3.1.4 Absence of an inclusive peace agreement

The absence of an inclusive peace agreement has been a big challenge for UNAMID peacekeepers to perform their mandate as stated by all the interviewees. They underscored the lack of demarcation between the GoS army and rebels (no buffer zone) or any binding agreement to all parties that would serve to make them accountable of the violation of its provisions. Respondent M15 expressed it in the following words:

“UNAMID was not a force standing between the GoS's force and rebels and there was no binding peace agreement to be observed on both sides in terms of each other's responsibility to avoid causing harm to civilians” (M15, June 2022).

He further explained that for some incident's cases, it was difficult to determine which party to conflict was responsible and many times both parties were accusing each other of committing atrocities against civilians. In addition, due to the lack of trust by the GoS in UNAMID, all investigations on incidents were conducted in the presence of a GoS's representative, intimidating sometimes the local staff who were interpreting and the victims or witnesses, making it difficult for UNAMID to get accurate information on the incident.

As seen in the literature review, scholars like Irina Livia Punga (2011) suggest that existence of a peace agreement is a condition for success of civilian protection in armed conflict area. It is also in line with the Brahimi report's and the UN High-Level Independent Panels' recommendations that the deployment of any peacekeeping

mission with the PoC mandate should be conditioned to the existence of an inclusive peace agreement.

The respondents further indicated that the continued splitting of the rebel movements groups made them weak and difficult for the peace process to succeed, putting civilians in a dangerous situation with increase of hostilities.

4.3.2. At the operational level.

Respondents highlighted the following challenges:

4.3.2.1. A too broad mandate not matching with resources.

In a group discussion, respondents were of the view that UNAMID was assigned a wide mandate which was not achievable within its means. It is also what Irina Livia Punga (2011) and other scholars argued, that the mandate of UNAMID was too broad and not achievable, advising that one of the conditions to effectively protect civilians in peacekeeping mission is to set a clear and feasible mandate that matches with resources. The respondents further indicated that even if efforts were put more on the PoC, its success was linked to other components of the mandate. This is evident since without an inclusive peace agreement to be observed by all conflicting parties the PoC was not sustainable.

Respondents, military, pointed out that UNAMID was lacking important logistics like attack helicopters to support the ground patrols and humanitarian aid convoys, tools like intelligence gathering capabilities to collect information on the predictable atrocities against civilians before they occur in order to plan ahead their protection. In addition, UNAMID strength in terms of personnel, logistics and financing was not corresponding to the broad mandate.

4.3.2.2. Lack of Cooperation of the GoS.

One of the factors for an effective peace support operation as highlighted in the 2000 Brahimi report is the consent of the parties to conflict of the UN intervention to facilitate the conflict resolution (Shaub, 2014). Respondents however pointed out that the GoS was reluctant to accept a UN force in Darfur, until a high pressure was put on it and

accepted a hybrid force with the condition to be predominantly of African character. Respondent M3 illustrated it as follows:

“The government of Sudan was not willing to cooperate with UN from the beginning and this can be interpreted as mistrust into UN in solving Darfur crisis and rather having a political hidden agenda” (M3, May 2022).

This challenge was seen by all the respondents, military and police, as an obstacle to the PoC. They all pointed out the denial of visas by the GoS to some peacekeepers and return visas to those earmarked as reporters of violent incidents; access denial to UNAMID force in some remoting area and mounting roadblocks where the GoS didn't want UNAMID to go for control or investigation, after getting information on attack on civilians. In this case, the GoS pretended that there was no security in that area and that it is in its responsibility to protect UNAMID personnel deployed on its territory. A police respondent, P8 narrated the following:

“Peacekeepers were denied access to some sites and sometimes they got clearance many days after the incidents had happened and proofs disappeared” (P8, May 2022).

This narrative illustrates how UNAMID has worked in difficult conditions contrary to AMIS which received cooperation from the GoS but lacked resources to perform its mandate.

Furthermore, in a group discussion, respondents indicated that the host country didn't trust UNAMID, and the later was seen by the GoS as an obstacle to the Khartoum government, in reporting the violent incidents committed against civilians mostly by the GoS allies and in the eyes of its security organs. The GoS, all the time, wanted UNAMID to leave the country. Respondent M18 who has also served in AMIS narrated that:

“Politically, UNAMID was not supported by the host country contrary to AMIS and the hybrid force was just a compromise between the GoS, AU and UN” (M18, June 2022).

Similarly, respondent M20 noted:

“There was no political will to solve the conflict in Darfur and since the government was stronger than the rebel movements, it didn’t value the presence of peacekeepers nor did trust them” (M20, June 2022)

The respondents, military and police also remembered the curfew that was imposed to peacekeepers starting at 18h and yet violent incidents happened during the curfew hours.

The fact that the GoS was hostile to part of its population in Darfur and failed to exercise its R2P, AU and UN took responsibility to provide protection to civilians in the absence of the political will of their government to accomplish that task. The lack of cooperation of the responsible government made difficult the fulfillment of the PoC mandate by the peacekeepers who, instead of playing a support role, became the main provider of protection to civilians. Contrary to what argue scholars like Nash (2010) and Jacob (2019) as well as UN, that the individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its people, the case of Darfur was different. Without the political will of the dominant warring party to resolve the conflict, a peacekeeping operation would find difficult to perform its PoC mandate.

