



**COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

**PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF BOTSWANA'S POSITION  
FROM 1992-2009**

**A thesis submitted to the University of Rwanda in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the award of a MA degree in Security Studies**

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## DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my original work and has never been published before in any university or institution to the best of my knowledge.

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Signed..... Date.....

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

Great thanks and appreciation go to my wife Wame Mbeha, family and friends especially Lt Col Eric Ntsosang.

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## ABSTRACT

This paper set out to find Botswana's position regarding participation in peace support operations from 1992 to 2009 and why it has adopted such an outlook. The paper further investigated why Botswana should participate in peace support operations and how well it is prepared. To address this objectives the methodology chosen for this paper is the case study design to understand Botswana's position in lieu of military interventions by Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in peace support operations in particular. The data was collected from both secondary and primary sources. Data was collected using questionnaires from selected key respondents in the BDF. Additionally expert's documents, newspapers, including Government of Botswana Parliamentary records (Hansard) were used. This paper established that Botswana's position on peace support operations is that of indifference. The BDF is overstretched by internal security operations especially anti-poaching. This situation is aggravated by lack of an active Reserve Force to complement the BDF. The risks associated with participation in PSO and public disapproval following the killing of a BDF officer in Darfur was found to be one of the fulcrum for the current position.

The paper also found out that Botswana has not only a moral obligation, but also a legal obligation by virtue of it being a member of United Nations, African Union and Southern African Development Community to participate in peace support operations. This paper also found out that although the BDF has a Peace Training School which essentially implies willingness to partake in peace support operations, it is not ready for peace support operations deployment. The rational choice theory was used to understand the phenomenon under study. It is based on assumptions that individuals make choices based on their preferences and information that they have to make rational decisions. This has been proven in that individual actors like in the executive and other members of the Legislature have been instrumental in Botswana's foreign policy, determining whether Botswana participates in peace support operations or not over the years. The major recommendations of this paper are: Botswana Government should consider its constitutional review, in the process the Legislature may be empowered to influence decisions on the future BDF external deployments, the BDF should participate in peace support operations in order to improve Botswana's relations with other countries, the Government of Botswana should consider having a budget to equip the BDF for peace support operations.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>APSA:</b>	African Peace and Security Architecture
<b>ASF:</b>	African Standby Force
<b>AU:</b>	African Union
<b>BDF:</b>	Botswana Defense Force
<b>DRC:</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ECOWAS:</b>	Economic Community of West African Countries
<b>MHI:</b>	Military Humanitarian Intervention
<b>NGO:</b>	No- Governmental Organization
<b>OP:</b>	Office of the President
<b>OAU:</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>PSO:</b>	Peace Support Operations
<b>RCT:</b>	Rational Choice Theory
<b>RECs:</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>R2P:</b>	Responsibility to Protect
<b>SADC:</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SANDF:</b>	South Africa National Defense Force
<b>UN:</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDOF:</b>	United Nations Deployment Force
<b>UNEF:</b>	United Nations Emergency Force
<b>UNIFIL:</b>	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
<b>UNOMOZ:</b>	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
<b>UNOMUR:</b>	United Nations Operation in Uganda/ Rwanda
<b>UNOSOM:</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>UNSC:</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNTSO:</b>	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

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## **CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

### **1.0 Introduction**

This paper set out to investigate Botswana's position towards peace support operations (PSO) over the years. Peace support operations which are independent variables are defined and Botswana's position which is a dependent variable put into context from 1992 to 2009. The chapter covers the background, the statement of the problem, the questions that this paper seek to find out, the objectives, significance of the paper, scope and structure.

### **1.1 Background**

The daily interactions in human societies have always been marked by cordiality as well as adversity. Interstate conflicts during the inter-war were resolved through conquest and rarely by intervention by the United Nations (UN) through peace support operations (PSO). Many countries contribute military personnel and civilians voluntarily to participate in peace keeping operations and bring about required peace (Dobbie, 1994). The main challenge to countries contributing personnel has been whether to intervene or not. This has created a security dilemma for many countries and Botswana is not an exception. The changing character of PSO over the years from traditional peacekeeping to more robust mandates requiring advanced military capabilities has led many countries to reconsider their participation (ibid).

Ironically, the international arena has witnessed much interest and participation by most countries in the peace support operations, to fulfill their national interest (Chossudousky, 2011). The contemporary world order has been characterized by a myriad of intrastate conflicts Post-Cold War. These domestic conflicts have a tendency to spilling over to regional or even affect global security (Avezoz, 2013). In essence, what this implies is that if security of one state is compromised, it is likely to have a ripple effect. The international system has reacted by formulating peace support operations to be conducted under the ambit of the UN to address the issues of common and collective security. Developed countries have been leading in most of these peace operations even though they have been selective in the areas of interest to intervene (ibid).



Keller (1996) observed that in the past, the tendency was for the intellectuals from abroad the continent to identify African problems; today there is a mood of introspection and a growing trend to find African solutions to African problems. Regional bodies in Africa have been utilized to ensure that there is peace and tranquility in the world. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has formulated a strategy indicative plan for organ on politics, defense and security co-operation with the objective of ensuring peace and security in the region (SADC, 2003).

However, the dilemma of promoting regional security with regional committees has become problematic since it at times borders on overriding with the country's sovereignty. Sharp and Fisher (2005) noted that in the past, the BDF undertook UN operations and participated in several missions. According to the Minister of Defense, Justice and Security Honorable Mmusi, the Missions in which the BDF intervened to date include "Somalia in 1992 and ended in 1993. During this period, the BDF took part in Operation Restore Hope and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1 and 2). The Mozambique Mission was undertaken from 1992 to 1994 under the auspices of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNUMOZ 1 and 2). In Rwanda, the BDF took part in the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (ONOMUR) in 1994 and 1995. Operation BOLEAS in Lesotho was in 1998. The operation in Eritrea was in 2004 to 2006, in which the BDF took part in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Lastly, in 2005 to 2009, the BDF took part in the African Union Mission in Sudan, United Nations Mission in Sudan and United Nations Mission in Darfur" (Botswana Parliament Daily Hansard, 2020, p.8). These were positive experiences for Botswana, the Botswana Defence Force benefitted from these operations, public relations exposure and belief in its own capabilities (Sharp & Fisher, 2005).

According to Neethling (2000), the involvement of South Africa National Defense Force (SANDF) and the BDF in Lesotho came at a time when President Kabila was requesting for military support and assistance against advancing rebel forces in the DRC. It is notable that only Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe honored the request and intervened. Zimbabwe and Angola were blamed for allegedly intervening to protect their countries' business interests, so did South Africa in Lesotho to protect the Katse Water Dam Project (ibid). Since 2009 Botswana has not proactively deployed its military in peace keeping operations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate BDF readiness to participate in PSO, and find out the position of Botswana over the years. It contends that states, and Botswana in particular

considers its national interests first. This conceptualization informs the decision of whether to intervene in peace support operations or not. Thus when discussing the case of Botswana, the experiences of other countries will be relied upon.

## **1.2 Statement of problem**

It is the responsibility of every country to intervene on humanitarian grounds as well as under the obligation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). To this end, article 24 of the Charter confers upon the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 deals with regional arrangements and states that nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping remains one of the main United Nations tools to protect civilian populations, help prevent new conflicts, reduce violence and strengthen security on the ground. It is thus the responsibility of every country, including Botswana as a member of the UN and regional bodies such as SADC to maintain contributions towards peacekeeping operations in the continent.

The dilemma of whether to intervene on purely humanitarian assistance or on national interest has been problematic. Most states intervene where they feel that their interests are at stake (Brown, 2003, Neethling, 2000). It is ideal for states to intervene on humanitarian grounds and Responsibility to Protect Principle (R2P). Unfortunately, most states including Botswana only intervene where their national interests are perceived or under threat, and currently is not deployed in any peace keeping missions since 2009 though there are numerous missions in the African continent today. These decisions result in a number of innocent people losing lives that would have been protected by timely interventions with a clear purpose of R2P. Botswana's participation will not only help alleviate human sufferings and bring about peace by augmenting other countries efforts, but will go a long way in enhancing its image in the region and continent as well as enhancing its capabilities. It has become a norm for states to push their national interests and security issues under the pretext of Military Humanitarian Intervention (MHI). Hoffman (2003) noticed that whenever a state finds its interest at stake, it uses one of its instruments of power, the military force, to take care of the situation under the pretext of MHI. Neo-realists point out that states only intervene in major flash points and not secondary areas in a way to reserve their forces for more crucial missions (Hoffman, 2003). Brown (2003) also observed that the main aim of states in

interventions is to influence the behaviors of others states in international relations. Even though concepts of MHI and responsibility to protect (R2P) have been introduced; states still find a way to select areas they prefer to intervene on.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

1. What is Botswana's position vis-à-vis peace support operations and why?
2. Why should Botswana participate in peace support operations and how well is it prepared?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

1. Find out the current position of Botswana regarding Peace Support Operations and why?
2. Investigate the reasons why Botswana should participate in PSO and its readiness?

### **1.5 Significance of the Paper**

This paper in its broader sense will inform Botswana Defence Force peacekeeping policy. The paper hopes to benefit individuals and organizations that are responsible for peace keeping and conflict resolution. Thus, this paper hopes to contribute to policy formulation and implementation by the Government of Botswana.

### **1.6 Scope of the Paper**

This paper looks at Botswana's involvement in PSO in the region and beyond. The issue of PSO is wide and far reaching for different countries. The issue can be discussed from an international perspective considering the regulations in place determining the operations of the UN. The issue can also be discussed looking at Botswana's involvement in PSO in the continent from 1992 to 2009. The phenomenon under discussion can be looked at by focusing on the SADC region and how Botswana is involved in the regional affairs of SADC. The paper however, will look at the issue of Botswana involvement in peace operations across Africa from 1992 to 2009 by focusing on the military interventions the country has taken part which includes the Unified Task Force in Somalia, from 1992 to 1993, UN Operation in Somalia II, from 1993 to 1994, United Nations operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) to monitor the Rome General Peace

Accords, from 1993 to 1995, UN Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (ONOMUR) where observers were sent from June to October in 1994 as well as Military Observers in Sudan and Darfur in 2005-2009. This will be coupled with an analysis of the decision making of actors within the country and ultimately building a picture of whether Botswana should continue participating in such operations.

