



UNIVERSITY *of*
RWANDA

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

MA IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOMALIA A STUDY OF
SOMALI POLICE**

Dissertation submitted to the University of Rwanda fulfillment of the requirement for the award of Master of Arts Degree in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation

BY

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APPROVAL



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AUTHORISATION TO SUBMIT THE CORRECTED DISSERTATION

I, undersigned, **Dr. George Wycliffe BUTARE**, member of the panel of examiners of the dissertation entitled: **SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOMALIA: A STUDY OF SOMALI POLICE**, conducted by **SADIK ADEN ALI**

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
A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Dr. George Wycliffe BUTARE', written over a light blue rectangular background.

Dr. George Wycliffe BUTARE

For Administration of the CCM MA Program

DECLARATION

I, Sadik Aden Ali, undersigned, do hereby declare that the work presented in this research project titled "Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Somalia: a Study of Somali Police", is my own original production, that it has never been presented before by myself or anyone else for the purpose of receiving an academic award.

Candidate Signature 

Date 17 June 2022

DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to my families for their encouragement and endurance during this academic journey. It has not been easy for them, especially my parents, wives, and children, who had to persevere with the fact that they would not be seeing their son, husband, and father for a whole year. Indeed, colleagues and co-workers have also felt my absence and my contribution.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|--|
| AGO | Attorney-General's Office |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ATMIS | African Union Transition Mission in Somalia |
| AU | African Union |
| BRA | Banadir Regional Administration |
| CID | Criminal Investigations Department |
| DDRR | Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration |
| DIGP | Deputy Inspector General of Police |
| FGS | Federal Government of Somalia |
| FMS | Federal Member States |
| HQ | Head Quarter |
| IDP | Internal Displaced People |
| IGP | Inspector General of Police |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| IND | Immigrations Naturalizations Directorate |
| INL | International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
| MoIA | Ministry of Interior Affairs |
| MoIS | Ministry of Internal Security |
| NCO | Non Commissioned Officers |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NISA | National Intelligence and Security Agency |
| NLSP | Non-lethal Support Package |
| NPC | National Police Collage |
| NPM | National Policing Model |
| NSA | National Security Architecture |
| PCRD | Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy |
| PPDB | Police Professional Development Board |
| RNP | Rwanda National Police |
| SAP | South Africa Police |
| SNA | Somali National Army |
| SOCK | Significant Original Contribution body of Knowledge |
| SOP | Standard Operations Procedure |
| SPF | Somali Police Force |
| SSF | Somalia Security Forces |
| SSPS | Southern Sudan Police Service |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |
| UNODC | United Nations Office of Drug and Crime |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office of Political Support |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSG | United Nations Secretary-General |
| UNSOM | United Nations in Somalia |
| UNWOMEN | United Nations Women |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordinance |

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ABSTRACT


First of all, I express my gratitude to Allah Almighty, Most Merciful, for the gift of life, good health and wisdom. His advice, his faith, and his endurance throughout this mission, without them, I would not have had this opportunity. I would also like to take this time to thank my Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali Police Force for giving me this opportunity, believing in me and enabling me to participate in this course. Special thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Innocent Rugaragu, for his unwavering direction and guidance, which enabled me to complete this research project. He is a source of encouragement and inspiration for me to succeed in this mission.

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Finally, I would like to thank the course participants, especially my colleagues from the Police Senior Command and Staff Course (PSCSC) 10/21-22. I appreciate their views, criticisms, and contributions during the debate and discussion. They have provided me with a variety of ideas and experiences, both in terms of academic and operational staff work. In addition, our Allied students, weren't terribly homesick either because of the warmth of the local Rwandan students who welcomed us and made us feel at home. I sincerely admire them.

Key Concepts: Security Sector; Reform; a Study; Somali Police.

Figure 1.1 Somalia Reference Map - Hamar Jab-Jab District



CHAPTER ONE:

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the research topic (Security Sector Reform in Somalia: a Study of Somali Police) with the purpose of studying of Somali Police reform, which is unique. Such research had not been done to Somali Police ever before.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is widely recognized as a concept in flux. It has a long history, dating back to the post-conflict reform of security forces and the dramatic political transitions of the twentieth century. SSR was more closely linked to post-conflict state-building exercises in the 1990s and 2000s. Examples include the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan (Muggah and De Boer, 2019, p.7). Some authors argue that SSR is all about capacity building of security forces.

In the security forces, SSR is sometimes misconstrued as "functional capacity building." In fact, SSR is an important component of state formation in many nations, as it decreases concrete security dangers for citizens and should always contribute to democratic security governance. To put it another way, SSR is largely a political rather than a technological undertaking. It raises fundamental questions about power allocation, needs close coordination with local elites, and may require flanking incentives and circumstances (Eckhard, 2016, p.1). Some other claims SSR is all about structure. Furthermore, Eckhard argues that SSR is for the security of the population. SR refers to planned improvements to existing structures and procedures in the country's security sector, with the goal of providing effective security in the interests of the populace (Eckhard, 2016, p.6).

The importance of governance issues and civilian participation into policy formation has been underscored by the transition away from state- and armed services views of security and toward a broader emphasis on human security (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002, p.175).

The AU's first major SSR attempt in Africa was the 2006: AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD), which stressed 'the restructuring of the state's organs, notably those linked to security and justice,' in order to combine post-conflict peace. In a year letter, the UN announced the Strategic Partnership for SSR, with the purpose of supporting in the development of the African Union's

SSR Framework (approved in 2013) and infusing AU input into UN SSR development (Detzner, 2017, p.131).

The region's experience with SSR has been mixed, with some striking differences between countries. For example, in the early 1990s, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea embarked on extensive reform and reorganization of their security institutions. Despite the fact, that they differed significantly in terms of sponsorship, philosophy, and focus (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p,4).

Genuine reform has taken a long time to occur, and SSR possibilities have arisen as a result of civil service reforms. The Civil Service Law, for example, has had a positive impact on the organization and staffing of Ethiopia's Ministry of Defense's civil service wing, and public consultation on national security strategies and dialogues over security and defense reviews has become more and more accepted as the norm (though well managed and tightly orchestrated by the state) (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p. 14).

The efficiency and professionalism of the security sector are measured not only by the capability of the security forces, but also by how well they are managed, monitored, and held accountable. While post-conflict countries argue that donors were deeply involved in conflict-affected countries' peace building efforts and gradually realized that conflict prevention costs less than recovery, (Detzner, 2017, p.118).

Police Reform in a Broader Context plays a key role in post-conflict and transitional countries. It is vital for sustainable peace and development. People have to feel safe and secure and have confidence in their State. This can be achieved only when everyone, including the law enforcement agencies, are accountable to laws that are consistent with international human rights standards. Police reform is also associated with sustainable development. It is argued that an improved security situation is a precondition for socio-economic recovery in most post-conflict settings. Strengthening police institutions has to be conceived as part of wider rule of law and security sector reform (UNSOM, 2015).

Police reform is a core part of security sector reform. It is commonly defined as the transformation of a policing organization into a professional and accountable police service that is responsive to the needs of local communities (Moser, 2009). However, some authors believe reorganizing is starting new chapter. It is claimed that reorganizing the police force will necessitate a break with the past. This is especially true following the end of a crisis or destabilization. In practice, however, most police officers are only

changed on a case-by-case basis. Implementation issues, as well as international norms, are filtered via local norms as they develop (Hills, 2014, p.1).

The absence of local engagement and responsibility of the evolving reform agenda has been a fundamental challenge in Ethiopia's security sector reform (SSR). As a result, a number of governments, donors, and organizations have pledged to support the notion of local ownership. However, this has devolved into a rhetorical device rather than a guide to donor behavior. Although some reform initiatives are ongoing, the police force has been charged of human rights crimes in the past.

In Ethiopia, private security firms are legal, although they are strictly controlled. The country's significance as a transit point for heroin originating in Asia and intended for Europe, as well as cocaine destined for South Africa, pose additional security concerns (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p.13).

While Kenya has instituted widespread defense, police, judicial and constitutional reforms, the probability of successful security sector reform (SSR) remains highly questionable. It finds that reforms have tended to be inadequate and ineffective because of an underlying assumption that the only problem is a lack of capacity and resources. The SSR debate in Kenya is still embryonic, and security sector players and policymakers are yet to see the benefits of a broader, strategic engagement with civil society groups. Such groups may need to reconsider their confrontational stance on security matters and to think critically about what they bring to the SSR debate (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p.17).

Beckitt and Bakrania remark that Eritrea's current totalitarian government does not afford a direct entrance point for security sector reform. The greatest method to prepare Eritrea for SSR is to support democratic change on the domestic level while simultaneously exerting international criticism and demand for democratic elections (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p. 10).

South Africa's police (the SAP) conducted an internal upgrading reform in 1991. This required a reaction to both the changing political environment signaled by Mandela's release and the decriminalization of liberation movements in 1990. This added to the pressures of changing crime trends and international scrutiny. Apartheid police forces were notorious for their unaccountability and unrestrained use of force. Prior to the 1994 election, the majority of police reform research and advocacy work focused on police rights violations. Numerous international human rights organizations have condemned South Africa's various police forces for their violations. As a result of this focus, the ANC's (the transition's main negotiating party) agenda has shifted in the post-election period; the emphasis was on number of

connections mechanisms for police oversight. On five fronts, the ANC demanded police accountability (Rauch, 2000, p. 8).

South Sudan, Significant security challenges still remain in Southern Sudan. Despite this, the rule of law sector and the police have been neglected in Southern Sudan's Security Sector Reform (SSR). Four years after its establishment, the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) has yet to be the primary agency ensuring civilian security. Reform must involve legislation, organizational structure and infrastructure investment if the SSPS is to respond effectively to threats identified by the Southern Sudanese (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p. 30).

In Uganda, the character of decision-making and the quality of responsiveness depends on historical factors, the country's socioeconomic set-up, its political culture and the international environment. Decision-making authority in the security domain is diffuse. Different groups in society exercise their 'demand' for security more through informal relationships than formal mechanisms. And the state's relationship with external actors (including donors, and regional and global powers) affects security decision-making (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p.38).

In Rwanda, 2000 Rwanda national Police (RNP) was established signifying further reforms in the police sector. The Government of Rwanda deemed necessary to combine the work of the Communal Police, National Gendarmerie and Judicial Police to strengthen and co-ordinate the process of policing in the country, under the leadership of one ministry, that of Internal Affairs. The formation of the new National Police had five primary objectives. These objectives were proper utilization of the human and material resources, harmonization of administrative and operational procedures, uniformity in training, and harmonious approach to the fight against crime and, greater efficiency and productivity in providing police services to the community (Theophilus, 2015, p.60).

Somalia's Security Sector Reform (SSR), effective implementation of SSR is pivotal because the African Forces (African Union Mission to Somalia) providing security and stability to the federal government for the last decade are conditionally planning to transfer their responsibilities to the Somali forces by 2020 (Ulusow, 2018).

However, transforming peace and security responsibility to Somali Security Forces by 2020 has shifted 2021 while earlier 2022 the responsibility and AMISOM mandate shifted under ATMIS. Nevertheless,

the reforming task have been implemented due to more commitments and competences which unfortunately misuses the foundation and the bases to reach the desired objective. This research is services to find gaps and to contribute to SOCK, this chapter covers: Study Background, Statement of the Research Problem, Research Gap, Research Questions, the Purpose of the Study (General & Specific Objectives), Significance/ Rationale of the study, Delimitation of the Study, Scope of the Study, Limitation of the Study and the Research Outline or an Organization of the Study.

1.2 Study Background

Over two decades of conflict, primarily in southern Somalia, destroyed much of the country's infrastructure, economy, and legitimate institutions. The country became fragmented after Siyad Barre's government fell apart in January 1991. (Omar *et al.*, 2017). Police institution was among government institutions that were also destroyed. The Somali government fell apart in 1991 as a result of growing political tensions and infighting. Key governance institutions had disintegrated, and public services could no longer be provided. (Abdullahi, 2021).

In 2012, Somalia transitioned from transitional to legitimate governments, and a new federal government was established in Mogadishu, with an AMISOM force joining Somali forces to combat the militant Al Shabab group. Conflict persists in the south, where access is difficult, while Somaliland and Puntland have remained relatively peaceful in the north. Since the central government's collapse in 1991, there has been a surge in political and scholarly interest in the concept of a fragile state (Abdullahi, 2021).

The Somali Police Force (SPF) was founded in 1943 as the Somali Police Corps, but changed its name to the SPF in 1960 when it merged with the British Somaliland Scouts to form the newly formed Somalia's national force. (Hills, 2014). Having legal ground and foundation upon all respective constitutions and the current provisional constitution especially chapter 14th on Article 126 and the guiding principles with same chapter on Article 127th (Government of Somalia, 2012, p.45).

“In Somalia, unfortunately what makes the SSR look like failed is the reform implementation started with a wrong approach because the decision-making leaders of the federal government failed to honor the tenets of the roadmap for SSR. This is explained in the provisional constitution and in the International Security Pact, and New Partnership Agreement adopted at the London Conference on Somalia on 11 May 2017” (M. Uluo, 2018).

The Somalia Joint Rule of Law Program UNSOM, UNDP, UNODC, UNOPS, UNICEF and UNWOMEN have evolved the Somalia Joint Rule of Law Program paintings plan for 2018-2020, in near collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Security and representatives of the Somali police. In addition to that, The United Nations Secretary-General, in his letter of 2 July 2015 to the Security Council, recommended to establish a non-lethal support package (NLSP) for the Somali police, Moreover, The Joint Rule of Law Program has three police related priorities: (1) Political work associated with the New Policing Model; (2) Increasing the visibility and the presence of police, particularly at the federal member states level; (3) Capacity building of police with a focus on improving police service delivery at the community level (UNSOM, 2015).

The biggest triumph on the safety front has been the unintentional consensus on a National Security Architecture established with the support of Somali officials. The country's integration of multiple protection systems across federal states will be strengthened as a result of this protection agreement. A notable financial achievement is the principal National Development Plan (NDP), which outlines the FGS's financial reconstruction and improvement targets for the 2017-19 term. The completion of a number of economic policy reforms and initial capacity building programs in key ministries and institutions has resulted in significant progress toward FGS reengagement with International Financial Institutions (particularly the IMF). The FGS is now in a better position to carry out Somalia's peace building efforts and a strategy for the future as a result of these historic achievements of long term development (AfDB, 2017, p.1).

The security governance in Mogadishu is set up in the conventional way. The beachfront city was formally acknowledged as the capital of the federal republic when the internationally recognized non-transitional FGS was created in 2012 and it now contains presidential palace, known as Villa Somalia. It is the capital of the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA), which has seventeen districts and covers the same territory as Mogadishu. It's in the Banadir district, which is another Mogadishu city (it receives 15 per cent of the federal budget). Benadir is Somalia's smallest administrative region, although it contains the country's largest population, estimated at 1.65 million people by the United Nations (Hills, 2017, p.2).