4.3.2.3. Attacks on UNAMID personnel

During the time of AMIS, violent attacks on its peacekeepers were frequent, especially on their convoys, escorting fuel and humanitarian aid. Peacekeepers were killed, injured and their cars hijacked by armed groups, taking away the humanitarian supply and fuel for their own use. Before interview with former UNAMID peacekeepers, I thought that these kinds of attacks could not happen during their time since they were well equipped logistically and capacitated in terms of personnel. However, respondents indicated that they were also exposed to attacks when they were at their team sites or on patrols, escorts or convoys in hostile areas when fulfilling their civilian’s protection mandate. They remembered some shocking cases of attacks on UNAMID personnel by armed groups at the team sites and during patrols and convoys which took lives of or humiliated peacekeepers. Respondent M17 narrated that:

“Although UNAMID was a strong force, there have been some unfortunate cases of attacks on its personnel on convoys, leaving some of them killed. The security in Darfur was unpredictable and even the team sites could be attacked any time” (M17, June 2022).

A female police respondent, P6 highlighted a case of rape of female peacekeepers attacked at the team site, which happened during their time in UNAMID and said:

“A shocking case happened at one team site, attacked by Janjaweds who were claiming blood money, as compensation for their relative who was killed by rebels and, to show their anger, raped women peacekeepers who were at the team site” (P6, May 2022).

This horrible situation was mentioned by other respondents in a group discussion, pointing out that some contingents were more subject to attacks than others depending on how they have behaved in terms of self-defense when attacked or ambushed. They further indicated that those peacekeepers who have used force for self-defense were known in the whole Darfur and have created fear in armed groups and were less provoked. The example given was the contingent from Rwanda, known as a disciplined and capable force which defended itself when aggressed, leaving casualties among the attackers.

Respondents added that the failure of peacekeepers to defend themselves once attacked reduced the trust in them by IDPs and villagers, losing the hope to get a proper protection from the peacekeepers who can't protect themselves. This is close to the narrative of Darfurian refugees living in a camp in Chad, interviewed by Zuhair Bashar in 2017, who stated that one of the reasons to flee Darfur was the lack of trust in peacekeepers who failed to protect themselves (Müller & Bashar, 2017).

Respondents revealed that UNAMID had a mix of troops: depending on the sending countries, some were ready to take the risks associated with PoC activities, others were rather avoiding any incident that would involve them in the conflict. This has compromised the effective fulfillment of the civilian protection mandate in the hostile areas of deployment and tarnished the image of UNAMID on its capacity to protect civilians, added the respondents.

4.3.2.4. The weight of UN bureaucracy

The UNAMID was a hybrid peacekeeping mission to be commanded by both AU and UN (UNSC Resolution 1769, 2007). When asked if there was a demarcation of roles of AU and UN in the management of UNAMID, the answer from the respondents was that

there was no demarcation, that AU was not very active on the field, but rather UN providing funds and logistics was dominating. Respondent M3 narrated that:

“UNAMID was a hybrid mission, but its command was not balanced between UN and AU. UN had a very high influence, providing resources, recruiting staff, etc. and its top leadership was seen many times in Darfur through frequent visits to peacekeepers contrary to AU. It was visible on the field that UN has taken control of the mission” (M3, May 2022).

This goes in line with what Major Jordan D. Shaub argued, that at the deployment of UNAMID, there was no clear command line between UN and AU (Shaub, 2014).

The respondents explained that the UN systems applied in the day-to-day management of UNAMID. They however criticized the rigidity of UN rules and regulations preventing peacekeepers on the field to take initiatives, and its bureaucracy in taking decisions as well as the long procedures to get logistics supplies from UN stock which were meant to enable the mission to fulfill its mandate. They gave examples of some requisitions of logistic items from the stock which were needed but delivered after many months or not delivered at all while they were available in the stock.

In addition, the configuration of the mission was hampering the performance of UNAMID. As explained by military respondents, the director of mission support being a civilian and managing all assets including air assets, was making difficult to undertake quick interventions or deployment in case of emergency, especially in zone where there was no close team site. Also, the pilots being civilians and operating in an armed conflict area, they didn't understand the need for quick reaction.

4.3.2.5. A parallel structure for the peace process

Respondents indicated that for the Darfur peace process, UN created a parallel structure and set up a Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) to drive the process and report directly to UN Headquarters in New York. The JMST was based in Doha, Qatar, where negotiations of an inclusive peace agreement were taking place and it was led by a Representative of UNSG who was at the same level as the Joint Special Representative heading UNAMID, added the respondents. According to them, this parallel structure was not helping UNAMID since the pressure on the field to get a binding agreement to

all parties was not shared with the JMST located in Doha. This means that a part of the mandate of UNAMID to facilitate the mediation between the GoS and non-signatories rebel movements to the DPA was transferred to another organ created in the course of the execution of the mandate, making difficult for UNAMID to manage the pressure on the field to get an inclusive peace agreement, a condition for the sustainable protection of civilians.

4.3.2.6. Lack of intelligence gathering capabilities

Respondents mentioned the lack of intelligence gathering capabilities or absence of tools to collect information in the structures of UNAMID, making difficult to prevent attacks on civilians and on UNAMID personnel in exercising their PoC mandate. Respondent M18 revealed it in the following words:

“There are some violent incidents or attacks on civilians and on our own personnel that we could have prevented if we had recruited informants in the hostile areas to provide regular information on the movements of rebels and migration of nomads, enabling us to secure humanitarian relief supply routes and the migration corridors” (M18, June 2022).

This narrative explains the importance to get timely information on the movements of nomads since it was well known that violent incidents involving communities were seasonal and mostly happened towards the end of the harvest season when pastoralists were grazing their animals in the farms of black Africans, inciting disputes over land (de Waal, 2007).