## **1.7 Structure of the Paper**

The paper is structured as follows:

The first chapter covers or contain the introduction and the background of the paper. The Statement of the problem follows before research questions are presented. The paper then presents the research objectives followed by the significance of the paper being dealt with and finally the scope of the paper. The second chapter includes definition of key terms, the genesis of PSO, evolution of PSO, PSO in Africa, theoretical framework conceptual framework, historical overview of Botswana, Security sector and security framework. In chapter three, the paper presents the methodology to be employed in the paper. This includes methods used in this paper.

In chapter four, data collected during the study is presented in line with the questions that the paper is trying to address. In other words, the chapter contains all the relevant data that is usable in trying to answer the research questions. In chapter five, from the data presented and the analysis made, this chapter concludes and summarize the findings as well as provide recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an intellectual background of literature that forms the basis upon which understanding of the phenomenon under study can be conceptualized. In line with this and for the sake of expository coherence, this part covers: Definition of terms, Genesis of peace support operations, evolution of peace support operations, peace support operations in Africa, restructuring of the Botswana Defense Force, theoretical framework, conceptual framework, historical overview of Botswana, overview of security sector in Botswana and security parameters.

### **2.2 Definition of key terms**

The intention of this part is to build a foundation and contextualize concepts from where the argument of the paper will be developed. It is imperative to put into perspective key concepts of this paper before scrutinizing through the literature. The intention of peace support operations is to create a conducive environment for peace (Fortna, 2004).

### **2.3 Peace**

“There is no unanimity by scholars on the definition of peace. It is difficult to find agreement on the definition in the literature either by governments or in academia itself, peace is often defined negatively as the absence of war and physical violence” (Gawerc,2006 p.438). This definition is inherently problematic, not least of which is that peace is often defined differently by different actors or groups in a conflict. In order to define peace in a broader and more positive way, Johan Galtung ( as cited in Gawerc,2006) differentiated between negative and positive peace. Whereas negative peace is the absence of direct violence (e.g. people being killed), positive peace also includes the absence of structural violence ( e.g. dying as a result of poverty) and cultural violence.

## 2.4 Peace Support Operations

Truly certainly advisable to be alive to the United Nations's purpose as enshrined in the UN Charter (1945) is to keep afloat calmness and stability, cultivate and build bridges among states, fostering countries working together so that they can overcome their challenges in terms of finances, their way of lives, the way they interact with each other and their day to day needs as a people and communities. PSO is a generic word which describes a well thought out worldwide support ideologies or ideas for keeping afloat and constantly tracking and starting up ceasefire processes completely stopping the recurrence of aggressive misunderstandings. The UN Charter outlines two types of PSOs: Peace support management are sanctioned by mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under the United Nations Charter under Chapter VI (Peacekeeping) or VII (Peace Enforcement), or the deployment of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Howard & Fortna, 2008).

The ceasefire implementation is enforced, it involves taking into account duties or execution of duties to bring back and resuscitate ceasefire or calmness taking place among aggrieved entities who disagree to the proposal made by the negotiators and they might persist with their warring activities. (Howard & Fortna, 2008). This is a procedure fully defined in the seventh Chapter of the United Nations Guide and principles. It includes provocative army operations towards estranged and warring states more so the United Nations Organ on safety is not mandated to send out armies solely towards acts of this nature and caliber, executed as continental safety innovations, alternatively borne with cooperatives of volunteering countries prior to the approval and endorsement of the UN organ in charge with mandates issues it being guided with the Seventh Chapter of the UN guidelines and fundamentals.

Peacekeeping, is not explicitly outlined in the UN Charter, but has been in practice for over six decades (ibid). It is defined as a third-party intervention that, involves the deployment of military troops and or military observers and or civilian police in a target state; established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation (among other things) between formally, potentially, or presently warring parties. Is neutral towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behavior.

## 2.5 Peacemaking, and Peace-Building

Galtung (as cited in Gawerc,2006) also set out a tripartite typology making a distinction among peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building to guide third-party intervention efforts and clarify the different roles needed. Peacemaking, which conflict research has tended to focus on, refers to the negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers directed towards reaching an official settlement or resolution to specific conflicts. Peacekeeping which is the focus of this paper, on the other hand, involves third-party intervention to keep apart warring groups and maintain the absence of direct violence or reduce it.

Peace-building on the other hand, which has arguably received attention by conflict researchers, and has been the least operationalised in part because of its wide range of activities that receive less publicity, focuses on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the grass roots level (Gawerc, 2006). Further, the intention of peace-building is to create a structure of peace that is based on justice, equity, and cooperation thereby addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict so that they become less likely in future (ibid).

Furthermore, other scholars like Acuna (1995) posits that peacekeeping missions are basically understood to be those observation missions that have a component of military component in their structure. Acuna (1995) differentiates between peacekeeping missions and peacemaking missions of which the latter does not have a military component in it as they have in their main goal the peaceful settlement of situation. The military component in peacekeeping mission is therefore very important. Doyle et al (1997) sees peacekeeping missions as confidence builders where conflicting parties are able to build some kind of trust towards each other in order to sit together and talk their issues out. This is possible if there is a third party which the conflicting parties believe is neutral and can listen to their problems with a sober perspective. The operations are therefore more of mediation operations where the main issues is to create a peaceful environment as the warring factions sit together to find a lasting solution for their problems.

However, with respect to peacekeeping, Hatto (2013,p.496) posits that “it has become just one of the aspects of multinational peace operations, the latter can now entail humanitarian assistance, election supervision, the repatriation of refugees, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former

combatants, the restoration of the state's ability to maintain security out of respect for the rule of law and human rights, or support for the finding of legitimate and effective governance institutions". For the sake of simplicity, however, the generic term peace support operations or missions will be used in this paper to refer to all multinational peace operations.

## **2.6 Genesis of Peace Support Operations**

This sub-section will provide a chronological but brief intellectual history of UN peacekeeping operations. It is by no means comprehensive, as the literature is too vast to cover exhaustively. Instead the focus will primarily be on the major trends in the literature, and what it tells us about the effectiveness of this policy tool in determining peace settlement. It is perhaps advisable to provide a preface of the nature on conflicts that warrant UN intervention before a cursory look at the historical perspectives.

Since the end of World War II, with the creation of the UN collective security system, interstate wars have become a rarity. Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen (as cited in Gawerc, 2006) suggest that for the period 1989-2003, which marked the end of the Cold War, there have been only seven (7) interstate armed conflicts, two of which continued to be active through 2003: the United States led coalition and the insurgents and operatives of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the India-Pakistan war over Kashmir. In contrast, during this same period there were 116 intrastate conflicts active in 78 countries. Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr (as cited in Gawerc, 2006, p.436) note that as early as 2005, 19 of the 20 "major armed conflicts" were intrastate, and six countries could be denoted as having "emerging intrastate wars". These contemporary conflicts are the main reason for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping operations. They have been defined by Mary Kaldor (as cited in Gawerc, 2006, p.436) as "protracted social conflicts," "deep rooted conflicts," and intractable conflicts".

Goulding (1993, p.452) holds that the official view in the United Nations is that "the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was the first United Nations peacekeeping operation". It consisted of military observers who were unarmed, sent to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise a truce negotiated by Count Bernadotte in the first war between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It stayed on when, a month later, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, ordered a ceasefire. A similar group was deployed a few months later in Kashmir. A major step forward was taken when the first armed



United Nations force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in Egypt following the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on that country in October 1956 (Goulding, 1993). It is important to point out that the United Nations is a body that is entrusted with maintaining world peace and security. It becomes difficult to imagine it as pacifying peace and security when peacekeepers get armed and engage in armed struggle with an attempt to realise sustainable peace (Howard & Fortna, 2008).

The Congo peacekeeping operation (1960-64) deserves special mention. It is often described as a failure and in the words of Frantz Fanon (as cited in Swart, 2011, p.44)'s now infamous dictum, "Africa is in the shape of a pistol, and Congo is the trigger". This has proven all-too alarmingly true, given the grave turmoil and instability the Congo has both produced and experienced since independence despite United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed with a view to achieving sustainable peace settlement. Congo is interesting in the contemporary context for three reasons. The peacekeeping operations were deployed in a country where the institutions of state were collapsing. Secondly, it was the first peacekeeping operation to include very substantial civilian elements. Thirdly and most importantly, it was initially deployed as a peacekeeping operation, but when it became clear that the peacekeeping mode would not enable it to achieve its objectives, the Security Council authorised it to use force on a considerable scale to end the secession of Katanga, the first, and until Somalia the only case of a transition from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement.

The Near East war of October 1973 gave rise to two other remarkable achievements: the interposition of the second United Nations Emergency Force between the Egyptian and Israeli armies in an exceedingly dangerous and complicated military situation, and, eight months later, the deployment of a United Nations Force (UNDOF) to control an agreed buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in Syria. That force is still there Goulding (1993, p.453). This is arguably a mirror of failure by United Nations peacekeeping operations to determine sustainable peace settlement. Following UNDOF, the line went almost dead until in 1988 the new readiness of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together revived opportunities for resolving regional conflicts and created a renewed demand for peacekeeping.

During the intervening 14 years, only one new operation was set up, UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL also is interesting in the contemporary context. It is an operation about whose viability the then Secretary-General and his senior advisers had doubts as to whether it would accomplish its mandate

(Goulding, 1993, p.453). The doubts by the UN top official to a large degree illuminates the shortfalls of peacekeeping operations in achieving sustainable peace. Nevertheless, UNIFL was pushed through the Security Council by the United States for pressing, if passing, political reasons: President Carter was launching the negotiations which were to lead to the Camp David Accords and did not want that process derailed by the Israel invasion of Lebanon which had just taken place. UNIFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never enjoyed the necessary cooperation from all the parties concerned. This illustrates how much easier it is to get into a peacekeeping operation than to get out and the need therefore, for the Security Council to satisfy that conditions exist for succesful peacekeeping before taking the decision to set up a new operation (ibid).