However, in 2019, the Somali government began a significant security sector reform effort, focusing primarily on the SPF and military. The ultimate objective of the SSR initiatives was to create a practical, affordable, and responsible security sector, with the initial goal being to build a payroll and human resource system so that the force could be restructured and right sized. In the first phase, there were five objectives to be achieved. The first step is to create a complete database for the Somali Police Force that

will be turned over to and managed by SPF leadership its seventeen districts play a crucial influence in politics and decision-making (it receives 15 per cent of the federal budget). Benadir is Somalia's smallest administrative region, although it has the greatest population, estimated at 1.65 million by the UN in 2014. Approximately 1.65 million people live in the United States (Hills, 2017, p.24).

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

For over a decade, international partners have pumped resources both material and financial in the security sector reform processes, yet peace in Somalia remains elusive (Abdullahi, 2021, p.6).

Except for Afghanistan, Somalia spends more on security as a percentage of its budget than any other fragile country in the world (World Bank review 2017). For more than a decade, successive Somali governments and the international community have worked hard to resurrect Somalia's security forces (SSF). After the country's government collapse in 1991, attempts are being made to restore stability of the country. Billions of dollars were spent to train and equip tens of thousands of military, police, and intelligence personnel in order for them to stabilize their country, liberate it from the militant group al-Shabaab, and enforce the rule of law. Neither of the two goals has been fully realized nearly 15 years later. The country's security forces are perpetually underfunded, deeply divided, and increasingly politicized (Institute, 202, p.6).

Since the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre's authoritarian socialist administration in 1991, which started the state's violent dissolution, Somalia has been mired in political unrest. Various warlords have engaged in a power battle, murdering and injuring thousands of civilians in the process. In 1992, UN peacekeeping forces commanded by US marines arrived in Mogadishu to defend a continuing humanitarian effort, but they left two years later after failing to complete their objective. Before establishing Federal Member States (FMS) Police, Somali had only three Police institutions (Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland Police Organizations). Three public police units with no organizational archive were the first suggestions. The second half identifies security and stability as critical factors affecting the re-emergence of police forces, with positional versatility being the only obvious general norm. The final section concludes that police are selectively reconstructed rather than being significantly reorganized or reformed (Hills, 2014, p.2).

According to the Report, the federal government of Somalia had spent approximately one-third (USD 197 million) of its budget on security sector reforms and that eight-out-of-10 government employees

(accounting for 48 percent of government wage bill) were also found with the security sector. Other international partners in the form of international institutions and bilateral partners had also spent over USD 1.5 billion annually on Somalia's security sector. Indeed, such support without the government being able to develop its own capacity to restore stability is unsustainable (Abdullahi, 2021, p.1).

In January 2017, the World Bank and the United Nations issued a technical report titled "Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review". This aimed at helping the Somali leaders to understand the critical role of fiscal budget and public financial management in the SSR. The report details the widespread problems of corruption, desertions, and disorganization affecting the police, the military, and the justice service. Finally, it offers a long list of recommendations for consideration in rebuilding those institutions within the framework of the federal state. The estimated annual cost for the security and justice services is US \$428 million (M. Uluo, 2018).

Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe are four nations with similar institutional systems that have important elements impacting police governance. These statistics demonstrate that public accountability plays a minor role. However, when it comes to restoring institutions. It takes more than repairing structures and institutions to rebuild a post-conflict country. It entails regaining people's trust and confidence, as well as nurturing connections and offering them hope (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010,p.7).

These are important questions to explore because the ideas on which police should be constructed or transformed, as well as their authority, are uncertain. The police force has a record for being resistant to reform. (Hills, 2014, p 2). On the other side, discipline emphasizes the necessity for SPF reform. The SPF's efficient implementation has diminished, and its standard procedures and discipline have been reduced to a bare minimum, but recollections of how police was organized before 1991 have certainly had an impact (Hills, 2014 p. 9).

We now know that there are police officers who are loyal to politicians. In the majority of countries, policing is distinguished by means of prerogative and rationality. However, Somali policing is like Somali politics, specifically situation to moving loyalties, extended family calculations and opaque decision-making; pragmatism and informality are extra feature of its governance than ordinary or precedent. Police restructuring is vital to the future of regional and Somalia's geopolitical, Demography, Security, and economic stability. So, to eliminate political loyalty policing public participation is must.

Dialogue with civil society and citizens is critical to the establishment of a stable and long-term security structure in Somalia (Beckitt and Bakrania, 2010, p. 23).

1.4 Research Gap

A research gap denotes what the current state of knowledge has failed to address and thus, appears to be missing. Therefore, it means, a problem that a researcher would wish to see addressed in their study quest has not been answered in the particular area of their interest (Transformation, 2021, P.9). Research gap is a key problem or a question that has not been answered by any of the existing studies within your area of research. Others conducted researches on SSR in Somali are: Abdullahi (2021), UNSOM (2015) , M. Uluso (2018), Detzner (2017), AfDB (2017), Hills (2017), (Blyth, 2019), Beckitt and Bakrania, (2010) Hills, (2014), Institute (2021), Transformation (2021), Babalola and Nwanzu (2020), Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky (2017), Beyene (2018), Harborne (2017) & IRIN (2013). Other discussed generic views on SSR in Somali do exist but no one had done research on Somali Police Reform, which looks bit neglected. Thus, the need for this study is to understand how SPF-SSR is conducted to focus on this information gap.

1.5 Research Questions

According to formplus (2021), a research question is a precise investigation which provide an answer to what the study inquiries about. Therefore, research question rests at the heart of a methodical investigation and aids the researcher to plainly identify a course for the study process (Transformation, 2021, p. 10).

These research questions are intended to reach the objective and bias less answers that surely contribute to Somali Police Reform. These questions had assisted the researcher to gain answers from experienced and unexperienced personnel who are already in the exact field of work, in which the main question is *what are the current challenges of SPF reform in Somalia?* Thus, this research study is guided by the flowing questions; -

- What is the current situation of the security sector reform in Somalia and why is it needed?
- To what extent does SPF SSR Contribute to Peace Building (PB) in Somalia?
- What are the current challenges of SPF reform in Somalia?

1.6 The Purpose of the Study

Research objectives, according to Editage, (2019), should describe succinctly what the research aim at accomplishing. They sum up the end results a researcher wishes to realize through the undertaking and presents the bearing to the study. A research objective must therefore be feasible (Transformation, 2021, p. 9). The intent of the research is to study and analyze the SSR in Somali case of Somali Police, to find out what are the Somali Police reform challenges that does not allow to implement. During this research objectives are classified into two (General & Specific Objectives).

1.6.1 General Objectives

To study and examine the broader understanding of SSR in Somalia: a study of SPF reform by displaying the achievements challenges and opportunities surrounding and lastly generate recommendations.

1.6.2 Specific Objectives

To examine the broader understanding of SSR in Somalia study of SPF reform achievements, challenges, and opportunities.

To understand the contributions of SPF SSR in Somalia's Peace Building processes.

To assess the challenges operationalization and capacity building of SPF Somalia.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study depicts a written clarification or rationale that clarifies why a research inquiry was needed; and validates the significance of the research work and the effect it has on the research field. It's input in terms of new awareness and how others will benefit from it (Transformation, 2021, p.10). No research has been done to this field before. Which means the literatures to this field is limit. So, the findings of this research shall be useful to Policy makers, the government for generating desirable policies, Ministry of Internal Security and this research shall be an asset to any party involve security sector reform. On the other hand, to have sustainable solutions this research with above mentioned objectives is paramount significant.

So, this research shall contribute to SPF SSR process, SOCK and recommendations to the Somali Police Command. Lastly, the findings of this research will be basis for further studies to other researchers who may interest in discovering further studies on the research topic. Showing Conclusions about SSR practice are difficult to reach due to a severe lack of empirical research in many cases; what is especially

needed is rigorous comparative research with analytical depth. to find the gaps and make a significant pragmatic contribution. This research will be significant to the researchers are who interested in this field of studies. However, Somalia is in its recovering phase following prolonged conflict and at least 14 years of war on terror. Somalia's future is unpredictable due to lack of well managed SSR, Political reconciliations and reform that has not succeeded. However, this research will give policy and decision makers guidelines to consider rather than following their emotions and interests.

1.8 Delamination of the Study

According to Theofanidis and Fountouki, (2019) these are in fact, in the real meaning, the precincts deliberately placed and defined by the writers themselves so as to ensure that the study aims and objectives do not turn out to be impracticable to attain (Transformation, 2021, p. 11). Due to the nature of this research topic, the researcher intended to identify and discuss in general only SSR in Somali. But specifically, this research was concerned with the SPF reform. However, as an example the study would be used to refer to other institutions to be reformed beyond SSR.

1.9 Scope of the Study

According to editage (2019). The scope of a study enlightens on the extent to which the research area will be investigated in the study work and indicates the bounds within which the study will be operating (Transformation, 2021, p.11).

This research was implemented in Somali Police HQ and Hammar Jajab District. Participants and respondents were the staff from Somali Police force and members from the community. All planned respondents had met and connected. Unfortunately, the researcher committed to meet with AMISOM & UNSOM Police, but they refrained from participating. This scope of the research will encompass around Somali Police Force reform in regard to the reform for contributing to the Somalia's peace building process in post conflict society.

1.10 Limitation of the Study

According to Theofanidis and Fountouki (2019), limitation refer to an imposed restriction, which are out of the researcher's scope. Therefore, such approach effect results / conclusions of the study. (Transformation, 2021) P12. In this research some challenges out of expectations happened which may

affect other researchers during collection of data the respondents proposed were stakeholders of SPF were also among (AMISOM/ATMIS, UNSOM POLICE and DONORS of SPF) but not participated.

1.11 Organization of the Study

This study is organized into Five Chapters that are arranged as follows; - Chapter One; Introduction or Background to the Study of the SSR in Somali Study of Somali Police. Two; an overview of literature review, conceptual and theoretical framework of the Study, Chapter three; study Process of conducting of research (Methodology), chapter four; critical evaluation of research findings, data analysis and presentation, chapter five; summary, conclusion, and recommendations of entire research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITARATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the information of what other researchers written about the Security Sector Reform especially in the same field of research. However, the reader shall also see many other necessary information of theoretical and conceptual frameworks significantly in police reform.

2.1.1 Somali Police Force History

According to Hills, (2017). Somali Police Force (SPF) is among Somalia National Armed Forces and the first National Institution established 20th Dec 1943. However, the reality is that according to Coqperg, (1958) ‘‘the Somalia Police Force (SPF) traces its beginning back to the foundation of a -Somali' Carabinieri organization in Somalia in 1924. From 1924 to 1941 the- Police was under the Italian Carabinieri and was an integral part of that group. Prior to 1937 the laws in force were essentially decrees of the local Italian colonial administration.

In 1937 the Parliament of Italy extended the laws of Italy to all of the colonial areas making applicable not only-laws on the books at that time but those passed subsequent to the 1937 ordinance. the defeat of the Italian army in East Africa in 1941, the British Government took over the administration of the area. In that year the British organized the Gendarmerie as a combination police and security force for Somalia. This organization effectively policed the area in criminal matters and in quasi-military matters until the turnover of the administration to the Italian Government in 1950 (Coqperg, 1958, p.11).

Although, Coqperg’s statement is the exact history of Somali Police establishment, yet from open source we have seen other writers claiming that it has been established 20th Dec 1943. While no source is referenced rather than oral, to my knowledge and experience the researcher have several times tried to get the exact history of Somali Police by asking to the seniority and long-term serving officers, mostly replied that ‘‘Somali Police was established dated back 1924. But we have taken that it has been established 1943 due to the force prestige against colonial era’’ Police faced many different situations due to existing circumstances, in different time frame before 1943 SPF logo was ‘‘*tiger head*’’ for braveness. While latter 1943 shifted to ‘‘*Gazella head*’’ for the attention, for the enactment law changed many times due to Political arena, form 1960 up to 1976 SPF was under Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA).

Then, 1976 SPF under the Siad Barre regime, it was moved from the Ministry of Interior to the Presidency. It was considered part of the Somali National Army. Nevertheless, SPF was necessary Institution to the nation that also collapsed in like all other government institutions during the civil war, from 1991 up to 2015 it was under MoIA. From 2016, SPF, National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and Immigrations, Naturalizations Directorate (IND) were shifted from under MoIA to the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) that has been established since then it is there.

After civil war started 1991 SPF officers were recalled for serving 1993 by UNISOM, when UNISOM mission terminated the police personnel were sent back to civilians. Again 2000 when Transitional National Government stationed at Mogadishu again Somali police at Mogadishu were recalled. On 2005, new beginning to Somalia whereas Islamic Union Courts (IUC) become to exist under which Al Shabab had secretly established. 2005 when Transitional Federal Government station at Jowhar and Baidoa Somali Police were recalled whereas the police and new militia were unified since then SPF is operating with tremendous change and improvement.

2.1.2 Somali Police Force (SPF) Structure

The structure of SPF is not static or fixed structure. it changes many times with the effect of the Commissioner's intent and decision having power granted Art 20 of Police Law No. 2 Dated 23 December 1972 (Somali Police Force and MoIS, 2024). SPF was structured as; - Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Directorates, Regional Police Commanders, Mobil Forces and Training Schools.

Meantime, due to the Governmental system structure changed from unitary to federal system SPF is experiencing new shift of structure without legitimacy. However, Federal Provisional Constitution clearly prescribes in Art 130 (Government of Somalia, 2012, p.46). federal police structure shall be issued by the federal parliament.

International Community and donors belief what makes pending to have SPF general structure is the constitutional review "If a constitutional review is being conducted, the parliament would have time to formulate and adjust police law in which the structure would have been scribed, it is critical to ensure adequate linkages with a police reform process, as the core principles of the reformed structures must be confirmed and enshrined in the revised Constitution.

SPF has flexible structure aligned with the Federal system in National Policing Model (NPM). March 2016 Federated policing models of Belgium, Germany, India and Nigeria were introduced, offering the

Somali officials a reference for different options. After four days of negotiations the officials reached an agreement, and the draft New Policing Model (NPM) that was endorsed in Baidoa (UNSOM, 2015).

Nevertheless, the current structure consists of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners (Operations & Administration), Directorates, Federal Member States Police Commissioners, Regional Commanders, Mobile and Special Forces, Academy and Training Schools. However, the number of directorates is not static it is very flexible which depends on the consent of the Commissioner with national political consideration. For the time being SPF does not have signed hierarchy structure chart which indicates the current structure that SPF operates.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

Somalia was originally known as one of the failed states. Mogadishu is now home to every clever enterprise, the Somali expatriate is returning, and Somalia is now taking in refugees from other countries. During this time, a lot of important things happen. One of them was Somalia's embrace of federalism through political agreements, as well as the democratic transfer of power contained in the Somali interim constitution of 2012, which marked a watershed moment in the country's reconciliation (UNSOM, 2015, p.12). Conceptually, if SPF is reformed even the performance of the policing would have been improved to serve the public in professional manner.