4.3.2.7. Hostile working environment

UNAMID operated in a hostile environment since there was no inclusive peace agreement and the security situation continued to deteriorate due to the splitting of rebel movements resulting in the increase of armed actors in the Darfur conflict and making it difficult to stop violence (Aubyn, 2016). The respondents also recalled the bad weather conditions that restricted the movements of peacekeepers for PoC activities especially floods during the raining season and the dust storm called “haboob” that happens during the months of May and June, preceding the raining season and limits visibility both on the road and in the air space (de G Shepherd, 2017). They further

indicated that IDPs camps were scattered, naturally created without any plan, without water and electricity and with poor infrastructure like roads, and hindering the patrols around farms, water wells, market places, forests where fire woods were collected, etc. The interviewees also recounted the attacks on UNAMID convoys by armed groups, injuring peacekeepers, looting the supplies and hijacking UNAMID cars and other properties, due to the bad weather. Respondent M13 narrated it in the following terms:

“The attackers used to take opportunity of bad weather to cut off convoys and hijack the vehicles which were behind others and those in front couldn’t realize it in a short distance, due to the lack of visibility caused by the haboob dust storm, preventing them to make a quick intervention” (M13, June 2022).

This narrative indicates how the bad weather hampered the PoC activities and the high risks that were exposed the peacekeepers, requiring an efficient system to collect information on the roads’ possible threats before any convoy leaves the departure site.

Respondents added that Darfur was very vast compared to the capacity of UNAMID and patrolling all the hostile areas was not feasible during the bad weather period. As Punga argues, the environment in which peacekeepers will operate has a critical influence on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission in the PoC (Punga, 2011).

4.3.2.8. Language barrier

Another challenge highlighted by the respondents is the language barrier which made difficult to communicate directly with the local people, and the local interpreters were sometimes biased due to the presence of the government police officers accompanying the investigation’s team. This was seen, as stated by the respondents, when the translation was not matching with the body language of the IDPs or local people. It had a negative impact on understanding the incident that happened, the way it was reported by the peacekeepers and the perception that local people had on UNAMID incidents reporting.

4.3.2.9. The needs and wants of Darfurians

The respondents mentioned the fact that the people of Darfur have suffered for decades of violent conflicts, especially the intercommunal conflicts opposing Arabs and African

tribes over land, water and races (domination of Arabs on black Africans) and later on the conflict opposing the GoS army and rebel movements fighting for power and resources and for stopping the domination of Arabs. They further explained that with the deployment of UNAMID, people of Darfur had high expectations to get full protection and see all their problems solved after their government had failed to discharge its responsibility to protect them. During the interview, respondent M6 underscored that:

“The people of Darfur had expectations which were higher than the mandate of UNAMID at the extent that people were expecting that UNAMID will resolve the governance issues and address the root causes of the conflict” (M6, May 2022).

This narrative shows how the people of Darfur initially believed in the robustness of UNAMID, thinking that what AMIS failed to provide will be delivered by UNAMID and solve all their problems. The interviewees mentioned that IDPs were expecting to get services that UNAMID was unable to provide like jobs, food, infrastructure, jailing the perpetrators of killings, rapes and looting, and putting an end to the Darfur conflict. These unattended expectations created mistrust in UNAMID by the people of Darfur.

4.3.2.10. Lack of incentives for IDPs to return to their villages

Respondents indicated that in Darfur, the majority of the black Africans live in IDP camps since they can be protected and easily receive humanitarian aid. In a publication made by Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC) on 31 December 2013 on Sudan IDPs, it stipulated that Darfur had 1,982,500 IDPs living in camps by end of 2013 (refworld.org). Respondents believed that there were approximately 174 IDP camps settlements including those recognized by the government as well as informal ones.

Since the hostilities have not stopped and returning to their villages may result in losing all the gains that they have acquired in the IDP camps, people prefer to stay there and invite their family members who live outside the camps to join them. Respondent P5 elaborated on it in the following words:

“IDPs were safer in the camps, there was no incentives for them to return to their villages, instead of reducing, their number continued to increase following the facilities provided to them in IDP camps” (P5, May 2022).

Another respondent, M12 narrated:

“UNAMID was not deployed to resolve the political problems between the GoS and the opposition parties, it was a facilitator and the return of IDPs to their villages was politically to be handled by the parties to conflict through the peace agreement” (M12, June 2022).

For IDPs to return and settle to their villages, there was a need to create a conducive environment at their villages with security at the top and provision of humanitarian aid in assisting them to return to the normal life, explained one of the respondents, adding that this can only happen if there is a political will from both sides of the conflicting parties.

The above accounts show that security was more assured in the IDP camps than in the villages, following the creation of team sites near the IDP camps that facilitated the performance of protective activities such as patrols and escorts. This is in line with what argue scholars like Paul D. Williams (2010), that the physical presence of peacekeepers in at the center of the civilian protection.

As the Darfur refugees living in Chad pointed out in the previous studies, they fled their country mainly because of insecurity at their villages and lack of trust in UNAMID to protect them. Taking into consideration the big size of Darfur, more emphasis was placed to the protection of IDP camps. This explain why instead of seeing IDPs returning to their villages, the opposite movements of people from the villages to the IDP camps was observed, looking for protection and easy access to the humanitarian aid.

4.4. Enablers

As peacekeepers expressed their feelings of having performed the PoC mandate in accordance with the means and facilities they had, this section highlights their narratives on what have been the enablers in the fulfillment of the PoC mandate.

