

THE MAASTRICHT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT/SFB

**ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS:
THE CASE FOR COMMUNITY BASED REINTEGRATION
PROJECTS IN RWANDA**

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to all the ex-combatants struggling in a readymade Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program.

This work is dedicated to my loving wife, Yvonne and our Children, Benita, Briton, Bella and Bruce whose love and encouragement took me to another level.

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I would wish to extend my heartfelt appreciation to all those to gave me their invaluable support in one way or another.

I am grateful to the Almighty God for all the heavenly blessing;

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I am indebted to all my colleagues at the MSM/SFB, intake 4; particularly Solange, Safari, Elijah, Muyango and Joseph whose encouragement throughout the course made me take it to the final completion.

DECLARATION

I, **Francis MULINDAGWI**, declare that this thesis is my original work and has never been submitted for the award of a Masters degree in Business Administration (MBA) or any other academic title.

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Francis MULINDABIGWI
September 2012

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ABSTRACT

This paper looks closely at the challenges facing the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in the context where so much resources and related research has been invested to alleviate the consequences of armed conflicts that bring about suffering and economic degradation of individual participants, communities and nations. This paper brings out the success stories and related processes that bring them about in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants, in the new approach of Community Based Reintegration Projects (CBR).

At the base of the success of this approach, is involvement of all stakeholders and beneficiaries. Involvement brings about understanding of the whole process, a smooth implementation process and a sure way of success and sustainability. This involvement should not be at the last end of the process but from the very beginning, the planning phase. This brings about ownership and better understanding.

The planning process therefore is the most crucial of all the stages of any undertaking. It lays the foundation for any project, upon which all the other pieces will find support. It should take all it requires, in time and resources, but it should be perfect.

This is where the Community Based Reintegration project of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, did differently from the rest of the classic DDR processes, and was able to showcase good results in the economic reintegration of the Rwandan ex-combatants. Based on the results of this study, it is recommended here that the CBR process be adopted where possible as it gives by far better results with less resource in the economic reintegration of the ex-combatants.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1	AFC	AFC Consultants International GmbH
2	AGs	Armed Groups (part of the demobilisation factions of the Rwandan rebels)
3	CBR	Community Based Reintegration
4	CFJ	Centre de Formation des Jeunes (Youth Training Center)
5	DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
6	DPKO	United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operations
7	DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
8	FAR	Former Rwanda Government Armed Forces
9	GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
10	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
11	HIMO	Haute intensité de main d'œuvre (Labour Intensive Public works)
12	IDP	Internally Displaced People
13	IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
14	ILO	International Labour Organization
15	KfW	KfW-Entwicklungsbank (Financial German Cooperation)
16	LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
17	MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization & Reintegration Programme
18	MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
19	MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and economic Planning
20	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
21	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
22	NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
23		Programme de Développement Local : Programme de Haute Intensité de
	PDL-HIMO	Main d'Ouvre
24	PIM	Project Implementation Manual
25	RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
26	RDRP	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
27	RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
28	SIDDR	The Stockholm Initiative on DDR
29	SC	Steering Committee
30	UN	United Nations
31	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
32	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
33	VET	Vocational Education Program
34	XC	Ex-Combatant

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 STUDY BACKGROUND

Peace and Security have been the most important issues debated over the world since World War I. These concerns and debates culminated in the creation of the United Nations after World War II and the powerful Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations. Not only the DPKO, the United Nations (UN) Security Council and other UN agencies particularly the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), have been so involved in world peace and security, but also other world bodies like the World Bank and other Individual National Government agencies like the German organisation (GTZ), United States Aid Agency (USAID), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Renown foundations and specialized national institutes like the Institutes for strategic studies and some fully fledged universities for peace and security studies. Despite all these efforts, peace and security have been illusive and it may be said, though their contribution is not questioned here, that there is much to be desired. Africa and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa has been most hit by this scourge of lack of peace and security.

Wars have been one of the main resultant of socio-economic and political imbalances. In the last part of the last century, internal strives and wars have particularly in Africa caused a lot of suffering and negated any efforts at development. The effects of these wars are a fractured society, maimed men and women with physical and mental/spiritual scars and dilapidated/fractured families, communities and national economies. Wars exacerbate internal societal relations and tear apart the society. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process has been one of the major components of the peace and stability process and its overall goal is supporting the strengthening of security and enhancing the peace and reconciliation process by the reduction in combatant forces and their return to civilian life. The economic consideration in the DDR process has been added and is receiving much attention.

Wars are fought with men and other resources. These are consumed but as the war ends, the resultant massive armies of the belligerents, the physical and moral destruction of the men and women in uniform, become a national burden. Rwanda and the whole of the Africa Great Lakes Region have experienced one of the worst and longest wars, massive recruitments and so have their stories to tell.

In the last fifteen years, the United Nations has developed the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and has incorporated most of the best practices as obtained from information sharing through its UN Inter-Agency Working Group (Group that unites all DDR practitioners and consultants). These IDDRS are increasingly being utilized as guidelines in most DDR programs world over. On the other side, the World Bank has supported its own programs of DDR and together with other partners in development, has sponsored the biggest DDR program in Central and Eastern Africa through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration program (MDRP). Rwanda implemented the MDRP DDR program since 2001 but had already implemented a more or less similar program since 1997.

As a bank, the World Bank implemented its DDR program in conjunction with the contracting state either through a grant, a loan or both. The implementation is guided by Loan/credit/grant agreement and a project implementation manual (PIM). The most interesting element in the PIM for this study is the “eligibility criteria”. The World Bank DDR is therefore targeted at an individual who has been carefully identified as a combatant and the preference would be that all the support be channelled through the ex-combatants individual bank account. Interestingly in the last few years, this long held view is timidly changing towards incorporating the children and spouse of the combatant and this for economic and business reasons.

In post conflict recovery, all the efforts at economic and social recovery are at the national level and most DDR programs target the individual. Most of the individual beneficiaries in most cases are sought to have contributed to the misery of the community. Community Based Reintegration programs aim at redressing this issue and their effectiveness is being tested in many countries. The DDR program of Rwanda implemented a CBR project since 2004 until 2009.

It is the aim of this study to show how effective this project is in the process of economic reintegration of ex-combatants in the process of peace and reconciliation and identify the challenges related to its implementation. This is also in line with the definition of the concept of Peace Building as actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Ngoma, 2004).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

A lot of resources, both financial, technical and in research have been invested in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Some programs have advocated for focused support to ex-combatants and investments in these programs sometimes go beyond what is spent locally on the rest of the population in national development programs.

Other programs have been more inclusive, to include internally displaced peoples (IDPs), refugees, women and children associated with armed conflicts and sometimes entire communities. This approach has not gained much support and is not widely implemented.

Some specialists have advocated that the eligibility criteria should not be limited to gun surrender and proof of knowledge of gun handling, but should include IDPs and refugees as well. Some independent research have shown that 19 programs of DDR have cost about 1.599 billion in 2007, making it an average of \$1,434 for each demobilised soldier (Escola de Cultura de Paz, 2008). This is certainly above the GDP/capita for most of the countries in which these programs take place.

Despite the above heavy investment both on human and financial resources and recommendations, most DDR pundits have agreed that it would be hard to talk about total success in the reintegration of ex-combatants though some limited success has been earmarked here and there.

This study therefore sets out to identify the gaps in the DDR process and highlight the planning and implementation process of the CBR project and assess its impact on the successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

There is clearly need for a rethinking in terms of DDR programming and policy on the part of donors and recipient nations. The study sets out to find out what went amiss and it is in its intention to identify gaps at all levels that may include but not limited to the planning process, identification of beneficiaries, implementation procedures and financial and human resources pulling. This study strives to assure the donor countries the reason for more support for these development projects and how and where it should be channelled.

Major research objective

The major objective for this study is **to assess the impact of the CBR project in the success of economic reintegration of ex-combatants.**

The following are minor research objectives:

- To identify and analyse key challenges in the DDR process for successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants.
- To comparatively analyse the planning, implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation of the CBR project

This research therefore, identifies gaps in classic DDR programs, provides insights into the existing solutions as identified in the CBR process and provide new knowledge in the DDR process. The researcher has tried to satisfy the requirements for the award of an MBA degree of an internationally recognized Maastricht school of Management.

1.4 Research questions

After having identified the problem, this study tries to identify and isolate the reasons for this failure or dismal success despite massive investment and extensive expertise and a vast

knowledge and literature in the so-called “best practices” and informed guidelines on the subject matter. The study strives to answer the following questions:

1.4.1 Major question:

- (i) Why does successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants remain limited?

1.4.2 Minor questions:

- (ii) What are the major obstacles to successful reintegration of ex-combatants?
- (iii) Who should benefit from economic reintegration interventions?
- (iv) How is the CBR project planned, implemented and monitored differently from the rest of the DDR projects?
- (v) How does the Rwanda Community Based Reintegration (CBR) contribute to economic reintegration of ex-combatants?

1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

This research is limited in the period between 2004 and 2009, when the community based reintegration project was implemented by the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), the national DDR program.

The research does not cover all the eight districts in which the CBR projects were implemented but limits itself only to 3 districts. These include at least one district where the project was well implemented, an average performing district and a poorly implemented project.

In as much as the research talks about the general reintegration issues, it dwells mainly on the community based reintegration. The study draws insights from other similar DDR programs in other countries particularly in Africa but focuses mainly on Rwanda. Conclusions made have been reached based on the data and information that obtain in Rwanda but may apply elsewhere.

1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The design of this study is descriptive in which, questions of who, what, when and how are answered. Several techniques are employed. Surveys in which semi-structured questionnaires

are administered, interviews and focus group discussions are carried out. The research therefore is both qualitative and quantitative where possible.

A reasonable sample of respondents is selected and is representative enough. The sample includes but not limited to all age brackets, gender and levels of education. It also takes into consideration the ratio of ex-combatants to non-ex-combatants.

1.7 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The research is limited in the area of coverage. The most representative of the outcomes of the implementation of the CBR by the RDRC would have been to visit all the 8 districts. But the study only covered 3 districts and hopes this is representative enough of the whole project.

A major limitation is where and when the main and key informants, whose knowledge of the project, may not be available due to other commitments. The researcher used all the means available to get this information.

Linked to the above, are the resources that are available to the researcher, both human and financial. The researcher used all the means possible to elicit support to reach all the stakeholders in the CBR projects and to collect all the important information for this research.

1.8 Thesis structure

This paper is divided into five chapters, each dealing with a major theme of the paper. Chapter 1 introduces the whole work and gives a historical overview, a problem statement and introduces the whole concept of the reintegration of ex-combatants and the plight of ex-combatants in their quest for reintegration into their society of return. It also gives the objectives of this study, its coverage and limitations.

Chapter 2 gives a literature review in which all the available information in the reintegration processes and programming for ex-combatants are examined, and chapter 3 presents the research methodology adopted for the study while in chapter 4, collected data is analysed, findings and discussions are presented. Chapter 5 deals with conclusion; makes

recommendations derived from the research findings and introduces the need for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces and reviews the available knowledge, both theoretical and practical in the realm of reintegration of ex-combatants. This chapter therefore includes information that indicates how this has been done in other programs and how practitioners and policy makers have devised or crafted programs for reintegration of ex-combatants with particular emphasis on economic reintegration. It narrows down to one project, the Community Based Reintegration, that aims at supporting both the ex-combatants and their neighbours in their community of return who are equally vulnerable and need this support. Before we can do this, we need first to understand the main terms used in this paper, such as understanding who an ex-combatant is, what DDR programs are and the nature of conflicts.

2.2 Key Concepts

2.2.1 Who is an Ex-combatant?

There are several definitions of ex-combatant, some emphasising the knowledge of handling and surrender of a gun and others insisting on having one through a demobilisation process (UN, 1999, Lindsey, 2001, Kingma, 2000). An ex-combatant is a man or woman, young or old, who joined and participated in warring factions either willingly or forced through abduction or coercion. Being a combatant entails leaving behind property, opportunities, and exposure to death and mental and/or physical injury. At the height of the war, combatants commit crimes and atrocities sometimes against their own families or communities.