2.3 Federal and State levels of Police

The majority of contemporary federal systems are founded on historically and socioeconomic factors. Some were formed to respect the demand for determination and self of social groupings in a heterogeneous society, while others were born out of a compilation of pre-existing policies. While federal states have many levels of government with different degrees of executive, legislative, and judicial decentralization, they are defined by multiple levels of governance. Somalia's federalism began in 2004. Somali leaders reached an agreement on how to share authority and resources, which culminated in the adoption of a provisional constitution in 2012. It describes Somalia's federal structure (Blyth, 2019, p.11).

The Somali Police have a long history dating back to approximately the turn of the nineteenth century, when the British colonial masters organized an armed constable to police the north coast of Somalia, and later also the rest of the country personnel in 1943 under the command of 120 British officers. The Somalia Gendarmerie was renamed the Somali Police Force in 1948. (SPF). The authorities renamed the corps the Police Organization of Somalia from the Forze di Polizia della Somala in 1958, making it a

completely Somali force. Despite provisions in Article 126 (4) and (5) of the Provisional Constitution of Somalia (2012) establishing police services at the FMS level and sharing responsibilities with the Federal Police, the legal and organizational basis for professional state police services was inadequate (UNSOM, 2015).

SPF regulations (Regulation no 14, 04th Jan 1973) and enactment (law no 2, 23rd Dec 1972) based Military revolution doctrine, has been reformulated in 2016 after Military regime collapsed in 1991. Thereafter, the regulation and enactment law has been reformulated in 2016 when Ministry of Internal Security was established in 2012. Which remains illegal lacking the legitimacy form the parliament. the interior of Somalia The Somaliland Police Force was established by colonial authorities in 1926. After defeating the Italians in 1941, the British established the Somalia Gendarmerie, which has grown to over 3000 officers.

Future Police Expansion at the Federal and State Level The development of the NPM and a strategic support plan has been a major task for the FGS and FMS. The Guulwade Plan for the SNA was originally proposed to be what the Heegan Plan for the Somali's Police is to the SNA: a consensus-based plan with support from federal and FMS authorities that sets short to medium-term targets to respond to current threats and seeks donor support to meet the baseline targets (Somali Police Force and MoIS, 2024, p.2).

The draft Heegan proposal revealed in 2015, on the other hand, the international community rejected the draft Heegan proposal offered in 2015 for a variety of reasons. These include: a lack of FMS inclusivity; an agreed-upon policing model; and a failure to clarify lines of authority, command, and control boundaries between the FGS and established and emerging FMS (Harborne, 2017,p.28).

Two levels Police to work effectively and efficiently it depends on the political that leads all other aspects of governance. For example, how Somalis understand the federalism governance and how security and related concepts is arranged to share is incompatible. However, this needs deep understanding and fulfillment of all agreed points as stated in NPM.

2.4 Federal Police Reform

In post-conflict and transitional countries, police reform is critical. Police reform is also linked to long-term development. In most post-conflict settings, improved security is a prerequisite for socioeconomic recovery. The United Nations Office of Political Support (UNOPS) captures the biometric and

biographical data of federal and state police officers on its Human Recognition System as a first step toward creating a transparent, accountable system for effectively managing stipend payments.

Any reform will face resistance from powerful groups and individuals that will defend their vested interests. Police and the security sector at large, lie at the core of state power and sovereignty and will consume a large percentage of state revenue and international support. Thus, police reform is likely to face even stronger challenges than reform in other sectors of society. While technical advice is indispensable, police reform is inherently a political process, and it is essential to adopt an approach that takes the above into consideration, ensuring the support of all relevant constituencies.

In addition to that, without congruent reforms in the justice and corrections areas, police reform will at best not have the desired impact in fighting impunity and strengthening the rule of law.

Once federal member states and their administrations were established, the table was set for police reform to take place in a federal context. In Somalia, police reform appeared to be less contentious than reform in other areas, such as defense or revenue sharing, and UNSOM police proactively supported the process during a political window of opportunity in 2015 and 2016 (UNSOM, 2015).

Some of the current serving police were recruited. While Somalia is in its recovering stage from 2017 to 2019 Federal police reform has mainly done to Somali Federal Police in Mogadishu. Although, that reform looks like that has not succeeded or not implemented as planned due to political challenge and security circumstances which this research is intended to display: what, why and how the police reform has been done with necessary recommendations. There is good intention that has ambitions to implement the reform policy in federal system. But this looks like as it exists in papers. While it looks like impossible in the practical field, if all other sectors of federalism are not agreed, then, there is no way SSR will be agreed unless, in federal system, current Politician chooses to suitably implement that policy. But, if not, then nothing will move forward and we have seen practical examples over past decades.

2.5 Maritime Security and Piracy

Piracy from Somalia is on the decline. It's been a few years since a large commercial vessel was hijacked and held hostage by Somali pirates. Following the trend in 2013, the total number of incidents caused by Somali-based pirates, reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), fell from 20 in 2013, to 3 in 2014, to zero in 2015 and remain zero up to date. This represents a very significant development compared to the 237 ships targeted by Somali pirates in 2011 (Harborne, 2017). Somali Maritime Police

Unit was independently established on 2017 while aligning with the reform on 2020 its name shifted to Somali Police Department of Coast Guard.

2.6 Leadership

On May 11, 2017, at the London Somalia Conference, the London Security Pact was signed. It offers a shared prospective of Somali-led security institutions and forces that are inexpensive, credible, and accountable, while also providing the security and protection that Somalis desire. As part of a comprehensive security plan, it complies with international humanitarian and human rights norms. According to the (Article 4 NPM) Legal Framework, the Bill establishing the Police must be issued by both Houses of Parliament and must not contradict each other. The Federal Police Bill must be passed by the Federal Parliament.

Furthermore, Art 3 specifies that "the appointment of the Federal Police Commissioner shall be proposed by the Internal Security Minister and endorsed by the President. The President of the Federal Government then approves/signs the (federal) Cabinet Ministers' recommendations. The appointment will then be published in the Republic's Official Bulletin. The appointment of Federal Member State Police Commissioners shall be suggested by their respective Ministers of Security, approved by their respective Councils of Ministers, and issued by (their respective) State Presidential. (UNSOM, 2015).

However, this NPM has not been signed by the parliament which means does not have legitimacy and the Police Law no2 1972 prescribe the same chain while Somali cabinet does not have MoIS rather it was the Interior Affairs that Ministry that used to have that authority to propose the Commissioner and the deputy commissioner, the rest of the officers was the commissioner who have that power.

2.7 Pensions

The SNA and Somali police have a number of individuals who may soon be or already are above a reasonable retirement age for military personnel, which makes the reform process necessary to perform. But currently, there are officers who are above 50 years and who are still serving in Somali Police. The main challenging question is: how will the government pay their retirement funds? A huge number should be retired by paying their pensions. This amount will be huge that current Somali Police cannot afford. This is one of the main obstacles to federal police strategy that needs to be addressed (Blyth, 2019, p.8).

2.8 Justice and Rule of Law

Justice in Somalia is dispensed according to disparate sources of law. This creates inconsistent legal outcomes. The law derives from at least four sources, including: a legislative framework that follows both from the Italian (civil law) and British (common law), legal traditions, customary xeer principles, and Sharia law (within which there are divergent opinions as to whether Salafi or Shafi's interpretation should prevail). While the Provisional Constitution determines that the law must comply with Sharia's principles, no determination has been made on how this would work in practice in the intersection of legislation and Sharia's, or in the structure of the judiciary or in the qualifications or appointment of judges (Harborne, 2017).

Following the above complexity, I argue that Somali police needs deep reform, prioritizing the legal, justice and the rule of law. In short, Somali penal and procedural codes with many other laws were enacted 1963 and 1964 while Police Law was 1972 and the Police Act was 1974 and hence, they need to be reformed to reflect the signs of the time.

Prosecution, as the link between the police and the judiciary, prosecutors play a key role in reducing impunity. The Law on Judicial Organization of 1962 sets out the basic mission of the Attorney-General's Office (AGO) to direct criminal investigations, initiate and conducts criminal proceedings and to conduct civil proceedings in matters determined to be of public interest. By law, prosecutors also exercise overall supervision over prisons, although this has not been translated into practice (Harborne, 2017).

The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) has significant role in the administration of justice and is a highly specialized and technical endeavor. When the offence under investigation carries a sentence of three or more years in prison, criminal investigations are typically conducted by police assigned to police stations or by the CID. Mogadishu is the headquarters of the CID. The United States Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) are funding a project to train, equip, and mentor the investigators, as well as to support the establishment of a better forensic department. Outside of Mogadishu, the CID generally lacks the capacity to conduct professional investigations (UNSOM, 2015).

To properly prosecute cases in a timely way and avoid extended imprisonment, the police must work closely with the prosecutor's office. The MoIS and the FMS are receiving assistance in revising the

Heegan Plan so that it outlines a clear plan for enhancing formal partnership between the police and the justice sector in order to improve criminal justice system efficiency. (Harborne, 2017).

2.9 Institutional Capacity Building

According to Harborne, (2017), UNDP Somalia, “The Somali Police's quick professional development has been hampered by a serious dearth of competent personnel in the rule of law sector, particularly police officers with inadequate professional capacity. Despite the lack of broader political compromises, significant work has been made toward implementing the National Security Architecture. The federal government's decision to perform an operational readiness review and confront its conclusions is commendable. This opened the ground for a realistic and feasible proposal to overhaul the security industry. It also highlighted the federal government's huge hurdles in restoring the state” despite the fact, that SPF faces serious challenge of lack of capacity personal. On the other hand, there is tremendous professional capacity building and overwhelming support by the international community and bilateral sisterly nations mainly Turkey and Italy which indicates how SPF is in good truck of institutional capacity building.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

Albrecht Schnabel and Hans Born writes that the significance of SSR is that it illustrates that security encompasses a much broader range of institutions and actors than traditional military elements (Schnabel and Born, 2011, p.10).

SSR has gained popularity as a means of addressing at least some of the issues confronting transitional societies. Hopefully, the complex and contentious concept of security sector reform will be more familiar and comprehensible, and thus more reasonable and useful to political decision-makers as well as the stronger global political, scholarly, and social circles (Brzoska, 2000).

The normative idea of SSR assumes that society benefit from a security sector that is a source of peace, security, growth, and stability rather than a hindrance (Schnabel and Born, 2011, p.8). If taken seriously, SSR entails a wide range of activities with an equally wide range of actors. The sheer number of activities associated with comprehensive and holistic SSR can give the impression that, if followed to the letter, it is an impractical and unnecessarily complex endeavor that is disconnected from the realities of many, if not all, transitional societies. The whole SSR agenda, on the other hand, as the following pages demonstrate, makes sense in and of itself, as it outlines precise actions toward the construction of a secure security

sector (Schnabel and Born, 2011a). However, for this study, the main theory based is the Realism theory in which the researcher referenced.

2.10.1 The realism theory

Theories of state formation have affected methods to SSR and governmental; this study analyses SSR from a historical-philosophical standpoint via the lens of state and state creation theories. It cautions against having high expectations about the SSR's potential to establish viable, democratic, and accountable nations. Instead, we must carefully decide what level of performance is feasible for each project based on the local circumstances (Wulf, 2010).

Strategies to SSR and state-building have been inspired by theories of state formation. It cautions against having high expectations about the SSR's potential to build stable, transparent, and accountable nations. Rather, we must carefully assess what level of performance is feasible for any individual initiative, depends on local circumstances (Fischer and Wils, 2004). Somali is federal government that has been suffering long term of civil conflict and terrorism. However, now it's in recovering state. Still, Somali is under structural and institutional challenges, stability, development, and harmony.

State depends on its ability to enforce the rule of law so that human/state is protected. However, to achieve steady level of law enforcement requires building of competent police and judicial institutions. The process of security sector reform particularly Somali Police Reform is going very late as measure of strengthening the institutional capacity of the police as enforcement arm of the government. This requires time, resources and political will for it to be achieved.

2.10.2 The Constructive theory

The foundation of stability lies more on leadership which should be rooted on the art of the constitutionalism. Such a vision is underpinned by a common or shared understanding of the constitutional prerogatives that guide and control the individual and sometimes diverging aspirations of the various players within the security sector (Schnabel and Born, 2011, p.18).

For the case of Somalia, the authority of the government emanates from the populations who have a role to play in how institutions are run, including the Somali Police force. This is illustrated using the constructive theory, which holds that it contributes to consider what needs done to help enhance Africa's

security sector Although part of the argument is that theorizing obscures what needs to be done, such a study would be entirely inadequate if it only consisted of criticism

As a result, it restricts the fundamental importance to two main types of skeptical observation. The first is that, in a field as complicated as relations between the military, civil power, parliament, and ordinary people, and particularly in a continent as diverse as Africa, a rational approach is bound to be superior to a purely theoretical one. While it is possible to isolate certain pragmatic objectives in the SSR program that are required for democracy to function properly (for example, a civilian defense minister), these are basically objectives derived from the accepted characteristics of democracy, in this case that an elected politician should be accountable to parliament for all aspects of government policy. (*Bajpai 2000*).

The process of security sector and especially police reform is geared towards professionalism, Human rights, Peace building, accountability, Transparent and service delivery. Police reforms in Somalia have received and confirm to have received different forms of aid, technical, financial, equipment to achieve efficiency. The placement and the use of these resources should be guided by the government. The needs of population should be central in determining areas of reform.

2.11 Somali Police challenges in Reform

The London Security Pact Article 6 states that “the pact sets out an agreed vision of Somali led security institutions and forces that are affordable, acceptable, and accountable and have the ability to provide the security and protection that the people of Somalia deserve and need, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards as part of a Comprehensive Approach to Security.” (M. Uluso, 2018). However, nothing implemented what has been agreed so far since 2019 political crises had escalated.

From Planning for UN Peace - keeping to Planning for Somali Ownership. In January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to deploy a peace operation “aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation that will support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia”. In the absence of other security options and under pressure from the AU, the UN Security Council authorized the mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Resolution 1744 (2007) (Blyth, 2019).

It was mandated to assist with the restoration of the transitional federal institutions, provide security for humanitarian assistance, and coordinate with other international partners to build the Somali security forces. The Security Council agreed with the AU PSC that the mission should initially be mandated for six months and requested “the Secretary-General to send a Technical Assessment Mission to the African Union headquarters and Somalia as soon as possible to report on the political and security situation and the possibility of a UN Peacekeeping Operation following the AU’s deployment” (Blyth, 2019). However, on 22020 AMISOM mission shifted to ATMIS with the full authority that Somali Security Forces taking the lead.

2.12 New Policing Model (NPM) In Somalia

The NPM clearly sets the framework on how policing will be controlled and managed in Somalia, with separation of powers and responsibilities based on jurisdiction between the federal and states police. However, this needs political forum in national level. In July 2015, Somali national and regional stakeholders at the technical level commenced a consultation process on a new policing structure in a federated Somalia, Federated policing models of Belgium, Germany, India and Nigeria were introduced, offering the Somali officials a reference for different options. After four days of negotiations the officials reached an agreement, and the draft New Policing Model (NPM) was endorsed 24th June 2016 at Baidoa - Somalia.(UNSOM, 2015).