4.4.1. Strategic proximity of team sites to the IDP camps

Respondents indicated that the capacity of UNAMID in terms of personnel and equipment allowed the mission to create team sites close to the IDPs camps, especially those located in hostiles areas and this strategy enabled them to be physically present near the IDPs camps and made PoC feasible. This is in conformity with what has been identified in the literature as factors of success and effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission assigned a PoC mandate, namely the ability to control the area of deployment and to implement protection measures as highlighted in the study conducted by the Ford Institute for Human Security of the University of Pittsburgh (2009) and in the research conducted by Nicolas Lamp and Dana Trif (2009).

Respondents pointed out that the creation of team sites strategy has allowed them to conduct regular patrols around the camps and alleviate the challenges of movements' restrictions imposed by the GoS and by the bad weather conditions.

4.4.2. Well- trained peacekeepers

Respondents also attributed their success in the PoC to the training they received on PoC prior to their deployment, in addition to the experience they acquired in the implementation of the civilian protection from other similar missions. They stipulated that some troops and police contributing countries have sent peacekeepers well trained and ready to take on the PoC assignment. Those contingents were experienced, understood the meaning of civilian protection and the related risks, and prepared to perform it. Respondent M10 stated that:

“There are countries that contributed very competent, experienced and disciplined troops and even the parties to conflict were aware that the sites controlled by those forces, once attacked, the consequences were huge for the assailants” (M10, June 2022).

This is in conformity with the 2019 UN policy on the PoC and the 2015 Kigali Principles on the civilian protection which put more emphasis on the responsibility of troop and police contributing countries to provide well trained peacekeepers for effective PoC implementation in UN peacekeeping missions (Keeler & Kanetake, 2017; UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2019).

4.4.3. Outreach and quick impact projects

Respondents indicated that UNAMID peacekeepers performed outreach and quick impacts projects relating to providing services to IDPs, including constructions of houses and roads, installation of Energy saving Cooking Stoves, buying basic school materials for students, constructing and repairing water wells, providing medical and veterinary services, etc.

According to the interviewed peacekeepers, this was achieved due to the expertise of some contingents that helped to solve some of the problems causing the conflict like water drilling by the Thailand peacekeepers, addressing the water scarcity, installing the modern energy saving cooking stoves by Rwandan peacekeepers, addressing issues associated with fire woods collection, etc. These initiated quick impacts projects enabled peacekeepers to build trust of the people of Darfur and reduced the risk of rape for women going outside the IDP camps for firewood collection and water fetching.

4.5. Requirements for satisfactory PoC.

The following are the views of peacekeepers on the requirements for satisfactory PoC as explained by most of the respondents.

4.5.1. Understand the roots cause of the conflict and possible solutions

Respondents believe that for any peacekeeping operation, before it is deployed, the mandating authority has to analyze the conflict, understand its roots causes, its dynamics and actors and the possible solutions to address the roots causes in order to solve that conflict. This would inform the mandating authority on the proper and clear mandate, the required strategies and resources to achieve it. They further pointed out that in the case of the Darfur conflict, UN and AU didn't have solutions to end it.

4.5.2. A political will to resolve the conflict

Respondents pointed out the need for political will of the parties to conflict to address the intra-state conflict and protect their people. In this context, the existence of an inclusive peace agreement is the foundation for any peacekeeping to deliver on the PoC mandate.

4.5.3. Adequate training

Respondents suggested that prior to their deployment, there should be training of troops, police officers, civilians involved in PoC, contingents' commanders and all mission's leaders at all levels on the protection of civilians, using simulation exercises in order to acquire necessary skills and be prepared to fulfil the PoC mandate.

4.5.4. Rapid deployment of a capacitated peacekeeping force

Respondents were of the view that the effective implementation of the PoC mandate should start at the beginning of the peacekeeping operation in order to make a difference at the earliest and gain confidence and trust of the local population, beneficiaries of protection.

4.5.5. Responsibility to protect by the host country

Respondents stipulated that the host country should take the lead in all activities aiming at the protection of its citizens and has to understand that the peacekeeping force presence is to support it and not to replace it in its R2P. They further pointed out the need for cooperation of the host government with the peacekeeping force and provide it with all the necessary facilitations in order to effectively perform the PoC mandate.

4.5.6. Exercise the powers offered by the UNSC

Currently UNSC deploys robust peacekeeping force with the mandate of Civilian protection under chapter VII of the UN charter, allowing the forces to use all means including use of force where necessary to protect civilians. Respondents said that, from their experience in Darfur, where contingents have used force to protect IDPs or the humanitarian aid and workers and themselves, it has been a deterrent to other attacks. On the contrary, those contingents that were not prepared to use force when attacked or ambushed in exercising their mandate, have been subject to constant attacks and a source of logistics and military ammunition for the assailants. They further highlighted the importance of clarifying the Rules of Engagement, especially under which circumstances the troops should use force.

4.5.7. A flexible UN system

Respondents indicated that there is a need for a flexible UN system in the management of the peacekeeping mission with less paperwork and bureaucracy, in order to enable peacekeepers, take prompt action and deliver on the mandate. Respondents further stipulated that sometimes there are cases of emergency in the field that require a quick reaction in order to save lives of civilians. Therefore, a flexible decision-making system allows the commanders in the field to take initiatives and resolve the problem, and report back.

4.5.8. A well-defined mandate matching with resources

Respondents indicated that the mandating authority has to set a clear and achievable mandate and allocate adequate resources including sufficient well-trained personnel, appropriate logistics and financial resources. In other words, stated the respondents, when the capacity of the mission in terms of military and police personnel is enough to control the whole area of deployment, with adequate logistics fitting with the environment in which peacekeeping will operate and enough financial resources, the chances of success in PoC are many.

4.5.9. An Intelligence gathering capabilities

Respondents indicated that there is a need to have an intelligence gathering capabilities in order to get necessary information that would allow the mission to prevent violent incidents against civilians and its own personnel before they occur.