Fortna (2008) set to answer the question of whether peace keeping missions work or not. She focused on peacekeeping post-Cold War conflicts and how they were impacted by peacekeeping missions. Her conclusion was that more than fifty percent of the missions conducted across the world have helped prolong peace in the countries involved hence the conclusions that the missions are effective. The world picture however, may not reflect the truth on the African continent because of the different situations. Although on a world view the peacekeeping missions have yielded more than half of what was anticipated in terms of bringing peace, sustainability of the peace is still a question to be pondered on even in those countries. More so on the African continent, regardless of which organization was responsible for the peacekeeping missions, the results have mostly been negative posing the need to look at African cases separately and as unique cases (ibid).

The OECD (2010) analysis based on peacekeeping missions in Africa concluded that progress was not being made by 2009 though Africa has the most peacekeeping missions across the world. It states that African continent has had missions like UNAMID in Sudan's Darfur region and UNMIS in the same country, UNOCI in Ivory Coast, MONUC in DRC, BINUB in Burundi and other missions in Morocco, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. However, looking at the aftermath of these missions, very few notable results in Mozambique were successful otherwise most of the countries either relapsed after the missions thus leaving the respective countries with unsustainable peace not enough to create a stable government and move on as a country. The OECD further highlights that in countries like DRC and Sudan the UN peacekeeping mission did not bring the intended peace. At the overall level, the missions did not bring the intended results on the continent despite being one with the most important UN missions of all the continents in the world.

A similar stand is taken by Murison (2004) who posits that the UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Somalia and DRC failed and that this created the need for African states to find African solutions to African problems. The emphasis made is that some issues that result in conflicts on the African continent are peculiar in nature and can best be handled by Africans themselves. Issues like the nature of tribal rivalry, the effects of cultural differences among the people on the continent are deep seated and they require proper scrutiny and understanding for sustainable solutions to be found.

What is clear from these pieces of literature is that the African cases of peacekeeping are peculiar and that looking at the low success rate, different implementing stakeholders need to rethink and re-strategize on how peacekeeping missions on the continent are to be executed. The efforts geared towards peacekeeping in Africa should have Africans who are conversant with the African environment leading, so as to be able to tackle the problems from their core mandates and make these missions more effective. The other enduring problem is that countries intervene based on interests (ibid). There are numerous cases to illuminate this point. One of the greatest difficulties experienced during Operation BOLEAS was clearly its political justification from a regional perspective (Neethling, 2000).

Much confusion surrounded the modalities for security co-operation under the auspices of SADC. In August 1998, SADC became the focus of international attention when Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The decision was based on requests from President Laurent Kabila for military assistance (the DRC became a member of SADC in 1997) against advancing rebel forces. Still, the undertaking was *ad hoc* and was not organized under SADC auspices, although it did receive retroactive endorsement from SADC. South Africa specifically emphasized the need for a peaceful solution and declined to send troops (ibid). Surprisingly, on 22 September 1998, following political instability in Lesotho, the Republic of South Africa sent contingents together with the Republic of Botswana to intervene. The mission of the combined task force was "... to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order (Neethling, 2000).

According to Neethling (2000), the South African government insisted that the military intervention did not constitute an invasion, while the SANDF maintained that there was not only a proper SADC mandate, but also a virtual moral obligation on South Africa and Botswana to intervene in Lesotho. The decision

was based on and justified by the fact that SADC was directly approached by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, who requested the intervention; that the intervention was based on agreements reached in SADC; that all attempts at peacefully resolving the dispute had failed (ibid).

Later South Africa was seen to be protecting its national interests especially the Katse Dam Water Scheme. Another important point relates to the fact that Zimbabwe and Angola were harshly criticized in the South African media, as reporters claimed that Zimbabwe's main motive was an effort to promote Zimbabwean business interests in the Congo. Similarly, it was reported that Angola's interest was to prevent the Angolan rebel force, Unita, from using the DRC as a rear-base (Neethling, 2000).

## **2.7 Evolution of Peace Support Operations**

As early as in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, PSO have been used as an instrument of foreign policy, but have garnered momentum and prominence with the end of the Cold War in 1989 (St-Piere, 2008). They are possibly the most significant apparent activity created by the UN in 1945 although numerous were (and still are) organized outside the UN framework. In the UN context they became known as the "blue helmets" or "blue berets" because of their distinctive headgear, and over the years were alternatively praised as the UN's key 'recipe of success' for handling crises, or denounced as a symbol of the world organization's 'total failure' when faced with tragedies like Somalia or Bosnia in the 1990s.

Peace operations are constantly evolving, adapting to the challenges of new security environments. The evolution, however, is neither straightforward nor linear (ibid). Since the first peacekeepers were deployed in 1956, the concept of peacekeeping has changed dramatically. Originally, it referred to the interposition of a neutral force between parties to a conflict to stop or contain hostilities, support a ceasefire, or supervise the implementation of a peace agreement. While traditional peacekeeping, as a mechanism for resolving peace, is far from obsolete, the concept is constantly evolving as a result of changes within the peace and security environment. Since the end of the Cold War (1989), peacekeeping has undergone substantive transformation. Contemporary peace operations are now multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional. They are characterized by a mix of military, police, and civilians who are often deployed to hostile situations where there is no peace to keep. They involve a range of organizations including the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and other non-state actors. Finally, they incorporate political, economic, social and/or cultural elements as well as military security components

and cover a multitude of tasks including monitoring, enforcement, protection of civilians, and security, governance, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and elections. Over the years, peace operations have been compelled to change and adapt to new environments at an unprecedented rate, translating in what is now referred to as ‘complex peace operations’ (St-Piere, 2008, p.5).

## **2.8 Peace Support Operations in Africa**

African Peace Support Operations (PSOs), are peculiar when looked at within the context of intra-state conflicts over the last 25 years. Within this period, African PSOs emerged. According to Zabadi (2016) African Conflicts and Regional Interventions evolved against the background of a phenomenal increase in Africa of disruptive intrastate violent struggles. Since the fall of the USSR at the end of the Cold War in 1989, civil wars have occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zaire, and Central African Republic among others.

However, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initially had its focus more on securing independence for African States, defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity, including managing or resolving conflicts between Member States. The OAU, in its almost four decades of existence (1963 - 2002), was inherently deficient in addressing the complex security threats, the challenges of human rights abuse, and the absence of good governance that confronted the continent particularly after the Cold War. This lack of capacity became obvious beginning from the 1990s, especially with OAU’s failure to manage the conflicts in Chad and later Rwanda. Its transformation became inevitable and therefore in 2002, it was replaced with the African Union (AU), and with frameworks tailored at enhancing conflict management mechanisms in support of lasting peace (ibid).

This transformation significantly leveraged prevailing circumstances, particularly the expanding prominence of regionalism in collective security mechanisms, especially PSOs, supported by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Zabadi, 2016). Arguably, PSOs in the 21st century are closely linked to the maintenance of international order and harmony in the world. Indeed, PSOs of recent have dominated the United Nations discussions and international system, especially since the last decade of the 20th Century. As collective security instruments PSOs abound at regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Consequently, PSOs are being mounted almost for each conflict such that this can be

described as a growth industry. However, the concept and practice of Peace Operations in the UN and AU slightly differ, although in both contexts they have evolved into complex, multidimensional and increasingly integrated mechanisms. They now involve greater coordination and cooperation among military, police and civilian elements. In the AU context, after a long trajectory, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was articulated as the continent's response to the ever growing challenge of intra-state violent conflicts (ibid).

Peace Operations in the African context now take place within this security architecture, and have undergone remarkable evolution, including a long process of planning, targeted at making the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) operational by the year 2015. The emergence of the ASF concept, approved in 2004, within the AU's APSA framework has confirmed once again a great milestone for Africa. The main challenge of African PSO has been resources. Furthermore, compounded by bad governance leading to protracted conflicts.

The need for Africa to develop the capacity for managing its plethora of conflicts was reinforced by five major factors. First, Africa disproportionately accounts for a high number of violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era, with a huge toll on development within the continent. Second, the global community is increasingly reluctant to send troops and resources to resolve conflicts in Africa. However, the West has taken keen interest in assisting Africa build the capacity to respond to conflicts on the continent. Third, there has been a gross lack of political will by governments across the continent, in terms of conflict resolution. Fourth, there has also been inadequate institutional capacity for conflict management. Fifth, although Africa significantly lost its geo-strategic importance to Western nations after the Cold War, the continent still retains a significant chunk of natural resources and raw materials much needed by the West and the world at large. These factors are further discussed subsequently. First, conflicts in the continent permeate national, sub-regional and regional spheres. They spread to neighboring countries, affect sub-regional solidarity and undermine continental progress


## **2.9 Restructuring of the Botswana Defense Force Services**

The Botswana Defense Force was formed ten years after independence in 1977 from the remnants of the Botswana Police Mobile Unit (PMU). It got modernized over the years through acquiring modern equipment in its inventory (Henk, 2015). Traditionally, the Botswana Defense Force has been dominated by the Army. The Air wing only saw considerable growth in 1996 (ibid). The main task of the Botswana

Defense Force has been state sovereignty from its conception in 1977 (Molomo, 2009). This was necessitated by the regional dynamics at the time especially the apartheid South Africa and the White minority rule in Rhodesia. Besides state sovereignty, there was also growing interest in peacekeeping operations starting in 1992 in Somalia under a Unified Task Force led by the United States.

The BDF has grown professionally because of this exposure. The Services have been expanded to include the Logistics Command, in addition to the Air Arm Command and Ground Forces Command. Being a landlocked country, Botswana does not have a navy. The President is the Commander in Chief of armed forces. The BDF's direction, control and general superintendence is overseen by the Defence Council as enshrined in the Defence Act of 2018 section 22(1). The Minister of Defense reports directly to the Commander in Chief, the President. The Commander of Botswana Defense Force reports to the Commander in Chief and the Minister while the Command Commanders reports directly to the Commander of Botswana Defense Force.