The cultural that has been practiced in SPF since establishment was unitary system with autocratic leadership style in which most of the strategic officers feel offended based on decentralization rather than centralized. Regarding the legal and juridical framework, a new Policing model is intended to enact in order to replace the police law no 2 of 1972, clarifying the roles, responsibilities and relationships of the Federal Police and the State Police. The Federal and State police will have standardized uniform but different badges and insignias to mark their identities. in June 2016, the NLF approved a version that includes more details, especially on the duties of relevant police entities/units. In addition, new units were introduced, such as the State-level Birmadka and the Customs Police Unit (UNSOM, 2015). In regard to NPM, the Darwish mobile force seems to have ignored in NPM and assumed as future consultations.

The NPM was once again affirmed at the highest political level, when the National Security Council endorsed an agreement on the main principles of national security architecture (NSA) on 8 May 2017. This agreement specifies the combined number of the future federal and state level police services (including Darwish and Coast Guard) at 32,000, compared to 18,000 troops for the Somali National

Army. This can be understood as a clear decision by Somalia's leaders that the primary responsibility for internal security shall rest with the police. The NSA however did not determine how to distribute this figure between the regular police and Darwish, or between the federal and state levels, on 11 May 2017, during the London Conference on Somalia, a Security Pact was adopted by Somali. In the pact, the NPM and the NSA were recognized and endorsed by all parties without amendment (UNSOM, 2015). Regarding 2017 elections new government had come to power with totally different strategy on security forces that seems more unitary than federated ones and exclusion for consensus agreements among the FGS and FMS, but FGS ownership than international partners.

2.13 The Police Professional Development Board (PPDP)

The Police Professional Development Board (PPDB) become created on sixteen December 2015 at a unique symposium held in Mogadishu prepared via way of means of UNSOM Police. It become attended via way of means of the Somali Police Force leadership, police representatives from the FMS and Banadir and worldwide partners. A main accomplishment of the PPDB up to now has been the improvement and endorsement of a Basic Police Recruit Curriculum, the primary standardized police schooling curricula permitted via way of means of the SPF and the FMS.

2.14 Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR)

The MoIS is the focal point for providing the support to the disengaged combatants with the involvement of other government ministries and agencies. International partners manage transitional facilities located in Mogadishu, Beletweyne, Kismayo and Baidoa. Some twenty reinsertion projects have been externally financed to provide short term jobs for about 1,000 former AS combatants and members of the respective local community in four regions (Harborne, 2017, p.43).

2.15 AMISOM/ATMIS

Since the evacuation of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II in 1995, AMISOM was sent to Somalia in 2007. Some international actors arrived in Mogadishu at the outset of the mission. Only a tiny number of UN and humanitarian relief groups remained in the nation to address some of the country's most serious humanitarian issues, and they largely functioned through proxies in Somalia .(Council and States, 2000). Initially authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 19 January 2007, AMISOM was subsequently also authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1744 on 20 February 2007 (AfDB, 2017, p.1).

Endorses the African Union Peace and Security Council's decision to rename AMISOM ATMIS and authorizes the African Union Member States to take all necessary measures, for a period of 12 months, in full compliance with participating States' international obligations, including humanitarian action human rights law and international law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and territorial integrity of Somalia. (UNSC, 2022).

2.16 The Somali Transition Plan

The FGS formed a drafting group in the first three months of 2018 that included members from federal security ministries, security personnel, AMISOM troop and police providing countries, the United Nations, and international partners. The FGS prepared a plan for Somalia's transitioning to security ownership based on the framework text. Each of the five federal member states was inspected on the ground in order to gain a better understanding of their current security capabilities and goals, as well as to guarantee that local circumstances were considered. As the Transition Plan is being planned and implemented, the Security Council has defined requirements for the withdrawal of AMISOM personnel. The "gradual and systematic decline and rearrangement of AMISOM's uniformed personnel in accordance with the transition strategy" was laude Resolution No. 2431 (2018).

CHAPTER THREE:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

A planned activity designed to establish new data and details about a specific phenomenon is known as research. Again the same author explain research is "something that people do in attempt to discover out new things in a logical manner, thus increasing their knowledge (Oshagbemi, 2017, p.67).

Methodology, is a combination of collecting research plans and methods centered on theoretical assumptions to customize a certain approach of statistics and type of analysis (Bright, 2019, p.29). To conduct research there should have to be a method way that allows the researcher to find data methodologically. Unless other wase, no research would have been fruitful without methodology.

Research Methodology is genuinely worried with how research is carried out. This is known as the study design, and it typically entails research using questionnaires, interviews, observation, and/or experiments (Gounder, 2012, p.13).

This chapter is intended to demonstrate how data was collected by displaying how it was discovered using a questioner and interview guide method. Some of the procedures described in this Chapter as methods that were used during the data collection the study include the research design, Unit analyses, data collection methods, data analysis methods, sampling procedures, and ethical considerations.


3.2 Research Design

According to Leedy (1997:195), Research design is a plan for a study, providing the overall framework for collecting data (Oshagbemi, 2017, p.68). Others define it as a plan for selecting subjects, research sites, and data collection procedures to answer the research question. Research design can be understood as the a collection of methods and procedures for collecting and analyzing data for the analysis design of a study defines (Goodson *et al.*, 2016). To have effective research, the researcher needs to use methodology and the methodology literally needs procedure or framework. Therefore, footprint is called the research design that is necessary for every research.

3.3 Study Area

This study is conducted in Hamar-Jajab district in Mogadishu at Banadir region in Somalia. This district is consisting of 4 wards (1st May Ward, General Da'ud Ward, Gaheyr Ward & Horsed Ward). Caniglia as quoted by Chittick in 1917, the existence of one of Mogadishu's old quarters was recognized as Hamar Jajab ('smashed up' Hamar) and 'El Alauane.' According to Caniglia, Hamar Jajab enlarged about 4 km west of Hamar wein, and the remnants are reported to have been destroyed (Jama, 1996, p.71).

Figure 1.1 Somalia Reference Map - Hamar Jab-Jab District



Source (UNOCHA Somalia, 2012).

The district is one of the most popular districts in the Banadir region. Historically, it was found in the 16th century and presents all Somali people without differentiation as one of the districts of opportunity for all. It enjoys Mogadishu's seaport. For the justification of why the researcher selected this district, it is the central hub of Mogadishu's 17 districts where the National Police Academy (Gen Kahie Police Academy), Central HQ of Police Revenue Protection and Federal Mobile Robust Police (Darwish HQ) are located. All these police infrastructures are important to police reform as they are different commands of different SPF sections and each contributed to the process of its under command officer.

Thus, this study area has importance to the SPF reform as being the central hub of collecting and unifying fellow officers under their section. The research believes this district is the most important district for SPF reform and has been there for so long as the Police Academy is located, and SPF is concerned.

3.4 Study of the Population

The layout of the population on a specific area in accordance with societal conditions and requirements is known as population distribution (Kumar, 2015, p.24).

This population that the researcher met consists of all categories of society (men, women, youth of both sexes, employed, unemployed, educated, uneducated, police, civilians, and reform team consist of SPF and MoIS personnel in Hamar-Jajab District. but mainly police officers (15). because of the nature of this research. For someone to participate in such research on police reform one needs to be already in the circle of the police or do police reform work. Although the police are not isolated, they work in the public and the researcher allowed the participation of both police and civilians who had participated in the reform process and those who had not.

3.5 Sampling Size

Any evidence-based study with the goal of drawing inferences about a population from a subset must take sample size into account (Taherdoost, 2017, p.22). Sampling is a way of a small group of people consisting of all categories representing the entire large group to avoid bias and to save time and resources. In this regard, the Benadir region consists of the city of Mogadishu, which comprises seventeen districts. Mogadishu, as the capital of the Federal State of Somalia, hosts the Federal Government of Somalia. (ReDSS, 2017). The Mogadishu area is estimated. According to a World Bank population census estimated at about 2.9 million inhabitants, Mogadishu's boundaries (like those of other cities in the country) are undefined, and estimates of its size range from 80.4 km² to 148.9 km², with a population of 2.9 million people (Earle, 202. p,3).

The population of the Benadir region was estimated to be 1,650,227 people in 2014, including 369,288 IDPs, according to the Population Estimate Survey (PESS). Males constituted 49.3% of the non-IDP population, while females constituted 50.7 percent.²² Mogadishu had a population of "between 1.7 million and 2.6 million people, depending on estimates," according to the World Bank report from 2021. ²³ Mogadishu's population was 2 179 900 people as of 2019²⁴, according to UN figures referring to "the

urban agglomeration" of the capital city, whereas the CIA World Factbook cites 2 388 000 people as Mogadishu's inhabitants as of 2021 (Report, 2021,p.12).

This study research only concerns the study area, which is the Hamar-Jajab District, with no official estimate having been mentioned yet. However, this research's general population is 2500 habitants, in which the target population is taken as simply as 80 respondents. Therefore, the sample shall be drowned from here.

Using a combination of ways In a single study or a set of studies that have investigated the same underlying phenomenon, researchers gather, analyze, and interpret quantitative and qualitative data. (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2015). For several of the most prevalent qualitative research designs and procedures, methodologists have published sample size guidelines. According to Sandelowski (1995), cited by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005), sample size in qualitative research should not be too small that it is difficult to achieve data saturation, theoretical saturation, or informational redundancy. At the same time, the sample should not be too large that it is difficult to undertake a deep case-oriented analysis.

Creswell (1998) has recommended that 20 to 30 participants can be used for study research. Gay et al (2006) argued that qualitative studies can be carried out with a single participant or with as many as 60 participants while Morse (1994), suggested 30 to 50 interviewees. Therefore, due to the time constraints and the resources at the disposal, it has not been possible to conduct a research on the whole population of 80 participants and other in habitants of General Da'ud ward of Hamar Jajab district specially civilians are not familiar with the SPF and how it works. However, the researchers target population is 34 in which the sample size shall be drown from. That is the reason why the researcher determined a sample size which was relatively in the acceptable level of range between 20 and 30 participants as it was recommended by creswell (1998).

3.6 Determination of sample size

In determining the sample size of research participants from 80 members of both police and civilians who are able to do a work, researcher used the formula of Alain Bouchard (1975). This formula stipulates that when the universe of the population is lower than 1.000.000 individuals, it matches a sample of 96 individuals to a given error margin of 10%.

The following formula is applied:

$$n = \frac{N_o}{1 + \frac{N_o}{N}}$$

n= desired sample size

N^o= size of statistical universe which corresponds to 96 individuals

N= size of the targeted population group which is 108 people from poor families who got FS to do their own low income generating activities.

$$n = \frac{96}{1 + \frac{96}{34}} = \frac{96}{\frac{43 + 96}{34}} = \frac{96}{\frac{130}{34}} = 96 * \frac{34}{130} = \frac{3264}{130} = 25.1076923077$$

Consequently, a sample of 25 respondents has been taken. The selection of the respondents was also done using simple random sampling technique of probability sampling methods. According to Janesick (1994), a simple random sample is selected so that all samples of the same size have an equal chance of being selected from the population.

3.7 Data Collection Methods

The researchers of this study mixed both primary and secondary data. The researcher applied secondary data from other researchers and primary data that he collected from the field as he met with SPF and MoIS reform staff, police, and other civilian respondents. The methods and instruments used in this study as techniques to collect data and appropriate information are as follows:

3.8 Questionnaires

A questionnaire is a form containing a set of questions, especially addressed to a statistically significant number of subjects, and is a way of gathering information for a survey (Oshagbemi, 2017, p.82). For this study, interviewer is a process of collecting data in the form of a list of questions in written form and answers obtained from the participant. To justify why the researcher chose the questioner, the researcher used a qualitative form of questioner that allows data to be collected from primary sources such as those who are directly involved in the SPF reform process and those who are not, primarily other officers and civilians who SPF performs service delivery.

3.9 Interview

For qualitative researchers, one of the data collection procedures is the interview (Adhabi and Anozie, 2017,p.86). The interview, on the other hand, is a method of data collection. "As a key source of data, the researcher conducted interviews, and participants employed oral form". "Interviews provide the

foundation of primary source material in qualitative research approaches," the same authors say again (Adhabi and Anozie, 2017,p.86). This clarifies that the interview is import for the primary source data collection.

However, in this study, an interview was conducted to supplement the questioner and collect primary data from the relative resources for the field of this study, which is mostly individuals who have directly or indirectly participated in SPF reform at related SPF infrastructures and the MoIS workstation. Interviews were conducted using a structured questionnaire and interview guide, to collect data using the English language, some respondents responded using the Somali language by their consent and later translated into English for data analysis. However, all the interviewees were Somali nationals. Unfortunately, the researcher has tried to reach AMISOM, currently serving under ATMIS and the UNSOM Police. However, the researcher failed to find them due to their unwillingness to participate.

3.10 Documents Review

Documents are one of the data collections tools or methods. It involve the available relevant literature data to the research topic, that has been collected and analyzed by someone else and relate to this study field (Transformation, 2019, p.13). This type of data collection allows the researcher to consult with previous studies to have a better understanding of the study in secondary form. For this thesis, the researcher consulted several different data sets that have been collected in secondary to SSR in Somalia, mostly in generic form, data form, security sector reform in Somalia, and reform guidelines and procedures of SPF reform.

3.11 Data Analysis

Data analysis is a process a series of connected activities designed to obtain meaningful information from data that have been collected (Richmond, 2006, p.21). It can cover a wide range of procedures and methods. However, before programs can use these procedures and methods effectively, we believe it is critical to view analysis of data as part of a process (Richmond, 2006, p.33). Data analysis is the method of creating a suitable format for recreating data in order to provide a fair assessment of what was examined and to easily analyze in needed to respond the researcher's questions. For this study, data was collected and analyzed in order to interpret and discover meanings related to the field of study. It was created by this researcher to provide meaning to the study's beneficiaries or readers, who may one day become another researcher.

3.12 Ethical Consideration

Clough and Nutbrown (2002:84) make the following observation about research ethics: ".....in order to better understand, research teams must be more than highly proficient." They must enter into chattered intimacies and expose themselves to their subjects' emotional worlds, whether these worlds are pleasant or repulsive to them. They must contend with the duality of recognized and experienced selves, both conflicted and both real” (Oshagbemi, 2017,p.89).

Although communities have legal standards and norms that govern their behaviors, ethical norms are generally wider and less formal or customary than laws. Moreover, in the academic field, it is most protected, has to be considered and is extremely sensitive. During its execution, the study adhered to the highest ethical standards. Institutional clearance and assistance approval were obtained through the use of an authority letter from the National Police College (NPC) in Musanze, Rwanda. Explanations, information, and the relevance of the study were made available to the people, and the respondents were engaged to inform them and understand exactly what was going on and what was required of them during this study to connect the respondents with the necessary information needed, and this was accompanied by holding the respondents' dignity and worth.