4.5.10. Regular consultations with the mandating authority

Respondents pointed out the need for troops and police contributing countries to make regular consultations with the mandating authority on the performance of the mission's mandate of PoC and address issues which need a decision at the highest level, including redesigning the mandate or strategies to achieve it.

4.5.11. Holding peacekeepers accountable

Respondents highlighted the need for holding peacekeepers accountable for their failure to protect civilians if there was a possibility to do so. Respondent M2, narrated:

“If disciplinary measures were taken against those peacekeepers who showed negligence in the fulfillment of the PoC mandate, like repatriating them to their generating countries, this can stop negligence in exercising the PoC and set a good precedent in the performance of the PoC mandate” (M2, May 2022).

This narrative gives an example of sanction that can be applied in holding peacekeepers accountable. However, this should be linked to other factors such as adequate training and holding peacekeepers at the highest standards by troop and police contributing countries, availability of required resources to perform PoC and a clear and feasible mandate by the mandating authority.

Most of these requirements are in line with the Kigali principles on the Protection of civilians (2015), which in turn are in harmony with the UN policy on the PoC adopted in 2019. Both bring in accountability of peacekeepers in the case of failure to protect and emphasize on the proper training of peacekeepers by the troops and police contributing countries prior to their deployment as well as use of force when necessary to protect civilians. They also call for regular consultations between the troop contributing countries and UN headquarters on setting or changing the Peacekeeping mandate and on resources availability, etc.

4.8. Summary

This chapter has presented the data collected from the field through interviews and group discussions with selected senior military and police officers, men and women former UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda. The main findings, presented in the narrative form were analyzed in order to understand the feelings of the respondents on their achievements in the PoC mandate, the challenges they faced with, what enabled them to perform the PoC mandate and what is required for satisfactory PoC of our time.

Peacekeepers understood the PoC mandate as all activities undertaken to prevent or stop atrocities against civilians and were confident that they fulfilled that mandate,

based on several activities they performed, especially patrols, escorts and quick impacts projects that addressed some of the needs of IDPs and reduced their movements outside the camps, which used to expose them to the risk of attacks, killings, injuries, rapes and child abuse. They indicated that the robustness of UNAMID with capacity in term of personnel and equipment, the training they got prior to deployment and the strategic positioning in team sites near the IDP camps enabled them to perform the PoC mandate.

Respondents however admitted that, due to numerous challenges, mainly the lack of cooperation and facilitation of the host government, the absence of the peace to keep, lack of political will to end the conflict, they were not able to fully protect civilians and some incidents occurred in their presence.

Furthermore, peacekeepers gave their opinion on what is required to provide a satisfactory PoC, emphasizing on the implementation of the Kigali principles on the protection of civilians, the commitment of the parties to conflict to politically resolve the conflict, the cooperation of the host government with peacekeepers, a clear and achievable mandate, etc.

The following chapter will present the general conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the findings from the data collected through individual interviews and group discussions with military and Police, former UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda. It highlighted the general feelings of the respondents on the extent to which they performed the PoC mandate and the numerous challenges they faced with. It also indicated what enabled the peacekeepers to protect civilians and what is required for a satisfactory PoC.

The present chapter gives a general conclusion and recommendations from the research findings.

5.2. Conclusion

This study aimed at examining the feelings of former UNAMID peacekeepers on the extent to which they have fulfilled their mandate of civilians' protection in the Darfur region, and what facilitated or hindered that undertaking, from the peacekeepers' perspective. To achieve this objective, it used a qualitative approach in data collection and data analysis. In the first instance, the literature review was undertaken to analyze selected existing studies, which provided important insights on related subject, especially regarding the concepts and the pre-conditions for a peacekeeping mission to effectively protect civilians that have served as point of departure for the present research.

Secondary, the data were collected through individual interviews and group discussions with selected former peacekeepers from Rwanda, military and police components. A purposive sampling was used in the selection of respondents, targeting the peacekeepers who are accessible and mainly can provide the information which would enable to get answers to the research questions.

The questions raised in this study were: (1) How peacekeepers understood their mission and felt they fulfilled it? (2) What have been the challenges? (3) what have eased its performance? (4) What are the requirements to provide satisfactory PoC?

The perspectives of the former UNAMID peacekeepers helped to respond to those questions and therefore understand better the centrality of civilians' protection in peacekeeping mission.

(1) The peacekeepers understood their PoC mandate as defined in the UNSC resolution 1769 and subsequent resolutions on Darfur and felt they have fulfilled it in the capacity and means availed to UNAMID. They were confident that their presence and the PoC related activities they undertook reduced attacks, killings, rapes and other atrocities against civilians in Darfur, especially in IDPs camps. It is clear that UNAMID contributed to the PoC in Darfur following the reduction in atrocities against civilians as a result of its deployment in that hostile region of Sudan.

(2) Peacekeepers however recognized that due to various challenges, they were not able to provide satisfactory protection to civilians who stayed at the villages to the extent that some atrocities against them could happen in the presence of UNAMID force in Darfur. The main cited challenges include the lack of cooperation of the GoS, restricting peacekeepers' movements in some hostile areas, the non-existence of an inclusive peace agreement which would be binding to all parties, lack of political will to solve the conflict, bad weather and inadequate infrastructure, etc.