The following structure below illustrates a generic outlay of the command and Services:



Source: Researcher (2020)

**Figure 2.9.1.1 Botswana Defense Force generic structure**

### **2.9.1 Theoretical Framework**

Using the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) which explains human behavior as well as choices people make when confronted with decision making situations on a daily basis (Eriksson, 2011; Glaser, 2010), the paper hopes to analyze Botswana's position and at the end evaluate whether it is rational for the country to partake in these peace keeping operations in the continent. For instance loss of one uniform man from BDF may weigh more on the country than it is in other countries like Nigeria or South Africa with huge




armed forces. Thus, with all factors considered, the paper hopes to arrive at a conclusion of whether it is rational to participate in these peace support operations (ibid).

According to Eriksson (2011) a theoretical framework can be defined as a correction of interrelated concepts, usually a theory but not always, that help to firmly ground a paper in a theoretical construct. The purpose of this paper is to investigate Botswana's position in PSO and why, as well as assess its preparedness for peace support operations. The paper also seeks to investigate the reasons why the country should participate in these peace support operations. The theory that better fits the nature of this paper is Rational Choice Theory (RCT). RCT is used to explain human behavior as well as choices people make when confronted with decision making situations on a daily basis (Eriksson, 2011; Glaser, 2010). The basic premise of rational choice theory states that social behavior emanates from behavior of individual people. It explains that social, political or economic decisions made are based on rational thinking of individuals which makes them make rational choices based on the presented options (Glaser, 2010). Thus all things being equal, rational choice theory should be able to predict possible choices individuals are likely to make based on the situation and options presented. RCT acknowledges that all decisions are made in some kind of setting and that actors make rational choices based on what is presented on the table.

The RCT is more likely to help in arriving at an answer regarding whether Botswana as a country is ready to partake in peace support or keeping operations (ibid). This would through thorough analysis of the situation in Botswana as a country as well as its security sector current situation. The theory is more likely to draw a comparative analysis of the country's defense force as compared with other countries and help get the paper closer to determining whether it is really "rational" for the country to take part in such military campaigns. The theory is also more likely to shed light on the nature and setting of decision making process in the country and predict whether partaking in such military activities would be anywhere close to being rational. On the second question the paper seeks to address, the RCT theory which could help excavate sources of reasons why the country has to participate in peace keeping operations. Such reasons are likely to be important ingredients in arriving at a conclusion of whether it would be rational for the country to participate in these operations.

### 2.9.2 Conceptual Framework

This paper looks at the situation of Botswana as a country and its participation in peace support missions considering a number of factors both internal to the country and even external. Botswana has an armed force that is comparatively smaller than other African countries. However, by virtue of its affiliation to regional, continental and international bodies like SADC, AU as well as UN, it is mandated to play roles some of which include partaking in such peace support operations. However, as a sovereign state the primary mission of BDF is to ensure that the country, Botswana, is protected from internal and external threats. These situations boil down to the decision makers in Botswana on whether it is worth it or not considering relevant situations both internal and external.



Source: Researcher (2020)

Fig 2.9.2.1 Conceptual model

### 2.9.3 Historical Overview of Botswana

Botswana is a land-locked country which is located in the Southern part of the African continent bordering South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Ramsay et al, 2018). Gaborone is the capital city and located in the South East region. According to the report by Census and Demography Division (2015), the population of Botswana was estimated to be 2.3 million in 2019. The country is vast with area of 600,370 sq km (585370 sq km land and 15000 sq km water). The geography is flat and up to 70% is covered by the Kalahari Desert. Botswana is a Parliamentary democracy with three independent arms of Government being the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.

The country has a peculiar history as compared to other Southern African countries. This is so because unlike most of the Southern African countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, Botswana did not experience the shedding of blood to gain independence from the British colonialists. It was a smooth transition which only involved negotiations. Literature has it that it was easier for the country to negotiate for its independence because at that time the British colonialists did not regard it as one of its precious holdings (Alexander & Kaboyakgosi, 2018). There were protecting the country (hence the name protectorate) to make sure that they could use the land unchallenged as a passage for infrastructure like railways.

After independence, the first President of the country Sir Seretse Khama set in motion a tone of pragmatism in the internal affairs of the country (Grant-Marshall, 2018). The President was dedicated to protect the country as well as cater for the welfare of the people. Thus, the main concern of the first Presidents was to bring structural changes that could help in uplifting lives of the people of Botswana (Osei-Hwedie & Mokhawa, 2019). To this end, the President had little concern about what was happening elsewhere in Africa and in the neighboring South Africa. The policy that guided the first President of the country was more of that of indifference. Botswana as a country wanted to have as little involvement in the international affairs as possible so as to have enough time to concentrate and deal with internal problems it was facing as a newly born country (ibid).

However, the pressure of being surrounded by countries struggling for independence caught with the country and had to succumb to the needs of the struggling neighbors. Freedom fighters from neighboring countries especially South Africa are said to have sought refuge in Botswana taking advantage of its neutrality and peace (ibid).

This did not go well with regimes in those countries to an extent that Botswana started receiving threats and attacks from countries like apartheid South African regime. It is worth noting that by the time the country gained independence in 1966, the new state inherited a Police Mobile Force for internal security and for almost ten years after independence the country did not have a standing army as they did not see a need for it. According to Honorable Dithapelo Keorapetse, the ruling party was encouraged by the then Leader of Opposition Honorable Phillip Matante to form a standing army (Botswana Hansard, 2010).

President Seretse Khama, the pioneer of pragmatism was reluctant on this advice, the focus was on protecting the state as well as improving the welfare of the citizens. President Seretse Khama was trained in Britain as a barrister and married a white British woman, Ruth Williams. He was also Paramount Chief of his tribe, Bangwato. Being the first President Seretse Khama, it was not surprising that he was concerned with the widespread poverty around the country. However, the political environment of countries surrounding Botswana gave the President a reason to improve security of the country leading to the formation of Botswana Defense Force as the country's standing army in 1977 (Henk, 2015). Such events like the apartheid regime in South Africa gave the first President of independent Botswana enough reason to increase protection of the country though he still maintained his absence on the regional and international scene to some extent (ibid).

The second President, Sir Ketumile Masire came with a slightly different approach to that of Seretse Khama although they agreed on many fronts. His experience as Vice President under the Seretse Khama regime, as a former teacher, journalist as well as a master farmer influenced part of the decisions in the shaping of foreign policy during his tenure. He is known to have opened up the country to the international community during his tenure. Masire continued ensuring that security of the country was a priority coupled with enhancement of the local people's welfare. He also promoted democracy just like his predecessor. The only conspicuous difference between Seretse Khama and himself was the international engagements. Ketumile Masire decided to break the silence of Seretse Khama by participating in the international community more (Osei-Hwedie & Mokhawa, 2019). His understanding of security enhancement and democracy was through international collaboration. This understanding coupled with the changes at regional and continental levels forced President Masire to participate in peacekeeping operations under United Nations (UN) banners. President Masire also found himself in support of sanctions against countries that were found to be breaking democratic values such as Lesotho in 1996. Here we see President Masire continuing to uphold democratic values and having the welfare of the citizens at heart through his concern for security of the country just like his predecessor (ibid).

Festus Gontebanye Mogae succeeded Ketumile Masire in 1998. He is a British trained economist and technocrat with rich work experience that included working with international organizations. Such a background also contributed to the nature of foreign policy of the country. Under Mogae, given his economics background, Botswana was open for business. At that time BDF was fully operational and growing and had experience of taking part in different peace support operations during the Masire regime

(Gwatiwa, 2015). The participation in these operations did not just expose the growing BDF but it also brought Botswana closer to the region and the continent. However, these operations were also a learning curve for the country and appeared to have been a big influence in the decision making process for future peace support operations. Since the ascendance of Lt. Gen Seretse Khama Ian Khama in 2008 to Presidency including his successor and current President Dr Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi there has never been a decision to proactively deploy the BDF into peace support operations.

In summary, the office of Precedency, or the President in particular has been the main actor, including Ministers and some Members of Parliament in determining the foreign policy direction of the country. Botswana's foreign policy was more outward looking during President Masire and Mogae administration. This partly explains the Botswana Defence Force participation in PSO at the time. The President of Botswana has powers as enshrined in the constitution to deploy the BDF internally or externally without consent of even Parliament (Botswana Hansard, 2017). The Member of Parliament Honourable Dithapelo Keorapetse once decried of these immense powers in parliament:

“Madam Speaker, in my deliberations, I wish to speak to the powers of the President; including the powers of appointment, powers relating to the Defense Council and touch on the challenges faced by soldiers; including emoluments and pension, issues relating to defense spending and procurement, as well as operations other than war and the issues of peacekeeping missions. Madam Speaker, when you look at the Constitution of the Republic, Section 48; the supreme command of the armed forces lies with the President and the President has the power over the deployment of the armed forces inside and outside the country.

Now Madam Speaker, the problem is the absence of adequate oversight on this power by the President. Our view this side is that this power need be revised to make Parliament consent in whether the country goes to war or not. It is Parliament which sanctions expenditure and borrowing. Madam Speaker, war is costly and Parliament therefore must have a say in whether the country goes to war. The President must be duty-bound to ask the legislature to declare the state of war or grant him permission to deploy the armed forces externally or internally” (Botswana Hansard, 2017,p.389).

While it is apparent that during the Presidency of former President Masire and Mogae the Botswana Defence Force was more active in participating in peace support operations, it was not the case with their immediate successors reign, it appears they were more involved in promotion of peace through diplomatic means. The following extract by the former President Lt Gen Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama puts this into perspective:

“Madam Speaker, Botswana continues to play a critical and influential role in the promotion of global issues, such as respect for human rights, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, as well as the maintenance of international peace and security through regional and multilateral diplomacy. Despite our developing nation status, Botswana has remained steadfast in articulating her position with regard to the violation of human rights, poor governance and lack of democratic credibility as well as fanning conflicts based on ethnic, racial and religious bias and or territorial claims. The principal culprits have been named in the past and we will continue to do so in our press releases. The United Nations Security Council has on many occasion failed to provide the required leadership on such issues as some are part of the problem instead of the solution.