Nevertheless, in this study the confidentiality and privacy of information, responses and other additional data obtained from the respondents are carefully maintained, where as a researcher did not include any names of respondents in the documentation and also personal information and strictly kept between the researcher and the respondents considering the study area personnel security issues as the respondents suggested.

However, no one was harmed while doing this study, and it is strongly recommended that any plagiarism belonging to other persons as intellectual property or any other institutions and universities be double-checked. Furthermore, because of the nature of this study and the country's setting, all personal information and interactions are strictly kept avoiding terrorist infiltrations.

CHAPTER FOUR:

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents, analyses, discusses and interprets the results and the findings from the data analysis procedure using qualitative analysis. This part also presents the various points of view expressed by the respondents.

The study combines together participants' perspectives on Security Sector Reform in Somalia. Therefore, this chapter is organized as follows: In sub-section 4.1 the background information of the respondents. This is divided into tables. The first table shows the categories of respondents while in sub-section 4.1.1 Table (1) categories of respondents, Table (2) 4.1.2 shows the gender of the respondents and Subsection table (3) 4.1.3, age of the respondents, and then sub-section table (4) 4.1.4 shows the marital status of the respondents and the sub-section table (5) 4.1.5 has the level of education, as sub-section table (6) 4.1.6 indicates the level of an employment 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 contains the results of the study, Analysis of data and findings summary The grounded theory was used to analyze the data for the study.

4.1 Background Information Respondents

Participants may have different ideas and perceptions that have significant meaning for this research study, so background information of the respondents with the categories combined is necessary and precondition to mention in the research projects, and especially this one is significant due to the nature of this research.

Categories of the respondents

Table (1) General categories of respondents Table 4.1.1

| <u>Respondent's</u> | <u>Target Sample</u> | <u>Interviewed</u> | <u>Achieved</u> | <u>Overall rate</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Police Officers | 15 | 15 | 30 | 100% |
| Secondary level | 4 | 4 | 8 | |
| University level | 16 | 16 | 32 | |
| Unemployed youth. | 6 | 6 | 12 | |
| Total | 41 | 41 | 82 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

This indicates that respondents of this research are composed of 25 respondents which consists of 15 Police Officers and 10 Civilians. Among them, 4 attended Secondary School, 16 are University level and 6 of them are unemployed. The questionnaires were distributed all of them in Hamar-jajab district and interviewed a sample of 15 Police Officers at Hamar-jajab districts. All the primary data collected on the field will only be used in this thesis. In percentage 60% are police while 40% are civilians. The number of questionnaires that were filled and return represented 100% of the responses rate. The background characteristics explored included all categories of the respondents. These indicators were used as possible predictors of the study of Somali Police Reform.

All the respondents were willing to attend based on their consent; none of them was forced or deceived to participate. However, this means due to the nature of this research project majority are police officers based the information they may have and the study area where the research was distributed.

Gender of the Respondents

The gender of respondents is important because it indicates the categories of the participants in this research project, which is paramount to the significance of avoiding one category of the community that distorts the legitimacy and reliability of the research project. However, the below table indicates the gender categories of the respondents that have participated in this research project.

Table 4.1.2 Gender

| Gender | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Male | 13 | 52.0 | 52% | 52.0 |
| Female | 12 | 48.0 | 48% | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100.0 | 100% | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As stated by the results in Table 2, the gender of respondents was 52% males and 48% females. This shows that the study had a few more males than females, and this implies that police work is more visible with males than females. Although this is not much of a difference, men are always more than women in

the fields of work. According to the researcher’s experience, Somalian society is more patriarchal. So, in normal situations, females have fewer interactions with males in public. Unless otherwise, the researcher purposively selected females to ensure their participation.

Age of the Respondents

The age of the respondents is also important and sufficient to understand how mature the respondents were based on age categories and different perceptions. The age levels of the respondents who participated in this research project have contributed to gaining reliable responses because different age levels have different perceptions and assessing with different results. That is what added value to this research project.

Table 4.1.3 Age

| Age | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| 20-30 | 7 | 28.0 | 28% | 28.0 |
| 31-40 | 9 | 36.0 | 36% | 64.0 |
| 41- Above | 9 | 36.0 | 36% | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100.0 | 100% | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

For the age, majority of the respondents 9 out of 25 are above 41 years old and another 9 are in between 31 up to 40 years old while the remaining 7 respondents are aged between 20 to 30. In percentage, those aged above 41 years are (36%) and those aged 31-40 years are (36%) and those ones aged 20-30 are (28%). Although, there is not many differences, this is an indication that youth were not mostly familiar with this research project. Rather they may prefer recreational field on sports and dating or chatting rather than participating research project. This is analyzed using the SPSS statistics method after collected from the field, coded and divided odd and even numbers. This was the result found from the SPSS statistics, to avoid any mistakes on calculations by using naked eyes. This section of the age of the respondents

indicates that the respondents are in different categories of age, this displays how mature are the respondents who can take decision to participate and contribute.

Marital Status

this section of marital status the researcher intended to show how far that the participants are clearly responsible, in which the widows are spouses and husbands of the veteran police officers who sacrificed their lives for the sake of the nation and those who have severe damages for serving the nation.

Table 4.1.4 Marital Status

| Marital status | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Single | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Married | 12 | 48% | 48.0 | 68.0 |
| Divorced | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 88.0 |
| Widowed | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Considering the marital status, the majority of the respondents, 12 out of the 25 respondents, are married, which is 48%, followed by 5 who are single, which is 20%, and 5 respondents are divorced, which is 20%, and the widowed, which is 12% of all respondents. However, these participants responded with their full consent and attraction. In addition to that, due to the different categories of respondents' marital status, some of them have some tangible experience with the police in terms of professionalism, skills, strategy, and the method of payment.

Level of Education

In this section, the researcher intended to indicate the level of education of the respondents, which is also significant. It shows the readers how far the respondents understand the questions asked in the form of questions and interviews, which give this research, project an added value.

Table 4.1.5 What is your highest level of education

| Level of education | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Non | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 12.0 |
| Primary | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 20.0 |
| Secondary | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 36.0 |
| Diploma | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 44.0 |
| Bachelor | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 68.0 |
| Masters | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

For the level of education, most of the 8 respondents had attained a master's degree, which is 32% as the highest level of education followed by 6 respondents who had attained a bachelor's degree, who are 24%, then 4 respondents who attended Secondary School Education, who are 16%, then 3 respondents who did not attend any education, who are 12%, and 2 respondents who attended a diploma, who are 8%, with another 2 respondents who attended Primary School Education, who are also 8%. This indicates that the answers given in the interview session can be easily understood based on the respondent's education level versus the answers gained from them.

When the research distributes the questioners with group of people crowded certain area to participate by responding, who picked and responded were mostly the educated ones who are capable to understand the questioner and answer them. Ask the reader can see the above table those responded majority of them were the master's level.

Level of employment

This section, like all the other above sections, is the last section of the categories of the respondents. It is also intended to indicate the level of employment of the respondents, which is also another direction of

the respondents' categories. This can be understood based on how stable the respondent was during his or her participation in this research project.

Table 4.1.6 Employment

| Employment status | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Employed | 19 | 76% | 76.0 | 76.0 |
| Unemployed | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The means of earning a living was also considered to associate the links between food, house, marriage, and money as basic values that can influence the normal life of humans, particularly the respondents. However, the majority of respondents are employed (76%), and 24% are unemployed. Among those are the police officers and mostly civilians from MoIS, some of whom are working hand in hand with the Human Resource Directorate to particularly perform the reform.

4.2 Findings from the Respondents

The Broader Understanding of SSR in Somalia achievements, Challenges and Opportunities

This section service as an open minded to both the respondents and the readers of this research project, it depicts general view of the SSR conducted in Somalia in general the achievements challenges and opportunities.

4.2.1 Has there ever been conducted SSR in Somalia?

Most of the respondents answered yes. However, one of the respondents said ‘‘might the approach used, and the methodology accommodated was not perfect and that is why the SSR conducted in Somalia does not reach any tangible results to even Police reform, example if today ask the public or even parts of the government, does the police is reformed, mostly they cannot tell you how’’

Original Somali language

“ laga yaabee in habka la’siticmaalay iyo nidaamka loo maray uusan aheyn mid quman, taasina waa sababta dib u habeynta Ciidamada eel aga sameeyay Soomaaliya aan laga gaarin natiijo la taaban karo, xitaa dib u habeynta laga sameeyay Boliiska, tusaale ahaan hadii manta aad dadwenaha ama qeybo dowlada ka mid ah aad weydiisid Boliiska ma dibu habeyn baa lagu sameeyay, intooda badan kuuma sheegi kareen”

Table (1)

Table 4.2.1 representing has there ever been conducted SSR in Somalia?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Yes | 21 | 84% | 84.0 | 84.0 |
| No | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

This is the first question that has been asked every respondent, as has been indicated in the table 21 respondents out of 25 responded YES. Whereas only 4 respondents out of 25 responded said NO. this means in percentage 84% answered that there has been conducted SSR in Somalia. While the remaining 16% reject that SSR conducted in Somalia.

This means that having an overview of the SSR status in Somalia is an important point for the research project and even for the respondents. As the researcher stated in the research delimitation, SSR in Somalia will be discussed several times as an overview or as an example at some points. However, the majority of the research focuses on police reform. As the above table indicates, they represent the respondents, which tell us SSR has been conducted in Somalia, where police reform is substance under it. As for research, it is clear that SSR is conducted. However, there is no clear process and result which shows us how far it has succeeded.

4.2.2 Has all the Security institutions subject to SSR in Somalia?

As the participants responded the SSR done in Somalia in which police reform was mong, not all security institution is subjected to SSR, which means some institution was not conducted any reform, for example the custodial Corps or the correction was not part of the reform and was planned after Police and Military reform.

Table 4.3.2 representing if all the Security institutions subject to SSR in Somalia?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Yes | 11 | 44% | 44.0 | 44.0 |
| No | 14 | 56% | 56.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

the researcher intended to have an overview idea about SSR in Somalia and this question services to clarify if does all Somali security institutions subjected to SSR as same question to all the respondents. However, as indicated the below table from the respondents 11 respondents out of 25 had responded YES. Whereas 14 respondents out of 25 responded NO, in percentage 44% of the participants responded YES while 56% percent responded NO. This shows that there is a clear confusion about if all security institutions subjected to SSR, this means the process used was not clear.

It also means that the SSR was not implemented as a standard. although there is no one size fits all. But it is not clear how the police institution is reformed, and the corrections are left behind. Yet the corrections work hand in hand with the police because the police are the means, and the corrections are the ends that justify the rule of law. In short, when police apprehend criminals, is it correction or rehabilitation after a court of law and then send them back to the community? So, there is no way that only the police can be reformed in the national SSR process.

4.2.3 Has the SSR impacted the capacity of Security institutions in Somalia?

The participant's responses are not falling apart; they do not have many big differences as a result. The majority of the respondents responded "no," while a large number of respondents responded "yes." But what gives a meaning to the respondents who responded yes is that they said "we would have seen how they habit"

Table 4.2.3 Has the SSR impacted the capacity of Security institutions in Somalia?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 11 | 44% | 44.0 | 44.0 |
| No | 14 | 56% | 56.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

This question serves to clarify the result of SSR in Somalia if it has impacted the capacity of security institutions in Somalia. However, 11 respondents out of 25 responded "yes." Whereas 14 respondents out of 25 responded "NO." In percentage, 44% of the participants responded "yes." While 56% responded "NO."

This means there is no clear line between if the SSR impacted the capacity of security institutions or not, it cannot be easily differentiated and even actually it is not easy that every person can differentiate rather than someone who is experienced.

4.2.4 Are Somali security institutions the sole security provider of the country?

Participants respond that Somali security institutions are not sole security provider of the country because there are private security companies, private security personnel guards, local militias and even terrorist groups provide security to residents under where they control or operate.

Table 4.2.4 Are Somali security institutions the sole security provider of the country?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Yes | 12 | 48% | 48.0 | 48.0 |
| No | 13 | 52% | 52.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The above table indicates that 12 participants out of 25 responded Yes, in percentage it is 48%, while 13 participants out of 25 responded "No," in which percentage it is 52%. This means that even though the numbers do not have much difference, the majority of the respondents argue that there is no other security provider than the security institution. However, there are others who are unofficial security providers that cannot be underestimated.

4.2.5 Is current legal and constitutional framework for the security system adequate in Somalia?

This section the researcher intended to indicate if the current legal and constitutional framework for the security system is adequate. However, the majority of the participants responded it is adequate while the other part responded it is not adequate.

Table 4.2.5 Is the current legal and constitutional framework for the security system adequate in Somalia?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Yes | 11 | 44% | 44.0 | 44.0 |
| No | 14 | 56% | 56.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As the above table indicate, 11 participants responded "yes," which is 44%, while 14 participants responded "no," which is also 56%. This is based on what they see. This means, based on our understanding, the majority of the respondents believe yes. However, to provide an exact answer, it needs someone who has sufficient information or is familiar with the legal and constitutional framework because the Federal provisional constitution clearly prescribes in Art 127 that laws and regulations for the levels of Somali police force will be issued by the Federal Parliament, which by now there is no lawful act and regulations for Somali police force and they are not adequate.

4.2.6 Are security and justice actors involved in politics?

as the participants responded and clearly mentioned that there is huge involvement of security and justice actors into the politics, and they argue that “Security and justice actors should have to be separated from politics” which is a phenomenon that takes us another direction.

Table 4.2.6 Are security and justice actors involved in politics?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Yes | 21 | 84% | 84.0 | 84.0 |
| No | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As shown in the above table, 21 of the 25 participants answered yes, representing 84%, while only 4 of the 25 participants answered no, representing 16%. This means the majority of the participants responded that security and justice personnel are involved in politics and there are huge differences among them. This is a clear answer to the question, and it shows that reform is really badly needed to build professionalism and separation of governmental powers. Unless otherwise, this damages the image of SPF.

4.2.7 Are there adequate internal and external oversight mechanisms for security services?

Participants responded that there is no adequate internal and external oversight mechanism to the security services. However, one interviewee responded “if there would have been an oversight mechanism, the mistakes would have been corrected, there should have to be an oversight as stated by the Art 126 (6) of the Federal Provisional Constitution, parliament supervises the police reform we never seen”

Original Somali language

“Hadii uu jiri ay nidaam korjoogteyn jiri lahayd, qaladaadka ku dhaca shaqada dhexdeeda waa la sixi lahaa, waan in ay jirtaa kor joogteyn sida uu qabo Qod 126-aad, faqradiisa 6-aad ee Dastuurka KMG ah. Hadaba, weli ma aynaan arag Baarlamaanka oo kor joogteynaya dib u habeyn Boliiska”

Table 4.2.7 Are there adequate internal and external oversight mechanisms security services?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 10 | 40% | 40.0 | 40.0 |
| No | 15 | 60% | 60.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As indicated in the above table, 10 out of 25 participants responded yes, which is 40%, while 15 out of 25 participants responded no, which is 60%. This means the difference is 20%, which denotes how far the majority of the participants argue that there is no internal and external oversight mechanism for the security services, which excludes the ownership and the applicability of national policies of the security services.