(3) Respondents attributed their success in making contribution to the PoC in Darfur to the robustness of UNAMID, strengthened in terms of personnel and equipment, that facilitated them to strategically deploy force and control the area of deployment, by creating team sites near the IDP camps. This strategic positioning also facilitated them to implement the protective measures such as daily patrols, escort of women going outside the IDPs camps for various activities like cultivate, fetch water, collect fire woods, going to the market, in order to protect them against attacks and rapes, etc. Respondents added that their achievements in PoC were also a result of the quick impacts projects initiated by the peacekeepers like drilling water well, installing energy saving cook stoves, community policing activities, education, etc., which responded to some needs of IDPs and reduced their movements outside their camps. Furthermore, the adequate training in PoC received by some contingents prior to their deployment enabled them to perform the POC mandate.

(4) To achieve a satisfactory PoC, respondents cited a number of requirements, including the adequate training of the peacekeepers and all involved staff in PoC prior to their deployment, set of a clear and achievable mandate and avail adequate resources to implement it, accountability by peacekeepers and other actors involved in PoC, facilitation by the host government and use of all means including force when necessary to protect civilians, etc. Most of these requirements are contained in the 2015 Kigali principles on the Protection of civilians and the 2019 UN policy on PoC.

It is evident from the peacekeepers' narratives that UNAMID contributed to the protection of civilians in Darfur by its presence and through protective activities performed by the peacekeepers, preventing attacks on civilians and on humanitarian aid convoys. However, due to the indicated challenges faced with, some violent incidents against civilians continued to occur and the protection provided was not sustainable. Indeed, the protection of civilians can't be sustained if other components of the mandate like the restoration of peace through an inclusive peace agreement and its implementation are not achieved.

The perspectives of the peacekeepers have helped to understand better how the PoC mandate was fulfilled by UNAMID in Darfur, the challenges and enablers in the performance of that mandate, what is required to provide a satisfactory PoC and have filled the gap of previous studies on the subject, which had only based on the stories of refugees from Darfur to conclude that UNAMID failed to protect civilians.

5.3. Recommendations

From the analysis of the peacekeepers' perspectives on their achievements in PoC mandate, the challenges they faced with and the enablers in undertaking that mandate, the following are the recommendations for future Peacekeeping missions to perform the PoC:

The mandating authority, UN or a Regional Organization, should first analyze the conflict, its causes, its dynamics and the actors involved as well as the possible solutions to end it and the environment in which the peace support is going to be exercised, in order to determine the kind of peace operation to be deployed, the mandate to be

designed with set targets that will facilitate assessment of the progress and the required resources.

All UN members should adhere to the Kigali Principles on the protection of civilians. There is a need for their full implementation by the troop and police contributing countries, the UN or the Regional mandating authority, peacekeepers and other actors in the PoC and accountability should be required to all stakeholders in PoC in order to achieve the change needed in the PoC.

The UN or a Regional entity should deploy a peacekeeping force with enough capacity from the beginning to enable it make difference on the ground and gain the trust, the minds and hearts of the people in order to get their full collaboration and achieve the PoC.

The accountability of peacekeepers on their activities should be linked to other factors. These include adequate training to enable peacekeepers acquire PoC skills, no imposition of caveats by the troop and police contributing countries to allow the commanders on the field take action needed without waiting for instructions from their capital, a clear and feasible mandate supported by good political strategies to facilitate its implementation and availability of required resources and logistics to perform the PoC.

UN should review its system and make it flexible to enable peacekeeping commanders to take quick action when necessary, and include in the peacekeeping mission's structure a system of collecting information from the field, an intelligence gathering capabilities, in order to get necessary information that would guide the mission to prevent violent incidents against civilians and its own personnel before they occur.

5.4. Suggestion for future research

This study was exploratory in nature. It has given space to former UNAMID peacekeepers, military and police components, men and women in uniform from Rwanda, to express their feelings on how they performed the protection of civilians mandate, the challenges faced with and the enablers in fulfilling that mandate. Undeniably, further research that would expand the population and include

peacekeepers from other troop and police contributing countries as well as the civilian component may yield greater insights.

MAPS

Map of Darfur in Sudan



Source: [google.com/map of Darfur region in Sudan](https://www.google.com/maps/@12.8666667,32.3333333,12z), published on 6 June 2021 by OCHA.

REFERENCES

1. Atkinson, J. D. (2017). Qualitative Methods. In *Journey into Social Activism: Qualitative Approaches* (pp. 65–98). Fordham University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1hfr0rk.6>
2. Aubyn, F. K. (2016). UNAMID Police and the Protection of Civilians in Darfur. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center. Policy brief 1/March 2016.
3. Bailey, B., Leo-Rhynie, E. & Morris, J. 2000. Why Theory? In Parpart, J. L., Connelly, M. P., Barriteau, V. Eudine (Ed.), *Theoretical perspectives on Gender and Development* (pp. 1-22). Ottawa, Canada.
4. Baker, E.S & Edwards, R. (2012). How many qualitative interviews is enough. National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper, March 2012.
5. Bannigan, K. & Watson R. (2009). Reliability and Validity in a nutshell. *Journal of Clinical Nursing*, 22 June 2009
6. BASH, B. L. (1994). Discussion of Peacekeeping. In *The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping* (pp. 5–14). Air University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13983.7>
7. Beadle, A. W. (2010). Protection of civilians in theory – a comparison of UN and NATO approaches. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), 15 December 2010.
8. Blair, R., Di Salvatore, J., & Smidt, H. (2020). When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?. *Available at SSRN 3529177*.
9. Breakey, H. (2012). Protection norms and Human Rights : A rights – based analysis of responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilian in Armed Conflicts, *Global Responsibility to Protect* 4, no 3 (2012) : 309-33 at.
10. Chataing, P.-A. (Ed.). (2015). *ACLED Working Paper No. 9 Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection*. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03812>
11. Claire, A. (2019). From concept to practice: the long road to operationalizing protection. *Disasters*, 43(1), 46-66.
12. Coyne, I. T. (1997). Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling; merging or clear boundaries?. *Journal of advanced nursing*, 26(3), 623-630.
13. Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2016). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*. Sage publications.
14. De G Shepherd (2017). Sand and Dust Storms: Subduing a Global Phenomenon. A Sandstorm hovering over the African Union – United Nations Mission in North Darfur, Elfasher. <https://wedocs.unep.org/Frontiers-2017-CH4>. EN.pdf