I wish to reiterate Botswana’s strong support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is the only permanent criminal international court of last resort that plays a deterrent role in preventing the commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In order to demonstrate our unequivocal support for the work of ICC, Botswana recently undertook a significant step by domesticating the Rome Statute and thus making it part of our national laws.

Government further remains committed to ensure that the conduct of our foreign relations contributes to national development and the improvement of the living standards of all Batswana by attracting foreign direct investment and other forms of international support. Our foreign policy posture is premised on the principles of good neighborliness and peaceful co-existence. In this regard, we continue to bilaterally and regionally engage immediate neighboring countries with a view to further strengthen and deepen the existing special bonds of friendship and close collaboration. In this respect, bilateral mechanisms in the form of Joint Permanent Commission on Defense and Security and on Cooperation are hosted annually on alternative basis with Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively. Botswana also continues to

effectively contribute to regional efforts aimed at consolidating democracy, peace and security in the Southern African Development Region (SADC) region” (Botswana Hansard, 2017,p.31) .

In addition, Botswana continues to engage other countries through the use of soft power diplomacy at continental level. This demonstration of commitment in advancing the objectives of African Union was fully articulated by former President Khama in Parliament when he said:

- “Botswana has consistently honored her assessed annual financial contribution to the African Union; Equally, Botswana has always responded to the international appeals for assistance to other African countries in times of natural disasters and other calamities. As would be recalled, Botswana made contribution to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea when the three countries were affected by the Ebola virus. As a result, Botswana was in 2015 given an Award by the African Union for her positive life-saving contribution during the Ebola virus crisis.
- Despite our own developmental challenges, Botswana has in the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood continued to extend humanitarian assistance to some members of our African Union family whenever they experience natural catastrophes. In the past humanitarian assistance was extended to Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Togo. Botswana has also on several occasions’ extended humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, when they were hit by natural disasters such as cholera, floods, famine, and foot and mouth disease. Botswana has also supported peace building initiatives, reconstruction and development efforts of fellow African countries. This has included extending technical support and cooperation to a number of countries, namely Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Seychelles and South Sudan.
- Botswana played an active role in the resolution of conflicts both at military and political levels under the UN, AU and SADC mandates. These include: sending military contingents or Observers to UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Darfur, Sudan and Lesotho; participation in peacemaking leadership role by Former President Masire (Lesotho and DRC) and Former President Mogae (South Sudan). In recognition of Botswana’s demonstrated commitment to continue contributing to Africa’s peace and stability, in

April 2016, Botswana was elected a member of the African Union Peace and Security Council for a period of two years.

Madam Speaker, our country continues to benefit from the assistance we receive from our International partners. I, therefore, take this opportunity to once more acknowledge and thank all of the countries and international organizations, including private institutions and individuals, who have supported us over the past year” (Botswana Hansard, 2017,p.31) .

#### **2.9.4 Overview of Security Sector in Botswana**

Security and safety issues originally have always been conceptualized as the safeguarding of the borders as well as the good standing of a country and not having induced fear from other countries. The security organs in all-encompassing terms take into consideration amongst others the military, semi armed groups, community and government police, surveillance organs (armed and police) special assignments police, employees dealing with movements of government goods and services, courts and oversight institutions, justice and arbitration, criminals rehabilitation sector, advocacy bodies, the public protector, local or community justice system, independent safety organs, people representative bodies such as the legislature and by the way of its extension as standing and statutory committees assigned specific tasks, Non-Governmental Bodies, practicing lawyers, the fourth estate and the church (Molomo, 2009). Organizational dealing with safety shall do their business guided by the fundamental and worldwide guidelines and treaties, the guidelines of rules and abiding by the peoples morals and responsibilities. A qualified and principled safety organization will fail lest it is backed by an autonomous and effective court process together the rehabilitation or prisons services, Over and above the law enforcing agency in order to uphold and implement law and stability there shall exist a well-coordinated court system to bring to book the rules breakers and the rehabilitation sector to keep sentenced rule breakers. The society opinion becomes a nullity where rules are enforced and used selectively. (ibid).

#### **2.9.5 Security Parameters**

Botswana at its birth and upon gaining autonomy in the year 1966 the country’s safety and security was solely premised on the assistance of the countries she shared borders. Given that the state was bordered by countries run by the few controlling whites, it was on the receiving end of the conflicts brought about by freedom fighters. Botswana’s kind of administration of accepting its neighbors regardless of political



affiliation and beliefs together with asylum sparked a revenge and reprimand by neighboring countries (Molomo, 2009). The gravity of the freedom fighters in the then Rhodesia, now the Republic of Zimbabwe led to the North Eastern breath of Botswana into a conflict bound region. The Selous Scouts, an extremist group under the then Rhodesian security organ got involved in conspicuous and criminal executions undermining Botswana's borders in the guise that they were following the political refugees. They engaged into executions of burning down of properties belonging to Botswana, holding captive of individuals, forcibly taking away very unsuspecting, ordinary Botswana citizens. In this era Botswana's security and protection was solely incumbent upon the Police Mobile Unit (equivalent to local policing body). Only in March 1977 that the BDF was conceived and started. Botswana was targeted not only by the Rhodesian forces, but also by the South African Defence Force. The situation reached a crisis following the Soweto resistance and rebellion on 16 June 1976 when a drift in the number of black indigenous South Africans came to the fore and written on history and profound. (ibid).

Come December 1977, South Africa came up with a blue print that advocated for an all-encompassing way forward and vision serving as a guide on South Africa security as a country called 'Total Strategy' targeting Front Line States (Brown 1990, p. 57). Coming with this vision and guide South Africa as a country was viewed as being at loggerheads with the indigenous citizens together with the countries that belonged to the coalition that was against apartheid. The country was confronted with a drift of uprisings geared towards erasing the apartheid governance. In the continent, violent activities were experienced at points of entry of neighboring countries that ended up in casualties. Such incidents halted the expansion of the country's livelihoods, as well as turning the continent into unsecure environment to plough back one's finances. Consequently, Botswana system mainly concentrated on the country's safety measures. From the beginning it was supposed to aggressively gain its good standing and freedoms and autonomous country possessing its own powers. Therefore, Botswana's defense and security guidelines and regulations became premised upon a delicate state of security. In this regard, it was inevitable that security was conceived of in the Westphalian sense that emphasized territorial integrity. The type of governance is premised on multicultural dimensions needed to safe guarded and protected away from suspicious and genuine hostilities in the continent (ibid). To this end, government recognize that without the rule of law, democratic constitutions, a system of checks and balances in government, or viable and functioning institutions, sound security governance is impossible. Hence the current approach to enhance the security sector capacity.

### **2.9.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided the genesis and evolution of on peace support operations literature. Peace support operations have been used as an instrument of foreign policy. They gained prominence at the end of the Cold War which saw the increase in intra-state conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping evolved over the years to contemporary and more robust peace support operations requiring military capabilities to enforce peace. In contribution to peacekeeping, some of the countries consider their national interests first. The formation of the African Union brought hope to peacekeeping in Africa to address timely interventions. However, there are still operational challenges in as far as logistics in concerned in the conduct of peacekeeping under African Union.

The formation of the Botswana Defense Force was in response to acts of aggression orchestrated by Apartheid South Africa and the Rhodesian White minority regime. In this regard, it was inevitable that security was conceived of in the Westphalian sense that emphasized territorial integrity

## **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter lays out the methodology used in this paper. The methodology in research is very important as it provides a clear framework and guide to the paper (Bryman, 2012). Thus this paper will cover the following: Research design, methods and procedures of data collection, data analysis, quality assurance, ethical considerations and limitations and mitigations strategies.

### **3.2 Research Design**

Research design involves the planning, organization, collection and analysis of data. It includes deciding on the best approach, the research questions, the type of data to be collected, the data collection techniques to be used as well as how the paper is to be organized and analyzed hence in general telling the study what to do and where to go during the research. A research design is the master category that brings the logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of the paper.

This is a qualitative research inquiry based on case study design. According to Bryman (2012), the basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. The case used in this paper is about Botswana. Case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Stake,1995 as cited in Bryman,2012, p.109). Research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. A choice of research design reflects decisions about the priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process (ibid). The paper will significantly depend on document review for its data. However, to be up to date with the events in the country of study, that is Botswana, regarding what has been transpiring in the area of interest, a questionnaire will be administered on key respondents to gather information. This will greatly help in ensuring that the paper has a picture of the history as well as the current issues in the study area.

This paper is about a case. The location is Botswana, and this implies a community or an organization. The main focus of the case is the Botswana Defense Force as an organization. However, this cannot be achieved without talking about Botswana as a country. The Botswana Defense Force (BDF) is an organization, or one of the Department of the Government of Botswana. The main focus of the cases is peace support operations in which the BDF has participated on as the unit of analysis. With a case study,

the case is an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth elucidation of it (Bryman, 2012). Furthermore Bryman (2012, p.112) posits that “what distinguishes a case study is that the researcher is usually concerned to elucidate the unique features of the case. This is known as an idiographic approach. Research designs like the cross-sectional design are known as nomothetic, in that they are concerned with generating statements that apply regardless of time and place”. Case study design was chosen for this paper its flexibility to use different research methodologies for collecting data. Respondents’ opinions are then turned into facts by making relationships based on the themes of the research questions. This makes it inexpensive.

### **3.3 Methods and Procedures of Data Collection**

This paper is based on desktop research. Methods of data collection are based on both primary and secondary data. This will allow for synthesis of existing literature on peace support operations. This paper relied entirely on the following for data collection:

1. Botswana Parliamentary proceedings records (Botswana Hansard)
2. Government reports
3. Media documentaries
4. Newspapers reports
5. Experts documents reports and published texts
6. Internet sources
7. Journals and books
8. Historical records
9. Questionnaire (Annex A)

These documents were relied on as they provided the researcher with both secondary and primary data that was used for analysis. This is important as it allows the researcher to establish relationships (Denzin, 1970). Information on security matter is normally highly classified, hence parliamentary records were used to allow the researcher to analyze reports and submissions of legislators on the BDF and participation in peace support operations.