4.2.8 Does the elected executive have some role in setting basic security and justice policies, priorities and procedures?

Participants responded yes they have big role on setting basic security and justice policies and they are those who had an authority to verify and set security and justice policies, priorities and procedure

Table 4.2.8 Does the elected executive have some role in setting basic security and justice policies, priorities and procedures?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 17 | 68% | 68.0 | 68.0 |
| No | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As the above-mentioned table indicates, 17 participants out of 25 respondents answered yes which is 68% and the rest 8 participants out of 25, which is 32%. This means that the elected executive have a role in putting basic security and justice strategies priorities and procedure.

4.2.9 Is there a political will for SSR in Somalia?

Most of the participants responded with yes that there is political will for the SSR in Somalia because it would have not been done even at SSR if there was no political will. However, other claimed that it was only based on emotions and unrealistic political campaign promises that does not have policies and strategies to implement. It was based more on a personal will rather than political will.

Table 4.2.9 Is there a political will for SSR in Somalia?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 16 | 64% | 64.0 | 64.0 |
| No | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As both the table, 16 participants out of 25 responded "yes," which is 64%, while the remaining 9 participants responded "no," which is 36%. This means the majority of the respondents answered yes, even though they were not sure of the extent of the political will. Nevertheless, others who scored no argued that it was only personal will but never political will. As a researcher, there was no political will that could cover the significance of the reform. The reform process won't move forward if the government office that leads the reform faces a political crisis.

4.2.10 Is there evidence of a coherent and coordinated approach by donors?

Majority of participants responded that there is no coherent and coordinated approach by the donors. It looks as if the Federal Government of Somalia advocates for total ownership because no coherent and coordinated approach of the donors have ever been seen in the reforming process.

Table 4.2.10 Is there evidence of a coherent and coordinated approach by donors?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 32.0 |
| No | 17 | 68% | 68.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As it can be seen in the above table, most of the participants responded with no, which is 68%, while the remaining eight participants out of 25 responded with yes, which is also 32%. This means the majority said no, there is no coherent and coordinated approach of the donors because there was no systematic review from the donors, any kind of monitoring during the reform process, or even evaluation after phase one was completed. However, those who responded "yes" might be right because, in some respects, there was some supervision from the World Bank.

4.3 Understanding the Contribution of SPF SSR in Mogadishu for Somali’s Peace Building Process

4.3.1 Following the SPF SSR, the working relation between SPF and local communities increased?

The participants strongly disagreed that there is a working relation between SPF and local community that increased after SPF SSR. Most participants who answered claimed that “there is no relations between police and the community that have increased”

Table 4.3.1 Following the SPF SSR, the working relation between SPF and local communities increased

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 36.0 |
| Disagree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 48.0 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 52.0 |
| Agree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 80.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As it can be seen in the above table, participants who responded with strongly disagreed are 9, which is 36%, agreed are 7, which is 28%, strongly agree is 5, which is 20%, disagreed is 3, which is 12%, and not sure, 1 which is 4%. This teaches us that reform has not been succeeded if after the reform, relations between the police and the community do not increase. It indicates that the objective of the reform has not been achieved.

4.3.2 Post SPF SSR the crime statistics has decreased substantially

Participants who are already familiar or experienced have answered this question with strongly disagree and disagree which they claim no crime statistics have decreased substantially but rather vice versa which they mean increased.

Table 4.3.2 Post SPF SSR the crime statistics has decreased substantially

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 16.0 |
| Disagree | 13 | 52% | 52.0 | 68.0 |
| Not Sure | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 84.0 |
| Agree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 96.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 1 | 4.0% | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As the above table indicates majority of the participants responded disagreeing if post SSR crime statistics has decreased having 13 participants disagree which is 52%, 4 participants strongly disagree which 16%, 4 participants not sure which 16%, having 3 participants agree which is 12% and 1 participants strongly disagree which is 4%.

This means already participants are officers in the field and familiar with the statistics increased or decreased. So, as researcher if post SSR crime statistics has not decreased substantially it means it has not been implemented fully or there is bad performance of the officers in the field. However, it could be without professional training on how to handle and manage incidents. In addition to that, if there is good collaboration with the community mostly it does not contribute much on in the field of work this can be the reason why crime statistics has not decreased substantially.

4.3.3 After SPF SSR the finance of the SPF is better managed

Most of the participants said after the SSR the finance is better managed and even the payment of the security forces is also increased substantially. However, even before the SSR police mechanisms of payment was better managed with payment done through personnel accounts and the institutions that process their payment are better managed.

Table 4.3.3 After SPF SSR the finance of the SPF is better managed

| Level of Agreement | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 12.0 |
| Not Sure | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 44.0 |
| Agree | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 76.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Most participants agreed, which is 32%, and the same number were not sure, while only 1 participant disagreed, which is 4%. This means that to answer this question, no more participants can respond rather than police officers or relatives that are familiar with the finance and payment mechanisms. The majority agreed, indicating that after SSR, finances are better managed and even increased. Furthermore, this approach has not been shared with the public openly. The 8 participants declared that they were not sure what it meant, they were not familiar. To conclude this section, post SSR, the financial mechanisms of the security force are better managed.

4.3.4 The corruption within the police has decreased significantly

This section displays if corruption within the police has decreased significantly since corruption with the police institutions in the world today cannot be underestimated. However, again participants who are familiar in the police or those who are already serving can respond if the corruption decreased or not. As presented in the below summary, they said that it has not decreased significantly.

Table 4.3.4 The corruption within the police has decreased significantly

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Disagree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 56.0 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 60.0 |
| Agree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 88.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Above table shows participants responses. Having the majority of 9 respondents disagreed which 36%, 5 strongly disagreed which is 20%, 7 participants agreed which is 28%, 3 strongly disagreed which is 12% and the lastly 1 participant which is 4%.

This means that after SSR, the corruption in the police does not decrease significantly, which tells us that the SSR that has been done in the police has not impacted and resulted in significant corruption significantly. which failed to reach the research objectives.

4.3.5 The rank, knowledge and experience of SPF officers are adjusted after the reform

This section services to clarify if the rank, knowledge and experience of SPF officers are adjusted after the reform, the participants responded that it does not adjust well to the extent of performing well.

Table 4.3.5 The rank, knowledge and experience of SPF officers are adjusted after the reform

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Disagree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 48.0 |
| Not Sure | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 68.0 |
| Agree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The above table indicate the response from the participants if the rank, knowledge, and experience of SPF officers are adjusted after the reform. Having 5 participants strongly disagree, which is 20%, 7 participants disagree, which is 28%, 5 participants are not sure which 20% is, 6 participants agree, which is 24%, and lastly, 2 participants disagree, which is 8%. This means most of the participants disagree, or even strongly. However, it depends on how far they have understood the adjustment, although it can be easily seen during the SSR process; officers where diminished data was captured and reshuffled.

4.3.6 Vulnerable groups in the Somali police, they are in senior management positions

This section shows if the vulnerable groups in the Somalia police are in the senior management positions. In fact, one of the interviewees said “except the gender consideration with the effect of little senior position for the female officers, other vulnerable groups were behind”. In addition, in the strategic position of the entire police, there is only second Deputy Inspector General of police (DIGP) who is a lady the rest nothing can be mentioned.

Table 4.3.6 Vulnerable groups in the Somali police, they are in senior management positions

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Disagree | 10 | 40% | 40.0 | 60.0 |
| Not Sure | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 76.0 |
| Agree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

5 participants responded strongly disagree, which is 20%; 10 participants disagree, which is 40%; 4 participants are not sure, which is 16%; 6 agreed, which is 16%; and 2 participants strongly agree, which is 8%.

This means that there are some senior positions nominated for female police officers. But it is like a glass of water added to the ocean. This is what was supposed to be corrected post SSR, which did not happen, which displayed how the SSR has not reached the desired objectives

4.3.7 Attention is given to police capacity building post SPF SSR

Like other previous sections, this section is intended to discuss if attention is given to police capacity building post SSR, in which participants responded that police capacity building attention is given post SSR. One of those interviewed had this to say, "Yes, attention is given to training for capacity building." They were continuous and continued by the international community and bilateral sisterly nations such as Turkey and Italy as a result of the post-SSR effect."

Table 4.3.7 Attention is given to police capacity building post SPF SSR

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 16.0 |
| Disagree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 24.0 |
| Not Sure | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 40.0 |
| Agree | 10 | 40% | 40.0 | 80.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As can be seen in the above table that indicates the responses from the participants, 10 participants agreed, which is 40%, 5 strongly agreed, which is 20%, 4 participants responded not sure which 16 %, 4 participants strongly disagreed, which is 16%, and 2 disagreed, which is 8%.

This means that after SSR, the focus is on police capacity building, which is a positive step. The training given by the bilateral agreements was there even pre-SSR. However, other professional courses were also covered following SSR and will continue to be built for capacity.

4.3.8 Nothing has changed in terms of essential infrastructure and Equipment of SPF since first phase of the SSR completed.

Participants responded by agreeing that nothing has changed in the infrastructure and equipment of SPF since the first phase of SSR was completed. One of the participants responded, "although some infrastructures were renovated, nothing much was done, which indeed the policy and the strategy of the senior leadership is not to increase infrastructure but to renovate." However, it is necessary to have infrastructures which did not exist before, but because of the scope of the work and the current context, are needed.

Original Somali Language.

“inkastoo xoogaa dhismayaal ah la dayactiray, laakiin wax badan lagama qaban taasoo aad moodo xeelada iyo siyaasada Hogganka sare ee Taliska Ciidanku inuu san aheyn in la kordhiyo dhisma yaasha ee kali ah dayactir, si kastaba ha ahaatee waa muhiim in la helo dhismeyaal kuwaas oo aan horay u jiri jirin. Laakiin, sababta baaxada shaqada iyo xaalada lagu jiro loogu baahday”

Table 4.3.8 Nothing has changed in terms of essential infrastructure and Equipment of SPF since first phase of the SSR completed.

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 8.0 |
| Not Sure | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 36.0 |
| Agree | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 68.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 68.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Due to the responses that has been given by the participants that can be seen in the above table indicates that nothing much has been done in terms of infrastructure and equipment. This does not mean nothing has been done. Renovation to the existing building and some equipment like the data base emplaced in the CID were done. However, this is not enough at the institutional level.

4.3.9 After SPF SSR is completed, senior posts were given to younger energetics police officers

This service to discuss if senior posts were given to the younger energetic police officers, participants indicated yes, that this was very clear that senior positions were younger energetic police officers that are well known and visible in the fields of work.

Table 4.3.9 After SPF SSR is completed, senior posts were given to younger energetics police officers

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 8.0 |
| Agree | 19 | 76% | 76.0 | 84.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

19 agreed (76%), 4 Strongly agree (16%), 1 Not sure (4%). 1 Disagree (4%) and no one and strongly disagreed. This means good step taken to the youth in security empowerment. This is among few other steps taken to the right direction, but it does not mean that the objectives of the reform has been reached.

4.3.10 Coordination and cooperation between SPF and Other security institutions increased.

This section is intended to discuss if the coordination and cooperation between SPF and other national security and defense institutions increased. Most participants declare that they are not sure. They mentioned that the exact relations are not only visible ones. There are other mechanisms that are invisible which we cannot comment. But the visible is that everyone sees that it is good.

4.3.10 Coordination and cooperation between SPF and Other security institutions increased.

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 16.0 |
| Not Sure | 10 | 40% | 40.0 | 56.0 |
| Agree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 80.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As can be easily seen the majority of the participants responded 10 (40%) not sure, which means that the relations are not the visible ones that can be commented on. However, there other relations and partnerships of the operational areas, defense and administration and staff issues because, institutions have joint working areas on investigations, counter terrorist and criminal justice systems.

4.4 Challenges of Operationalization and Capacity Building of SPF SSR in Somalia

4.4.1 Political situation of the country constitutes challenged in SPF SSR

SPF SSR had faced several challenges in pre, during and in post. However, political is the biggest and everlasting challenge to SPF. Participants responded political challenge is the biggest one.

4.4.1 Political situation of the country constitutes challenged in SPF SSR

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Not Sure | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 16.0 |
| Agree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 44.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 14 | 56% | 56.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The above table indicate that 17 participants 1had strongly agreed that the political situation is the biggest challenge to SPF SSR, which 56% 7 agreed, which is 28% of the entire respondents. 3 were not sure (12%), 1 strongly agreed, which is 4%, and no one disagreed. As the majority of the respondents mentioned, this means that politics is the biggest challenge that SPF SSR faces, recalling how SSR commenced in mid-2019 and underwent 2020. The Federal Government's leadership, political crises, and the election crises in 2021 posed great challenges to the SPF SSR. In addition, there was no political agreement prior to SSR, which is the precondition to initiating SSR in such post-conflict countries. Therefore, SPF and SSR met at the junction with the biggest political stake, which highlights lessons to be fully considered.

4.4.2 The current police act is enough for SPF to operate through the country

This section relates with the legal issue that participants cannot fully comment except legal professionals and the practitioners. However, participants responded mostly that “the current act is enough for SPF to operate, as SPF is operating now without any further conditions”. Some argued that it is not enough due to the globalization, technologies and Governance that shifted from unitary to Federal system and police is organized into Federal and State levels.

Table 4.4.2 The current police act is enough for SPF to operate through the country

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| Disagree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 32.0 |
| Not Sure | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 56.0 |
| Agree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 68.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As can be easily see above table, 8 participants responded strongly- agree which is 32%, 6 participants are not sure which is 24% while another 6 participants responded which is 24%. As the researcher this means, participants are not aware of current SPF act - not enough to operate because the latest SPF act and the code of conduct (Police Law 2. Dated 23 Dec 1972 D. Police Act No. 14 Dated 4 January 1974 respectively (Somali Police Force and MoIS, 2024).