Some ex-combatants may have been forced to commit crimes against their communities, families or peers. This dehumanizes them as they dehumanize their community and alienates them further from their community (Muwonge, 2007). This creates resentment for the community and family members and this may be observed in the settlement patterns. It should be remembered that ideally they should return to their communities, but sometimes choose other areas of return. Return to a new area and community means starting to create a new social and economic capital

from scratch and thus their economic reintegration becomes even harder. Most of the Rwandan ex-combatants returned to their home communities and those who never returned were due to lack of land in their communities or the pull factor to the urban places.

Based on a representative survey of former child soldiers in Uganda, Blattman et al (2006) have found that participation as a combatant in war leads to lower post-war earnings through lower education and skills. When youths become combatants, their ability to obtain an education is curtailed or, at the very least, they are unable to gain marketable skills obtained through work. By participating in war, such youths are less skilled or educated than others in their cohort who do not fight and therefore become trapped in lower income employment. Blattman and Annan were able to demonstrate that the reduced earnings due to participation in war is indeed an effect of the war on former combatants and not simply an artifact of less productive members of society becoming combatants in the first place. They were able to determine the causal direction of the effect of war on combatants' earnings because they have shown that recruitment of male youths into the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was random. In essence, they have shown that the unfortunate recruitment of child soldiers in Uganda was a natural experiment with participants as the LRA selected randomly, and this has enabled a variety of analyses to be performed rigorously.

The above is a pattern that appears even in more developed contexts such as the USA where there are greater opportunities for veterans of the armed forces to obtain a post-combat education. Some studies of American Vietnam War veterans showed how young American war veteran endure low payment jobs like the young Ugandan LRA abductees.

The above studies show the depth of vulnerability and dispossession of ex-combatants in comparison to their non-combatant friends. The ex. combatants find themselves at the lowest level of income in their communities and are not always considered for local support in other local government developmental assistance programs as the communities argue that there is a Commission set aside for them. This is another type of conflict the ex-combatant has to grapple with in his struggle for economic reintegration. Some DDR programs have tried to mitigate this by sensitization but the Rwanda DDR has put a public program mainstreaming activity in which a massive sensitization campaign to include and consider ex-combatants into the mainstream

local government development initiatives is directed at the local leaders, the community and the ex-combatants themselves. But still this has not given the envisaged results of total economic reintegration of XCs.

Nothing more explains the feelings and thus the self-resentment of ex-combatants than the following words by ex-combatants themselves as collected on the South African ex-combatants by Gear (2002), who indicates how the south African war veterans who feel that they have been discarded after being used, how they are being treated as villains while sometime back they had been heroes. All this show how the ex-combatants inner- self has been eroded and how they have lost creativity and they have no confidence and initiatives in themselves. They cannot trust themselves and so cannot trust anybody and so cannot work with institutions of development as we know them today. This, as said by ex-combatants from South Africa, summarizes what we know of most ex-combatants and the outcome of the DDR interventions of giving out hand outs (Gear, 2002). Hand outs here mean unsustainable support. The DDR support as it is today is considered here as handouts. Hand outs always create a dependency syndrome and create laziness and erosion of personal initiative and effort.

As for the ex-combatants from Rwanda, they said: “We always consumed what we got without thinking about the future because we were not sure that we would be alive. We need some time to develop the culture of saving and planning. We used to acquire property, only to abandon it. In the army when we were deployed for an operation or transferred, we never used to move with any property. I had to abandon my property three consecutive times when I was still in the army. Therefore we are now in the process of learning how to live like others, to acquire property, to plan and to make savings. However, without any more means, property, it is impossible” (Muhorakeye, 2007). This is true as the disarmament and demobilisation process is mainly depriving/taking away from the combatant, the only tools he knows how to handle (the gun), his source of income/employment (fighting in a group: government or rebellion) and his only social network, his peers in the forces he has served in his adult life.

A lot of literature has been written on the psychology of an ex-combatant. Some of the above South African and Rwandan ex-combatants words testify to how deep their confidence, vision and self-esteem are eroded. They cannot have any initiative and worse still any business

initiative. All these suggest new thinking in the support for sustainable economic development of ex-combatants lives. This study looks at the Community Based Reintegration as one of the better options for confidence building, social acceptance and in particular, economic empowerment and resource pulling by the community and ex-combatants together.

2.2.2 What is a DDR Program

DDR stands for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Some practitioners have included DDRRR, to include Reinsertion and Resettlement but reintegration summarises all. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. DDR seeks to support the ex-combatants in their economic and social reintegration so that they can become stakeholders in the peace and post conflict recovery.

Disarmament is normally done by military and police authorities, while the rest of the process is done by Government appointed agencies, national or international NGO's. The DD part of the process are usually short and easily done while the R part takes long and difficult to achieve. It has been recognized that the sustainable peace building process will go hand in hand with successful DDR process and this will only obtain through an all encompassing long term process of recovery (Vencovsky, 2006). In this study, we shall dwell on the reintegration part, mainly on economic reintegration.

DDR programs have been implemented world over for the last 3 decades, but the major concentration has been in the so called Great Lakes Region of Africa (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo). In this region, a DDR program was coordinated by the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of the World Bank and cost over 440 million US dollars, demobilizing about 280,000 ex-combatants, a total cost of \$1,571 per demobilized ex-combatant (MDRP, 2010). This program has been the most ambitious of all the DDR programs but talking about its success in the overall economic reintegration of ex-combatants would be very difficult. Several reasons may explain this, but for the sake of this study, we believe this could be a case of planning, participation and beneficiary targeting.

2.2.3 What is Reintegration?

The UN defines reintegration as “the process through which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a socio-economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level”, (UN, IDDRS, 2006). It is the process of returning to the civilian community life and engaging in socio-economic livelihoods other than violence. It is a dynamic and tedious process.

It is a process that has proven to be very long and difficult as it aims at changing the roles of the ex-combatants that he has been involved in his military career and requires him to put up with the community as a community citizen (Watson, 2009). Sustainable reintegration is therefore a situation whereby all the ex-combatants are involved in productive employment and business, have been accepted by the community and are participating fully in the social and economic fabric of the community as a whole.

It is an inclusive process that should move beyond the targeting of groups. One key recommendation of the final report of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) is the need to provide financial and technical support to communities for receiving ex-combatants (SIDDR, 2005). Successful reintegration therefore will happen if implemented in the framework of a wider poverty reduction strategy that benefits the whole community, thus the need for community based initiatives in reintegration. Reintegration is divided into two main aspects: social and economic reintegration. The focus of this paper is the latter.

2.2.4 War and armed conflict

Most ex-combatants may not or vaguely know the root causes of the conflicts in which they participate. Some conflicts are short and others are long. Some are more cruel and harsh and others (few of them) are conventional wars, respecting the basics of the international law on armed conflicts. The nature of the conflict has a big impact on the prospect of reintegration outcome at the end of the war. Shorter wars offer better opportunities/chances while longer and more cruel conflicts complicate the prospects of reintegration.

Some wars, like the LRA war in Northern Uganda, have deliberately destroyed the community bonds and human relations as a weapon of war. Child abduction and forced killing and in most cases killing family members or peers is used as deterrence for return to community or desertion. Rape and other violent atrocities committed against the community are part of the war machine, aimed mainly at dehumanizing the combatants and making them less critical of the war and make them more bloodthirsty (Muwonge, 2007).

As found in Uganda by Blattman and Annan (2006), the mental distress suffered is a rather comparative to the level of violence witnessed rather than the combat experience. Mental and moral scars from the conflict scars rather than bodily scars complicate more the chances of successful reintegration. The levels of distress suffered which is also relative to the cruelty and violence of the conflict also goes in line with the complication of reintegration prospects. A study conducted by the RDRC on the community dynamics for the Rwandan ex-combatants found out that 65% of ex-combatants presented a certain level of mental disorder and these groups had the highest rate of reintegration failure (Rugumire, 2007). The stress suffered during war and the ensuing psychosocial trauma levels are a factor of the success of reintegration of ex-combatants. The community and its people are some of the victims of the cruelty by ex-combatants. These need to unite or reconcile with the community to find some form of healing and coming to terms with the traumatising elements. The CBR projects come to offer to ex-combatants, an avenue and opportunity for dialogue and coming to terms with the offended community.

In developing countries, communities serve a particularly vital role in the economic life of individuals and households. Because wars can dramatically transform the social networks of communities, they can potentially have important impact on the economic outcomes of former combatants. Wars and conflict lead to a loss of social insurance with which former combatants can restart their economic activities since communities can serve as a vital source of social insurance.

War and poverty go in tandem. Wars lead to poverty and poverty may trigger wars. Tajima (2009) points out that ability to obtain remunerated jobs is an incentive not to enlist in armies/rebellions and this can lead to a eradication of armed conflicts. Thus successful economic

reintegration is a path to the eradication of war. In developing countries, this presents a big challenge as few people can be said to be employed: most are underemployed and thus potential for detractors. Agriculture and the rural setting in which most are absorbed, form a big reservoir for combatant recruiters. This is also the reason why most rebellions are based in the rural setting and the destruction of this set up, thus the livelihoods of the combatants and future ex-combatants is the focus of government forces in their fight against rebellions.

Wars and conflicts therefore affect the participants and entire communities in different ways depending on how long and severe the conflict was. However the most important challenge is how this conflict and war come to an end and the ensuing political dispensation. The Rwanda conflict was short but culminated in the 1994 Genocide that destroyed the whole Rwandan society and property. The political dispensation that followed was strong enough to put in place mechanisms for recovery and sustainable development that included a DDR program. This program included a CBR project that this paper assumes offers better opportunities for economic reintegration fro ex-combatants.

Having seen the nature of conflicts, the suffering that ensues for both the combatants involved and the destruction of the community in which these conflicts take place, we need to know how the Rwandan conflict was so as to understand the level of trauma and suffering the Rwandan ex-combatants have gone through and as we shall see later, this will have an impact on the level of success of economic reintegration for the Rwandan ex-combatants.

2.3 Brief history of the Rwanda Conflict

The Rwandan conflict originates, not from resource misallocation or misappropriation or natural calamities but bad political dispensation that led to the alienation and isolation of a big section of the national population. It was a case of denied rights and identity. It was a case of denial of citizenship and a homeland. Thus the conflict that ensued pitted not warring factions over natural resources but the need for the aggrieved section to have their rightful citizenship rights, have a right to a homeland.

The recruitment and enrolment to the rebel forces therefore, was motivated by the urge to gain these rights and this had an impact on the conduct of war as far as capital accumulation is

concerned. This may be said to be true for the recruitment into government forces which was being done on the premise of self defence against invaders from outside the country who wanted to take away their country. There was no material or financial reward for enrolment on both sides.

The Rwandan conflict was relatively short (4 years) and on the side of military combatants during the war period, we would say was relatively less brutal as there were no abductions, no major human rights abuses and other criminal atrocities committed. Crimes and human rights abuses were committed in the 100 days of Genocide against the Tutsi and this was mainly committed by the Interahamwe militiamen and civilians who are not part of the Rwandan DDR process. Ex-FAR men and women who may have committed such atrocities, only present a small fraction as out of a total 65,000 ex-combatants, only 13,000(20%) are ex-FAR and 7,500(12%) are from other ex-Armed Groups(AG), (RDRP, 2009). The remainder (68%) are from the forces that stopped genocide. Only a few cases of ex-combatants are reported to have appeared before the courts for genocide related crimes.

This motivation to enrolment into the armed conflict had an impact on how easy or difficult the economic reintegration of the ex-combatants would be. This work will bring out some of the impact of this characteristic on the success of reintegration interventions and how this calls for an approach that not only targets an individual but looks at the community.

The conclusion of the Rwandan conflict was the culmination of a protracted peace negotiation but with ultimate victory of one of the warring factions as the peace process aborted after the death of the former president in a plane crash. The victors were committed to the negotiated settlement deals that included DDR aspects for all the armies. The programs were implemented as envisaged albeit some financial difficulties.