This paper will target 5 key respondents. Purposive sampling technique will be employed. Purposive sampling, sample a form of non-probability sample in which the researcher aims to sample cases or participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Bryman, 2012). This is helpful in a paper like this because information about decision making especially in the military is usually not for public consumption and very few senior officers with relevant experience would have such.

### **3.4 Data Analysis**

According to Kawulich (2004) it is helpful to understand that there is no prescribed way to address qualitative data analysis and that the ways that one chooses to analyze data should stem from a combination of factors, which include the research questions being asked, the theoretical foundation of the paper, and the appropriateness of the technique for making sense of the data. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, this paper will use qualitative content analysis. This is a dimension of looking at works and publications that puts more weight on the part played by unearthing the intended communication of written pieces of works (Bryman, 2012).

Concentrating on giving all aspects of a platform to be derived from the information as well as identifying the importance of comprehending what the situation points to a unit under consideration and/ or interpretation ( as well as aspects deduced from such) showed up. This entails using research questions to group the data and look for similarities and differences. This approach according to Bryman (2012) is used when time and resources are limited. Interpreting information not dealing with numbers (non-numerical) specifically takes into consideration an individual seriously applying themselves to the information availed so that they are acquainted to it, from there finding similarities and pointers, intensively looking for different correlations that link up information which would assist

the scholar or information finder to comprehend what he or she possesses, from there putting into a vividly painted picture of data and finally describing it (giving it a description). To complement content analysis, discourse analysis was also used, based on the newspaper articles, documentary reviews of texts and language. It entails collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents. “A discourse is thus a topic and a focus of enquiry itself” (Bryman, 2012, p.573).

### **3.5 Quality Assurance**

Quality assurance in qualitative research is important. Descriptions and various aspects of finding out and tracking the substance or otherwise of the non-numerical base information which present opportunities for other windows or channels that point at dependability as well as veracity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, Guba & Lincoln, 1994, as cited in Bryman, 2012). They propose two primary criteria for assessing a qualitative study: trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness has four criteria, which are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (ibid).

Credibility is established on possible accounts of an aspect of social reality, it is the feasibility and credibility of the account that the researcher arrives at that determines its acceptability to others. “The searching for veracity of conclusions arrived at takes into account making sure the investigation and searching of data is executed in concert with best lessons learnt as well as handing of conclusions made back to the participants whom information and knowledge was sourced for verification that the scholar has comprehended the society and the participants or people” (Bryman, 2012 p.433).

On transferability criteria Taking into account that non numerical type of finding information is characterized by specifically involving vigorous learning of a considerable minute population, non-numerical conclusions mostly are premised on the peculiar place setting as well as the influence of the populace under scrutiny. Non numerical scholars are therefore nudged in the direction of coming up with what Geertz (1973) terms, weighty explanation carrying the finer explanations and a vivid picture of a way of life and doing business. This provides a database for making judgements about possible transferability of findings to other milieux. This criteria is what informed the researcher to gather all necessary rich peace support operations data on Botswana over the years as well as tracking the trends.

Comparably, the veracity of facts under the non-numerical type of finding information the extent to which it can be leveraged upon to find out the pros of the information given this type of information collection and the extent to which it can be relied upon, scholars could take the investigative manner. It accounts for making it a point that all the documentary needed are safe guarded at each and every stage of the information finding steps, creation and defining the challenges to be addressed, choosing key players in the information finding exercise, both oral and written documentation, information interpretation and conclusions, in an open and transparent mode and platform.

This strategy was used in this paper to collect data on peace support operations where Botswana participated, including records on the country's approach over the years to allow for data analysis and making judgements. According to Bryman (2012, p.435) confirmability is one aspect of ensuring quality assurance. It is concerned with ensuring that, while recognizing that complete objectivity is impossible in social research, the researcher can be shown to have acted in good faith; in other words, it should be apparent that he or she has not overtly allowed personal values or theoretical inclinations manifestly to sway the conduct of the research and the findings deriving from it. Confirmability is the work of the auditors (Lincoln and Guba as cited in Bryman, 2012). This research has met this criteria because it was conducted under supervision to ensure quality.

### **3.6 Ethical Considerations**

Since the paper relies on primary and secondary material, the paper affirms to remain cognizant of ethical obligations during the conduct of the paper (Bryman, 2012). The information collected during the time of this paper, the paper will be sensitive to professional, legal, social and moral values that were due to the originator of the various academic works used in the compilation of this paper. As a result of conducting this paper, professional conduct will be adhered to in respect to original works by scholars and authors of various academic papers and texts (Bryman, 2012). The works cited and used in this paper will be duly acknowledged in accordance with the academic referencing protocol. Any information that reveals the identity of individuals who are subjects of paper shall be destroyed unless the individual concerned has consented in writing to its inclusion beforehand at the end of the study.

### **3.7 Limitations and Mitigation Strategies**

The main limitations of this paper is time and resources to conduct the research. The other difficulty is that most of the Defence and security documents are classified. Botswana does not have a codified National Security Policy and Foreign Policy document that would have informed the researcher on the security priorities of the country. This research's main focus was on military intervention other than other peace support operations. To mitigate these limitations, the researcher framed a questionnaire which was then emailed to Botswana to be administered by a team of research assistants. It is a cheaper way of gathering data from respondents. The research assistants were couched on the importance of maintaining high ethical standards, explaining the purpose of the research, it is not mandatory to answer the questionnaire. The researcher used Government documents or reports such as Parliamentary proceedings records to gather "verbatim" contributions from legislators on the position of Botswana pertaining to peace support operations.



## **CHAPTER FOUR: BOTSWANA AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS STUDY FINDINGS**

### **4.0 Introduction**

The segment below will present the results from information gathered from sources including the in-depth analysis from respondents as well as the Government document reports review that were conducted. The intention here is to give a picture of what is on the ground regarding information that the paper was seeking.

#### **4.1 Botswana's Position in Peace Support Operations**

The Botswana Defense Force has experience in peace PSO. Today, BDF is considered to be one of the most professional defense forces on the continent. There have however been a number of issues that have cropped into the participation of Botswana in peace support operation and other international military operations that have forced at times the decision makers in the country to withdraw to the drawing board and rethink the state of the country and its participation in such operations. To begin with, the Botswana Defense Force was initially created to enhance security of the citizens and the territorial integrity of the state. Currently, the main responsibility of the BDF has been deployment in anti-poaching operations and assisting the Botswana Police to maintain law and order (Henk, 2015). As such little was done to enhance the military capabilities of the force to project its power in the region or beyond like other militaries. Looking at the issue from this angle there have been a number of instances where Botswana did not involve itself in such missions despite calls to do so from other countries in the region.

To illuminate this aspect, the then Minister of Defense, Justice and Security Honourable Dikgakgamatso Ramadeluka Seretse, when presenting his proposals to Parliament on the Appropriation Bill No.1 of 2010 highlighted that:

“Mr Chairman, the Botswana Defense Force continues to perform its primary function of protecting the borders of this country. In addition, and in recognition of its expertise and capacity, as well as shared responsibility, the BDF provides assistance to sister departments and other civil authorities in the discharge of their

mandates. This collaboration has resulted in enhanced security for citizens and residents alike. In order to execute its duties to the satisfaction of the nation, the BDF has to maintain a certain level of readiness at all times, in both human and material terms. This requires resources.

After thirty-three (33) years of existence, much of the material assets of the BDF have seen better days. Technology has also advanced in the interim. Replacements, upgrading and consolidation across all disciplines, are required if the BDF is to remain ready for the task. Mr Chairman, Defence Forces are by nature expensive undertakings, but are an essential component of a functional state. In our case, the force had to be built from scratch, thus requiring reasonable financial allocations over the years. Increasingly however, the development budget is being devoted to the welfare of our men and women in uniform, especially on accommodation. Botswana as a country does not have a good manufacturing industry. As such, the military is affected as they have to import all the hardware paying in foreign currency, mostly the Euro and Dollar. This increases the cost of the maintenance of the Botswana Defence Force.

Mr Chairman, the BDF, like other Ministries and Departments of Government, has not been immune to the budgetary constraints. Mr Chairman, Botswana as a member of the International Organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others has an obligation to assist other countries in need by contributing to peace-keeping. We last participated in peace-keeping with a battalion size force in 1999, almost eleven years ago. Our international partners are of the view that, Botswana is not doing enough in this regard. There is a risk that future financial and other assistance will be tied to our contribution towards peace-keeping” (Botswana Hansard, 2010,p.268).

On the other hand, Botswana has no codified National Security Policy. This aspect was underscored by Honourable Dr Dithapelo Keorapetse on the floor of Parliament during the Appropriation Bill no. 1 of 2015 when he said:

“I think it is high time now Minister that we have a codified security policy. I do not know what happened to the National Security Strategy Review Seminar. What is the end product? The one which was in the Office of the President (OP) and I believe it was headed by Brigadier Peke. We need a codified Security Policy which will define the nature of our security threats, whether these are conventional or non-conventional, which ones are more serious and how these security challenges can be met. Not only that, this Security Policy will also inform our Foreign Policy in terms of how we relate with other

countries and in terms of potential external threats. It will inform our Corruption Policy and it will also inform our home land or policing security. It is very important that we have a Security Policy which will also even clarify the key security actors, both that are statutory and those that are not. It will also inform us as a country, the sort of alliances we should have and also even the grand strategy as well as issues relating to community security.

It is also important to look at the welfare of the security personnel in the Botswana Defense Force, Prison Services and Police Service. We have to have highly motivated security personnel. When we look at the BDF, their welfare needs to be looked into. There is the issue of accommodation, we still have many military officers, even in my constituency at the Eastern Military Garrison, married and un-married couples share accommodation sometimes. It is a problem that we need to look into. We still have the blocks, such as the 100 Men Blocks which have challenges of sewage systems, electricity and water. Madam Chairperson, we also need to look at the issue of the BDF operations other than war, the deployment of armed forces, for instance, non-military deployment like policing. It is important because soldiers have not been trained to police, we need to instead capacitate the police instead of deploying the armed forces in policing activities. The duty of a soldier is to train for combat during the peace time” (Botswana Hansard, 2015, p.258).