4.4.3 There is SPF Strategic and operational plan that is implemented accordingly

This section services to discuss that if the strategic and operational plan of SPF is implemented accordingly. However, the majority of the participants responded not sure, saying that “any strategic or operational plan of SPF has not ever been displayed either police or the public. Thus, I am not sure if it is because of the security context or not I never see and heard before”

Original Somali Language

“ wax istaraatijiyad ama qorshe howlgal ee uu Ciidanka Boliiska soomaaliyeed leeyahay weligii looma soo bandhigin Ciidan iyo shacab toona. Sidaas daraadeed, ma hubo inay sababtu tahay xaalada amaan ee dalka iyo in kale laakiin waligay ma maqal mana arkin”

Table 4.4.3 There is SPF Strategic and operational plan that is implemented accordingly

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| Disagree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 36.0 |
| Not Sure | 10 | 40% | 40.0 | 76.0 |
| Agree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

most of the participants whom 10 responded said they were not sure which is 42%, while the next number, 7 participants responded disagree which is 29%. This means the SPF strategic plan either has not been finalized yet or did not echo with the officers in preparation process and publicly shared for transparency and public accountability because the majority of the participants 10 responded not sure and 7 participants responded disagreeing yet the strategic plan exists while it has not been implemented accordingly, this is the SPF strategic plan 2021-2024 ‘ ‘ The Somali Police Force Strategic Plan 2021-24 is built upon the national policy direction contained in References A to I, and supersedes the Somali Federal Police Plan of 2018-2023. The goal of the plan services to contribute an overall strategic platform for the SPF's development. and the delivery of SPF police services, setting out four strategic priorities and twenty supporting strategic objectives for the next four years (Somali Police Force and MoIS, 2024).

4.4.4 The relation between police resource allocation and its operations are equitable

In this section participants responded ‘ ‘ the resources being given to the SPF and the supposed operations are incompatible and needs serious considerations’ ’

Table 4.4.4 The relation between police resource allocation and its operations are equitable

| Level of Agreement | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 24.0 |
| Disagree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 60.0 |
| Not Sure | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 72.0 |
| Agree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 88.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 3 | 12% | 12.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Participants respond as seen in the table with a majority of 9 participants disagreeing, which is 36%, 6 participants strongly disagreeing, which is 24%, 4 participants agreeing, which is 16%, 3 not sure, which is 12%, and another 3 disagreeing, which is also 12%. This means SPF's supposed work and resources allocated are not compatible due to the context of the country is supposed. All security gaps are covered along with other security and defense forces. However, resources allocated cannot cover much. This was among the aspects intended to be displayed by the reform and to be solved. So, if the SSR does not succeed, there is no way that this gap in resources can be overcome.

4.4.5 There are standard operational procedures to management SPF assets, personal and resource

As the participants responded there is standard operational procedure to manage SPF assets, personnel and resources. Respondents said “there is asset; human and resource management policy that is emplaced and applicable SOPs in SPF field of work”.

Table 4.4.5 There are standard operational procedures to management SPF assets, personal and resource

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 8.0 |
| Not Sure | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 44.0 |
| Agree | 12 | 48% | 48.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

As the above table shows, 12 participants agree, which is 48%, 9 participants are not sure, which is 36%, 2 participants strongly disagree, which is 8%, 1 participant strongly disagrees, which is 4%, and lastly, 1 participant disagrees, which is another 4%.

This means SPF has asset management policies and SOPs that protect the assets recorded and marked as belonging to SPF. However, this software database and the marking machine were available even pre-SPF SSR during and after those services, the aim of which was achieved. On the other hand, this shows us most of the essential items were there before the reform was initiated.

4.4.6 There is mechanism to address police complicity in crime, corruption, and human rights abuse

This section unlike other above sections discusses the inspections on the mechanism to address police complexity in crime, corruption and human rights abuse, the majority of the participants responded disagreeing and saying “crimes are there to happen, corruption is everywhere, and the human rights abuse are even increasing substantially”

Table 4.4.6 There is mechanism to address police complicity in crime, corruption, and human rights abuse

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 16.0 |
| Disagree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 52.0 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 56.0 |
| Agree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The table indicates that 9 participants disagreed, which is 36%, 9 participants agreed, which is also 36%, 4 strongly disagreed, which is 16%, 2 participants strongly agree, which is 8%, and 1 participant is not sure which 4%. Unless otherwise, it is only the officer in the field who can comment on this matter. However, respondents said that crimes, corruption, and human rights abuses are committed with complicity. Others argue that courts would have closed, and people would have immigrated from Mogadishu to safer places. This means that complicity exists, but the ability to operationalize it is insufficient to combat crime, corruption, and human rights violations

4.4.7 The police in Somalia are actively trying to attract more women to the service while providing equal opportunity with their male counterparts.

This section discusses if the SPF is attracting more women and at the same time providing them with opportunities like their male counterparts. The responses from the participants of this research project are balanced with an equal number. As a result, those who agreed to use the DIGP Administration, two District Police Commissioners, Gender Disk, and the Office of the IGP Principal Secretary as examples. Others who disagree explain it as a type of water added to an ocean that does not provide equal opportunities as its male counterpart.

Table 4.4.7 The police in Somali are actively trying to attract more women to the service while providing equal opportunity with their male counterparts.

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 24.0 |
| Disagree | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 48.0 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 52.0 |
| Agree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 80.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

In the above table, indicates how the participants responded, with the majority of 7 participants, which is 28%, agreed that the police are actively trying to attract more women and give them equal opportunities with their male counterparts. 5 (20%) strongly agreed, 6 (24%) strongly disagreed, 6 (24%) disagreed, and 1 (4%) did not score. This means although some positions are visible, this cannot be taken as an equal opportunity for male counterparts. This is to urge the SPF leadership to promote gender mainstreaming or even come up with affirmative action.

4.4.8 There is a recruitment policy, in approach to educational and physical fitness requirement of officers

This section considers the recruitment policy, education, and physical fitness requirements of officers. One of the interviewees said this: "in the Police Law 2. Dated 23 Dec 1972, it clearly prescribes the recruitment policy, education, and physical fitness requirements of requirement officers, which is now practiced by the SPF and its importance cannot be underestimated".

Original Somali Language

“ Sharci Lam 2 1972-dii ee Ciidanka Boliiska Soomaaliyeed, ayaa si cad u qeexaya siyaasada tababarada, waxbarista iyo caafimaad qabka jireed ee xubnaha loo baahdo, taas oo uu hada ciidanku ku shaqeeyo, hasayeeshee aan muhiimadeeda marna la iska indhatiri Karin”

Table 4.4.8 There is a recruitment policy, in approach to educational and physical fattiness requirement of officers

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| Disagree | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 28.0 |
| Not Sure | 5 | 20% | 20.0 | 48.0 |
| Agree | 12 | 48% | 48.0 | 96.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

as indicated in the above table 12 participants agreed that there is recruitment policy in SPF which is 48%, 5 disagreed which is 20%, 5 not sure which is also 20%, 2 strongly disagreed which is 8% and 1 strongly agreed which is 4%. This means SPF recruitment policy because there is no any police institution that hire or recruits officer unvetted and SPF is among. This was there since 1973 when SPF act was enacted up to date, it is not related with reform actually it would have reviewed and re organized if the SPF reform would have been succeeded.

4.4.9 SPF has standard doctrine and curriculum to train its cadet officers and NCOs

This section is intended to discuss the curriculum to train the officers. Participants mostly responded, "not sure" or "agreed," demonstrating logically "how can a police organization exist without doctrine and curriculum to train its officers; otherwise, there cannot be uniformity." Others disagreed, claiming that

SPF training is aided by a variety of actors. Therefore, it was not possible to have that training unity for SPF personnel on a single day.

Table 4.4.9 SPF has standard doctrine and curriculum to train its cadet officers and NCOs

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 20.0 |
| Not Sure | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 52.0 |
| Agree | 8 | 32% | 32.0 | 84.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 4 | 16% | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

Here 8 participants agreed which are 32%, another 8 participants scored not sure which is 32%, 4 disagreed which is 16%, another 4 had strongly agreed which 16% and 1 participant had strongly disagree. This indicates that SPF has doctrine and curriculum to train officers. However, in the reform it was intended to establish doctrine and curriculum for SPF in order to unify the trained officers in different areas and by different actors. This means the reform failed to contribute doctrine and curriculum for SPF which another factor that indicates reform failure.

4.4.10 The case-flow management and witness protection mechanisms of SPF has improved.

This section discusses judiciary police in the CID professional performance. That post SPF SSR the case flow management and witness protection mechanisms has improved. According to a participant “due high criminality and terrorist incidents no single witness or informer discloser to the danger, fact that judiciary mechanism had also reviewed and improved with incapacitating and equipping the necessary sections of

CID’’. However, others believes if CID is better managed and operationalized by protecting witness and managing case flows, Mogadishu would have been peaceful than now’’

4.4.10 The case-flow management and witness protection mechanisms of SPF has improved.

| Level of Agreement | Frequenc y | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 4% | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Disagree | 7 | 28% | 28.0 | 32.0 |
| Not Sure | 6 | 24% | 24.0 | 56.0 |
| Agree | 9 | 36% | 36.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly Agree | 2 | 8% | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 25 | 100% | 100.0 | |

Source: Primary data from respondents in Hamar-Jajab 25 Dec 2021-05 Jan 2022

The above table indicates that the majority of the participants agree on 9 out of 25, which is 36%, 7 disagree, which is 28%, 6 are not sure, which is 24%, 2 strongly agree, which is 8%, and 1 strongly disagree, which is 4%. Case flow management and witness protection of SPF mechanisms had improved, which is an important work for judiciary police. If this improved, the good work done needs maintenance. However, as a researcher, this has not been done much in comparison with the criminality rate and terrorism incidents, which have not decreased significantly. Above are the analytic responses from the participants and the structure of SPF, while the flowing sections are intended to display the findings from the participant’s responses.

4.5 Current situation of the security sector reform in Somalia & Why it is needed.

Generally speaking, SSR in conflict zones it is quite difficult to achieve effective results. On the other hand, some countries reached out without much assistance indeed. In many ways, the case for SSR is persuasive in a majority of African countries, and several have embarked on their own thorough reform efforts with little or no help from development donors. (Bendix and Stanley, 2008). Due to a lack of

coordination within AMISOM each soldier has contributed to the country's training and equipping of its own Somali security force in their sectors based on its own needs and customs. This raises severe doubts about the Somali National Armed Forces' ability to work together in the future. (Detzner, 2017). SSR has been conducted in Somalia in reference to the responses from the participants. But the approach used and the methodology accommodated was not perfect, and that is why it did not achieve any tangible desired results, although it was the first phase of data collection. However, for the time being, SSR in Somalia is at stake due to the lack of political and election crises that Somalia has faced in the last two years since 2020.

This means that having an overview of the SSR status in Somalia is important to this research project and even to the respondents; as the researcher mentioned in the research delimitation, SSR in Somalia will be discussed several times as an overview or as an example at some points. However, the majority of the research concentrated solely on "police reform. "The respondents claim that SSR has been conducted in Somali, which the police reform is based on. Research shows that SSR is conducted. However, there is no clear process and result which shows us how far it has succeeded. In addition to that, it is at stake.

4.6 SPF Reform Contribution to Peace Building (PB) in Somalia

Security sector reforms are a vital component of peace and state-building because they restore the state's capacity to provide security and promote stability, long-term peace, and good governance. (Abdullahi, 2021). In reality, there is little doubt that SPF contributes to Somalia's peace. The answer is always a resounding yes. However, the question is whether the SPF reform will help Somalia achieve peace.

The participants strongly disagreed that the working relations between SPF and the local community increased after the SPF SSR was conducted. They claim that "there is no relationship between the police and the community that has increased." Participants who are already familiar or experienced have answered this question with "strongly disagree" and "strongly disagree," which they claim even if no crime statistics have decreased substantially.

So, if the SPF reform does not contribute to a decrease in criminality, how does it contribute to peace building? Corruption in the police institutions in the world today cannot be underestimated. However, again, participants who are familiar with the police or those who are already serving responded significantly if corruption decreased or not. In summary, they mention that it has not decreased significantly.

On the other hand, there are good points that the reform highlighted, which is that attention is given to police capacity building post SSR, in which participants responded that police capacity building attention is given post SSR, "yes attention is given to training for capacity building." They were nonstop and continued by the international community and bilateral sisterly nations like Turkey and Italy from the effect of the post-SSR period in which the improvement was undergone. Another positive step taken is that senior posts were given to the younger, energetic police officers. Participants indicated this very clearly that senior positions were given to younger, energetic police officers that are well known and visible in the SPF field of work.

The coordination and cooperation between the SPF and other national security and defense institutions is stronger than ever. Most participants said that they were not sure. They mention the exact relations are not only visible ones; there are other mechanisms that are invisible on which we cannot comment. But the visible that everyone sees that it is good. " However, the nature of the work performed among defense and security forces makes it necessary to collaborate and coordinate more than anything else. In conclusion, SPF contributes to the peace-building process in Somalia, both with and without the reform, and will continue to do so. However, reform does not contribute to peace building in Somalia because it does not add any value to the SPF.

4.7 Current challenges of SPF Reform in Somalia

Iraq and Afghanistan are two instances of crisis countries that require significant external funding, technical and training assistance, and a combination of foreign internal defense and direct action by partner states to combat insurgencies. Such assistance was characterized by large amounts of outside funding and faced similar financial management issues as Somalia. (Harborne, 2017).

SPF SSR was not only financial but had also faced several challenges. However, politics is the biggest and everlasting challenge to SPF reform. Participants of this research project responded that the political challenge is the biggest one in which SPF reform cannot go ahead. Legal issues: participants cannot fully comment except for legal professionals and practitioners. However, participants responded that "the current Police Act is enough for SPF to operate, as SPF is operating now with no further conditions." Others argue that it is insufficient due to globalization, technological advancements, and a shift in governance from a unitary to a federal system, with police organized into two levels (Federal and State Police).

SPF Strategic and Operational Plan if it is implemented accordingly. However, the majority of the participants responded that they were not sure, saying "any strategic or operational plan of SPF has not ever been displayed either by police junior field officers or the public" and even never heard. This means a critical challenge against SPF's implementation of its strategic objectives due to a lack of buy-in from implementors.

As the participants responded, there is standard operational procedure to manage SPF assets, personnel, and resources. Respondents said "there is asset, human and resource management policy that is emplaced and applicable SOPs in the SPF field of work." For the inspections on the mechanism to address police complexity in crime, corruption and human rights abuse, the majority of the participants disagreed, saying "crimes are happening, corruption is everywhere, and human rights abuse is even increasing substantially." This is a critical challenge to the performance of SPF personnel and indeed the rapport with the public.

For the gender balance, SPF is attracting more women and at the same time providing them with opportunities similar to their male counterparts. However, the responses from the participants of this research project are balanced with equal numbers. Therefore, those agreed they mentioned as an example to the DIGP Admin, two District Police Commissioners, Gender Disk, and the Office of IGP principal secretary. While others who do not agree explain it as a class of water added to an ocean, which is not giving equal opportunities to its male counterpart.

Recruitment policy, education and physical fitness requirements of officers, participants respond that in the police Act it is clearly prescribed the recruitment policy, education and physical fitness requirements of officers, which is now practiced by the SPF. However, there is no curriculum to train the officers. Participants mostly expressed uncertainty and agreed by displaying logically "how can a police organization exist without having a doctrine and curriculum to train its officers?". Others disagreed, stating that SPF training is assisted by many different actors. Therefore, it never had that training unification with the curriculum for SPF personnel in a single day.