2.4 DDR Design and Planning

All DDR interventions should be planned and tailored to the prevailing socio-economic environment as obtained in a situational analysis at the planning and design stage. For example, Vencovsky (2006) advises that training and education should be in line with existing opportunities on the labour market, which in most developing countries are agriculture and small

scale trades and craftsmanship. As noted by Barre et al (1999), it is common for post conflict nations to witness a broken economy and infrastructure unable to accommodate new labour market entrants. A detailed environmental scan in the planning is therefore essential, looking at the employment opportunities and tailoring skills development towards these opportunities.

The ultimate objective of any DDR program is to support the sustainable economic reintegration of ex-combatants and thus sustaining a no-return to violence and crime. This however has resulted in selecting who should benefit and who should not. This means that this selective process based on set eligibility criteria to identify legible beneficiaries has been very important to eliminate some potential beneficiaries (World Bank, RDRP Technical Annex, 2001). This element details who should benefit from a DDR program and what he/she should fulfil. In some programs, this has been a major issue of contention. For example, presentation of a firearm has encouraged the sale and exchange of firearms. Another criterion is the knowledge of firearm handling. Again a lot of youth in conflict-prone areas know how to manipulate a firearm. This has had the effect of bursting the planned numbers of participating ex-combatants in programs in the DRC (MDRP, 2010) and Sierra Leone (Peters, 2007).

In the process of planning and designing a DDR program therefore, care should be taken to the context of the conflict particularly its root causes and its history, its impact on society and the particular obstacles ahead for peace and reconciliation with particular emphasis on the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The MDRP and other World Bank support programs have been criticised for this but in its position paper, the MDTRP acknowledges challenges for its targeted approach particularly axed on the peace and reconciliation process, and highly recommended for other partners in the DDR process to look at the general picture of reintegration including Community Based Reintegration, (MDRP, 2004). In its closure report, the MDRP acknowledged a phased approach for reintegration, one targeting the Ex-combatants and one targeting the whole community, (MDRP, 2010).

As parties to the Rwandan conflict had agreed to a DDR component in the post conflict recovery programs, there was need to implement a DDR program even through the conflict settlement agreement had been violated. A Government of Rwanda DDR program was initiated from 1997, but its results were minimal due to lack of funding. Since 2001, the World Bank led another

DDR program in Rwanda, an ex-combatant targeted approach that is hailed as one of the most successful DDR programs in Africa. Despite all this, Rwandan ex-combatants and the communities in which they return still face reintegration challenges and ex-combatants still feel have not been fully reintegrated (Rugumire, 2007).

This paper looks particularly at economic reintegration of ex-combatants. This is because most research has indicated that sustainability begins with economic independence. Besides, in an African set up, there are several mechanisms to support the ex-combatants in their social reintegration and there are a lot of public programs for this. Social programs, which are implemented communally, are very effective, but economic development programs, which at most are in groups of cooperatives or associations and at best individually, have hardly offered successful results due to several reasons some of which are lack of managerial skills and a limited resource base. An understanding of economic reintegration is detailed in the following section.

2.5 Economic reintegration

Economic reintegration simply means financial independence for an ex-combatant's household through productive and income generating employment. Financial independence passes through the accumulation of productive assets and other financial resources, which are then put to productive use. In most African set up, the main asset is land and later housing for a young man/woman to build own family. As we shall see later, these will be the main initial investments of most ex-combatants. As Collier (1994) has noted, demobilization of former combatants in Uganda led to an increase in crime when former combatants lacked access to land. This suggests that sufficient incentives to engage in productive activities may help to reduce the likelihood that former combatants engage in rent-seeking activities. This therefore calls upon looking at availability of productive assets to ex-combatants.

2.5.1 Productive Assets

In comparison with civilians, combatants face a distinct set of challenges in restarting their economic activities. As we know in Rwanda, most productive assets which are actually land are a family property. Most combatants are young and as Rwanda is highly populated, they do not

have access to this land. They lack the education and other skills as they spend the school time in the rebellion. Even after the wars, they feel it is too late for them to join schools. During the 4 year war (1990-1994) and the ensuing counter-insurgency wars that ended completely in 2002 in Rwanda, combatant's assets were destroyed as the war zones were insecure and the entire land as the main productive asset was laid to waste.

For Rwandan ex-combatants who were fighting on the RPF side, their families were targeted and most were wiped out during the 1994 genocide including their property. Also as a big number of families of RPF soldiers came from outside of Rwanda, they had no social or material capital on which to start and so waited for support from the DDR program. The path for reintegration of all these ex-combatants started on a wrong footing as far as productive assets are concerned.

2.5.2 Human Capital

Whether or not the combatant benefits materially from participation in a military organization, as he spends most of his time in the military activities, he loses out on the education, training and experience obtained by his peers who remain in the civilian economy. The military training and experience may not count in the civilian economy, and this leads to two things: lower income and earnings and secondly may lead them to exploit their skills which is the use of force thus being at logger-heads with law enforcement. Muhorakeye (2007) in her study on the Psycho-social situation of Rwanda ex-combatants has indicated that the local ex-combatants will always be suspected first in any crime or misconduct in the local society.

The above is also true from a representative survey of former child soldiers in Uganda, where Blattman et al (2006) as earlier indicated that the world over, ex-combatants suffer from low level earnings due to low skills and education due to much prime time spent in the participation in war and conflict. This is true for most of the ex-combatants as the schooling system in Rwanda was very segregative and rudimentary while other Rwandans were also leaving as refugees with limited resources to invest in education of their children.

2.5.3 Education and skills training

Education and skills training are means to enhance the human capital. As said above, most ex-combatants do not adapt to mainstream schooling as they are older than their peers in class and

have more family responsibilities. Most drop out soon after. Formal education therefore has not been effective in the reintegration of ex-combatants. On the contrary, skills training has been seen as the best option to afford ex-combatants to engage in the productive labor market and so most DDR programs have adopted a skills training program.

According to Peters (2007), the DDR program in Sierra Leone provides a useful example of one such program. Former combatants were given “five packages” from which to choose: 1) enlist in the army; 2) return to school with fees covered; 3) train for six to nine months for vocational skills with a stipend and skill-appropriate set of tools; 4) train in farming practices with a package of tools and seeds; or 5) participate in public works projects. Of all the ex-combatants, 51 percent chose the vocational training package; while 20 percent chose the educational package and 15 percent opted for the agricultural package. This indicates that vocational training is the best preferred training.

But a great hurdle is the absorption of the trained ex-combatants into the work force. Peters (2007) suggests that in developing nations where most conflict happen and whose economies depend predominantly on subsistence agriculture, this will not absorb the newly vocationally trained ex-combatants. That is, ex-combatants’ skills and desires may not match the realities of the market. Indeed, Humphreys et al (2007) found that there appears to be no difference whether an ex-combatant participated in the training program or not given the reintegration program outcomes. This is true as the ex-combatants need to show which trades benefit them best and should be those that will allow them self employment. This is what the Rwandan CBR project envisaged to do.

These training programs therefore should meet the aspirations and life objectives of the individual ex-combatant; otherwise the expected outcomes may not materialize. The training program of the Rwanda DDR offers an example where this did not yield the expected outcome simply because the beneficiaries had little choice to make. “Out of all trained ex-combatants; 69% did not find a job where they could use the training they received. The RDRP independent evaluation (Rugumire, 2007) indicated that vocational training (provided by RDRP and other projects and programs) did not have the intended employment impact; one reason is the somewhat rigid structure of the VET program, whereby RDRP purchased a fixed number of training places at CFJs in a number of trades, perceived to be good sources of employment.

These trades may not correspond to the personal wishes and aspirations of the individual ex-combatant, who then may find themselves pulled into a trade (Rugumire, 2007).

As earlier said therefore, a situational analysis should have indicated the absorption capacity of the economy, the job opportunities available and other economic outlets that may benefit the ex-combatants but also the beneficiaries should be involved at some stage and in some capacity in the planning of all the benefits by expressing their aspired or preferred trade. This does not disregard that these ex-combatants have little insights into what is being planned for them but at least they know what they want. This is only when the benefits will yield sustainable results.

2.5.4 Social capital

As indicated above, education and training are some of the attributes that impact the social capital, but also goes beyond this. Social relations and community set up are a bigger part of this and are targets of most rebellions on both sides. Wood, (2008), notes that wars and conflict alter definitely the community social relations. This in turn changes the social relations, thus the social network, the trust, and here the ex-combatant is the most victim. The deterioration of social capital networks can be harmful to ex-combatants' access to financial capital. If they do not get the trust of members of the receiving community, ex-combatants may not have access to loans that could allow them to start productive economic activities. In most cases, micro-lenders will always find that group lending arrangements which are effective in peaceful settings are not as effective in post-conflict settings.

Having seen what economic reintegration is and what was implemented in some programs including the Rwandan DDR, we need to look at why most DDR programs have not yielded the expected results and why we think the CBR projects should provide part of the solution. We have explained the motivation for most of the combatants for joining rebel forces and for the Rwandan case, this was achieved upon completion of the war. We have also indicated that the conflict in Rwanda was relatively short and less cruel as we know of the conflicts in Northern Uganda or the Sudan. The main hurdle for the successful reintegration of the Rwandan ex-combatants would be the last part: the available alternative for earning their lives once demobilised.

The CBR project came as an alternate solution for effective economic reintegration of ex-combatants and it is the objective of this paper to evaluate the contribution of the CBR project in the economic reintegration process of ex-combatants.

2.6 The case for Community Based Projects

2.6.1 Introduction

Despite the massive investment with a lot of donor participation even to the level of giving the ex-combatants an allocation per individual by far superior than the general income per capita, available literature suggests that these resources have not produced the expected results. According to the UNDP, for sustainable development and reintegration, there should be a shift from the short sighted support to individual ex-combatants to the support of the wider community (USAID/UNDP, 2000).

As generally accepted, security based projects should target ex-combatants. In any case, they need the basics for life to begin. This may continue for some time. But as life normalizes and they begin to settle down, there is need for means of sustainable production that go beyond hand to mouth. This means all interventions should be geared at changing the personality of an ex-combatant, to create trust in himself and his community, thus enlisting his personal effort in his personal and community development.

2.6.2. Theoretical consideration

Asked how he would use his time to save the world if he had only five minutes; Einstein said; “I would use four minutes for planning and one minute for action.” Using these words here does not imply that there is no planning process in the classic DDR programs. On the contrary, there is rigid planning in which elements like “eligibility criteria” are set and adhered to in a PIM that allows little or no room for flexibility.

But as the wise words by Confucius goes: “Tell me and I will forget. Show me and I may remember. Involve me and I will understand”. It goes without saying therefore, that planning and

involvement is crucial elements of any successful project and sustainability of any program particularly for vulnerable and marginalised groups.

These principles were taken into consideration in the planning and implementation process of the CBR. The planning process and the stakeholder involvement for the CBR programming are very crucial and were identified from the very beginning. These stakeholders include the ex-combatants, local leaders and development partners. This allows for better ownership, responsible and close implementation, culminating in a sure and successful achievement of set goals.

2.6.3 Participation

The CBR approach emerged since the late 1990s and was commonly known as Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR). In the basic CDR model, communities prioritize their own needs for post-conflict reconstruction through a participatory decision-making process and implement the projects through their own labour inputs.

In Rwanda CBR projects, local leadership participates in the planning and identification of projects identifies the beneficiaries and closely follows up the implementation of the projects. All the elements of the community are involved, ranging from smallest community leadership levels, the Cells, to the Governor of the Province and including the local religious leaders and local bank managers.

2.6.4 Employment

The Rwandan DDR program with one of its development partners saw the need for sustainable development through the CBR project. This was planned and implemented in 8 Districts (out of 30 Districts) in 3 Provinces (out of 5 Provinces). The selection of Districts was based on those with the highest number of resident ex-combatants. Those selected were asked to identify projects that would be implemented using Labour Intensive Works (HIMO) and this would be implemented where possible on public property.

The ultimate goal of this project was to allow the ex-combatants, through employment in the projects, earn an income through their labour, thus moving away from hand-out support. The project then supports them, with an array of services, to nurture their own business projects, either individually or in cooperatives out of their hard earned income.