The other aspect that burdens the BDF is that the Botswana Reserve Force though enshrined in the Defence Act, is not active to augment in other duties. This was underscored by the Honourable Minister Mzwinila when he posited that:

“Thank you Honorable Kgosi. But let me correct you, I am saying a fully active Reserve Force such as the one you find in other countries. The Reserve Force you are talking about is the one in the BDF Act which I have mentioned before and is not the one I’m discussing here. The Reserve Force being discussed is fully operational and assist in peace keeping and humanitarian issues such as patrolling and assisting the police. As I have said before in terms of policing duties, the BDF should not be involved in policing duties. It should have an active Reserve Force as in other countries where the active Reserve Force is the one that is involved in peacekeeping, policing and humanitarian duties. I think going forward; we need an active Reserve Force in evolution of the Defense Force. This is because the training of our soldiers does not

commensurate with them being peace officers. They are trained as combat officers. So, now if you are employing them as peace officers in terms of combating crime, they may not be that logical. So going forward, I implore you Honorable Minister to look at the possibility of an active Reserve Force and an active Air Force in the Botswana Defense Force as well as the Military Academy” (Botswana Hansard,2016,p.433).

Equally, the former Commander of the Botswana Defense Force, Lieutenant General Gaolathe Galebotswe, was quoted by the Botswana Gazette dated 19 February 2020, he cast aspersions on the readiness of the defense force when interviewed by the local newspaper:

“The BDF does not have the capacity to police or enforce the territorial airspace, should terrorists or bad intruders choose to come to Botswana. Our air force will be spectators because we are an air force by name. Our air force is in complete shambles. At any rate, the general noted, Botswana does not exist in isolation and should contribute to regional and continental security, hence the need to have the right equipment. We are a member of SADC and AU stand-by forces and they look to us to contribute what we have. The policy framework is that an attack on one is an attack on all and we have to contribute certain capabilities in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. I may be biased towards the military, but what I know is that we are living in a volatile environment where you may never know where and when your next attacker will come from. Should that happen, you should know that we are not ready” (Botswana Gazette, 2020, p.8).

#### **4.2 Botswana Defense Force Preparedness for Peace Operations**

Botswana is amongst the countries with the smallest size of armed forces in Africa (Dale, 1995). According to Poku (2001), the countries’ history is painted with peace and little military aggression towards other countries. Botswana’s background can best be understood by focusing on South Africa during the Apartheid era as well the wave of nationalistic movement in the neighboring countries (Gwatiwa, 2015). As a country that peacefully transitioned from colonization to independence (the independence was through negotiation and not conflict as was the case in most African countries

under colonial rule), Botswana did not experience much of the quagmires that characterized other African countries. Because of this, he (Seretse Khama) saw no immediate need to institute a standing military force for the country (Denbow & Thebe, 2006).

Thus from 1966 to 1977, Botswana did not have a standing military force but relied on the mobile force that was inherited from the colonial era (Denbow & Thebe, 2006). However, the country's strategic position, geographically, coupled with peace in the country attracted the attention of both freedom fighters from the region as well as the apartheid regime from the neighboring South Africa. Botswana committed itself to accommodating political refugees from neighboring countries like South Africa and Rhodesia (Gwatiwa, 2015). This did not go well with the apartheid regime of the neighboring South Africa which had a security policy of total strategy which was geared at destabilizing the Front Line States aimed at neutralizing anti-apartheid activists' operations across the South Africa borders (Gwatiwa, 2015). This explains the attacks Botswana experienced from South Africa one which was directed at the country's military base and saw Botswana soldiers killed by South African commandos. These external threats were also one of the reasons why the country decided to institute a standing military force in 1977 (Hanlon, 1989).

Another historical security threat that shook Botswana and called for serious consideration of upgrading the then national security strategy was the disagreements between Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu/Kasikili Island in 1990 where Namibian soldiers were placed strategically in Zimbabwe and Zambia without the country's knowledge (Gwatiwa, 2015). This did not just alert the country of the level of national security of the neighboring countries but also confirmed the need to facelift its national security. This was against the decision the country took after independence of non-engagement and of concentrating on development and poverty eradication for its citizenry.

#### **4.3 Missions Participated by Botswana Defence Force**

Botswana has been one of the active African countries participating in peace operations across the continents. According to the Minister of Defence, Justice and Security Honourable Mmusi, the missions in which the BDF intervened to date include "Somalia in 1992 and ended in 1993. During this period, the BDF took part in Operation Restore Hope and United Nations Operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM 1 and 2). The Mozambique Mission was undertaken from 1992 to 1994 under the auspices of the United Nations Operation and Mozambique (UNOMOZ 1 and 2). In Rwanda, the BDF took part in the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (ONOMUR) in 1994 and 1995. Operation BOLEAS in Lesotho was in 1998. The operation in Eritrea was in 2004 to 2006, in which the BDF took part in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Lastly, in 2005 to 2009, the BDF took part in the African Mission in Sudan, United Nations Mission in Sudan and United Nations Mission in Darfur” (Botswana Hansard, 2020, p.8). According Sharp & Fisher (2005), these were positive experiences for Botswana, the Botswana Defence Force benefitted from these operations, public relations exposure and belief in its own capabilities

What is common in these missions BDF has been part of is that they are coalitions where the BDF is just one of the countries participating. As already stated earlier, countries can be involved in military operations because of their affiliation to regional or international organizations. However, even with such membership there is an opportunity where a country can make a decision not to participate in a mission considering different reasons being internal or external to the country. Military missions such as peace keeping result in loss of lives and other disturbances in the military operation which may at the end even compromise a country’s national security. It thus is very important to scrutinize situations clearly before arriving at a decision of whether to be part of such missions or not. For instance in 2013, Botswana as a country after consultation resolved not to partake in the recent mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo citing that doing so would not just be too early but also expensive on the part of BDF (Piet, 2019).

#### **4.4 Considerations for Engaging in Peace Support Operations**

The former Foreign Affairs Minister, Honourable Phandu Skelemani once told the press in Gaborone that the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) already has its hands full with anti-poaching activities and control of the contagious Foot and Mouth Disease and cannot afford to send troops outside the country (Owino, 2010). This was following a row where one of the BDF members, Major Gaolatlhwe Tiro, was killed in the Darfur during what was suspected to have been a rebel attack (ibid). His killing angered ordinary Botswana who said that the troops should be immediately pulled out of the area as there was no peace to maintain in Sudan.

Honourable Phabdu Skelemani, also bitterly complained about the incident and threatened that the government might be forced to reassess the presence of BDF members in Sudan and that there was need to reassess their deployment roles. It appears there was reluctance on the Government of Botswana to deploy more troops in the region. In the past, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Honourable Momphati Merafhe, a former commander of the BDF was quoted as saying that he would not advise the government to deploy more troops in Sudan to be under the command of the African Union and that he could reverse that if the command changes to that of the United Nations (Sunday Standard, 2008).

Countries make a thorough assessment of the advantages and disadvantages before making a final decision of whether to participate in peacekeeping or not. There are a myriad of considerations that a potential Troop Contributing Countries need to consider before sending troops and personnel in PSO. Ragan (1998,p.760) highlighted that for a potential intervening country to determine when to participate, ‘the country estimates the probability of success and weighs the costs in terms of international reputation, national interests, and domestic constraints against potential benefits that accrue in this realm. Political actors have been a key determining force of whether to intervene or not with due consideration of public opinion.

#### **4.5 Current State of Affairs**

To begin with, the Botswana Defense Forces was initially formed to enhance security of the citizens and to maintain territorial integrity of the state. As such, little was done to enhance the military capabilities so as to project its influence in the region and beyond. Looking at the issue from this angle there have been a number of instances where Botswana did not involve itself in such missions despite calls to do so from other countries in the region. For instance, in 2017 at the height of disagreements in Lesotho, the Basotho and the Double Troika on Security which Botswana as a country is not a part of (Piet, 2017). In her statement, the then Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation, Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi stated that the decision not to send troops by Botswana to Lesotho was reached upon recognizing that the situation in Lesotho was solvable and that it had not reached the level of turmoil which would necessitate foreign troops into the country. However, other

countries like Angola, Swaziland, Namibia, and South Africa sent troops to Lesotho during that period for peace keeping (Piet, 2017).

Lesotho Foreign Affairs Minister, Honourable Lesedi Makgothi expressed disappointment that Botswana was not sending troops yet there was a request for such from the nation of Basotho. He said the decision to send troops was informed by the Double Troika Technical Assistance Mission after assessing the situation and coming up with the figure and the expertise of the troops. Initially, the request was for 400 troops, but it could only be ascertained by the findings of the Technical Assistance Mission (Piet, 2017).

What is more, according to the Botswana Gazette dated 19 February 2020, the understanding that BDF is just there for protection of the citizens and the integrity of the country's boundaries is the main focus. The front page of the paper read Ex BDF Commander Warns State, a story in which a former commander of BDF, Lt General Gaolathe Galebotswe was trying to give a picture of what the air wing part of the Force is like and why the much contested purchase of fighter jets by BDF is necessary. In the article, the ex-commander states that the situation with the air wing part of BDF was not good and that if people are to rely on BDF even just to protect the country there should be an overwhelming majority backing the purchase of the grippen fighter jets. The ex-commander continued to say in the article that the air wing as it is now cannot be relied upon to defend the country from outside threats.

Going back in time, in 2010, Botswana refused to send troops to the war torn Somalia when most of the African countries did (Owino 2010). It was a bold decision taken by the then minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Phandu Skelemani. Honourable Skelemani explained, in defense of the decision that Botswana as a country was at the moment very occupied with internal matters that needed attention of the BDF. He stated that the escalating incidents of poaching as well as the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the country were enough to retain BDF troops in the country and try to sort out the issues.



In 2013, the Government of Botswana was also faced with a hard time on whether to partake in the long Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. The reason given was of military logistics which were not in the right order. The following excerpt put this into perspective:

“The Government of Botswana has not yet made a decision whether or not to send members of Botswana Defense Force for peacekeeping in the troubled eastern Democratic Republic of Congo where, a few months ago, rebel militias seeking to topple President Joseph Kabila clashed with government troops. So far, four Southern African Development Community states have pledged to send troops into DRC. Reports from the Ministry of Justice, Defense and Security suggested that talks with the high ranking security officials and cabinet have been ongoing to decide whether Botswana can take part in peacekeeping” (Sunday Standard, 2013).