In summary, the objective was to study and discuss the broader understanding of SSR in Somalia by displaying the achievements, challenges, and opportunities surrounding it. This research found responses from the participants by mentioning that the challenges of operation and capacity building of SPF are political, legal, and financial. However, the specific intent is to understand and examine the contributions

of SPF SSR in Somalia's peace building processes and assess the challenges in operationalization and capacity building of SPF Somalia that this research project has highlighted so far.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter is intended to serve as an open mind in SSR in Somalia, analyzing and interpreting particularly participant responses about SPF reform for the respondents and displaying them to the readers of this research project. It depicts a general view of the SSR conducted in Somalia in general, the achievements, challenges, and opportunities for police reform. However, respondents participated openly, indicating how police reform was implemented. The majority of participants of this research project responded that there is no coherent and coordinated approach by the donors. It looks as if the Federal Government of Somalia advocates total ownership because no coherent and coordinated approach by the donors has ever been seen in the reforming process, yet donors and the international community assisted in terms of technical and financial support needed.

SSR has been conducted in Somalia. But the approach used and the methodology used were not perfect, and that is why it did not achieve any tangible desired results, although it was the first phase of data collection. However, for the time being, SSR in Somalia is at stake due to the lack of political will and election crises that Somalia has faced in the last two years since 2020. However, participants who are familiar with the police or those who are already serving responded significantly if corruption decreased or not. In summary, they mention that it has not decreased significantly. Another positive step taken is that senior posts were given to the younger, energetic police officers. Participants indicated this very clearly that senior positions were given to younger, energetic police officers that are well known and visible in the SPF field of work. Legal issues participants cannot fully comment except legal professionals and the practitioners.

CHAPTER FIVE:

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMANDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is intended to be the last chapter of this research project, which concerns Security Sector Reform in Somalia: a Study of Police. Overall, chapter one did set the general introduction and the background of the entire research, in which it identified the statement of the problem, the questions to be discussed, and the objectives that led the researcher to interview experienced and unexperienced personnel in the exact field of police work, related and unrelated. Chapter two covered the literature review and other vital information from other researchers who have written about the Security Sector Reform in Somalia: A Study of Somali Police, especially in the same field of research. This section also covered a lot of other necessary information in theoretical and conceptual frameworks in Somalia and beyond. Chapter Three discussed the qualitative research methods used, the approaches and procedures. Chapter four presented, discussed, and interpreted the results.

5.2 Summary

This chapter summarizes the salient points of this research project, concluding and recommending important points that are significant to undergo for SSR in Somalia a study of police reform in order to reach SPF's desired objectives and to implement Somali's peace building process so as to better serve the people and the property of the citizens and other inhabitants of the territory of Somalia Federal Republic.

This research project had achieved the achievements and the results for which it had been conducted. However, it is focused on studying the SSR in Somalia: a study of police reform. This research had general and specific objectives that are: to study and examine the broader understanding of SSR in Somalia; a study of SPF reform by displaying the achievements, challenges, and opportunities surrounding it as a specific objective. To examine the broader understanding of SSR in Somalia, a study of SPF reform achievements, challenges, and opportunities to understand the contributions of SPF and SSR in Somalia's peace building processes, To assess the challenges of operationalization and capacity building of SPF Somalia

Furthermore, participants do not hesitate to freely and openly respond to the questioner and exercise in the interview with full tolerance the time taken and to mention the current difficulties, challenges, and

gaps that they even make assumptions that would have come across if the SSR was better managed in consideration of all mentioned prospects and those needs an urgent consideration that shall be depicted in the recommendation forum.

5.3 General Conclusion

SSR is largely acknowledged as a notion in transition. Its origins can be traced back to the restructuring of security forces following wars and during periods of profound political transformation in the twentieth century. During the 1990s and early 2000s.

In Africa, the AU's first significant SSR attempt was the 2006 AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD), which prioritized "the restructuring of the state's institutions, notably those linked to security and justice" in order to consolidate post-conflict peace. The UN then launched the Strategic Partnership for SSR in 2007, with the goal of assisting in the creation of the African Union Framework on SSR (which was approved in 2013) and incorporating AU input into UN SSR development. (Detzner, 2017) P131

Somali Police was established in 1943 as the Police Corps of Somalia, it changed its name to the SPF in 1960 when it joined with the British Somaliland Scouts to form the national force of the newly independent Somalia. Having legal ground and foundation upon all respective Constitutions and the current provisional Constitution especially Chapter 14th on Article 126 and the guiding Principles with same Chapter on Article 127th (Government of Somalia, 2012). Somalia has experienced continuous political turmoil since the collapse of Mohammed Siad Barre's authoritarian socialist government in 1991, which triggered the violent disintegration of the state.

This research purpose is to study and analyse the SSR in the Somali case of the Somali Police, to find out what the Somali Police reform challenges are that do not allow it to be implemented. This research shall contribute to the SPF's SSR process, SOCK, and recommendations to the Somali Police Command. Finally, the findings of this study will serve as the foundation for future research by other researchers who are interested in learning more about the research topic. Somalia is in its recovering stage from prolonged conflict and at least the last 14 years of war on Tera. Still, Somalia's future is unpredictable due to a lack of well managed SSR, political reconciliation, and reform that has succeeded. However, rather than emotions, this research will provide policymakers and decision-makers with guidelines to follow.

This research study, the researcher intended to identify and discuss only SSR in Somali as general. But specifically, it shall concern the SPF reform. However, as an example it will be used to mention other institutions reform for comparison at some points. The normative idea of SSR assumes that society benefit from a security sector that is a source of peace, security, growth, and stability rather than a hindrance. If taken seriously, SSR entails a wide range of activities with an equally wide range of actors.

5.4 Recommendations for Future Researchers

This section presents general as well as specific recommendations needed to consider and overcome challenges that prevent Somalia from reforming its police force in a way that ensures the security of the nation. Although the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is working on Security Sector Reform (SSR), here are some suggestions to speed up the process and ensure its success: -

The Federal Government's Executive branch should make sure that they have the needed political will to implement the needed reform. One of the reasons why the objectives of SPF reform were not reached is that it started on the wrong path, which means there was no political reform and consensus among the politicians. So, this research recommends: National Political & Security reconciliations by the National Security Council in the first 6 months of 2023 Jan-Jun. The resources can be mobilized from the fiscal year and the stakeholders who normally donate to Somali Security. The KPI force generation from all Federal Member States, as well as the unification of forces from all tribes, will be unified under one command, under which the first phase commissioned officers will be trained, if this does not happen, it will mean that there is no political will behind it.

As long as economic reform needs huge financial assistance, the shortage of financial assistance is experienced in SPF. At this point, this research recommends allocating separate resources that can enable the reform to be conducted in an effective and efficient manner so as to achieve national objectives. to open a consolidated account only for the reform that is used to keep financial packages from July 2022 up to July 2024. SPF and Ministries of Finance MoIS will collaborate having joint task force designated trained and oriented only for this work. The account will be created with transactions starting on the proposed date.

Security, counter-terrorism operations, and timely reform are all impossible in today's world. So, this research recommends; - During the SPF reform, other national forces shall double their operations against terrorist groups with planned decisive conditions and course of actions, to liberate from the terrorist

groups in both middle and lower Shabelle regions of Mogadishu outskirts and neighbouring regions within the first 6 months from June 2022 to January 2023, and after reform, SPF shall participate in

Senior officers will be reformed in the first phase, followed by NCOs in the second phase. Both Shabelle regions were liberated from terrorist groups, cleared of unexploded ordnance (UXO), other explosive devices and IDPs with civil service issues emplaced in the proposed period of time by the ministry of Emergency and humanitarian.

As long as Somalia is in its post-conflict era, the public has lost trust. There is no effective public reconciliation, and the public does not believe in the reform. So, this research recommends: (1) to have public reconciliation and orientation while participating in the preparation of the reforming process to have their confidence and trust within 3 months from June to September 2022. To execute this recommendation, the financial resources should be used from the consolidated account. Human resources will be in the categories of the community where debates, seminars, and workshops will take place inside Mogadishu and liberated areas. Research will be conducted to identify the public's trust and confidence concerning the reform. Public debates will be organized to review if it is in good taste if insecurity incidents are decreased to the extent of free movements and election campaigns are held without any fear from terrorist groups.

Legal legitimacy is the foundation of the reform. Pending Constitutional Review becomes a challenge that cannot be easily overcome. So, this research recommends; (1) to review the constitution and accelerate the Police Act formulation that the national assembly will enact and then promulgate by the President; (2) to formulate police regulations that guide the reform and other necessary laws that police use in the first year from June 2022 to June 2024. The resources needed are available; the national assembly uses their own resources; manpower, financial, and other resources needed within the legal framework. The police legal advisory unit shall work under the supervision of the Internal Security and Justice Ministries, having consideration of SPF leadership.

Gender Mainstreaming is one of the pressing issues that the reform will address, as well as how gender is now balanced in the various governmental institutions that the SSR reform will prioritize. SPF reform is the main area where gender sensitivity is managed under supervision. However, for a long time, female importance was undermined based on history. So, women's and human rights development shall take their critical role in how gender is prioritized in the fields of SSR, especially in police reform.

To the SPF top leadership and MoIS, this research recommends; -to have a clear policy, program, and strategy concerning how the reform shall be conducted with a clear idea and objective in which the kind of the reform is precise. Contemporary police forces need formal education. to set a clear strategy and to work closely with donors and the international community in order to accelerate their technical and financial assistance. Finally, this study suggests that SPF leadership develop a clear gender mainstreaming strategy and that additional affirmative action is required to achieve the research's goal.

5.5 For future Researchers

This study was limited to SPF reform in the Hamar-Jajab district, Mogadishu, Somalia. However, SPF has two levels: federal and state police, in which SSR in Somalia is broad. Thus, this finding is not intended to be applicable to the SPF as a whole. Furthermore, the researcher suggests that further research on the same topic be done on the different Federal Member States Police of the country to find the general SSR in Somalia or state police reform to publish reliable, applicable, and retrievable results.

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ANNEXES

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (CASS)

CENTRE FOR CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT (CCM)

APPENDIX (1) QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondent, I am **SADIK ADEN ALI** a student of College of Arts and Social Sciences (CASS) department of Center for Conflicts Management (CCM) Main Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation in Musanze, Rwanda. As a requirement by the University of Rwanda (UR), I am conducting research for the award of a master's degree under this topic **“SECURITY SECTORE REFORM (SSR) IN SOMALIA: Case of SOMALI POLICE”** All the information provided by the respondents will be used for purely academic purpose and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

SECTION (A)

Biographic Data of the Respondent

1. Gender (please tick)

Male Female

2. Age (please tick)

20-30 31-40 41-Above

3. Marital status (please tick)

Single Married Divorced

Widow

4. What is your highest level of education (please tick)

None Primary Secondary

Diploma Bachelors Masters

Others (specify).....

5. Are you Unemployed Employed

If you are employed what is your occupation

SECTION (B):**The broader understanding of SSR in Somalia achievements, challenges and opportunities.**

| No | Questions | Response | Code |
|----|--|----------|------|
| 1 | Has there ever been conducted SSR in Somalia? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 2 | Has all the Security institutions subject to SSR in Somalia? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 3 | Did the SSR impacted the capacity of Security institutions in Somalia? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 4 | Are Somali security institutions the sole security provider of the country? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 5 | Is the current legal and constitutional framework for the security system adequate? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 6 | Are security and justice actors involved in politics? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 7 | Are there adequate internal and external oversight mechanisms security services? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 8 | Does the elected executive have some role in setting basic security and justice policies, priorities and procedures? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 9 | Is there a political will for SSR in Somalia? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |
| 10 | Is there evidence of a coherent and coordinated approach by donors? | Yes | 1 |
| | | No | 2 |

SECTION (C)

Understanding the contribution of SPF SSR in Mogadishu for Somalia's Peace Building Processes

| No | Question/Statement | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Not sure | Agree | Strongly agree |
|----|---|-------------------|----------|----------|-------|----------------|
| 1 | Following the SPF SSR, the working relation between SPF and local communities increased | | | | | |
| 2 | Post SPF SSR the crime statistics has decreased substantially | | | | | |
| 3 | After SPF SSR the finance of the SPF is better managed | | | | | |
| 4 | The corruption within the police has decreased significantly | | | | | |
| 5 | The rank, knowledge and experience of SPF officers are adjusted after the reform | | | | | |
| 6 | Vulnerable groups in the police, they are in senior management positions | | | | | |
| 7 | Attention is given to police capacity building post SPF SSR | | | | | |
| 8 | Nothing has changed in terms of essential infrastructure and Equipment of SPF since first phase of the SSR completed. | | | | | |
| 9 | After SPF SSR is completed, senior posts were given to younger energetics police officers | | | | | |
| 10 | Coordination and cooperation between SPF and Other security institutions increased. | | | | | |

SECTION (D)

Challenges of Operationalization and Capacity building of SPF SSR in Somalia

| S/N | Question/Statement | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Not sure | Agree | Strongly agree |
|-----|--|-------------------|----------|----------|-------|----------------|
| 1 | Political situation of the country constitutes challenged in SPF SSR | | | | | |
| 2 | The current police act is enough for SPF to operate through the country | | | | | |
| 3 | There is SPF Strategic and operational plan that is implemented accordingly | | | | | |
| 4 | The relation between police resource allocation and its operations are equitable | | | | | |
| 5 | There are standard operational procedures to management SPF assets, personal and resource | | | | | |
| 6 | There is mechanism to address police complicity in crime, corruption, and human rights abuse | | | | | |
| 7 | The police are actively trying to attract more women to the police service while providing equal opportunity with their male counterparts. | | | | | |
| 8 | There is a recruitment policy, in approach to educational and physical fattiness requirement of officers | | | | | |
| 9 | SPF has standard doctrine and curriculum to train its cadet officers and NCOs | | | | | |
| 10 | The case-flow management and witness protection mechanisms of SPF has improved. | | | | | |

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
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that **MAJ SADIK ADEN ALI** is a student at Rwanda National Police College, undertaking a Master's Degree in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation for the academic year 2021-2022. He is conducting a research on: "SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOMALIA: A STUDY OF SOMALI POLICE"; for which he is required to collect data from relevant sources. Any assistance rendered to him in this regard is highly valued by the College.

R MUJISI
CP
COMMANDANT



AUTHORISATION TO SUBMIT THE DISSERTATION FOR EVALUATION



UNIVERSITY of
RWANDA

CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

AUTHORISATION TO SUBMIT THE DISSERTATION FOR EVALUATION

I, undersigned, INNOCENT RUGARAGU hereby testify that under my supervision, Mr SADIK ADEN ALI, Reg No: 221031166 has successfully completed writing his MA Dissertation titled:

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOMALIA: A STUDY OF SOMALI POLICE.

Therefore, he stands with my authorization to submit required copies to the Administration of CCM for evaluation.

Done at..... June 10, 2022

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Innocent Rugaragu', written over a horizontal line.

Names and signature of the Supervisor:

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