2.6.5 Earned income

The CBR projects implemented Labour Intensive projects of infrastructure construction (roads and bridges) and agriculture vertical terraces for soil erosion prevention, where by a number of ex-combatants works hand in hand with community civilians. The percentage in most cases is 50% ex-combatants and 50% civilians. The project is designed in a way that 50% of the daily wage is saved and is given out at the end of the project. This is compulsory to everyone including civilians. The daily wage Frw 1000 (about \$2) is paid and Frw 500 is saved. At the end of the project, a beneficiary has about Frw 100,000 (\$200) in bank as saving (RDRC-CBR PIM, 2005). This money serves as seed money for any business venture engaged in at the end of the project. In the targeted approach, ex-combatants receive a total of \$1000 as reinsertion and reintegration package and in several instalments. But as seen above, little is done due the above mentality of hand outs. The hard earned income out of own sweat is spent rationally and with the sensitization and training, cooperatives and other business ventures are initiated.

2.6.6 Equity

It should be noted that effective DDR programs should offer specific consideration to vulnerable groups. The Rwanda DDR did this by offering special treatment to women, children and disabled ex-combatants but disregarded the community. The CBR project incorporated women and the disabled in its planning, the disabled ex-combatants, who were given roles which they could afford depending on their disability. Those without legs were given activities that they could perform on the site while seated. Those without arms were given roles as supervisors, walking around. This was just aimed at allowing everyone to participate in the project and earn an income and also socialize with the rest of the community (RDRC-CBR 2009). The vulnerable community members were also given a chance to work with ex-combatants in projects of a DDR program. This had the effect of better acceptance of the community towards the ex-combatants whom they thought were better rewarded than the community in other DDR programs. In this project, both the community and ex-combatants were equally benefiting, thus increasing the XCs

acceptance levels in the community and resolving equity issues that are seen to hamper the community acceptance of ex-combatants.

2.7 Conclusion

From the above, we conclude that despite the many causes of armed conflict, at least for the Rwandan case, the main ones are the deprivation of a people to national economic opportunities, the freedom to do business and other rights. The Rwandan refugees, both inside and outside of the country, have been subjected to this deprivation for over 30 years and this created a condition conducive for the youth born in this situation to join the rebellion, not for any material gains or wealth spoliation, but gaining this freedom and opportunity to advance their economic development. Ex-combatants from such a rebellion were rather particular in their reintegration process, for they had no economic or material capital to draw on.

As one Rwandan ex-combatant put it as he was being interviewed, he indicated how life was easy in the bush but after the country came to normalcy, the life of the ex-combatants has deteriorated, with no weapons for this new type of war (Meherteab, 2004). The CBR project came to show business light and path to those ex-combatants and enable them navigate through this economic jungle.

This paper will evaluate the role of social capital, assets and earned income, in promoting self or community development rather than the targeted allocations that tend to make the beneficiary dependent and trap him/her into a dependency cycle. It will also try to evaluate the contribution of the CBR project of Rwanda in skills training for beneficiaries, both ex-combatants and the community members, to engage into sustainable business ventures, either individually or in cooperatives so as to broaden the economic opportunity base and allow better acceptance of ex-combatants into the community.

The final CBR project evaluation by the RDRP indicated that the project was very successful in economic reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities of return and it is the aim of this study to critically analyse this and bring out evidence of this assertion and to contribute to the realm of knowledge in the sustainable economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

CHAPTER 3: THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Conflicts and wars destroy the whole social fabric and the result is a fractured social life and community, having lost its values and most of the means of its survival. All the interventions at reconstruction after the crisis are geared, in most cases at the visible (the means of survival) and forget the inner society (hearts and minds of people) that has been affected even more, and which is the driving force of the implementation of the interventions. This chapter brings out the depth of the understanding of this destruction, proposes the methodology of analysis of this destruction and also critically analyses the different approaches proposed for interventions in view of indicating the intervention that shows better economic reintegration results for ex-combatants.

3.2 Theoretical underpinning

Blattman (2006) observed that physical distress but more so the stress affecting the state of the mind, have more influence on the outcome of reintegration. He notes that the variations in the stress of the mind are more of a function of the violence witnessed rather than the combat experience. The above study conducted in Uganda by Blattman that came up with this understanding, is shared with Rugumire (2007) who found out that 65% of all the Rwandan ex-combatants presented a certain level of mental disorder and this group had the highest rate of reintegration failure. This study will therefore look into the state of mind and being of an ex-combatant before understanding what the CBR intervention was able to propose that worked differently from classic DDR

The presentation of the intervention was identified to have a great impact on its success. The ILO (2009) has identified this in what is calls decent work that aims at changing ex-combatants into a trusted, responsible and productive community civilian. The ILO contends that is only achieved through decent remunerated work, earned out of own sweat. This excludes the allocations that are dubbed “hand outs” (Gear, 2002) and which is done in all the classic DDR programs and advocates for earned revenue through employment envisioned in the CBR projects.

The SIDDR (2005) and the USAID/UNDP (2000) have proposed the community as the area of intervention as it is equally a victim of conflict and suffers the whole destruction. The African context is that the major productive asset which is land is community (family) owned and the young ex-combatant does not have access to this asset or has been laid/is being laid to waste by conflict. An intervention that isolates the community is identified to give limited chances of success.

The above views should be enshrined in a planning process that supersedes all activities and meticulously done as espoused by Einstein who believes the planning stage should be given more time and resources as it lays the foundation; and finally the early involvement of the beneficiaries so as to allow them to grasp the whole process so that they can better retain the lessons of the intervention as taught by the great teacher Confucius. Finally, Rugumire (2007) recommended that a study by the R DRP should test the hypothesis that CBR is an effective mechanism for social and economic integration of ex-combatants. This study will provide some insights into this and will pave way for further research.

In conclusion therefore, the understanding of the ex-combatants predicament, what form the intervention will take and where it will take place and the process of packaging this intervention are critical elements of the DDR intervention and will determine its success. This study will critically look into this, narrowing the research to the CBR project and critically analyzing if it was able to combine all these attributes.

3.3 Research philosophy and strategy

This research is in the realm of social research, aiming at the understanding of how ex-combatants act in relation to the situations they find themselves in and to the interventions directed to their support. Social research is concerned with exploring, describing, and explaining social phenomena involving human behavior (Sufian, 1998). It is the human behavior that is responsible for all the changes that are observed.

As indicated by Proctor (1998) that the ultimate objective and underpinning of any research project is the coherence of the research study aim, its questions and selected methods. She argues

that before any research method can be chosen, there is a need for a clear understanding of the two extreme research philosophies: quantitative and qualitative research methods.

In as much as quantitative and qualitative research methods may often present opposing and polarized views, they are frequently used in conjunction with one another. Clarke (1998) emphasizes that certainly there are differences between the two research methods, but philosophically the two paradigms are not mutually exclusive as often presented. For Webb (1989), he believes there is an exaggeration of the divergence of the two philosophies. Polit (2001) insists that the two methods are commonly used in tandem.

This study therefore is critical in analysis but as expressed by Guba (1990), certainly unobservable phenomena do exist and do have influence on observable phenomena, thus the need to make the differentiation between the qualitative and the quantitative methods, also described as critical multiplism (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Here critical means the need for rigor, precision, logical reasoning and attention to evidence is required but as this approach proposes as espoused by Cook (1985), this is not to be confined to only what can be physically observed. He came up with what he called “multiplism” that refers to the need to approach from several perspectives. Cook argues that through multiple perspectives, research goals are defined, research questions and research methods are chosen and results are interpreted.

Particularly in small samples like this study, several methods are desirable and this is able to establish warranted assertions as we are able to interact with our research objects in an interactive process to understand the phenomenon under examination. With the above research understanding, philosophy and strategies identified, we hope to achieve our objective which is mainly to critically examine how the support given to ex-combatants in form of reintegration packages have not yielded the required economic reintegration, and also to critically evaluate how the Community Based Reintegration process has benefited the economic reintegration of ex-combatants, by being rooted in an environment that understands and caters for their tribulations and aspirations.

This study therefore has also adopted the triangulation of both the qualitative and quantitative research methods, thus going for a mixed research strategy, being in agreement that the actions

of the XCs are equally driven by their behavior and that for the study findings to be real, they must be critical and so must be backed by some quantitative data.

3.4 Research design

This research is designed in the following way:

- (i) An extensive literature review will find out available information and research on the subject and is depicted in chapter 2.
- (ii) A questionnaire with closed and open ended questions was developed and deployed based on the research objectives and the research questions
- (iii) The researcher carried out interview with some selected participants depending on their level of understanding and also including local leaders, project managers and local bank managers.
- (iv) A focus group discussion was be arranged for all the sites sampled
- (v) All the data collected was analyzed, interpreted and presented in a final report with conclusion and recommendations.

3.4.1 Research population

A research population is defined as including all the people or items that have the characteristic the researcher wants to understand. It would be ideal for the whole population to assess and collect their views of the research questions but this is not practically possible. This is the reason why there is always sampling, which is supposed to be representative enough to allow to make generalizations that are realistic and apply to the whole population.

The research population of this study is composed of 8 Districts in 3 Provinces in which the CBR project was implemented. It involves a total of 100 people of whom 60 are ex-combatants and 40 are civilians, excluding local leaders, bank managers and local entrepreneurs who were closely following up the project but are not direct beneficiaries. It also excludes the rest of the community of people living around the project area and have benefited in one or another, directly or indirectly. All these people too have a lot of information about the project and its impact on the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and their views will be captured in focus group discussions.

3.4.2 Research sample

According to Webster (1985), a sample is a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole. When dealing with people, it can be defined as a set of respondents (people) selected from a larger population for the purpose of a survey. This is done in the process of sampling, which is the process or technique of selecting a representative part of the population for the purpose of determining parameters or characteristics of the whole population.

A sample is used because of time and resource constraints but all the more being able to make realistic inferences that apply to the whole population. It would also not be realistic to think that we would be able to meet the whole population. Given the dangers that go with sampling, we mitigated this by making the sample representative and big enough through a mix of random sampling and pre-determined samples.

Out of the 8 Districts, we have chosen 3 districts which were able to make use of the biggest budget of the project. These have had the majority of beneficiaries and at this moment believe had greater impact on the community. Out of the 5 private entrepreneurs who participated in the project, we interviewed 2. Out of 8 participating bank branches, we interviewed 3 branch managers.

On the beneficiaries, the sampling strategy was a purposeful sampling that includes convenient sampling. A sample size of 100 participants out of a population of 6,000 people is selected. This sample size has taken into consideration the ratio of ex-combatants to civilians and involves all the age groups and sex.

3.4.3 Data collection

Data collection is the process of preparing and collecting data whose purpose is to obtain information for record keeping, to make decisions or passing it on to others. Three phases are identified in the data collection: Planning the data collection, collection of data and presenting findings after due analysis. We have used the following data collection techniques:

- **Secondary sources:** there is a lot of information and data on the subject and this will be collected and analyzed in line with our own research objectives. This includes text books, reports and web based sources.
- **Observation:** this is a technique that is commonly used and involves systematically selecting, watching and recording behaviour or appearances and characteristics of the research subject. This could take the form of participatory, in which the researcher takes part in the situation which is being observed, or non-participatory in which the researcher observes the situation from afar.
- **Interview:** this is a data collection technique through which the researcher puts forward to the respondent, a set of oral questions either individually or in group. The answers may be written down or recorded or both.
- **Administering a questionnaire:** this is the most commonly used data collection technique. It involves administering a written set of questions to be answered by the respondent in written form. These questions may take the form of open ended or closed questions.

There are several ways of administering a questionnaire:

- a) Questionnaires are sent by mail but indicating clearly how to answer the questions and mailing back.
 - b) Respondents are gathered in one place and oral instructions given and time is allowed for the questionnaire to be answered.
 - c) Questionnaires are hand given and collecting the filled questionnaire done later.
- **Focus group discussion:** a focus group discussion allows for a group of about 8-12 respondents to discuss freely on the study subject with the guidance from the researcher.

Our study research has utilized administered questionnaires, observation, interviews and focus group discussions. The questionnaire with closed and open ended questions was utilized. It was left to respondents to be filled and collected later where the respondents were able to read and write but respondents who could not read or write were helped to fill it by a research assistant. The focus group discussions were mainly organized for community residents that included project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries while interviews were organized for local leaders, local enterprise managers and local bank branch managers.