In such insecurity dilemmas and states of indecision it is easy to notice that the issue of Botswana participating in peace support operations had to be taken back to the drawing board for a rethink, re-strategising and re-deciding.

It should be noted that, as already indicated, Botswana’s concerns rest on the need to protect its citizens and maintain territorial integrity of the country. This could be the reason why the country is very conscious in its involvement in PSO in the region. It is more like a country torn between obligation of the regional bodies and its local needs. This could be demonstrated in the decision of the country to withdraw its troops from the war torn Darfur region in 2009 after the region experienced continued unrest. In the article titled “Botswana withdraws its troops from Sudan” which appeared in Sunday Standard Newspaper of 15 March 2009, the Minister of Justice Defence and Security, Honourable Dikgakgamatso Seretse stated that the country decided to withdraw troops from the region with immediate effect following reports of continued unrest in the Darfur region (Sunday Standard, 2009). Such decisions are clear indications of the dilemmas that the country is faced with in its decision of whether to participate in peace support operations or not.

On Botswana’s Current Position vis-à-vis Peace Support Operations. The knowledge about peace keeping operations was assessed among respondents who participated to the study, including their appreciation on the present operations. All of them reported the knowledge and a positive

appreciation on peacekeeping operations. Most of respondents reported that peace keeping operations help to restore order in the country and assist displaced people to return to normal life. For example, one respondent expressed his view that: ‘The military assists in administrative duties that they are tasked such as transporting or even escorting food rations to the internally displaced persons’(Gaborone, February 27, 2020). Peace keeping operations also coordinates different agencies/ organizations to work together to restore order and stability in the country by bringing together the warring parties and come up with a common solution of the conflict. It promotes peace and tranquility within nations as well as between nations. It can also contribute to rebuilding of the host nation such as reconstruction of roads and other national infrastructures.

Regarding the current status of peace support operations, Botswana has a Peace Training Centre that it use to prepare its contingents before participating in peacekeeping operations. On daily basis, Botswana is always eager to deploy peacekeeping troops, but the lack of resources is a challenge. Another challenge was the lack of manpower and resources in maintaining operational duties such as anti-poaching and border patrols. However, one respondent reported a different *view*. ‘Botswana has not taken part in peace keeping operations since 2009, due to the fact that some warring parties or parties to the conflict were endangering the lives of Botswana Defence Force peacekeepers’ (Gaborone, February 27, 2020).

On the reason behind the current status of Botswana in peace support operations, the respondents revealed that Botswana supports the objectives of keeping peace in the world, because it is a member of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and South African Development Community (SADC). However, these operations have been suspended since 2009 because Botswana was unsafe due to attacks from some armed groups in the conflict areas. Other reasons include financial issues and the loss of an officer in Darfur region of Sudan.

Respondents to the study reported that Botswana has an obligation to restore peace and harmony in the world, because peacekeeping is a universal responsibility or obligation of countries, including Botswana. However, Botswana has stopped peacekeeping operations indefinitely. This is not beneficial because it is preventing Botswana Defense Force members to have operational experience in peacekeeping operations, as reported by one respondent:

“Having been to two peacekeeping missions in two different countries in Africa, I was exposed to a lot of experience and so much knowledge which one cannot get from any school, if I compare the two missions (Mozambique and Darfur) I have been involved in, I have learnt a lot from the two countries, one good example is just the concept of operation or the way the two missions were conducted. In Mozambique there were only two belligerent parties and they signed for the peace agreement and thereafter they were disarmed and demobilized, and troops were sent to assembly area or concentration camps, then the peace keeping process continued. Whereas in Darfur there were more than five belligerent parties, and some did not sign the peace agreement, the process of disarmament and demobilization was not done and therefore the peacekeeping process was not achievable” (Gaborone, February 27, 2020).

Most of respondents reported that Botswana was not prepared for peacekeeping operations, because of the lack of the right equipment, rigorous training for peacekeeping troops, and financial constraints. However, some respondents believe that Botswana was prepared for peacekeeping operations because it has professional and efficient army given the past experience.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL CONCLUSION**

### **5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

This chapter present a summary of the findings of the research. It recaps main points coming from the data collected and analyses done in the paper in line with the questions that the research was addressing. The essence is to present a version of what the research has found out as well as come up with recommendations. The main findings that have emanated from the subsequent discussions can be summarized as follows:

Although the Botswana Defense Force gained the necessary experience in peace support operations in the past during President Masire and Mogae. This paper found out that Botswana's current position in PSO in Africa is that of indifference relative to its internal challenges. The constitution of Botswana empowers the President to unilaterally deploy the military internally or externally without the consent of Parliament. This paper also established that the current position on PSO can be explained in terms of the skepticism expressed by former Foreign Affairs Ministers on the deployment of the Botswana Defense Force.

This paper find out that the rational for such position is that the BDF is overstretched by internal security operations especially anti-poaching. Though the Defense Act talks about the Reserve Force, such structure is not active like in other countries to assist in taking over other duties to allow BDF to focus and adjust its training for both internal and external operations. The risks associated with participation in PSO in Africa coupled with public disapproval in 2009 following the killing of a BDF officer by rebels in Darfur was found to be one of the fulcrum for the current position. The size of Botswana Defense Force (BDF) coupled with the huge tasks (for example anti-poaching and border security) on the local scene is one of the reasons explaining why the country has not been participating recently in peace support operations.

Botswana does not have an industry to manufacture military hardware. When equipment become obsolete it becomes too expensive to procure military equipment which is normally in Dollars or Euros. There has also been a mention of resources especially financial that the country needs in order to deploy troops to participate in PSO which the country tends to struggle to gather hence the non-

participation of the country in such operations. The main reason why the BDF was formed in 1977 was to restore Botswana's territorial integrity following unwarranted attacks by the apartheid regime in line with its "Total Strategy" to destabilize the region. This was a period also characterized by acts of aggression by the Rhodesian army in the North Eastern part of the country. The main focus of the first President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama was to ensure development of the country and welfare of the people.

The paper also found out that Botswana has a moral and legal obligation to participate in peace support operations due to its membership to the UN, AU and SADC. It has also been found that for the sake of unity with other countries, the country should participate in such peace keeping operations. The data collected in the research also indicates that military personnel learn a lot from their counterparts during peace support operations and hence Botswana's BDF can learn a lot and improve through participation in such operations. Participation in these operations also enhances the country's image.

On the country's preparedness, BDF has a Peace Training school which trains the troops on how to conduct and plan for peace support operations. This is an indication of willingness by the military leadership to participate in such operations should need arise. However, the small (compared to some of the African countries' defense forces) size of the BDF coupled with increase in military operations on the local scene (like anti-poaching and border patrol) requiring more and more military personnel makes the Force less prepared to participate in PSO across the region. The paper also found out that the political leadership are not ready to deliberately plan and deploy the military for peace support operations. Additionally, the revelations of the immediate former Commander of the Botswana Defense Force, Lt General Gaolathe Galebotswe that the BDF was not ready raised a red flag. As Commander of the BDF, General Galebotswe participated in the Defence Council meetings. A key structure that has superintendence over the affairs of the military in terms of decision making.

## **5.2 CONCLUSIONS**

This paper has established that Botswana's current position is that of indifference to PSO relative to internal security challenges especially anti-poaching and border security. Botswana has been taking

part in PSO since the time of the second President, Sir Ketumile Masire but has of late been reluctant to 'proactively' participate. The deployment of the military internally and externally is the prerogative of the President as enshrined in the constitution of Botswana. The Executive and to a less extent, the Legislature has had influence in the deployment of the BDF. The current position is also due to internal pressures in Botswana that require BDF presence which could be compromised if the country is to fully participate in peace support operations as was the case before. The relaxation in participation of the country in peace support operations has also been because of the increasingly unsafe nature of the operating environment.

However, the research has found that the country is not prepared to take part in these operations looking at the issue of resources. This has contributed to its recent absence in these peace keeping operations in the region. It has also been found out that because of the affiliations the country has with different regional and international bodies, Botswana is expected to participate in these PSO. Apart from the affiliation, participation in these peace support operations could also build strong bonds between the country and other countries in the region as well as providing much needed experience to the troops that participate in these operations. It is thus a matter of balancing between other countries in the region and managing the local insecurity that Botswana has to look at. Thus participation or non-participation of BDF in peace support operations should be as a result of a proper balance struck between these two sides.

The rational choice theory was used to understand the phenomenon under study. It is based on assumptions that individuals make choices based on their preferences and information that they have to make rational decisions. This has been proven in that individual actors like the President and Ministers and other members of the Legislature have been instrumental in Botswana's foreign policy, determining whether Botswana participates in PSO or not over the years. These decisions have been made in lieu of the priorities of the country to protect national interests.

### 5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommended:

- Botswana Government should consider its constitutional review, in the process the Legislature may be empowered to influence decisions on the future BDF external deployments
- Botswana should consider deploying the Botswana Defense Forces in peace support operations to assist other troop contributing countries to bring peace stability.
- Botswana Defense Forces should participate in peace support operations in order to improve Botswana's relations with other countries.
- The Government of Botswana should consider having a budget to equip the BDF for peace support operations.
- Botswana Defense Forces has a Peace Training school, it should participate in peacekeeping operations to give opportunity to laureates for practice, and otherwise, the school is giving the knowledge which is not utilized

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**ANNEX A TO RESEARCH PAPER: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE**

**PLACE.....**

**DATE.....**

**GENDER.....**

1. Answer the following questions:

a. What do you like about peacekeeping?

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b. What is Botswana/Botswana Defence Force position in regard to peace support operations?

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c. Why has this position been adopted?

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d. In your view is the current position beneficial to the country?

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e. Why should the country participate in peace support operations?

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f. Is Botswana prepared for peace support operations?

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g. What would be your suggestion regarding participation in peace support operations?

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