15. de Waal, A. (2007). Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 83(6), 1039–1054. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4541909>
16. de Wet, J. & Erasmus, D. (2005). Towards rigour in qualitative analysis. *Qualitative Research Journal*, vol.5, No 1, 2005, pp. 27-40
17. Di Razza, N. (2017). *Reframing the Protection of Civilians Paradigm for UN Peace Operations*. International Peace Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17517>
18. Dickinger, A. (2007). THE EXPLORATIVE RESEARCH. In *Perceived Quality of Mobile Services: A Segment-Specific Analysis* (Vol. 18, pp. 9–18). Peter Lang AG. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvc16hfw.4>
19. Docking, T. (2001). *Peacekeeping in Africa*. US Institute of Peace. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12413>
20. Durrheim, K. (2006). Research design. *Research in practice: Applied methods for the social sciences*, 2, 33-59.
21. Ekengard, A. (2008). The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Experiences and Lessons Learned, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Defence Analysis, August 2008
22. Elliott, V. (2018). Thinking about the coding process in qualitative data analysis. *The Qualitative Report*, 23(11), 2850-2861. Retrieved from <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/thinking-about-coding-process-qualitative-data/docview/2155621346/se-2?accountid=200358>
23. Farber, N. K. (2006). Conducting Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for School Counselors. *Professional School Counseling*, 9(5), 367–375. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42732709>
24. Fréchette, L. (2012). UN peacekeeping: 20 years of reform.
25. Gowan, R. (2019). The Security Council and the protection of civilians. In L. Sharland (Ed.), *Evolution of the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping* (pp. 7–10). Australian Strategic Policy Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23103.5>
26. Gruley, J., & Duvall, C. S. (2012). The evolving narrative of the Darfur conflict as represented in “The New York Times” and “The Washington Post”, 2003-2009. *GeoJournal*, 77(1), 29–46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41431189>
27. Hove, S. E., & Anda, B. (2005, September). Experiences from conducting semi-structured interviews in empirical software engineering research. In *11th IEEE International Software Metrics Symposium (METRICS'05)* (pp. 10-pp). IEEE.
28. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/53c3b3724.html>
29. HUNT, C. T. (2020). Challenges Facing UN Police in Protecting Civilians. In *Protection through Policing: The Protective Role of UN Police in Peace Operations* (pp. 10–23). International Peace Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25341.8>

30. HUNT, C. T. (2020). Police Peacekeepers and the Protection of Civilians. In *Protection through Policing: The Protective Role of UN Police in Peace Operations* (pp. 2–5). International Peace Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25341.6>
31. International Crisis Group. (2015). *The Chaos in Darfur*. International Crisis Group. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31836>
32. Ishaque, W. (2021). Evolving Trends in Peacekeeping: United Nations–African Union Hybrid Peacekeeping Operations (UNAMID) in Darfur.
33. Jacob, C. (2019). Civilian protection in the context of interventions. In *Handbook on Intervention and State building*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
34. Jibril, A.A.M. (2010). Past and Future of UNAMID : Tragic Failure or Glorious Success? Hand Briefing Paper, July 2010
35. Keeler, R., & Kanetake, M. (2017). The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.
36. Khalil, M. A. (2018). Robust Peacekeeping—Not Aggressive Peacekeeping. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, 112, 114–117. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26628112>
37. Kochani, L. (2020). Does higher quality peacekeepers equal better civilian protection?: A qualitative research study on UN-peacekeeping effectiveness in Mali and the DRC.
38. Konza, D. (2005). Ethical issues in qualitative educational research with vulnerable families. *Qualitative Research Journal*, vol. 5. No. 1, 2005, pp. 15-26
39. Labonte, M. T. (2015). Grappling with Double Manifest Failure: R2P and the Civilian Protection Conundrum. In *Human Rights Protection in Global Politics* (pp. 245-267). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
40. Lambert, S. D., & Loiselle, C. G. (2008). Combining individual interviews and focus groups to enhance data richness. *Journal of advanced nursing*, 62(2), 228-237.
41. Lamp, N. & Trif, D. (2009). United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Hertie School of Governance-working Papers, No 47, November 2009
42. Lewis, S. (2015). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches [Review of *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (3rd ed.)*, by J. Creswell]. *Health Promotion Practice*, 16(4), 473–475. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26741039>
43. Luqman, S. & Omede A. J, (2012). From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan, 14 February 2012
44. McNamee, T., & Muyangwa, M. (2021). *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners* (p. 431). Springer Nature.
45. MOHAJAN, H. K. (2018). Qualitative Research methodology in Social sciences and related subjects. *Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People*, 7 (1)