3.4.4 Data analysis and presentation

This is a process of data inspection; cleaning, organizing, describing, transforming, testing and modelling data for the purpose of gaining usable information that will lead to conclusions and allow for making informed recommendations.

The above processes were applied in the following manner:

- a) **Data preparation:** Data Preparation shall involve checking or logging the data in and checking its accuracy. The data is entered into the computer, transformed to form a database structure that will allow easy access and utilization. The data is logged in as it comes from mail returns of questionnaires, observation data and recorded data.

Checking the accuracy of the data, which should be done as soon as the data flows in, is accomplished by checking whether:

- The responses are legible.
- All important questions have been answered
- The responses are comprehensive and complete.
- All the relevant contextual information has been included such as the data, time or place.

- b) **Description of the data:** Statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. This provided simple summaries on the sample and the research questions. This formed the basis of the quantitative data analysis.

- c) **Data analysis:** inferential statistics help to draw conclusions and also make predictions about the properties of the population based on the information obtained. We used inferential statistics particularly to make judgments on what the beneficiaries of the project might think.

To conclude, in the process of data collection, analysis and presentation, we have concluded on the root causes of limited success of reintegration interventions and an understanding of how the CBR process was able to contribute better to the sustainable economic reintegration of ex-combatants and together with this, the development of the community and harmonious and peaceful living in the community. This is presented in form of statements, tables and graphs.

CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As detailed in chapter 2, the root causes of economic and social deprivation of ex-combatants have been identified. The main ones are the psychological status of the ex-combatants' state of mind upon demobilisation, the presentation of the support packages by different stakeholders and the available economic alternatives/opportunities for returning ex-combatants. Several interventions in different parts of the world that experienced conflict were mentioned but it was noted that successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants has remained elusive despite massive investment both in finance and human capital.

In this chapter, in the first sections, this study has tried to make a brief comparative analysis of the classic DDR processes and the CBR process as implemented in Rwanda. This has tried to answer the question of why there is very limited success stories in the DDR projects implemented all over the world. The last section tries to bring out how the CBR project as implemented in Rwanda can attest to such success that is achievable in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants if all the relevant ingredients of planning, implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation are associated in the very beginning of the projects.

4.2. A brief comparative analysis of the classic DDR and CBR processes

Looking at the amount of funds allocated to the DDR process and projects, we would assume very successful reintegration outcomes for all the programmes implemented in the developing world. But a quick analysis of the classic DDR programmes in the MDRP implemented in the Great Lakes of Africa (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Angola) in comparison to the CBR project implemented in Rwanda reveals the contrary.

According to Escola de Cultura de Paz (2008), in the classic DDR programs, the ratio for the cost of demobilisation of one ex-combatant with the national GDP is 4.5 times the National GDP/per capita on average. For example the ratio was 17.1 in Afghanistan, 12 in Burundi, 6.1 in Sudan and 4.1 times in Rwanda in 2005. This implies that most of the resources are consumed by heavy program management overheads.

With the existing conflict tensions and the above expenses, the local population left out of the programs feels cheated and so will not accept easily the returning ex-combatants and thus the decimal reintegration successes recorded.

Table 1 below gives both the general picture of the utilisation of resources for all the CBR projects in Rwanda and the particular projects visited in this study. In land terracing projects for example in Nyabihu district, 100% of all the funds allocated to the project went into the hands of ex-combatants and the community (87% for Ngoma and 90% for Butare, 13% and 10% respectively having been spent on road compaction works which is done by construction enterprises). The ratio of resources going into the hands of the XCs for all the CBR projects is 59% (of which 57% went directly into the hands of the ex-combatants and 2% in the reintegration services like bank account opening and other service provision to beneficiaries) and 30% was spent on tools and materials and road compaction works. This demonstrates how effective this approach would be in the poverty reduction process since most of the funds allocated to the project actually is delivered to where it is intended, the beneficiary. We may not talk of the same for the MDRP implemented projects.

Table 1 : CBR expenditures in the 3 projects

Description	AVERAGE FOR ALL CBR PROJECTS		INDIVIDUAL VISITED PROJECTS		
	Total Amount CBR (Frw)	Ratio for all 8 CBR projects	NGOMA Ratio	NYABIHU Ratio	BUTARE Ratio
Labour	1 297 437 988	57%	59%	85%	63%
Services	271 872 750	12%	20%	3%	8%
Materials & Tools	332 727 768	15%	4%	11%	17%
Miscellaneous	6 473 067	0.30%	1%	0%	0%
Reintegration	44 506 238	2%	3%	1%	1%
Compaction Works(for road Construction Projects)	338 199 334	15%	13%	0%	10%
Total	2 291 217 146	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: CBR final report 2009

4.3 The Rwanda CBR project

4.3.1 An overview

This study involved a sample of 100 respondents, 60 of whom were ex-combatants (only 3 were women) and 40 were vulnerable community members (of whom 15 were women) who participated in the CBR projects in 3 districts, Ngoma (Eastern province), Butare (Southern Province) and Nyabihu (Western Province). It also involved interviews with 6 local leaders (2 per District at different levels of authority) and 3 private sector participants (one per District) and 3 local bank branch managers (one per District). The field study was carried out in early March 2012. Table 2 summarises the composition of the sample by district (3), ex-combatants (male: 57, Female: 3), vulnerable civilians (male: 25, female: 15). The female ex-combatants population in Rwanda is about 1% (RDRP, 2010) and so this explains the small number of female XCs in the projects. Total sample size: 100 respondents.

Table 2 : Total respondents in 3 projects

Total respondents in 3 projects						
District	Site	Nr of respondents (community members)		Nr of Respondents (X-Cs)		TOTAL
		Women	Men	Men	Women	%
Huye	Nyanza-Nyumba-Mukoni road	2	6	11	0	19
Nyabihu	Vertical Terraces of Jomba	9	12	26	2	49
Ngoma	Lake Sake road	4	7	20	1	32
Total		15	25	57	3	100
%		15%	25%	57%	3%	100%

Source: Primary data

From the two tables (3 and 4) below, the ex-combatants are young and vulnerable with no skills to market: 68.5% are under 40 years of age and 88.9% have not gone beyond primary education and so unable to cope with modern trainable skills. About 78% have over 4 dependents while this becomes 98% for over 3 dependents. This shows the level of vulnerability and coupled with the inability to be trained in modern skills, the package received from the classic DDR programs soon vanishes upon demobilisation. It should be remembered that in an African setup, while in the army, most of the dependents' burden is placed somewhere else on the family members, but once demobilised, these dependents return for support.

Without any marketable skills, the only place of reception for the returning ex-combatants is the rural areas where also there is no employment. That is why in this study, most respondents employment is agriculture which is actually subsistence agriculture. The study also revealed that at the end of the CBR projects, more employment opportunities were available and the number employed in agriculture had reduced or at least beneficiaries had other secondary income generating activities.

Table 3 : Number of Dependents

Number of Dependents		
Nr. of dependents	Frequency	%
2	3	5
3	12	20
4	18	30
5	10	16.7
6	9	15
7	3	5
8	3	5
9	1	1.7
11	1	1.7
Total	60	100

Source: Primary data

Table 4 : Age of responding ex-combatants

Age of responding ex-combatants		
Age	Number	%
Between 25 and 30	10	16.7
30 and 35	13	21.7
35 and 40	18	30
40 and 45	10	16.7
45 and 49	7	11.7
50 and above	2	3.3
Total	60	100

Source: Primary data

4.3.2 The planning process

The planning process of the Rwanda CBR begins with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda with its development partner which is the German Development Bank (KfW) and the GtZ. It also included the agreement on which approach to use and the setting up of objectives and identification of projects to be implemented. This also implied the selection of the geographical location of the projects.

It was agreed from the very beginning that this intervention would not be targeted, unlike in other DDR projects, where a rigorous eligibility criteria is used to indicate the beneficiaries of the intervention. This CBR targeted the whole community with a big number of ex-combatants and this was the criteria to select the 8 districts from the 30 districts countrywide.

The CBR programming would also involve their provision by the beneficiaries who would earn an income out of their own sweat. This was done through labour intensive projects that would give work to the biggest manpower possible that includes ex-combatants and the local vulnerable population. This has the effect of confidence and trust building and acceptance among the local population and ex-combatants as both benefit from the intervention as opposed to targeted intervention. This is a very important element in the process as this came frequently in the focus group discussions and interviews that indicated that ex-combatants were previously not readily acceptable into the community, were treated with disdain and could not access other development opportunities offered to the rest of the community for it was believed they had their separate and better support system.

4.3.3 Stakeholder participation

The stakeholders who include ex-combatants, the local community, local leaders at the Province, district and sector levels, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, the German Embassy in Rwanda, KfW and GtZ were involved from the very beginning of the project.

A forum of decision making was set up, the steering Committee chaired by the KfW involving most of the stakeholders, would study projects submitted by the RDRC and would make important decisions like funding a project.

Most of the planning in the classic DDR projects are done through government negotiations and documents are produced that give every detail of project implementation in what is known as Project Implement Manual (PIM) derived from Loan/grant agreements and their technical annexes. Beneficiaries are never consulted for their views.

4.3.4 Selection of projects

The projects selection involves the local administration prior to identification of priority areas in the infrastructure development. The main criterion is to identify a project that can employ a very big number of manpower, hence the name: High Intensity of Labour Projects, or better known locally as “HIMO”, a French acronym. The selected projects are then approved by the Provincial level and submitted to the RDRC which then makes detailed implementation studies and present them in the Steering Committee for approval.

The approved project is then handed over to the local administration (the district) for implementation supported by a private entrepreneur, through a signed agreement with the RDRC. This involvement of the local private sector in the projects is for developing local entrepreneurial capacity in the rural targeted areas and there is always some positive discrimination in the selection process.

4.3.5 Implementation arrangements

Labour arrangements

As said, the CBR process identified high labour intensive projects in infrastructure development. The ideal being to have an equal ratio of ex-combatants to non-ex-combatants but where this was not possible, reduced ratios were accepted. Women were given equal opportunities to men and also disabled ex-combatants were given tasks that they could manage in relation to their disability.

The labour involved was those that live near the project site, but ex-combatants who could accept to camp or rent nearby housing were accepted. The ratio of ex-combatants to the vulnerable local community members was set at 50:50. At one point when the ratios of ex-combatants to the community members were not adequate, a decision was taken to increase the ratio of community members, something that would not be possible in the classic DDR projects.

Payment arrangements: Using banks and savings

All the workers had to open a bank account on which everyone's wages would transit. This was a very good arrangement as the majority never had bank accounts. It also had the effect of sensitising them to using banks and later on access bank credit system. The local banks also were encouraged to give loans to participants of the project as they were assured of the savings that would never be drawn in less than six months and that all the payments would transit through these accounts.

Remunerated employment at the end of the months afforded the participants a chance to work with banks that they were later sensitised to benefit from their services. All the ex-combatants had had bank accounts for the DDR allowances but had never had bank loans. Very few community members had had bank accounts and no one had had a bank loan. This was a great achievement on the level of the

community and even ex-combatants, who despite having had bank accounts that were used only for drawing their reinsertion and reintegration packages.

The private sector

Unlike in the classic DDR processes where other main partners are NGO's (both local and international), in the CBR process the private sector was involved in the implementation arrangements. Using local entrepreneurs had the effect of boosting the local economy and generally boosting the ownership of the projects.

These entrepreneurs were not used as contractors but as labour managers where they manage and plan the daily work of the participants, make pay lists and give daily reports of the progress of the works. Every project had at least one private entrepreneur overseeing the implementation of the project. Local suppliers of sand, stones and other construction materials were also recruited, thus leaving more money in the community. In the group discussions and interviews, all the participants were happy about this development and implementation arrangements and expressed satisfaction with it. They acknowledged having benefited nothing from the many other DDR programs compared to what they have benefited in the only CBR project in the locality.

The private entrepreneurs were very crucial in the implementation and follow up but particularly for the "On-the-job" training of participants as they implemented the CBR project. At the end of the projects, the technical and managerial skills gained enabled setting up some private cooperatives and associations that are operational and doing well.

The local administration ownership

The local ownership element in the implementation arrangement was very beneficial for the long term reintegration of ex-combatants before the CBR. Ex-combatants who had been perceived as having received more than they deserved, found themselves being denied the opportunities offered by the mainstream development projects at the local level. Having involved local leaders in the project implementation and having incorporated the community as beneficiaries, other opportunities were also

opened up for ex-combatants who were gladly accepted into the community and are benefiting from the mainstream local development opportunities.

This did not only solve the problem of equity that has plagued most DDR programs, where the local community feels cheated when the ex-combatants are being rewarded for their “supposed” crimes. This feeling shuts off the door for the ex-combatants into the mainstream development opportunities but with this approach, they share the CBR with the community and the later opens up for the ex-combatants.

4.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

The overall monitoring and evaluation was done by the AFC consultants, who were hired to assist the follow up of the whole process, from planning to implementation. The Consulting group had local staff that would be present and oversee the day to day monitoring of the project and were backed by international expertise. The work of the AFC was very crucial in the implementation and realisation of the targets and advises to the RDRC and its partners.

The local entrepreneurs involved in the implementation arrangements were also providing M&E insights into the project. They could identify changes in the attitude, labour feelings and aspirations and social trends among the participating workforce.

The M&E for the classic DDR is mainly done by the head office which sometimes has regional representatives. With the CBR, the local administration, the Districts and lower entities, who were also involved on the onset of the project planning and implementation, were also involved in the monitoring of the project. Since they were in the proximity of the project sites, their contribution was very crucial in the timely completion of the projects. At the higher level, the RDRC, the Province and the Ministry responsible for local administration were also involved in the follow up and sensitisation of the participation and commitment to the project success.

From the above, we can conclude that:

The planning process in the CBR is more inclusive, not based on expert and practitioners crafted guidelines that may sometimes ignore the local and cultural peculiarities. The CBR allowed for early consultation with the beneficiaries at local levels and this brought the decision making process closer to

them. Ex-combatants and the participating community understood more the reasons for whichever intervention was proposed.

Being too stringent on the beneficiary (participants) of the intervention of a DDR program limits its sustainability, taking up roots in the community is hampered and the overall social and economic development sustainability even for the targeted groups is limited. The CBR case underscores that even with limited resources; the impact of social and economic transformation is enormous.

This project process is not only inclusive but also identifies vulnerable groups that are positively discriminated. The employment of the handicapped based on their level of handicap and the positive discrimination of the most vulnerable of the local population is a solution to avoiding the equity issues raised in other DDR programs where ex-combatants are perceived to being rewarded for the supposedly atrocities committed during the war. In this process, also the handicapped ex-combatants are not thrown away as said earlier of the South African ex-combatants experience.

The CBR process allows for better ownership and follow-up. The list of all the people who would be involved in the M&E of the project is endless, ranging from the local religious leader, local school head teacher, and lowest local administration level to the District and Provincial levels of administration. The effect of this total ownership of the community and the wish for its total success was the driving force behind all the success.

We may conclude here therefore, that the classic DDR projects spend a lot of money on different administrative overheads and end up not being effective in their objectives; while the CBR spends most of its resources on the XCs and local vulnerable population and by this, ensures that all the intervention resources are directed at the beneficiaries that includes the local vulnerable population.

4.4 The Rwanda CBR project contribution to economic reintegration of ex-combatants

The following section looks at the findings from the interviews, focus groups discussions and questionnaire findings from the study. It is a true reflection of the respondents as they have seen and lived the CBR experience as they put it. There were 3 sources of information in the study: (i) a questionnaire administered both to the participants (both ex-combatants and non-ex-combatants) in the CBR projects; (ii) interviews with the local administration officials, local bank branch managers and

private sector participants and; (iii) focus groups discussions, which arranged groups of those who participated and those who never participated but were present at the time of project implementation. All these are beneficiaries of the projects in a way that they were selling their products to the workers and are benefiting from the public utility project like road construction.

The project had many objectives but the main economic ones being:

- (i) Ex-combatants perceive their economic perspectives in the civil society improved in comparison to the date of demobilisation
- (ii) Ex-combatants have increased their capability to sustain their livelihoods
- (iii) Ex-combatants stay in their communities of return.

At the end of this section, we should be able to conclude on the overall contribution of the CBR project on the successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

4.4.1 Participation/employment

The whole CBR project in the 8 districts employed about **1,737** ex-combatants with about **7,200** vulnerable community members, (RDRC: CBR, 2009), but the 3 projects sampled in the study employed over 850 ex-combatants and about 2,500 vulnerable community members. The ex-combatants included even those who were not physically fit but could fill the roles of supervisors and clerks. The effect of participation in communal public works together with ex-combatants had a great effect on the acceptance of the ex-combatants by the local community and confidence building in the mind of ex-combatants. The trust so created was high that now the perception and rating of ex-combatants to their contribution in the development to the community is very high.

The effect of employment on the psychology of ex-combatants is enormous. In the army days, combatants are used to consuming and upon demobilisation, the package given was equally consumed and soon ex-combatants were left with no means of income and remained destitute. With this earned income and the sensitisation and training that followed, and the interaction with the local community used to fending for themselves, the ex-combatants learnt how to utilise efficiently their income.

4.4.2 Savings through working with banks

The project included an element of mandatory saving of 50% of the daily wages. The daily wage was Frw 1000 (approximate \$2). This would be kept in a bank that would deliver it as a lump sum at the end of the project. The saving would act as seed money and also a basis for loan application. At the end of the projects, some people had saved over 200 US Dollars on a bank account which they had never had before (all ex-combatants had bank accounts).

As we know the importance of banks in economic development of peoples, this also marks another difference between the CBR and the classic DDR processes. All the workers in the project were subjected to mandatory savings. As most had never worked with banks, they never knew the importance of this facility and were at first hesitant and that is why it was mandatory. The findings in this study demonstrate the effect of this service and arrangement.

Table 5 shows that all the ex-combatants worked with banks and benefited from bank loans (100%) and at least over 80% took a loan greater than their monthly pay of 30,000 Frw, indicating a scheduled payment in time and an improved creditworthiness of the XCs by the previously vulnerable population.

This also indicates a change from the subsistence living to more sustainable activity and income generating trends in their livelihoods. Table 6 indicates new activities in which the loans were put. It particularly indicates that the consumption needs which are characteristic of rural populations (subsistence living/production) took only 23.3% while important life changing expenditures (education and health) took 26.7% and income generating activities and investments took about 45%. This ultimately marks change in livelihood trends and confirms an improved livelihood and better life standards, thus better economic reintegration of XCs as individuals and in their community.

Table 5: Amounts and Frequencies of bank loan Requests

Amounts and Frequencies of bank loan Requests		
Amounts	Number	%
Between 25,000 and 30,000	12	20%
30,000-40,000	16	26.7%
40,000-50,000	22	36.7%
Over 50,000	10	16.6%
Total	60	100,0%

Source: Primary Data

Table 6: Use of Bank loan from CBR

Use of Bank loan from CBR		
Activity	Frequency	%
Basic needs	14	23.3
School Fees	10	16.7
Medical fees	6	10.0
Purchase of land(field)	10	16.7
Small farm animals	4	6.7
Income Generating activity	6	10.0
House improvement	3	5.0
Association costs	4	6.7
Other	3	5.0
Total	60	100.0

Source: Primary Data

From the above tables 5 and 6, we can say that the XCs and the community in general, are enjoying changing economic opportunities offered by the CBR that include working with banks, personal revenue management through savings and new jobs opportunities offered through training based on everyone's capability to comprehend and investment financing opportunity offered by banks.

4.4.3 Economic Reintegration

Reintegration aspects

The study overarching goal is to prove that the CBR can bring out successful economic reintegration of XCs through HIMO works that give employment to the community and resident XCs. This is the aspect that allows the XCs a sustainable livelihood in the community. To verify and confirm the above objective, the study research deployed research instruments that included a questionnaire, interviews and group discussions centred on this theme. The following are some of the responses and views held by participants in the study:

This study has found out that, in table 7, after the implementation of the CBR, 3.3% of the ex-combatants feel they are poorly reintegrated and 76.7% feel they are well integrated. This clearly underscores the success of the CBR in this process as evidenced in table 8 where the community, before

the CBR, believed that 26.6% of ex-combatants were poorly integrated before the CBR and only 12.1% had been very well reintegrated.

This shows a big difference in the reintegration outcomes in a period (5 years) of the CBR implementation: an increase from 12.1 % (before CBR) to 76.7% (after CBR) who feel are better off and a reduction from 26.6% (before the CBR) to 3.3% (after the CBR) who feel are still poorly reintegrated.

Table 7: Description about feelings about their situation after the CBR

Description about feelings about their situation after the CBR		
Response	Frequency	%
Very good	46	76.7
Good	12	20
Poor	2	3.3
Total	60	100

Source: Primary data

Table 8: Reintegration of XC before CBR as seen by the community

Reintegration of XC	Residents					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Very good	31	37	68	8.7%	17.7%	12.1%
Good	223	123	346	62.8%	58.9%	61.3%
Bad	101	49	150	28.5%	23.4%	26.6%
Total	355	209	564	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: RDRC, 2007. CBR Baseline Survey.

In general and as discussed with the local leaders and in group discussions, XCs were believed to be troublemakers in the community and would be the first suspects in any law breaking incident in the community. The CBR has reversed this perception and XCs are participating in the community development. They have earned the community respect through the labour works done together with the community members and the cooperatives and associations formed after the works, are cementing their

economic relations. In all the local administration entities in the study, XCs had been elected as local leaders. In Ngoma, they had elected an XC as a local sector councillor (the most senior local leader at this level).

Women have been particularly touched by the CBR project. Women are 18% in the work force of the 3 project under study. As usual for all the African communities, these had a big family burden, hardly affording the basic requirements for their families like health and education requirements. With the CBR, they testified they are able to purchase the local health insurance (Mutuelle de Sante) and also pay the school fees for their children. They were also able to buy small domestic animals (goats) that are a source of income in case of need (Table 5) and thus raising their economic status.

(i) Sustainability of livelihoods

Table 9 below indicates what levels of sustainable economic activity these ex-combatants could undertake with 18.3% working on their family farms or plots of land while about 82% working off-farm. Most were uneducated and could not read or write. Fig 1 also indicates how stable the ex-combatants are getting with 65% in own houses at the locality. Given also the marriage status at 86.2% (Fig 3) and the housing status, we can confirm that the ex-combatants are rooting themselves in the community and are gaining stability. Settlement is a major sign of sustainability particularly for the African context.

Community members indicated that the majority of ex-combatants were badly perceived in the community before the CBR for over 62.5% had problems of security and delinquency (table 10) and 23.3% were considered poor by the community. But as indicated with more local house construction, more investment in associations and cooperatives and better acceptance, ex-combatants are getting more rooted in the community of return. This is confirmed in table 11, where at least 91.7% of the ex-combatants feel they are at ease with the community members and only 3.3% can say they are not at ease with the community. This small fraction (3.3%) may be explained by some social character traits of each individual that help him cope/fail to cope with problems.

Table 9: Table of New jobs performed by XCs

Table of New jobs performed by XCs		
Activity	Frequency	%
Masonry	14	23.3
Land Terrace specialist	8	13.3
Farmer	6	10.0
Agriculture	5	8.3
Artificial inseminator	2	3.3
Hair dressing	2	3.3
Carpentry	2	3.3
Basket weaving	4	6.7
Pork and Chicken rearing	2	3.3
Trading in Bananas	4	6.7
Security services	2	3.3
Public road repair works	4	6.7
Masonry aid	5	8.3
Total	60	100.0

Source: Primary data

(ii) Employment

Ex-combatants who were employed in few jobs now have many alternatives. It is also clear from the findings that new trades were learnt and new jobs acquired. Table 9 above indicates that even though the majority were peasant agriculturalists, they later became masons, carpenters, animal artificial inseminators, fishermen and transporters in boats, bicycles or motorcycles and some became managers of cooperatives. The new types of jobs created were acquired locally (at the CBR project) and are benefiting the local population who could not have dreamed of any skills acquisition as indicated with the level of skills and education before the CBR (Fig 3 & 4).