46. Mohamed, A. M. (2020). Darfurians in the Diaspora: Perceptions of the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan's Past and the Future of Darfur Under International Response.
47. Morse, J. M. (2000). Determining sample size. *Qualitative health research*, 10(1), 3-5.
48. Müller, T. R. & Bashar Z. (2017). 'UNAMID Is Just Like Clouds in Summer, They Never Rain': Local Perceptions of Conflict and the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions. *International Peacekeeping*, 24 (5), 756-779
49. Müller, T. R. (2020). Protection of Civilians Mandates and 'Collateral Damage' of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Histories of Refugees from Darfur. *International Peacekeeping*, 27(5), 760-784.
50. Nash, K. L. (2010). Responsibility to Protect: Evolution and Viability, May 10, 2010
51. Netabay, N. (2009). The Darfur Peace Process: understanding the obstacles to success, May 2009, Joan B. Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
52. Newcomer, K. E., Hatry, H. P., & Wholey, J. S. (2015). Conducting semi-structured interviews. *Handbook of practical program evaluation*, 492, 492.
53. Nolen, A., & Talbert, T. (2011). Qualitative Assertions as Prescriptive Statements. *Educational Psychology Review*, 23(2), 263-271. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23882863>
54. Ogden, J., & Cornwell, D. (2010). The role of topic, interviewee and question in predicting rich interview data in the field of health research. *Sociology of health & illness*, 32(7), 1059-1071.
55. peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology
56. Ponelis, S. R. (2015). Using interpretive qualitative case studies for exploratory research in doctoral studies: A case of information systems research in small and medium enterprises. *International Journal of Doctoral Studies*, 10(1), 535-550.
57. Punga, I.L.(2011). UN Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians in the 21st Century. Case Studies : MONUC and UNAMID, Utrecht University, August 12, 2011.
58. Rai, N., & Thapa, B. (2015). A study on purposive sampling method in research. *Kathmandu: Kathmandu School of Law*, 1-12.
59. Razza, N. D. (2017). Reframing the Protection of Civilians Paradigm for UN Peace Operations, International Peace Institute. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17517>
60. Reich, S. & Whitehead, J. & Nelson, P. (2009). Protecting Civilians. Key Determinants in the Effectiveness of a Peacekeeping Force. Ford Institute for Human Security, GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh.
61. Roberts, P., & Priest, H. (2006). Reliability and validity in research. *Nursing standard*, 20(44), 41-46.
62. Sandelowski, M. (1995). On the aesthetics of qualitative research. *Image: The Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, 27(3), 205-209.

63. Sarkin, J. (2009). The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa's Sub-Regional Organizations in Dealing with Africa's Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. *Journal of African Law*, 53(1), 1–33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646824>
64. Schaub, M. J. D. (2014). Peace support operations in Darfur: The International Communities Failure to protect
65. Sebastián, S. (2015). Civilian Protection. In *The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the gap in the protection of civilians from physical violence* (pp. 7–8). Stimson Center. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10990.5>
66. Smith, M. G., Whalan, J., & Thomson, P. (2011). The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments. *Security Challenges*, 7(4), 27–38. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26467114>
67. Stebbins, R. (2001). Exploratory Research in the social sciences: what is exploration? The University of Calgary.
68. Stimson Center (2016). Briefing Note: *Protection of Civilians by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali*. Stimson Center. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10808>
69. Swedberg, R. (2020). Exploratory research. *The production of knowledge: Enhancing progress in social science*, 17–41.
70. unamid.unmissions.org/press-releases-statements
71. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 Darfur (2007). *International Legal Materials*, 46(5), 900–904. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20695740>
72. United Nations, Department of Peace Keeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008
73. United Nations, Department of Peace Operations (2019). Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2019.17
74. Van der Lijn, J. (2013). To Paint the Nile Blue : Factors for success and Failure of UNMIS and UNAMID, June 2013.
75. van der Meulen, E., & van der Putten, F.-P. (2009). Darfur. In *Great Powers and International Conflict Management: European and Chinese Involvement in the Darfur and Iran Crises* (pp. 9–22). Clingendael Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05468.5>
76. Walt Kilroy. (2018). The Evolution of Civilian Protection in Peacekeeping Mandates: the Reality of UNMISS Operations in South Sudan. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 29, 133–143. <https://doi.org/10.3318/isia.2018.29.12>
77. Watkins, D. C. (2012). Qualitative Research: The Importance of Conducting Research That Doesn't "Count." *Health Promotion Practice*, 13(2), 153–158. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26739544>
78. Weir, E. A. (2013). *Policies That Protect: The African Union and the Protection of Civilians*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08026>

79. Wels, W. (2019). The many meanings of Protection of civilians. A truth universally acknowledged?
80. Welling, J. J. (2007). Non-governmental Organizations, Prevention, and Intervention in Internal Conflict: Though the Lens of Darfur. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 14(1), 147–179. <https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2007.14.1.147>
81. Williams, P. D. (2010). Challenges Facing the Protection Agenda. In *Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa* (pp. 14–28). Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19161.6>
82. Williams, P. D. (2010). Turning Analysis into Action: Some Lessons for Enhancing Civilian Protection. In *Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa* (pp. 38–47). Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19161.8>
83. Wilson, C. (2013). *Interview techniques for UX practitioners: A user-centered design method*. Newness.

APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

This study is on: “Any contribution of UNAMID in the protection of civilians in Darfur region, Sudan? The perspectives of the peacekeepers”.

The interview consisted of individual in-depth interview and group discussion conducted by me, as the researcher, with 30 selected respondents from the military and police components, male and female, former UNAMID peacekeepers from Rwanda.

The interview was unstructured with open-ended questions.

Interview guide questions

1. How did you understand your mission?
2. How do you feel you fulfilled the PoC mandate? Please explain.
3. How do you see as the main challenges for the fulfillment of your PoC mandate? Please explain.
4. How do you see as the enablers in the fulfillment of the PoC mandate? Please explain.
5. What do you see as the requirements to provide satisfactory protection of the civilians of our time? Please explain.