Table 10: Problems of XCs before CBR seen by the community

Problems of XCs in the community before CBR seen by the community		
Problem	Frequency	%
Delinquency	12	30
Security	13	32.5
Poverty	9	22.5
Health	3	7.5
Other	3	7.5
Total	40	100

Source: CBR Base line Report, 2007

Table 11: Filling at ease in your community

Do you fill at ease in your community		
Response	Frequency	%
Yes	55	91.7
A little	3	5.0
No	2	3.3
Total	60	100.0

Source: Primary Data

(iii) **Settlement**

Settlement is a sign of stability particularly in the African context. Fig 1 indicates that 65% have built own houses after having benefited from the CBR. Only 31% of all the ex-combatants lived in the community in the last five years, implying they never had houses in the community (they could have come for the CBR employment or have just been demobilised), but now, after the CBR, 65% have built own houses and only 4% have indicated the will to leave the community in the next 3 years (Fig 2). Those who live with parents and friends are also likely going to stay and begin their families here.

Group discussions indicated that most of the ex-combatants dreamed of constructing own houses, first as a condition for getting married and second for recognition in the community. Psychologically, owning a house gives you the comfort and assurance of residence and allows participating in community. Group discussions indicated that the community only believes reintegration and settlement is fulfilled once a person has a house. We can conclude here that the CBR has presented a good channel for settlement, affording the XCs means to acquire land and housing.

Figure 1: Housing Status of XCs after the CBR





Fig 2: Housing Trends for XCs



Source: Primary data


Source: Primary

data

(iv) Training


The project involved a training component. Training was organised in different trades: construction of roads and bridges, modern agriculture practices such as artificial insemination, handcraft (basket weaving), cooperative movement management and elementary book keeping. At the end of the training, participants would receive tool kits that would help them start own workshops and create jobs for themselves and also employ others. It is in this regard that a workshop, a basket weaving association and other handcraft developed.

Figure 3: Education Levels of XCs



Source: Primary Data

Figure 4: Literacy Levels for XCs



Source: Primary Data

Even though 78% is said to read and write (Fig 4), still this is elementary education or self taught. Only 5% had secondary education, 21.7% had not gone to school at all and also none had university education (Fig 3). This is a major handicap to socio-economic change and is cause for self-degradation and loss of self-confidence.

The CBR project has demystified this notion by affording the XCs and vulnerable community members by giving those skills that are needed in the locality and are put into use immediately at this very locality where about 82% has indicated that they have secondary income generating activity that was learned from the CBR training program (table 9). This table confirms that all the ex-combatants (also the same for the participating vulnerable community members) can be trained, can have an alternative trade and live off farm with better prospects of sustained revenue streams. This is very crucial in a densely populated Rwanda with low levels of education and a very big youthful population.

(v) Cooperatives and associations

Several cooperatives and associations of artisans and trade (basket weaving, carpentry, and water transport using small boats) have been formed. An association of road maintenance on one project (Ngoma District) has also been formed and was hired to maintain the road infrastructure made in the CBR project. This will only give sustainable employment to members but will also help to maintain the road and ensure its longer term utilisation.

The cooperative movement is particularly important in Rwanda as most of the mainstream support is channelled through these organisations. The government has set up loan guarantee funds that allow only people in cooperatives to benefit. All the cooperatives and associations in the areas of study have benefited from bank loans which are very sizable. The water transport cooperative in Ngoma got a loan of \$1000 to purchase a boat engine that runs the boat that allows the population to cross the lake at a fee.

An important element in the associations and cooperatives is that all are mixed: they bring together ex-combatants and community members, men and women of all ages. Most of the leaders of the associations and cooperatives were ex-combatants. This implies the trust they have in them has improved tremendously. In all the discussions and interview, all praised the role played by the new cooperative sand associations to uplift the economic standards of the members.

4.4.5 Public infrastructure developments

An important factor in the sustainability and visibility of the CBR projects is its nature of the construction of durable goods in form of public infrastructure like roads and bridges and public land terraces. Even though these activities employ a big number of the ex-combatants and the local vulnerable people, the rest of the community that see and use the infrastructure accept and rate highly the intervention of the project whose economic contribution to economic development is immeasurable.

While the payment packages in the DDR program are consumed and in most cases leave the particular beneficiary with all needs unmet, the CBR leaves behind a whole village hitherto inaccessible opened up for economic exchange with the rest of the district, or a barren area opened up for agriculture after a road construction and a full land terracing project respectively. The effect of this is twofold:


- (i) The infrastructure opens up the communication channels of the area and allows tapping the local resources and channelling them to markets.
- (ii) The easy access allows other development opportunities to open up and enhances the economic production of the area and exchange with the rest of the District. All these ultimately benefit the ex-combatants and the community as well.

4.4.5 Other social benefits

Social relations: the CBR project has assisted the community and the ex-combatants to live in harmony. The baseline survey of the CBR had indicated that at least 53.3% had problems of poverty and delinquency (table 10) and this shows the vagabond type of life the ex-combatants had. But as indicated in table 7 & 11 on their feelings/perception about their acceptance in society, their housing achievements and trends (Fig 1&2) and their new achieved employment opportunities (table 9), we can confirm that their social relations with the community and with themselves (family and their psychosocial status) has improved and indicates very positive reintegration results.

Marriage: As seen from the CBR baseline survey (2007), most ex-combatants (68%) were not married but now over 89.2 % are married (including 4% widowed) as indicated in Fig 5 below. In the African context, marriage cements the communal ties, acceptance and sustainability. It also means more productive means at the family level and more incomes and more inclusion and participation in society and thus more and better reintegration.

Figure 5: Marital Status after the CBR



Source: Primary data

4.4.6 Conclusion

We set out to indicate the challenges of the DDR processes and how the CBR has been able to present success in this process, as exemplified by the Rwandan CBR case study. We can conclude therefore, the CBR process is better suited for the sustainable reintegration of XCs due to the following identified reasons as clearly found out in this study:

It involves and benefits all the victims of conflict that is the community as a whole. As wars and conflict affect equally the community as well the fighting combatants, both victims should somehow find support in any eventual support programs. This is because the community is where the psychosocial issues of the XCs are better understood and supported through the social support safety networks of the community. The CBR has fulfilled this.

The planning and implementation arrangements are better suited and centred to the beneficiary rather than imposed based on best practices and lessons learnt from foreign experiences that may not apply to the local situation. Flexibility and adaptation on implementation parameters in time are some of the innovations in the CBR planning process. For ex-combatants, the project was able to avoid the handout phenomenon and instead paid out labour from participants. This earned revenue was rationally utilised

and out of this, employment was made, more savings realised, individual development achieved and social respect earned.

The CBR projects leave behind durable and tangible assets in form of roads and bridges, reclaimed agricultural land and the skills and entrepreneurship that will always be beneficial to XCS and the community. These are long terms gains that are not achievable in the classic DDR programs. The CBR outcomes are sustainable and durable and this is better for ex-combatants.

CHAPTER 5. MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings and also gives conclusions and recommendations related to the specific study findings in relations to the study objectives.

5.2 Summary of findings

This study, which set out to identify the contribution by the CBR projects to the success of the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in light of meagre success recorded in the DDR programming, was able to show that success in economic reintegration is possible with limited resources and can only be achieved sustainably with the involvement of ex-combatants together with the community.

It is always and has always been advisable to involve beneficiaries on the onset in any socio-economic development for the community, instead of using ready-made tailored solutions that are assumed to benefit all the situations.

This study therefore was able to identify the quality of economic reintegration of XCs before the CBR and concluding from these study findings, interviews and discussions, that reintegration through the classic DDR programming did not reach the envisaged objectives in the eyes of the XCs themselves and the community as a whole. Despite these interventions, they were labelled as delinquents and trouble makers but after the CBR, they are integrated into the community as full and useful community participants.

The implementation of the CBR project changed this situation and radically changed the lives of the XCs and vulnerable community members who were able to participate in these projects. They made a new life with new skills and employment opportunities and in most cases, self employment, meaning more likelihood of sustainability. They were able to access bank loans and having joined cooperatives and associations were able to pull resources together to form bigger income generating activities. This study was able to find out that there was an economic transformation of ex-combatants livelihoods that were successfully economically reintegrated.

5.3 Major findings

On the ex-combatants:

At demobilisation, most ex-combatants do not know where to begin from, having lost their source of livelihood, peers, hierarchy and networks. They are sent into a community sometimes very hostile or at best non-supportive. They have no marketable skills, and are not trainable in the formal education system; not used to income savings but rather to instant consumption and in most cases (65%), unfit for mainstream society activities due to trauma or psychosocial problems related to war. They are therefore psychologically traumatised and have no initiatives of their own and have a feeling of betrayal and abandonment.

Most of the ex combatants are young and energetic and willing to work in any situation. They maintain their military discipline and respect leadership. They have no work but are ready to do work.

At the end of the CBR projects, the ex-combatants have gained their confidence and are now participating in community development, have gained marketable skills and are contributing to own personal development. They have earned revenue, saved with a bank and obtained loans. They have joined cooperatives and associations with mixed membership with the community members met at the CBR workplace. Most of the XCs together with other local members are now employers, giving jobs to the local population and earning sustained income. They have embraced the community networks and are easily integrating it. They are no longer treated as sources of insecurity and delinquency as before. The majority of the ex-combatants are happier with their current situation than what they thought before. They are better contributing to their own lives and the community at large.

On the Community:

The contempt and mistrust that existed between the community members and ex-combatants is long gone and XCs are now accepted into the mainstream activities of the community. The

community now reveres the ex-combatants and have elected them among their local leaders and even cooperative leaders. The community now accepts and takes pride into the ex-combatants wherever they see the development projects in infrastructure and agricultural developments that were implemented through the CBR projects.

Ex-combatants were fully intergraded into the community after the CBR project and have now gained the social capital, which is a pre-requisite for individual socio-economic development, acceptance into society and the feeling of belonging. Because their reintegration prospects had failed, they were feeling lonely and abandoned. They were thought to be troublemakers and sources of insecurity but now are the trusted local leaders, cooperative managers and opinion leaders in the community. Thus the community has been enriched with these elements who otherwise have the military discipline culture but could not be put to good community use due to social isolation, lack of support structures and limited integration.

The CBR premise therefore is based on the holistic support to the returning ex-combatant and the receiving community, which in one way or another is also a victim of the conflict; and allows sharing the little development opportunity that is available. This sharing allows for mutual understanding, acceptance and networking that bring new development ideas and resource pulling to the community. This therefore resolves the big challenge of equity, whereby the rest of the victims of the conflict, which is the community, feel left out of the support programs and so raises resentment and mistrust against the only beneficiaries, the ex-combatants in the classic DDR programs.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The objective of the study is to assess the impact of the CBR projects in Rwanda in the successful reintegration of Ex-combatants in the realm of DDR processes. Having indicated what the CBR did differently from the rest of the classic DDR programming, we have come to the conclusions below based on the findings of the study of the CBR process of Rwanda.

5.4.1 Planning and participation

From the research and the comparative analysis made, fewer resources are utilised to implement a successful CBR project than a classic DDR project. Planning is based on the particularity of each situation and detailed studies are done ahead of implementation. Several levels of administration are consulted and involved in the process.

An understanding of the state of mind of beneficiaries was clearly understood before the support is given. Current DDR projects give allocations to individual targeted ex-combatants without any other form of sensitisation or training and these have and will always give limited results. It should be understood whether the demobilised soldiers are ready to embrace the change in life style or occupation for at the stage of demobilisation, they lose all sources of revenue, peers and networks, the only social capital they have developed during their life in the army.

From the onset, the CBR identified the need for participants/beneficiaries early role in the planning process and involving the biggest number of beneficiaries as possible. It should be remembered that all the communities in most conflict areas are poor and are equal victims of these conflicts and so are equally in need of support. Segregation of any sort brings with it mistrust that may erode the achievements of the project. The CBR project therefore was able to mitigate this by involving the vulnerable community members as beneficiaries and including works of public interest in the investment projects like road construction projects that benefit the rest of the community.

Particularity of participants and community conditions was taken into consideration. Planners were able to avoid using set criteria for selection of participants that are believed to fit all intervention environments. The CBR was able to change targets, participants/beneficiaries with ease during the implementation process and this flexibility allowed it to succeed.

5.4.2 Implementation

In the CBR, several implementation arrangements were made that are not common in other DDR projects. The most notable is the earned incomes, fruit of own sweat, instead of allocations which

are treated as handouts. This has the effect of better and rational utilisation of this hard-earned revenue.

Even though other DDR projects use banks for allocation (at least in Rwanda), the mandatory savings and sensitisation to use banks led to better utilisation of earnings. This led to easy access to bank loans with more resources available for use.

Training is a major component of the project and this has had a remarkable change in life skills and employment. It was identified that most education and training programs in classic DDR are not in line with what ex-combatants want or what the local labour market can absorb. Beneficiaries of the CBR project are getting more off-farm jobs and thus earning more revenue. The training in the CBR is for jobs that are being implemented (on-job training) while the other DDR projects may offer some training that sometimes may not necessarily give access directly to employment.

All the community members including those not employed by the CBR, equally feel are beneficiaries and have taken up follow up and monitoring of the projects. As said earlier, all the local leaders including religious leaders are following up and monitoring the success of the local CBR projects. This gives better ownership and localisation of the project and this assures full success.

5.4.3 Improvement of living conditions of ex-combatants

We can conclude that with the CBR, the lives of ex-combatants improved from the job opportunity and the skills learnt from the project. All those who had never made bank savings were now having access to bank loans and are investing into other off-farm activities.

Ex-combatants were living in isolation, being mistrusted and overlooked. The project raised their status in the community to the level of being elected as leaders in cooperatives and associations. This confirms that their self-inflicted isolation and/or psycho-social problems were abated and XCs can now feel like other esteemed citizens. The project was therefore, able to implement efficiently, the Rwanda DDR program of ex-combatants mainstreaming into other local government development initiatives. The study was able to show that ex-combatants now feel are

accepted into society and are contributing to its development, which is contrary to what they felt before.

5.4.4 Successful reintegration for ex-combatants

This study set out to find out the contribution of the CBR in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. We were able to bring out existing knowledge to attest to the minimal reintegration outcomes in DDR programs implemented elsewhere. With the CBR project in Rwanda, this paper was able to demonstrate that the project was a lifestyle changing process, where beneficiaries can now live on their own earnings, use them to access bank loans and associate with the rest of the community in a resource pulling process to form business cooperatives and enterprises.

5.4.5 The Community

The community which is always a victim in any armed conflict and so should not be left out as a beneficiary. The CBR has economically benefited the community and we have identified the low cost nature of the CBR project implementation even though there is a heavy initial investment, but justified by the numbers of beneficiaries and the sustainability of the reintegration outcome.

The community, the area of return for the ex-combatants, needs to accept them if they will have sustainable reintegration. It is in the community where other public development initiatives are channelled. It needs to accept ex-combatants so as to include them in these opportunities. It should therefore be part of the process just as we have identified that it is also a victim.

As a general conclusion, we can certainly say that what was announced in the study objectives and research questions were achieved by this study, where it showed clearly the key challenges of the classic DDR process that include but not limited to the eligibility criteria that set the stage for discrimination of beneficiaries, and the pre-set implementation guiding principles and best practices that may not befit all the situations and the successes of reintegration of ex-combatants and vulnerable local community members identified in the CBR projects under study.

The study was able to give a comparative analysis of the planning and implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements of the classic DDR process and the CBR process,

indicating the major differences of flexibility, beneficiary participation and equity that led to the success of the CBR project.

The paper was able to demonstrate that the CBR project as implemented in Rwanda was able to bring about successful economic reintegration of XCs, who had exhausted all the planned DDR allocations but had remained poor and vulnerable.

It was also indicated how the public infrastructure development implemented during the CBR projects brought economic development to the community, thus benefiting the local poor community and so reducing poverty in the framework of the national poverty reduction strategy. This therefore proves that some initiatives like the SIDDR and the UNDP and USAID ideas on community based support for better reintegration of ex-combatants are true and workable.

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above conclusions, the objectives of this study and the study findings that have demonstrated the contribution to successful reintegration of ex-combatants by the CBR project, we can therefore recommend the following:

5.5.1 at the planning level

All those individuals affected by war, either as combatants, porters, sex slaves or community participants who are deprived of their opportunity to work, to develop and to live a peaceful and harmonious life, should benefit from the DDR intervention. If this fails and the intervention singles out part of the community, then it is bound to fail or at most give limited results.

Beneficiaries should be encouraged to work for remuneration instead of simply receiving hand-outs that are not rationally utilised. The intervention may also take the form of training that allows for longer term employment and sustainability. The training should be tailored towards the beneficiaries' needs and the available local employment opportunities. These should be the guiding principles in the planning process.

All the stakeholders should be involved and consulted from the onset of project planning. There are no ready-made solutions to all problems and situations. Lasting solutions come from beneficiaries.

5.5.2 at the implementation level

We recommend the involvement of the biggest number of stakeholders as possible even at the level of implementation. Whoever is concerned in one way or another should be called upon to contribute to the success of the project at least in some implementation planning or decision making forums. We have indicated the role of the local community leaders including religious ones in the implementation and follow up of the CBR projects. These groups of people who work and live near the project sites are the ones who know what works and what does not. Their views should never be ignored and above all, they are opinion leaders in their community and can easily influence social relations and facilitate change.

This paper recommends the use of the private sector, which is young and growing in developing countries. Where bureaucratic and procedural bottlenecks have hindered the completion of projects, the involvement of the private sector has been a solution. Several implementation arrangements can be agreed with the private sector, just as it was in the CBR where they were contracted only to manage and supervise the working teams of ex-combatants and the vulnerable community members. Since these are working for profit, they are bound to complete their tasks effectively and efficiently. This is also another way of stimulating the private enterprise and since the local ones are given more preference, this also leaves more money in the community.

5.5.3 at the community level

Beneficiaries should be consulted from the onset as this allows for total ownership and this assures success. Ownership will be exercised in form of participation and consultations. All the stakeholders should be involved and this will also allow for total ownership for the intervention.

The community is the ultimate base for any development, whether individual or communal. Supporting the community to develop, brings with it individuals that will also include the targeted individuals. This paper therefore recommends that, even though targeted support is crucial for when out of the army, ex-combatants have nothing on which to begin individual life,

but for sustainable economic reintegration, the community based support is the ultimate way to go.

5.6 Suggestions for further reading and research

Despite the enormous literature of guidelines, best practices, lessons learnt and resources, the classic DDR programming has not given the much needed sustainable reintegration outcomes. The CBR, on the contrary, promises tangible results with less investment, though with much more and better planning and implementation arrangements emphasising a close and strong monitoring and evaluation system.

As most of the DDR programs are also timidly including CBR projects sometimes as parallel projects; and as espoused and advocated by major DDR research and development institutions like the SIDDR, more research should be put into the Rwandan CBR project to empirically and extensively prove the CBR project successes as announced in this study.

Particular research should be done on the discriminatory element in the classic DDR of Eligibility Criteria that shuts out the door for most of the victims of the conflict, thus making the beneficiaries, the ex-combatants, less acceptable to the community and minimising their chances of sustainable reintegration.

More comparative research should be done on the socio-economic effectiveness of allocations, so called Hand-Outs in the reintegration process and the remunerated labour process as practiced in the CBR projects.

More research should be done on how the CBR/ labour intensive works can contribute to income distribution between the rural areas and the urban areas.

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APPENDIX 1: CBR Questionnaire

A) For CBR workers

I. Worker personal data

1. CBR site work.....
2. District.....
3. Sector:.....
4. Name and last name
5. Sex 1 male 2 female
6. Year of birth 19
7. Marital status : 1 = Single 2 = Married 3 = Divorced 4 = Widow
8. Number of persons in your family:
9. Are you ex-combatant? 1 = yes 2 = no
10. If ex-combatant, year of demobilisation

II. Socio-economic data of the worker

11. Are you the owner of your house? 1 = yes 2 = no
12. Have you got some fields? 1 = yes 2 = no
13. For how long have you lived permanently here?
14. During the last 5 years, did you live in other places? 1 = yes 2 = no
15. Do you want to change your residence sector during the next 3 years? 1 = yes 2 = no
16. If yes why would you want to change your residence?
17. If no, why would you not want to leave?

III. About the XC economic reintegration

18. Did the revenues of your work contribute to improve your livelihood during the works 1 = yes
2 = no
19. What kind of expenditure did you make with your wages?

1 basic needs – 2 school fees – 3 medical – 4 fields – 5 small cattle – 6 cow – 7 house improvements – 8 other

18. On what did you spend the savings you made during the works?

1 basic needs – 2 school fees – 3 medical – 4 fields – 5 small cattle – 6 cow – 7 IGP – 8 house improvements - 9 Association fees – 10 other

19. Considering the revenues you had during the works and the savings you made, do you think your livelihood is presently better than before the project started? 1 = yes 2 = no

20. Did you receive training within the CBR project? 1 = yes 2 = no

21. If YES : what kind of training

1 on the job training - 2 Civic training - 3 CEFE - 4 Masonry - 5 other skills training – 6 Agriculture – 7 GTZ vocational training -

22. If YES, were this, or those, trainings useful? 1 = yes 2 = no

23. If YES, do you think the trainings gave you more capacities to sustain your livelihood? 1 = yes 2 = no

24. Did you receive tool kits? 1 = yes 2 = no

25. If YES, are those tools useful to you after the works? 1 = yes 2 = no

26. If YES, do you think those tools contribute to have more incomes in the future? 1 = yes 2 = no

27. Do you think the bank account is contributing to make your future better? 1 = yes 2 = no

28. Do you think the bank account is contributing to facilitate your access to credit? 1 = yes 2 = no

29. Since your bank account was opened, did you ask for a bank loan? 1 = yes 2 = no

30. If yes, for what kind of needs?

1 basic needs – 2 school fees – 3 medical – 4 fields – 5 small cattle – 6 cow – 7 IGP – 8 house improvements - 9 Association fees – 10 other

31. If yes, for what amount ?.....RWF

32. Are you member of an association? 1 = yes 2 = no

33. If yes, did the CBR project play a role in your association membership

34. If yes : what kind of association

1 Credit to each other 2 Agriculture & livestock 3 Commerce 4 Transport 5 Handicraft 6 Local development 7 other

37. If yes: are members of that association XC? 1= All XCs 2= Mixed

38. What do you think of the reintegration of XC in your community is?

1 good 2 fairly good 3 bad

39. What do you think the relation between XC and their neighbours are?

1 good 2 bad

40. Can you describe how it was?

41. Do you think the reintegration of XC is better than it was 5 years ago? 1 = yes 2 = no

42. If yes, out of the many existing programs and projects, what do you think was the main contributing factor?

43. What would you say is different with CBR from other previous support for reintegration?

B) FOR CBR WORKSITES COMMUNITY BENEFICIARIES

I. Personal data

44. CBR work site
45. District.....
46. Sector:.....
47. Name and last name
48. Sex 1 male 2 female
49. Year of birth 19
50. Marital status : 1 = Single 2 = Married 3 = Divorced 4 = Widow
51. Number of person in the family:

II. REINTEGRATION OF EX COMBATANTS

49. Do you know a CBR project was implemented in your area? 1 = yes 2 = no
50. In 2004, were there ex-combatants in your neighbouring? 1 = yes 2 = no
51. At that time, can you describe the economic situation of ex-combatants?
52. At that time, did the ex-combatants have some particular problems with the community? 1 = yes
2 = no
53. If YES: what kind of problems?
1 = delinquency 2 = security 3 = poverty 4 = health 5 OTHER (specify)
55. Have you worked for the CBR project? 1 = yes 2 = no
56. Currently, what do you think the economic reintegration of XC in the community is
57. Do you think that XC are positively contributing to the economic life of your community? 1 =
yes 2 = no
58. Do you think you benefited from the CBR project? 1 = yes 2 = no
59. If yes, can you describe how it has done so?

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. How has been the reintegration of ex-combatants in this area in the past and how is it now?
2. What do you think are the causes for this?
3. What do you think was the contribution of the CBR to economic reintegration of ex-combatants?
4. What was new brought to the community and the Ex-combatants by the CBR?
5. How was all this done?